藥箱（駁八十異端） 第 1 章 第 72/82 段

For it is not some bodily separation, but the Word subsisting in his own person, being Son from the Father, Spirit from Spirit, and God from God, excluding every syllogistic suspicion, being unto life for the faithful and for all who under the Father came into being through him and from him, for those who believe and know and do not consider the power of God foolishness, and the wisdom of God, which surpasses all examination and all reasoning, especially of corruptible men — as Aetius himself unwillingly confessed.

"If 'unbegotten' is, when said of God, indicative of privation, and 'the unbegotten' were nothing, what argument could take away 'nothing' from 'that which is not'? But if it signifies being, who could separate God from being — which is precisely himself from himself?" Refutation.

Aetius brings us the things said in terms of privation among the outside dialecticians, treating this matter as if for the sake of knowledge and benefit concerning God, though he is first of all ignorant of the cases in which the privative is used among those outsiders.

For the arguments of the dialecticians do not intend that speaking in terms of privation is admissible for all things, but only for those things which possess something by nature.

For with respect to those things which admit of standing in opposition to what belongs to them by nature, the term is used in the sense of privation; but with respect to things which do not admit of this, it is no longer so used.

For instance, no one would say 'blind' of a stone.

For that which is naturally constituted to see, and then loses its sight, is called blind; that is, if some bird or man or any beast whatsoever that is naturally constituted to see is deprived of sight, it is called blind in the privative sense.

So likewise we would not say 'not prone to anger' of a stone, nor 'guileless,' nor 'unenvious.'

But in the case of a man or a beast naturally constituted to become angry, when it does not become angry, one might speak of it in terms of privation; but in the case of things which do not admit of this, one could no longer do so.

Thus it must also be understood in the case of God, as the argument, directed against Aetius, proceeds to examine by way of questioning.

"Tell us, O Aetius: do you know God to be incomparable in relation to all things that do not exist from the same substance, or would you dare to number him together with all things? And if you should number him together with all things — with those that do not exist from his substance, but were made by him out of things that were not, through him who exists from him according to substance — apart from himself alone and the Holy Spirit, who is from the substance of the incomparable Father and of his only-begotten Son — then your confession would be most absurd."

"For how could he still be one among all things, from whom all things came into being out of things that were not? For this is impossible, and not even you yourself would say this."

"Since it is not admissible for him to be like or equal to those things which came into being by him out of things that were not, it is likewise inadmissible that he should undergo the same things as those unlike him — things which, precisely because they came into being by him out of things that were not, have all that belongs to them liable to be in privation of their opposites."

"For some things see, but not of themselves — for neither did they have their being of themselves, but according to the bestowed grace of the Giver — and in these it happens that the affection [of privation] occurs with respect to those things which existed in them according to the gift of the Giver, who is without passion, does not have his being from anything, and cannot be deprived as can those which came to exist out of things that were not."

...in substance and deity — as with 'not prone to anger,' [used] not because he does not become angry, but because he is anger-less in himself; and 'unbegotten,' because he is unbegotten in himself; even if the Son should be begotten from the Unbegotten, the privative expression is applied in vain to the Incomparable One in relation to others, according to the reasoning of this man who proposes it.

For neither are other things made equal to the Begotten, nor does the Unbegotten impart consubstantiality to created things — not because the possible is predicated of the impossible, but because the impossible things do not extend to reach the possible, on account of the exceptional singularity of the one God and of his only-begotten Son from him, together with the Holy Spirit.

"If privations are removals of habitual states, then 'unbegotten' said of God is either a privation of a state or a state of privation."

"But if it is a privation of a state, how could that which is not present be counted along with God as present? But if 'unbegotten' is a state, it is necessary to presuppose beforehand a begotten substance, so that, having thus received a state, it might be named 'unbegotten.'"

"But if the begotten [substance] partook of an unbegotten substance, then, having undergone the loss of a state, it has been deprived of unbegottenness."

"The substance, then, would be begotten, while 'unbegotten' would be a state."

