正統信仰闡釋 第 1 章 第 6/15 段

The third sense is smell, which comes about through the nostrils that send the vapors up to the brain, and terminates at the ends of the front ventricles of the brain.

It is perceptive and apprehensive of vapors.

The most general distinction of vapors is fragrance and stench, and the mean between these, which is neither fragrant nor foul.

Fragrance arises when the moistures in bodies are thoroughly digested; a middling condition produces the mean;

and when they are insufficiently or not at all digested, stench arises.

The fourth sense is taste.

It is apprehensive, that is, perceptive, of flavors.

Its organs are the tongue, and more than the tongue, its tip, and the palate, which some call the roof of the mouth;

in which are the nerves from the brain, spread out flat, reporting to the governing faculty the apprehension, that is, the perception, that has taken place.

The so-called gustatory qualities of flavors are these:

sweetness, pungency, sourness, astringency, harshness, bitterness, saltiness, oiliness, and viscidity;

for taste is the discerner of these.

Water is without quality as regards these qualities.

Astringency is an intensification and excess of harshness.

The fifth sense is touch, which is common to all living creatures;

it comes about by nerves sent from the brain into the whole body.

Therefore the whole body, and indeed the other sense-organs as well, possess the sense of touch.

Under touch fall the cold and hot, the soft and hard, the sticky and brittle, the heavy and light;

for these are known by touch alone.

Common to touch and sight are the rough and smooth, the dry and wet, the thick and thin, up and down, place and size (when it is such as to be encompassed in a single application of touch), the dense and rare, that is, loose, and the round (when it is small), and certain other shapes.

Likewise it perceives a body that draws near, together with memory and the understanding; and so too number, up to two or three, and these small and easily grasped.

But sight apprehends these better than touch.

It must be known that the Creator fashioned each of the other sense-organs double, so that when one is injured the other might supply the need;

for there are two eyes, two ears, two passages of the nose, and two tongues, in some creatures separated, as in serpents, and in others united, as in man;

but touch he set in the whole body, except for bones, nerves, nails, horns, hairs, ligaments, and certain other such things.

It must be known that sight sees along straight lines, but smell and hearing perceive not only in a straight line but from every direction.

But touch and taste discern neither along a straight line nor from every direction, but only then, when they come close to their own proper objects.

On the discursive faculty. To the discursive faculty belong judgments, assents, impulses toward action and aversions from action; and more specifically, the conceptions of intelligible things, the virtues, the sciences, the principles of the arts, deliberation, and choice.

To this also belongs that which through dreams foretells the future to us, which the Pythagoreans, following the Hebrews, say is the only true divination.

The organ of this also is the middle ventricle of the brain and the psychic spirit in it.

On the faculty of memory. The faculty of memory is the cause and storehouse of remembrance and recollection;

for memory is an imagination left behind by some perception actively appearing, or the preservation of a perception and a conception.

For the soul apprehends, that is, perceives, perceptible things through the sense-organs, and opinion arises; and intelligible things through the intellect, and conception arises;

so when it preserves the impressions of what it has opined and what it has conceived, it is said to remember.

It must be understood that the apprehension of intelligible things comes about only from instruction or natural conception, not from perception;

for perceptible things are remembered in themselves;

but as for intelligible things, if we have learned something, we remember it, yet of their essence we have no memory.

Recollection is called the recovery of a memory lost through forgetfulness.

Forgetfulness is the loss of memory.

Now the imaginative faculty, apprehending material things through the senses, hands them over to the discursive or reasoning faculty (for both are the same);

and this, having received and judged them, transmits them to the faculty of memory.

The organ of the faculty of memory is the hindmost ventricle of the brain, which they also call the cerebellum, and the psychic spirit in it.

On the inner word and the uttered word. Again, the rational part of the soul is divided into the inner word and the uttered word.

The inner word is a movement of the soul taking place in the reasoning part without any utterance;

whence often, while silent, we go through a whole discourse within ourselves, and in dreams we converse.

It is chiefly in this respect that we are all rational;

for those who are deaf from birth, or who through some sickness or affliction have lost their voice, are nonetheless rational.

The uttered word has its activity in the voice and in speech, that is, the word brought forth through tongue and mouth;

and therefore it is called the uttered word.

In this respect also we are called capable of speech.

On affection and activity. The term affection is used equivocally;

for there is bodily affection, such as diseases and sores, and again psychic affection, such as desire and anger.

