駁摩尼教 第 1 章 第 3/4 段

If, then, the principle of number is the monad, the principle of beings is also one.

If evil is not entirely without communion with the good, and the good is being, then evil is non-being;

for two beings share in being by virtue of being.

If the good is substance, evil is without substance;

for two substances share in being substance.

If evil is unmoved from the beginning, then motion is good, and immobility is evil.

Whence, then, did evil get motion? Life is good, and motion, and always was and is in the good; and the Good is living, and always was living.

Death, as you say, is evil, and immobility, and corruption, and mortification, and no less non-existence.

But wickedness, as you [pl.] say, was death.

Just as, then, the Good is life and living, so evil is death, mortification, and something mortified.

Whence, then, did it come to life and move? If from itself, then life [would be] from evil, which is impossible;

but if from the good, then the good — having become for evil the cause of life and motion — is not good.

And why did [the good], foreknowing the evils that would come from it, give it life? Evil, insofar as it is evil, is both without communion with the good, and contrary to it, and hostile; but desire for the good is [itself] good.

How then did that which is utterly evil desire the good? Wickedness is unmoved, and rather corruption, not generation.

How then did wickedness, being lifeless and insensate, put forth its own emanations? How then does it perceive the good and...

...the emanations of the good? That which proceeds from the substance of the unoriginate and uncreated is [itself] unoriginate and uncreated.

How then do you say that all things are from the substance of your principles? For if all things are from their substance, then [all would be] unoriginate principles, and nothing [created at all].

But if they are creatures, they are not from their substance.

Evil is corruption and death.

Evil, then, if it is evil to others but good to itself, sustains itself, but is not entirely evil;

for it sustains itself, and in this respect it is not evil.

But if it is entirely evil, it is evil to itself as well, and destructive of itself, and non-existent.

But if, in the corruption of one thing, the generation of another also occurs, it is not the corruption that is the cause of the generation, but the good, on account of the abundance of its goodness, brings about the generation of one thing even from the corruption of another.

For matter, having become subject to the good by it [the good], is good;

for indeed, in the beginning, it [God] brought all things from non-being into being.

The same thing, in the same respect, is not both good and evil; nor is corruption and generation of the same thing, in the same respect, the same power; nor is [anything] its own power-giver or its own corrupter.

Absolute evil, then, is neither being, nor good, nor productive of generation, nor creative of beings or of goods;

but the good, in whatever things it is present perfectly, renders them perfectly good; and in whatever things partially, [renders them] partially [good];

but in whatever things it is present not at all, they do not even exist, and are called entirely evil.

Fornication, insofar as it is desire, affection, and union, is good; but insofar as it is desire for what ought not [be desired] and what is forbidden, it is evil;

for that which is not commanded, but forbidden, is non-being, since it ought not [to be].

Therefore also the desire for that which does not exist, and ought not to come to be, is evil.

That which is truly evil is like the falling away from natural [good] dispositions.

For God made man upright, but they sought out many devices. But another [kind of] evil is spoken of according to sensation, such as the afflictions that come through trials;

for the name 'wickedness' is equivocal;

for sometimes it signifies the privation of virtue, and sometimes the privation of joy, that is, of what is desired.

For fornication is nothing other than a privation of chastity and a misuse;

for instead of loving and being united with his own vessel, that is, his own wife, he loves and unites with another's.

Unbelief, instead of believing in and loving the God who [truly] exists by nature, believes in the god who does not exist.

This, then, is wickedness: to treat that which is not as though it were, [and] not to render to each its own [due];

the things proper to each are those determined by God.

Proper to God is the glory and honor befitting Him as Maker; proper to creatures is the measure which the One who gave [them] being determined for each.

It is up to us either to use what has been given us by God for the purpose for which He gave it to us, or it is [also] up to us to use it not for that purpose; for example, He gave us the faculty of desire, so that we might desire Him, the only good.

If we use desire for this [purpose], it is virtue and good;

but if we love something other than Him, it is not use, but misuse.

For it was for this very purpose that He made us, that we might partake of Him by desiring [Him].