"But if 'offspring' signifies a passage, it is clear that it is indicative of a state, whether it has been transformed out of some substance, or whether it is that very thing which is called offspring."

Now then, Aetius, having already fought at length on the hypothesis of privation, allying himself with those estranged from the faith, has armed himself equally with them against the faith, saying nothing from faith, nor remembering the saying directed against those who speak vain things out of themselves and do not hold fast the beginning of the faith — as Scripture, refuting them, says: 'I said in my ecstasy, every man is a liar,' together also with 'I was greatly humbled.'

But now, again wearing himself out on the same matters, putting forward the burden of privation, naming, and habit, and of human syllogisms born of erroneous suspicion, and though he ought to be examined spiritually, he spares himself from checking his own impulse arising from human cunning, from which he attempts to say concerning God whatever he wishes.

But he also compels us, even though we have already discoursed at length about privatives, to abide again in the same matters and to wear ourselves out in refutations against him.

And the refutation prior to this one was sufficient, being able, on account of the similarity and equivalence of his syllogistic argument, to be brought against both propositions.

But since it is necessary neither to let a hard-mouthed horse go unbridled — whether it is being carried toward chasms, or has already been checked from its impulse — nor to concede to a man who says the same things against the faith, and not to speak against him, we shall say again to this point: if privations are removals of states, then 'unbegotten' said of God is either a privation of a state or a state of privation; and again, if it is a privation of a state, how could that which is not present be counted along with God as present? And if you should think about God in such-and-such ways, O Aetius, and set about conjecturing states concerning God, it is your own understanding that will be found deprived.

For whatever things may arise in your heart to set forth concerning God, apart from believing alone, and marveling exceedingly, and glorifying with the whole mind, you will be convicted of being unable to reason syllogistically about God, nor about his Son, nor about his Holy Spirit — lest God convict you and you become a liar, according to what is written.

For in us, both states and wills and thoughts are prone to error, since we are of such a nature and substance.

'Nature' and 'substance' are also said of God, but simply because we hear 'nature' used of both and 'substance' used of both, it is not necessary to compare the incomparable God with our nature.

So likewise in all the things which you might say concerning God, O Aetius: he himself is wholly uncomposite, incomparable, perfect in himself, in need of nothing.

For he is self-perception itself and self-will itself.

The offspring begotten from him, alone from the Alone, and his Holy Spirit have no equality with other things, whether of dignity, or of nature, or of any other supposition.

He has not deprived himself, either as to state or as to substance, of his own incomparable deity; nor has the offspring from him, as I said, been deprived of the dignity and equality of the Father, being incomparable, just as also his Holy Spirit is incomparable in relation to absolutely anything — which is the perfect Trinity: the Father perfect, the Son perfect, the Holy Spirit perfect, not being some kind of blending, nor differing from itself, nor having in itself anything inferior — lest that which is distinguished should efface the incomparable, and that which has been altered should produce a privation of being, so that [the Trinity] would be called perfect only in a state and not in truth, or named by a bare word in passing and not actually existing — as your understanding altogether contrives, attempting to alienate us from the doctrine of the faith that the one who comes to God must believe that he exists, and that he becomes a rewarder of those who seek him.

...which cannot be perfected in the Father alone.

For he who does not have the Son does not have the Father either, and he who speaks of the Son cannot do so apart from the Holy Spirit. For truly the Father is the true God, as the Son who knows the Father bears witness; and the Son is the true light, being known by the Father and borne witness to; and the Spirit is the Spirit of truth, not being alien, but proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son.

These things, then, demolish all the syllogistic mythology of your discourses, Aetius, and it is not possible for us to be persuaded to become disciples of Aristotle, your master, and to abandon the word of the fishermen, illumined in the Spirit of God, who are unlearned in speech and untrained, but are heralds of the truth in the power of God, of which they have been deemed worthy.

For the kingdom of heaven does not consist in syllogistic speech and boastful speech, but in power and truth.