Commonly and generally, affection of a living being is that which is followed by pleasure and grief;

and the affection itself is not grief;

for things without sensation, though they undergo affection, feel no pain.

The affection, then, is not the pain, but the perception of the affection.

And this must be considerable, that is, great, so as to come under perception.

Of the psychic affections this is the definition:

Affection is a perceptible movement of the appetitive faculty upon the impression of good or evil.

Affection is an irrational movement of the soul through the supposition of good or evil.

The supposition of the good moves desire, while the supposition of evil moves anger.

The generic, that is, common, affection they define thus:

Affection is a movement in one thing from another.

Activity, on the other hand, is an effecting movement;

and that is called effecting which is moved of itself.

So too anger is an activity of the irascible part, but an affection of the two parts, the soul and moreover the whole body, when the body is forcibly driven by anger to actions;

for the movement has come about in one thing from another, which is called affection.

And in yet another way is activity understood.

For activity is movement according to nature, while affection is movement contrary to nature.

According to this account, then, activity is called affection when it does not move according to nature, whether from itself or from another.

Thus of the heart, the movement by way of the pulse, being natural, is an activity; but the movement by way of palpitations, being immoderate and not according to nature, is an affection and not an activity.

But not every movement of the passible part is called an affection, only the more violent ones that advance into perception;

for the small and imperceptible ones are not yet affections;

for an affection must have a considerable magnitude.

Therefore there is added to the definition of affection, 'a perceptible movement';

for the small movements, escaping perception, do not constitute an affection.

It must be understood that our soul has two kinds of powers, the cognitive and the vital.

The cognitive are intellect, discursive reason, opinion, imagination, and perception; the vital, that is, the appetitive, are will and choice.

That what is said may become clearer, let us treat these matters in detail.

And first let us speak of the cognitive powers.

Now of imagination and perception enough has already been said in what has gone before.

Through perception, then, there is set up in the soul an affection which is called imagination;

and from imagination arises opinion.

Then the discursive reason, examining the opinion as to whether it is true or false, judges the truth;

whence it is called dianoia, from thinking through (dianoein) and discriminating (diakrinein).

That which has been judged and determined to be true is called intellect (nous).

It must be understood that the first movement of the intellect is called intellection (noesis).

Intellection concerning some object is called notion (ennoia), which, persisting and shaping the soul toward the thing thought, is termed reflection (enthymesis).

Reflection, remaining in the same state and examining and probing itself, is named consideration (phronesis).

Consideration, when expanded, produces the train of reasoning, which is called the inner word, and which in defining it they say is:

a most complete movement of the soul, taking place in the reasoning part without any utterance, from which they say the uttered word proceeds, spoken through the tongue.

Having spoken, then, of the cognitive powers, let us speak also of the vital, that is, the appetitive ones.

It must be understood that there is implanted in the soul by nature a power that desires that which is according to nature and holds together all that essentially belongs to the nature, which is called volition;

for the essence longs for being, life, and movement according to intellect and perception, striving after its own natural and full existence.

Wherefore they also define this natural will thus:

Will is a rational and vital appetite, depending on natural things alone.

So that volition is itself the natural and rational appetite, the simple power;

for the appetite of irrational creatures, not being rational, is not called volition.

Wishing is a particular natural volition, that is, a natural and rational appetite for some thing.

For there is implanted in man's soul a power of desiring rationally;

so when this rational appetite is naturally moved toward some thing, it is called wishing;

for wishing is a rational appetite and yearning for some thing.

And wishing is spoken of both concerning things in our power and things not in our power, that is, both concerning the possible and the impossible.

For we often wish to commit fornication or to be chaste, or to sleep, or something of the kind;

and these are among the things in our power and possible.

We also wish to be king;

this is not among the things in our power.

We may perhaps even wish never to die;

But wishing is of the end, not of the means toward the end.

The end, then, is the thing wished, as to be king or to be healed;

but pertaining to the end is the thing deliberated, that is, the manner by which we ought to be healed or to become king;

then after wishing come inquiry and examination.

And after these, if it is among the things in our power, there arises deliberation, that is, taking counsel.

Deliberation is an inquiring appetite occupied with practicable things in our power;

for one deliberates whether he ought to pursue the matter or not.

Then he judges what is better, and this is called judgment.

Then he is disposed toward and loves what has been judged out of deliberation, and this is called inclination (gnome);

for if he judges but is not disposed toward what has been judged, that is, does not love it, it is not called inclination.