Matter, he says, was without beginning, ungenerated, [confined] within its own boundaries, always moving in disorder, always warring against itself, and consuming itself.

And God too, he says, was within his own boundaries — without beginning, ungenerated, eternal, incorporeal, wholly light. But matter, he says, moving in disorder and without reason, came upon the boundaries of God.

And marveling at the light of God, it ceased from its warring against itself, but assailed the light, warring so as even to seize a part of it for itself;

for indeed they affirm that matter has rulers, as over a hidden kingdom, whom they call both 'world-rulers of this darkness' and 'spiritual [forces] of wickedness.'

And the good God, he says, permitted a part of himself, seized by it, to become captive, so that he might circumscribe and confine it, preventing it from advancing any further into his own boundaries.

If matter is without beginning, ungenerated, incorporeal, without quality, invisible, and likewise the good God [too], and all things are from their substance, how are the things that come from them seen? For that which proceeds from an incorporeal and invisible substance will certainly be incorporeal and invisible as well.

And before this: even if the two substances are without beginning, ungenerated, and eternal, and we are from them — not having been brought by them from non-being into being, but from their substance — then we too are without beginning and eternal;

for the offspring of any substance is consubstantial with the substance that begot it;

of the eternal, eternal; of the unbegotten, unbegotten; of the beginningless, beginningless.

If our constitution is from the substance of the good and of the evil, we are not creatures, but children — and there is no creation in the world.

If it is impossible for the substance of the good to turn into evil and to think or do anything evil at all, and it is impossible for the evil [substance] to turn and think or do anything good;

and our soul is of the good — [then] it is impossible for our soul to think anything base, and for our body to do anything good.

But we see many souls thinking wicked things — such as those of the Manichaeans — and many bodies doing good things — such as those of the saints.

If the evil one too is composite of the incorporeal and the corporeal, and the good one likewise, and our soul is of the substance of the good one while the body is of the evil one, then our soul will [also] be composite of the incorporeal and the corporeal — and so will our body.

If matter is without beginning: if it is incorporeal, how did [the corporeal] proceed from an incorporeal substance? For that which is without beginning is altogether unchangeable.

Things that are simple by nature are not naturally fitted to be united [into a composite].

How then did the mixture come about? And again:

If matter is composite of the incorporeal and the corporeal, and the corporeal is contrary to the incorporeal, who united the contraries? For contraries would not consort amicably with contraries, joined together into one fabric and one substance, unless the power of the Creator had brought them together into one.

Matter, then, being composite, received its being from the divine Word.

Is matter corruption, or is it corruptible? For corruption corrupts and is not [itself] corrupted, while the corruptible is corrupted by corruption.

and the corruptible, that is, that which is [in the process of] being corrupted, would be matter.

What is that which corrupts — is it corruption, or is it corruptible? For corruption is the dissolution of things composed.

That which corrupts is the one that brings on corruption, and that which is corrupted is the composite that is dissolved.

And that which corrupts and that which is corrupted are substances, while corruption is an accident, observed [only] in the dissolving of composed things, neither pre-existing them nor remaining after they are dissolved.

What then is matter — that which corrupts, or corruption, or the corruptible? And if you say it is that which corrupts, tell us: what does it corrupt, if not the good one? For you speak of nothing else but matter and the good one.

If then there were two, matter corrupts while the good one generates and brings into being — or else matter is constituted and sustained, while the good one is corrupted and perishes.

But if it corrupts itself, know that nothing is capable of corrupting itself.

and if it did corrupt itself, it would have consumed itself and driven itself into non-existence.

And how too can that which is corrupted be without beginning? But if it is corruptible, by what is it corrupted, if not by the good one? And then the good one will be a corrupter.

But if it is corruption, by what is it effected, and how does it exist? For corruption is dissolution, as we have said.

Who then is the one who dissolves, and what is that which is dissolved? That matter cannot be both corruption and a corruptible substance is evident from this:

for the corruptible substance precedes and pre-exists as a composed substance,

while corruption supervenes after the composition, dissolving the things composed.