For indeed we have heard enough from the beginning of your discourse about the privation of states and positions, and about a begotten substance and an unbegotten substance receiving and not receiving [a state], and about undergoing loss of state together with state, and about a substance entangled — begotten — while the state is unbegotten, and about the offspring being spoken of in passing but signified in state alone and indicative of a state, transformed from some substance, even though it is called offspring, as you have said.

For your line of thought speaks the same things about the same things, uttering nothing that puts an end to its being carried on about the same matters.

"If 'unbegotten' is a state and 'begotten' is a state, then substances are prior to states, but states, even if secondary to substances, are nonetheless more esteemed."

"But if the Unbegotten is the cause of the Begotten, and 'offspring' signifies being, bringing in the cause together with its own substance, then 'offspring' is indicative of substance, not of a state."

"But since the unbegotten nature brings in nothing along with itself, how could the unbegotten nature not be a substance, but rather a state?" Refutation.

Aetius again attempts to construct for us, as you see, friends of the truth, an argument distinguishing states both concerning God and after God.

And he posits some things as first, others as second.

But it is not even lawful to speak of 'first' or 'second' with reference to God.

For in God all things are present at once, and he has no need of addition.

Wherefore also pious reasoning proceeds on the principle that the offspring is not to be conceived of as originating from time.

For to God the Father and Son and Holy Spirit — that is, to the Trinity that exists —

Therefore the God who is, is called Father, he who is; and the Son who is, is called Son, being toward him who is, having been begotten without beginning and without time — as [Scripture says]: 'With you is the fountain of life,' and 'In your light we shall see light,' and 'He who is, in the bosom of the Father,' and 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'; and likewise concerning the Holy Spirit: 'My Spirit stands in your midst.'

And you see that there is nothing recent in the Trinity.

Wherefore neither is substance before state, nor state before substance.

...having mutability in each of those who possess positive states — even if you should force us, O Aetius, to speak of 'state' with reference to God — yet there is nothing in God more esteemed or more recent, but only what befits his dignity unto doxology: to the one deity belong one doxology and one honor, so that they may honor the Son just as they honor the Father, and so that they may not blaspheme the Spirit, because of the word of threat which forgives them their sin neither here nor in the age to come.

As is fitting, there is nothing to think, or piously hold, or glorify concerning the Trinity in a differentiated manner; rather, one must speak thus — that in the Father is the Father, in the Son is the Son, in the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit — and thus glorify in truth; just as the true faith deems it fitting to render worship befittingly to the one Trinity, and to know its dignity.

And neither does the Unbegotten need the Begotten to be brought in together with his own substance, so that the Begotten might become for him a cause of substance — as though 'offspring' were indicative of substance — nor is the substance of the Begotten a state of the unbegotten nature, nor is it so called.

For the Trinity is in need of nothing, nor does it receive any addition.

For it is not the case that, because the Trinity itself always existed and none of created things existed, the Father therefore devised, for the sake of some allotment or some acquired title or an addition to his dignity, to create through the Son heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible, and to establish by his Spirit all the power of the things created by him — as though, from created things having been created and things made having come into being, some additional contribution should accrue to the Father, who is called Creator and Maker, or should be conceived as an addition for the Son, through whom and from whom created things came into being, or for the Holy Spirit, in whom things established have been established.

For God, without having turned from one state to another, and without having been altered in nature and in substance, or as by a change of thought and a mutable purpose, made the things that he made.

For he had in himself that which is ever creative and perfect, and in need of no acquisition of glory.

And just as, in the case of created things, one thinking about God ought not to suppose that the dignity of God's substance and glory consists in some acquired state and worth, so Aetius will be checked, wishing to reason about God according to unbegotten and begotten, and according to the argument concerning state and substance which he brings forward to us — since it is confessed by all that created things exist truly, and were not devised for the sake of an acquisition of glory for the God who is without need — just as also in the case of the Only-begotten and of his Holy Spirit, it is not possible to say the same thing as of created things.