From this disposition arises choice (proairesis), that is, selection;

for choice is, when two things are set before us, the choosing and selecting of this one in preference to the other.

Then he sets out toward the action, and this is called impulse.

Then he makes use of it, and this is called use.

Then, after the use, he ceases from the appetite.

In the case of irrational creatures, then, an appetite for something arises, and immediately an impulse toward the action;

for the appetite of irrational creatures is irrational, and they are led by their natural appetite.

Therefore the appetite of irrational creatures is called neither volition nor wishing;

for volition is a rational and self-determining natural appetite.

But in the case of men, who are rational, the natural appetite is led rather than leads;

for it is moved self-determiningly and with reason, since in man the cognitive and vital powers are yoked together.

Self-determiningly, then, he desires, and self-determiningly he wishes, and self-determiningly he inquires and examines, and self-determiningly he deliberates, and self-determiningly he judges, and self-determiningly he is disposed, and self-determiningly he chooses, and self-determiningly he sets out, and self-determiningly he acts in matters that are according to nature.

It must be understood that of God we speak of wishing, but of choice in the proper sense we do not speak;

for deliberating belongs to ignorance;

for concerning what is known no one deliberates.

But if deliberation belongs to ignorance, then choice does also, by all means.

But God, knowing all things simply, does not deliberate.

Nor do we speak of deliberation or choice in the case of the Lord's soul;

for even if it was of a nature ignorant of things to come, yet being united hypostatically to God the Word, it had the knowledge of all things, not by grace, but, as has been said, by reason of the hypostatic union;

for the same one was both God and man.

Therefore neither did he have an inclinational will.

For he had the natural will, the simple one, beheld alike in all the hypostases of men; but the inclination, that is, the thing willed, his holy soul did not have contrary to his divine will, nor anything besides his divine will.

For inclination is differentiated along with the hypostases, except in the case of the holy, simple, uncompounded, and undivided Godhead;

for there, the hypostases not being in any way divided or separated, neither is the thing willed divided.

And there, since the nature is one, the natural will also is one;

and since the hypostases are without interval, the thing willed also is one, and the movement of the three hypostases is one.

But in the case of men, since the nature is one, the natural will also is one;

but since the hypostases are separated and stand apart from one another in place, time, disposition toward things, and very many other respects, on this account their wills and inclinations are different.

But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, since the natures are different, the wills also are different;

but since the hypostasis is one and the one willing is one, the thing willed, that is, the inclinational will, is also one, his human will of course following his divine will and willing those things which his divine will willed.

It must be understood that volition is one thing, wishing another, the thing willed another, the will-possessing faculty another, and the one who wills another.

For volition is the simple power of willing itself; wishing is volition concerning some object; the thing willed is the matter subject to volition, that is, what we will (as the appetite is moved toward food:

the simple appetite is the rational volition, the appetite toward food is wishing, and the food itself is the thing willed); the will-possessing faculty is that which has the will-power, such as man; and the one who wills is the very one who makes use of the volition.

It must be known that the term 'will' (thelema) sometimes signifies the volition, that is, the will-power, and is called natural will; and sometimes the thing willed, and is called inclinational will.

On activity. It must be understood that all the aforementioned powers—the cognitive, the vital, the natural, and the technical—are called activities;

for activity is the natural power and movement of each essence.

Natural activity is the innate movement of every essence.

Whence it is clear that things whose essence is the same

have also the same activity, and things whose natures are different have also different activities;

for it is impossible for an essence to be devoid of natural activity.

Again, natural activity is the power that manifests each essence.

Natural and primary activity is the ever-moving power of the intellective soul, that is, its ever-moving reason, which naturally springs forth from it perpetually.

Natural activity is the power and movement of each essence, without which only non-being remains.

Actions also are called activities, such as speaking, walking, eating, drinking, and the like.

And the natural affections too are often called activities, such as hunger, thirst, and the like.

Again, the result of a power is also called an activity.

Both 'in potentiality' and 'in actuality' are spoken of in two ways.

For we call a suckling child a grammarian in potentiality;

for he has the aptitude to become a grammarian through learning.

Again, we call the grammarian a grammarian both in potentiality and in actuality;

in actuality, because he has the knowledge of grammar; in potentiality, because he is able to expound, but is not actually carrying out the exposition.

And again we call him a grammarian in actuality, when he is in act, that is, when he is expounding.