How then could the substance of matter have had corruption running along with it, united with it in substance, [from the beginning]? But perhaps you will say that it was at one time corruption not in actuality but in potentiality, and likewise corruptible [only in potentiality].

But know that to be corruptive or creative [only in potentiality], while not yet actually effecting the corruption or the

creation — because the things that are corrupted or created cannot be coeternal with that which corrupts or creates — this is true.

But you say that nothing was brought from non-being into being; rather, that evil is of itself corruptive and consuming, so that it, having in potentiality both the [power] to corrupt and to be corrupted, was imperfect and not [yet acting] in actuality.

But that which advances from imperfection to perfection is not without beginning;

for if that which is unchangeable is without beginning, then that which is subject to change is not without beginning.

Which is first with regard to matter — its substance, or its corruption? And if corruption [were first], it would be impossible for it to exist at all, being consumed before it [even] came to be.

But if its substance pre-existed its corruption, then it is rather substance and existence, and not corruption; and there was once a state of incorruption, not yet having corruption as its opposite — and corruption is not without beginning.

But if its substance always existed, consuming itself, how did it bring forth fruits? If it consumed itself only partially, then it is not entirely corruptive, nor entirely corruptible, nor completely evil.

But if, being corruptive, it ceased corrupting itself, then either corrupting is evil, and it turned from evil to good; or corrupting is good, and it became evil from good.

If matter is evil, yet it corrupted itself, then it is good;

for that which corrupts evil is good.

Was matter light, or was it darkness? And if light, [it is] of the substance of the good one;

and behold, there is one principle, and not two.

But if darkness, how does darkness see? For if it sees, it has light.

But if it does not have light, it is blind — and how then did it see the light? And how, moreover, will darkness exist within that which is full of light, and not be dissolved? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? And again:

Did matter live, or not? And if it did not live, how was it moved? For everything that does not have life is unmoved.

But if it lived, it has life either from itself, or from elsewhere.

And if from itself, it was life, and not death.

But if it had life from elsewhere — either from the good one, and [then] how is he good who gave life to evil? — or from another besides [the good one], in which case there will not be two, but three.

Was matter without beginning of itself, or did it come to be from another?

And if it came to be from another, it is not without beginning.

But if it was without beginning, it always had being, and never had non-being.

How then do you call it corruption and death? For corruption bestows non-being, but matter never had non-being;

how then can it give what it does not have? And again:

Generation and corruption are contraries.

For generation is a bringing forth from non-being into being, while corruption is a dissolution from being into non-being.

If then matter, according to you, is corruption, how does it produce fruits and beget? And again:

Complete corruption also corrupts itself;

for if it constitutes and sustains itself, it is not complete corruption.

But if it also corrupts itself, it will not exist [at all].

'The good' (ἀγαθόν) is so named from the fact that all things run exceedingly toward it (from ἄγαν, 'exceedingly,' and θεῖν, 'to run') — that which is by nature lovable and desirable, and which all things naturally desire.

Evil is desire contrary to nature, that is, when we desire something other than that which is desirable by nature.

Of all things, then, both the good and the evil, the good is the beginning and the end;

for all things exist for the sake of the good — both those that are good, and those that are contrary [to it];

for even these [contrary things] we do while desiring the good.

For no one, looking to evil [as such], does what he does.

Therefore evil does not even have proper subsistence, but only a derivative subsistence (παρυπόστασις), coming to be for the sake of the good and not for its own sake; for everything that comes to be, comes to be either for the sake of the good, or for the sake of what is supposed [to be] good.

A prophet is 'deceived by God' either when God permits him to be deceived in accordance with the worth of his desire, or when, having foretold [something], and God doing other things than what he foretold, he is said to have been 'deceived by God' — that is, to have been shown to be a deceiver.

Tell us then, O Manichaeans:

Matter, which you call evil and darkness and corruption and death, without beginning and eternal — was it a substance, or an accident? And if a substance, was it either a body, such as earth, water, air, fire; or incorporeal, such as God, angel, soul; or composite of body and the incorporeal?

And if it was a body, it was motionless;

And how, without being moved, did it come to the borders of light? Or how did it acquire motion? Either the giver of motion to evil is [at once] good and not good, or another besides the good one gave it motion, and there will be three principles, and not two.