For it is inadmissible to say this.

But since Aetius comes bringing us syllogisms, speaking loftily and boldly directing himself toward the things above, while counter-reasoning from the things below, from created things, he himself will be found to be nothing according to his own syllogistic argument.

For the wisdom of men passes away, and the syllogistic speech of men is buried.

"For his spirit shall go forth, and he shall return to his dust." For all the syllogistic things of men pass away, and men shall pass away, together also with the syllogistic reasoning of Aetius and his artful practice against the faith.

But what remains — not his †syllogistic† [contrivance] — is faith and hope and love, according to what is written.

"If every substance that is unbegotten is such as that of God the Almighty, how could one say that one is passible and another impassible? But if, by an allotment of unbegotten nature, the one remains superior to quantity and quality and, simply put, to all change, while the other is subject to passions, having been granted to possess unchangeableness in its substance because the One who loves it has automatically permitted this, according to what has been said before, then it would at least follow that one should call the [nature] which acts 'unbegotten,' and the one that undergoes change 'begotten.'"

...his Holy Spirit, the Spirit that partakes of the things of the Son — he did not beget all, but one, wherefore he is only-begotten; and he sent forth one from himself, wherefore it is the Holy Spirit.

And he created through the One, and established in the One all things — some, who beget after creation and are begotten, and others, who were created, neither begetting nor being begotten.

But the uncreated essence of the Trinity is far removed from those things that were created by the Trinity and were not begotten from the Trinity.

Therefore the Trinity possesses impassibility and unchangeableness, while all things after the Trinity are subject to suffering — unless the Impassible One should grant impassibility, through incorruption, as a gift to those to whom he wishes to bestow it freely and ungrudgingly.

But they do not possess incorruption from an incorporeal nature, but from the bounty of the good and impassible God.

For neither does the suffering of the Only-begotten in the flesh bring about suffering for his divinity, even though it is believed, by the true confession of the true faith, that the Word, being impassible God, suffered.

He himself remained in impassibility, neither turned in nature nor altered.

Therefore, being Wisdom, and being impassible God, and knowing that he saves through suffering those who bear the sufferings of death, he did not send an envoy, nor an angel, nor even someone such as the prophets before him, but the Lord himself came, and having taken the passible nature into himself, he truly suffered, while his divinity remained impassible.

For the incarnate presence did not blunt the power of his divinity.

For he is found, in his divinity, working the works of God and not shut off by the flesh — rebuking the wind and the surge and the sea, calling Lazarus by his own authority, and doing countless other things beyond even these.

He also permitted, as was fitting, things pertaining to the flesh — to be tempted by the devil, to be struck by men, and to be seized by those who arrested him — so that in the passible flesh the Impassible One might suffer, while remaining impassible in his own divinity, not estranged from the impassible God, doing all things willingly according to his astonishing mystery, just as God the Father, together with him the Only-begotten and his Holy Spirit — ever a perfect Trinity and one impassible divinity — contains all things: one God, one lordship, the same God containing the universe.

And he does not fall under suffering because he contains all things, even though the things contained within him fall under suffering.

For God is within all things and outside the whole of all things, unmixed with all things.

Hence neither by being everywhere, nor by being outside all things, nor by containing all things, nor by all things moving in him, will he bring suffering upon the impassible God; just as neither by having begotten the Only-begotten, nor by the Only-begotten having been begotten, nor by his Holy Spirit having been sent forth from him, will he bring suffering upon the Holy Trinity.

For neither is the Holy Spirit passible, though he descended in the form of a dove upon the Jordan; nor is the Only-begotten passible, though he was baptized by John and touched by him; nor is the Father passible, though he cried out from above in a voice audible to men, saying, 'This is my Son; hear him.'

The Son, therefore, is without variation.

And the Father is unbegotten, while the Son is begotten — yet impassible; the Spirit too is impassible, having proceeded impassibly; while all other things are created, the perfect Trinity remains in its number and its uncreated designation, the Unbegotten One not being changed, nor the Begotten One being held fast by suffering.