It must be understood, then, that the second sense is common to both 'in potentiality' and 'in actuality'—second of the 'in potentiality,' but first of the 'in actuality.'

The first and only true activity of a nature is the self-chosen, that is, rational and self-determining, life that constitutes our kind;

and those who deprive the Lord of it, I do not know how they call him God who has become man.

Activity is the effecting movement of a nature;

and that is called effecting which is moved of itself.

On the voluntary and the involuntary. Since the voluntary is in some action, and the so-called involuntary is also in some action, and since many set down what is truly involuntary not only in undergoing but also in doing, it must be understood that an action is a rational activity.

Praise or blame follows upon actions; and some of them are done with pleasure, some with grief; some are choiceworthy to the doer, some to be shunned; and of the choiceworthy, some are always so, some only at a certain time, and likewise of those to be shunned.

And again, some actions are pitied, some are deemed worthy of pardon, and some are hated and punished.

Upon the voluntary, then, there follows by all means praise or blame, the being done with pleasure, and the actions' being choiceworthy to the doers, either always or at the time when they are done; while upon the involuntary follows the being deemed worthy of pardon or pity, the being done with grief, and the not being choiceworthy nor accomplished through oneself, even if one is constrained.

Of the involuntary, one kind is by force, the other through ignorance;

by force, when the effecting principle, that is, the cause, is from without, that is, when we are forced by another, in no way consenting nor contributing of our own impulse nor cooperating at all nor doing the forced thing through ourselves—which we also state in defining it:

That whose principle is from without, the one forced contributing nothing of his own impulse.

And by 'principle' we mean the effecting cause.

And the involuntary through ignorance is, when we ourselves do not provide the cause of the ignorance, but it just so happens.

For if someone being drunk commits murder, he killed in ignorance, yet not involuntarily;

for he himself brought about the cause of the ignorance, namely the drunkenness.

But if someone, shooting arrows in his customary place, killed his father who was passing by, he is said to have done this involuntarily, through ignorance.

Since, then, the involuntary is twofold—one by force, the other through ignorance—the voluntary is opposed to both;

for the voluntary is that which comes about neither by force nor through ignorance.

The voluntary, then, is that whose principle, that is, cause, is in the doer himself, who knows the particulars through which and in which the action takes place.

And the particulars are what are called by the rhetoricians the circumstantial elements, such as: who, that is, the doer; whom, that is, the one acted upon; what, that is, the deed itself—say, he killed;

with what, that is, the instrument; where, that is, the place; when, that is, at what time; how, the manner of the action; why, that is, for what reason.

It should be known that there are certain things in between the voluntary and involuntary, which, being unpleasant and grievous, we accept for the sake of a greater evil, as for the sake of avoiding shipwreck we throw away what is in the ship.

It should be known that children and irrational creatures act voluntarily, yet not by choice; and whatever we do through anger without prior deliberation, we do voluntarily, yet not by choice.

And a friend who suddenly appeared before us did so voluntarily, yet not by choice.

And one who unexpectedly came upon a treasure came upon it voluntarily, yet not by choice.

All these are voluntary because of the pleasure taken in them, yet not by choice, because they are not from deliberation.

For deliberation must by all means precede choice, as has been said.

On what is in our power, that is, on free will. The discourse on free will, that is, on what is in our power, has first the inquiry, whether anything is in our power;

for many are those who oppose this.

Second, what are the things in our power, and over what things we have authority.

Third, to examine the cause for which God, who made us, made us self-determining.

Taking up the first point, then, let us first speak, demonstrating that some things are in our power, from the things admitted by those very opponents, and let us speak thus:

Of all things that come to be, they say the cause is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or the spontaneous.

But the work of God is essence and providence;

the work of necessity is the movement of things that are always in the same state;

the work of fate is that the things done through it are accomplished by necessity (for this too belongs to necessity);

the work of nature is birth, growth, decay, plants, and animals;

the work of chance is the rare and unexpected (for they define chance as the coincidence and concurrence of two causes that take their origin from choice but bring about something other than what was intended, as when one digging a ditch finds a treasure;

for neither did the one who placed the treasure so place it that this man might find it, nor did the finder so dig as to find a treasure, but the one in order to take it up whenever he wished, the other in order to dig a ditch, but something else fell out, contrary to what both intended).

but something else fell out, contrary to what both intended).

And the work of the spontaneous is the coincidences of inanimate or irrational things, apart from nature and art.