But if you say that matter was incorporeal, whence [came] the body? For an incorporeal and beginningless substance cannot be turned into a body.

Whence then the innumerable multitude of bodies? But if you say that matter is composite of the incorporeal and the corporeal, know that it is impossible for a composite to come to be except from simples — just as it is impossible for two to come to be except from one and one, and impossible for man to come to be except from soul and body, and impossible for a body to come to be except from the simple elements: earth, water, air, and fire.

The simples, then, must exist first, and only afterward can the composite come to be from the simples.

There will therefore be, not two principles, but three.

Thus it is impossible for matter to be without beginning.

And if it was composite of the incorporeal and the corporeal, why did [the evil one] not make man from his incorporeal nature and body [alike]? Hear, O heaven, and give ear, O earth. Attend, O heaven, and I will speak, and let the earth hear the words of my mouth. For I will speak words not of my own heart, but [the words] of the darkened and defiled Manichaeans.

Hear, O peoples, tribes, and tongues, hear!

Let heaven and earth become today one theater.

Hear what the accursed Manichaeans say — they who are darkened concerning the light, the mouth of the devil.

They say that matter made war upon God and tore away a part from him.

They call God circumscribed — one who wars and is warred upon, who grieves and is cut off.

Is God warred upon? Is God cut off? Woe is me, woe is me — shall we not put them to death? Shall we not consume them with fire? Shall we converse with these men? Shall we receive them into communion? Whoever has communion with them is like them, and will share their portion both in this present age and in the age to come.

Brothers, this is what communion means:

let us rather die than receive the Manichaeans into communion;

whoever receives them into communion is himself a Manichaean, like them.

It is better to Judaize and die a Jew than to have communion with the Manichaeans.

Hear then, before God, O men, hear what the God-destroyed Manes says.

The world, he says, does not belong to God, but to the devil.

They wish to alienate us from our God.

And God, he says, grieved because a part was cut off from him, and suffered pain.

If a part was cut off from him, he is corruptible:

for everything that is cut is corruptible.

Evil, he says, plundered and seized a part from God, and therefore God sends and plunders and seizes back the part that was plundered from him.

Do you introduce robbers against God, O God-destroyed one? But, he says, God also made devices — twelve buckets, and the sun and the moon — in order to recover his own.

Then what? — that in the end something might come about: that the Good One might send fire and burn the world and consume everything, and restore matter down below to its own place, together with the souls that did not receive Manes. Hear what the adversary of God says, how great a power he attributes to matter:

He casts down the power of the Most High God.

First he says that he was plundered and robbed.

Do you call my God powerless? — But he yielded of his own accord.

How then did he grieve, if he was not compelled? No one willingly surrenders what is his own and then grieves over it.

But if he grieved because, being unable to prevail over matter in any other way, his own realm was not to be overrun, how is he not powerless? Then he grieves, and the part that is from him is punished, and he contrives and makes devices to recover his own, and yet he does not even recover the whole of what is his:

for the souls that did not follow Manes are punished forever;

and finally matter, once again rising up in its own regions against the Good One and afflicting him, while itself remaining unafflicted, but

at the last running back to its own place, together also with the souls that did not believe in Manes.

But perhaps it will also rise up again.

Tell us, O Manichaeans:

when matter was formerly at rest, was it good or evil? If it was evil, then, having later risen in rebellion, it became good.

But if it was first good, it later became evil.

Then, having risen in rebellion against itself and having moved in disorder, and having come to the borders of the light — if it beheld the immaterial light, how is it blind? And how, being matter, will it behold immaterial light? But if it perceived it, how is it irrational and mindless? And if, as you say, it even fell in love with it, how is it soulless? And how is it evil? For that which loves the good is not evil.

And how is it mindless and unwise, this thing that went forth from its own regions not like an irrational animal, but like a most excellent and well-ordered general — and that seized a considerable spoil of light and returned to its own domain? And how do you call evil that which received the good and made room for it? For things capable of receiving the good are not hostile or at war with it.