For neither was the One who begot held fast by suffering.

For the begetting is not bodily, but Spirit from Spirit and Son from Father.

Likewise the Holy Spirit too is from him — the Spirit of the Father, the Spirit of Christ — not created, not begotten, not a sibling, not a forefather, not an offspring; the incomparable essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit surpasses every concept and every mind — I would say, not only the minds of men, but also of angels.

The Father sent forth a sound for the hearing of men from above, impassibly — just as the created angels, and the heavens, and the earth, and all things did not bring about change and suffering for their Maker; but the whole matter is an astonishing mystery, according to what has been said: 'O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!'

'If the unbegotten nature is the cause of that which came into being, but the unbegotten is nothing, how could nothing be the cause of that which came into being?' Refutation.

The unbegotten nature is indeed, in a different sense — but not in the same sense as it is a cause with respect to all things — a cause in relation to the only-begotten offspring and to the Holy Spirit that is from it; yet not a cause in the sense of that which exists in relation to that which does not exist.

For the One who was begotten is not from things that are not, nor is the One who begot non-existent, nor is the Holy Spirit that is from him; but of the other things, that which exists is the cause.

Therefore the Holy Trinity ever coexists in its own glory, each Person ever existing in a manner corresponding to its own name and its own dignity.

For through it, and not apart from it, the things that came into being — which did not exist — came into being.

Therefore the Father is not, by himself alone, the cause of the things that came into being, but Father and Son and Holy Spirit made all things.

But if the Son were alien in nature — as having come into being from a cause, having not [previously] existed — then, having come forth together with all things, he too would have become equal to them, and God would have been his cause no longer in a generative manner but in a creative manner; and it would no longer be possible to call the One 'offspring' while calling the rest 'creatures,' but either all things together with him would have to be called 'offspring,' or he together with all would likewise have to be called 'creature.'

And nothing would have been set apart, since the One would have been made equal to all things in respect of coming from things that are not.

I would say not only angels equal to the Only-begotten who is their maker and creator, but also men, and cattle, and all things that fall immeasurably short of his nature and dignity.

But the One who is exists ever together with the one who truly, timelessly, exists as begotten from him — not from things that are not, but from himself.

And his Holy Spirit exists, not alien to his own essence, nor procured for God as though for [his own] assistance, according to the argument of Aetius.

'If the unbegotten is a privation, and privation is the loss of a possessed state, and this loss either perishes utterly or passes over to another, how then can the essence of God be named by the appellation "unbegotten" — [a name belonging to] a state that is either passing away or perishing?' Refutation.

If, Aetius, it is from you, from this point onward, that true opinion concerning God has been supplied to God's glory by your syllogisms, according to the arguments you stated above, then I too, addressing you directly, God permitting, will say the same to you: that, since none of the ancients — neither in the Old Testament nor in the New, among the holy apostles or prophets — held this opinion, you set yourself up as better and more reliable than God himself.

For, according to your own argument, it is from you, from this point onward, that the Divine received into its own faith this syllogistic technique of yours: to speak of the unbegotten as privation, and likewise of the begotten, and of the utter loss of a possessed state and of change, and of the naming of God by the appellation belonging to the essence pertaining to God.

For it is not because God is the creator of all things after his Only-begotten and his Holy Spirit that, through the constitution of created things, the privative terminology concerning what is not present in God was invented, or the affirmative terminology concerning what belongs to him was adopted, so that what was subsequently created might offer the 'better' attribute to God, and his purity might be conceived through the privative and unchangeable relation of that created realm toward these attributes.

But rather it is because he himself ever exists — being wholly glory, and wholly incomprehensible to all the things created by him — glorified according to the measure of those who reach out toward glorifying him: among angels according to the tongue of angels (which the Apostle proclaims to be preferable to that of men), and among men according to the lesser tongue of men, according to the measure and capacity of those who are yet lower still.

He is glorified in proportion to each creature's power; the glorification itself has fallen short, or has been altered.