To which of these, then, shall we assign the things done through men, if man is not the cause and principle of action? For neither is it lawful to ascribe to God deeds that are sometimes base and unjust, nor to necessity (for they are not among things always in the same state), nor to fate (for the things of fate, they say, belong not to the contingent but to the necessary), nor to nature (for the works of nature are animals and plants), nor to chance (for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected), nor to the spontaneous (for they call the spontaneous the coincidences of inanimate or irrational things).

It remains, then, that man himself, the one acting and doing, is the principle of his own works and is self-determining.

Further, if man is the principle of no action, deliberating is superfluous;

for to what end will he use deliberation, being lord of no action? For all deliberation is for the sake of action.

And to declare the finest and most precious thing in man to be superfluous would be of all things the most absurd.

If, then, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action;

for all deliberation is for the sake of action and on account of action.

On the things that come to be. Of the things that come to be, some are in our power, some are not in our power.

Those, then, are in our power of which we are self-determining to do and not to do, that is, all the things voluntarily done through us (for they would not be said to be voluntarily done if the action were not in our power), and simply, those upon which follow blame or praise, and concerning which there are exhortation and law.

And properly in our power are all psychic things and the things about which we deliberate;

and deliberation concerns things that are equally possible.

And equally possible is that which we ourselves can do, as well as its opposite;

and our intellect makes the choice of this, and this is the principle of action.

In our power are the equally possible things, such as: to move and not to move, to set out and not to set out, to desire things not necessary and not to desire them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in things one ought and not to rejoice, likewise also in things one ought not, and all such things, among which are the works of virtue and of vice;

for of these we are self-determining.

Among the equally possible things are also the arts;

for it is in our power to take up whichever we wish, and not to take it up.

It must be understood that the choice of things to be done is always in our power;

but the action is often hindered in some way by providence.

For what cause we have become self-determining. We say, then, that self-determination enters in immediately together with rationality.

For everything that has come into being is also subject to change;

For things whose origin began from change must of necessity be changeable.

And change is to be brought from non-being into being, and to become something other out of an underlying matter.

Now things without soul and without reason change according to the bodily alterations already mentioned, but rational beings change by deliberate choice.

For of the rational faculty one part is contemplative and the other practical: the contemplative is that which understands how things are, while the practical is the deliberative, which determines the right principle for things to be done.

And they call the contemplative part mind (nous), and the practical part reason (logos); and the contemplative they call wisdom, and the practical prudence.

Everyone, then, who deliberates does so on the supposition that the choice of what is to be done rests with himself, so that he may choose what is preferred by deliberation, and having chosen may do it.

And if this is so, then free will necessarily accompanies the rational nature;

for either it will not be rational, or, being rational, it will be master of its actions and free.

Hence also the irrational creatures are not free;

for they are led by nature rather than leading it;

wherefore they do not resist the natural appetite, but as soon as they desire something they rush to the act.

But man, being rational, leads nature rather than is led by it;

wherefore, even when he desires, if he so wills, he has the power to restrain the desire or to follow it.

Hence the irrational creatures are neither praised nor blamed, but man is both praised and blamed.

And one must know that the angels also, being rational, are free, and as created beings are likewise changeable.

And this was shown: that the devil, though made good by the Creator, became of his own free will the inventor of wickedness, together with the powers that apostatized with him, namely the demons; while the remaining orders of angels persevered in the good.

On things not in our power. Of the things not in our power, some have their beginnings or causes from the things in our power—that is, the recompenses of our deeds both in the present and in the age to come—while all the rest depend on the divine will.

For the coming-into-being of all things is from God, but corruption was brought in for the sake of punishment and benefit through our own wickedness.

For God did not make death, nor does He delight in the destruction of the living;

but death came rather through man—that is, through Adam's transgression—and likewise the other punishments.

But all the rest must be ascribed to God;

for our coming-into-being is of His creative power, our continuance of His sustaining power, and our governance of His providential power.

And since some dispute against providence, let us now say a few things also concerning providence.

On providence. Providence, then, is the care exercised by God over the things that exist.

Providence is the will of God by which all existing things receive their fitting conduct.

And if providence is the will of God, then it is altogether necessary that all things done by providence come to pass, according to right reason, in the best and most God-befitting manner, and such that they could not come to be better.

…that the same one is Maker of all that exists and its Provider;

for it is neither fitting nor consistent that one should be the Maker of things that exist, and another their Provider;

for in that case both would be wholly in weakness—the one as to making, the other as to providing.