If matter seized a part of God, then matter is active and productive, while the nature of the Good is passive and subject to flux.

But if matter desired the Good, and the Good gave a part of himself to the Evil, then both were changed:

for the evil, having desired the good, became good, and the good, having consented to be mixed with the evil, became evil.

Was the Good harmed by the seizure and the mixture, or did it harm, or was it benefited, or did it benefit? If it was benefited, then that which benefited it is active and good, while that which was benefited is inferior and passive.

But if it was harmed, then likewise that which was harmed is passive, and that which harmed it is more powerful.

But if the Good benefited matter, then he is envious — one who grieves and bears a grudge, handing matter over to fire, and, in the excess of his rancor, a part of himself along with it.

But if it neither harmed nor was harmed, neither benefited nor was benefited, then, in the first place, it is inactive:

for the good, wherever it comes to be, benefits, if it has good activity:

and, in the second place, it is unjust, because, having neither been benefited nor harmed, he will punish matter, which did him no wrong.

But if, as you say, God is angered and grieves because matter fell in love with him and partook of him, then let no one fall in love with him.

But if, as you say, God, knowing that matter was advancing upon him, willingly allowed a part of himself to be seized by it, so that, having circumscribed its motion, he might punish it — melting it down, as it were, like a lump cast into Gehenna — then, first of all, why did he not immediately melt it down and hand it over to Gehenna? And if he was unable to do so except in this way, why does he reproach us for not resisting the Evil One, when he himself betrayed our souls through his own powerlessness? Moreover, when you speak of Gehenna, you will have to say either that it is consubstantial with the Good, or consubstantial with the Evil, or that it is another substance — and then there are no longer two principles, but three.

For if it is of the Good, how does it punish? For Gehenna is not good.

But if it is of the Evil, then it does not punish evil:

But if it is something other than the two, then there are three principles, not two — or else it was brought from non-being into being.

And if this is so, why do we not come to the straight path and say that all things were brought from non-being into being? That which is without beginning is unchangeable:

for it is a change for that which did not previously exist to come into being afterward.

But those things whose being derives from a change are by nature changeable:

whereas those whose being did not begin from a change, but is without beginning, are by nature unchangeable.

How then did we come to be out of beginningless substances? This could only be so if these substances themselves are such as we are — men themselves as well.

But if they are of such a kind, how did they change? We therefore did not come from beginningless substances, but from non-being.

If matter and evil are a beginningless and eternal principle, having being from itself and possessing whatever it has — that is, its tyranny, its strength, and its evil — then it will hold these unchangeably.

How then will he who feared it so greatly that he allowed a part of himself to become its captive, be able in the end to prevail over it? Manichaean:

Why, since God foreknew that the devil was going to turn away

from the good to the evil, and cast away the good, and be in the non-existence of the good — which is what evil is — why then did he make him? Orthodox:

If he foreknew him, he foreknew him as one who would certainly come to be what he became:

for foreknowledge of that which will not certainly come to be is not foreknowledge at all, but ignorance and error.

Did God make him willingly? Orthodox:

And why, being good, did he wish to make him who was going to become evil? Orthodox:

God made him good:

but he himself willingly turned away and cast off the good.

Why did he cast off the good? Orthodox:

And why did he make him free-willed and changeable? Orthodox:

Every creature is by nature changeable:

for those things whose coming-into-being began from a change must by nature be changeable.

Or is not the bringing forth from non-being into being itself a change? Only the divine, therefore, is by nature unchangeable, as uncreated and ever-existing.

But of created things, those that are rational are changeable by will, being changed according to the will, while the rest are changeable according to the body.

And it is free-willed, because it is not by necessity:

for every rational being is free-willed.

For to what purpose would he use reason, if he were not possessed of free will? Or how would he come to be in virtue, or be good, if he were not possessed of free will? For that which comes about by force or by necessity of nature is not virtue;

whence even the irrational creatures do not possess virtue.

But to abolish the virtue of good things on account of some men's indolence is not the act of one who is just.

He ought, then, to have made only those who were going to be virtuous, so that only the good might exist and only virtue might hold sway.