But the divine essence is in itself unchangeable, since all creation is deprived of the ability to extend itself infinitely in glorifying him, the Most High essence ever surpassing all mind — it not being possible for it, through the things said by all creatures, to acquire alteration, or change, or advancement.

For that same divinity is most excellent, and incomparable, and glorified.

'If "unbegotten" signifies a privation not present in God, how do we say that he is unbegotten, yet not say that he is begotten?' Refutation.

He is indeed unbegotten, but this was nowhere stated — not by any prophet, not by an apostle, not by an evangelist.

For it was no marvel to say this concerning God.

For it was already inherent in pious reasoning, arising from the very law according to nature.

But you, Aetius, having innovated this for us, think that you are presenting yourself as a marvel.

But you have confounded and mixed together, with the pious law of nature and the ordinance of the faith graciously given by God for growth in improvement, the notion of conceiving the begotten as equal in dignity to the unbegotten — so that the one worshiped by you as unlike [the Father] might be found equal to the one who, according to your own teaching, is proclaimed as the one he is unlike.

If, then, you should worship the Father with a bare name only, you have offered the honor in mere pretense.

And if you worship the Son while acknowledging him to be unlike the Father, you have wrought confusion in your worship, honoring the unlike one equally with the one he is unlike.

But if, because of your preconceived unbelief, you refuse to worship the Son, you will be convicted by all, for not having recognized the One who is duly worshiped by all as equal.

For all the angels of God will worship him; and Mary worshiped him when he rose gloriously in the flesh, and so did all his disciples.

For they know that he does not bear the designation of 'made' nor of 'created,' but of one begotten from the Father, and they worship him as being from Being, and likewise the Holy Spirit that is from him.

For they know him to be, in essence, alien from the things that came into being.

For he is not made nor created, but begotten from the Father.

Therefore, Aetius, having labored over all these things and spent much time, and having introduced foreign doctrines, you will [in the end] worship him.

For all must stand before his judgment seat, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord — he who is not alien to God, but to the glory of God the Father, according to what is written and believed.

'If "unbegotten," as applied to God, is a bare name, and this bare utterance exalts the being of God above all begotten things, then the utterance of men is more honorable than the being of the Almighty — having adorned Almighty God with incomparable pre-eminence.'

'Unbegotten,' as applied to God, is neither a bare name, nor does it commune in essence with created things.

Therefore created things are not signified by a bare designation either.

But when another name is sought — one standing between 'unbegotten' and 'created,' which is precisely 'Son,' begotten and not created — to whom should this distinction be assigned? And if we should grant that it communes with created things, with neither of the terms mentioned being spoken by a bare designation — just as, in the case of the unbegotten and the one creating and the created things that came to be, no bare designation is admissible, so also in the case of the begotten and the Son no bare designation is admissible — then this baseless slander will reveal a confusion reasoned out on Aetius's part, since created things are not made equal to the name 'Son,' the created nature truly existing as such and not merely by a bare designation, seeing that the Son himself likewise does not receive the name 'Son' as a bare designation.

Since the only-begotten Son is not non-existent, nor is he — nor the Holy Spirit — spoken of merely by a bare designation, he is joined to the glory of the Father, and is not confused with the designation of created things.

The essence of the divinity thus subsists.

For neither shall the utterance of men or of others boast, as though procuring glory for a God who is in need of it, or adorning Almighty God — the God to be worshiped, the God who is Master and Creator and his own Maker.

For neither does it consider itself supremely glorious —

...nor does it consider itself the adorner of its own Creator, since it would then be regarding itself as an object of worship, yet without itself worshiping the One who is truly worshiped.

And your argument, Aetius, stirs up a case against all things in vain.

'If a cause has been allotted to everything begotten, but the unbegotten nature is without cause, then "unbegotten" does not signify a cause, but signifies a hypostasis.'

And indeed a cause has been allotted to everything begotten; yet we do not confess this as though we had learned it from you.