God alone is the perfect good, but by comparison with him all things are imperfect, being and being called good in this respect, insofar as they participate in him, and also by comparison with one another.

For that which participates more in the good, both is and is called more good;

and that which participates less, is and is called less good;

and that which does not participate at all, is not good at all.

But that which is not good at all is altogether evil.

And being itself is good;

for being is from God who is good, so that the devil, in respect of being itself, is good, inasmuch as he exists.

'Would it have been good for that man, if that man had not been born?' The Orthodox replies:

Since it befits the good God to give good things, while for the one who receives it is shame and reproach not to preserve the good things he received — and this not on account of the giver, but on account of himself and his own indolence.

And God, being good, cannot but provide good things — that is, he does not will to withhold them;

but he who does not wish to receive is himself the cause of his own condition, making not-receiving preferable for himself to receiving.

It is therefore neither just nor good that, because this man does not wish to receive, the good God should be hindered from doing well and giving good things.

For thus would evil conquer the good, if God, out of goodness, brings things from non-being into being, while that which was going to become evil, turning away from the good of its own will, hindered the good work of the Good.

'It would have been expedient, if that man had not been born' — but:

It was expedient for that man. It is good, both according to nature and according to justice, for the good God to do well and give good things; but he who received and did not preserve them made the receiving itself a reproach to himself;

for he himself, not willing the good, does not even wish for, nor delight in, the good that he has.

For being is not up to us, but from God alone, whereas being good is from God and from us.

God, then, gives what is his to give — being and well-being — while we, for our part, do what is up to us: namely, to preserve the good things given, whether we do so or not.

But what belongs to God alone, he himself gives as one who is good, whether we will it or not, so that the good might be in us at least to some degree.

God continually provides good things even to the devil, but that one does not wish to receive them.

And in the age to come, God gives good things to all;

for he is the fountain of good things, gushing forth goodness to all, and each one partakes according to how he has prepared himself to be receptive.

Here, then, having our desire set on other things and obtaining them, we take some delight; but there, when God shall be all in all, there being no eating, no drinking, no fleshly pleasure of any kind, nor any injustice, those who have neither their accustomed pleasures nor are receptive of the things from God are grieved incurably — not because God has inflicted punishment, but because we ourselves have prepared punishment for ourselves; since indeed God did not make death, but we ourselves have drawn it upon ourselves.

For by nature every composite thing is dissolved; but insofar as Adam was united to God through contemplation, he had within himself a life above nature, quickening his mortal nature.

But when he fell away from union with life, that is, with God, he passed from the incorruption above nature into the dissolution of the composite being according to nature, which is death.

But since some say that God, having foreknown those who would sin and not repent and would be condemned, ought not to have brought them out of non-being into being — for it is not the act of one who is good to make and then punish — we say to them, first, the word of the Apostle:

'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? For who has resisted his will? For whatever he wills, this is good;'

'And the potter has power to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor.' For it is he who makes both the righteous and the sinners — but he does not make them righteous or sinners, or honorable or dishonorable, [by that act of making them];

for the same apostle, in his epistle to Timothy, having first enumerated the vices, adds, saying:

'Whoever, then, purges himself from these, becomes a vessel of election.' For, having been made possessed of free will, we have the power to purify ourselves from the most shameful passions, or to defile ourselves.

Nevertheless, God made all men good.

He himself, then, provides both being and well-being to all, like the sun spreading forth the rays of his goodness upon all his works.

And it is not up to us to receive being, but well-being is up to us.

If, then, we should will and desire it, we partake of his goodness and shall be in light forever.

But if we grow indolent and blind ourselves and do not desire him, we shall be without part in him.

It was not fitting, then, that on account of our indolence he should become one who does not impart the gifts of his goodness, of which the first is being; nor was it fitting that our wickedness should conquer and render his goodness inoperative.

For if this were so, none of the things that exist would have come to be;

for none of the things that exist conducts itself worthily of his goodness.

For rightly, when compared to him, all things are unworthy of being.

Nevertheless God is not only good, but also just, and he sees all things, even before they come to be, as already existing.