與狄奧多西辯論 第 1 章 第 5/10 段

"For even if he was crucified," says the divine Apostle, "out of weakness, yet he lives by the power of God;"

then it was insofar as he was man, and not insofar as he was God, that, having entered the house, he did not wish anyone to know;

and the same one was possessed of will, also insofar as he was man.

"About the fourth watch of the night he comes to them, walking upon the sea;"

"and he wished to pass by them."

If, then, someone should take this to have been said of him insofar as he is God — by bodily limits, I mean, by the 'above' and the 'below' —

by the 'before' and the 'behind' —

by the 'right' and the 'left' — he will be compelled to say that the divinity has been circumscribed.

But if he says that these things were said of him insofar as he is man;

then the same one was possessed of will also insofar as he was man.

"And his disciples came to him, saying to him:"

"Where do you wish us to go and prepare for you to eat the Passover?"

If the eating of the Passover belongs to those under the Law;

and the Lord came to be under it insofar as he was man, and willingly ate the Passover; and the same one was possessed of will also insofar as he was man.

And the divine Apostle also, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, says concerning him:

"Having become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

Did he then obey willingly, or unwillingly?

But if unwillingly, it would reasonably be called tyranny, and not obedience.

and he became obedient not insofar as he was God, but insofar as he was man;

For insofar as he is God, according to the Fathers, he is neither obedient nor disobedient. For these things belong to those who are secondary and under authority, says the divine Gregory;

therefore, also insofar as he was man, he was possessed of will.

"Sacrifice and offering," he says, "you did not desire, but a body you have prepared for me;"

"Whole burnt offerings and offerings for sin you did not require;"

"In the scroll of the book it is written concerning me, that I should do your will;"

That the Father is called the God of Christ insofar as he is man, and not insofar as he is God — just as he is called Father insofar as Christ is God, and not insofar as he is man — I do not think even those on the opposing side would dispute.

But if, insofar as he is man and not insofar as he is God, the Father is his God, then also insofar as he is man, and not insofar as he is God, he willed to do the will of the Father, which is also his own;

for the Father's will is also his own, since he too is God according to essence.

For if this is so, he was possessed of will not only insofar as he was God and consubstantial with the Father, but also insofar as he was man and consubstantial with us.

But it is necessary to know that the divine Apostle, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, applied to the Lord the words of the Psalm just now cited.

And the great Moses, in the account of the creation of man, introduces God as saying:

"Let us make man according to our image and likeness."

If, then, man is the image of the divine nature,

and the divine nature is self-determining,

then, provided he preserves the likeness to the archetype, he is by nature self-determining.

And if this is so, and the archetype came to be by nature what it is, and the image likewise by nature, then according to both his natures the same one was by nature possessed of will.

For it was declared beforehand by the Fathers that the will is the natural self-determination;

but it is understood one way in the case of God, another way in the case of angels, and yet another in the case of men.

In the case of angels, since the readiness [to act] concurs together with their habitual disposition, and admits no interval of time whatsoever;

but in the case of men, since their habitual disposition of readiness is conceived of temporally.

For if Adam obeyed willingly, and beheld willingly, and having willed, ate,

then willing is the primary movement in us.

But if willing is the primary movement in us, and yet, according to them, the Word, having become man, did not assume this together with the nature,

then I did not come into being without sin.

And if I did not come into being without sin, then I was not saved;

since indeed what is not assumed is unhealed.

Furthermore, if the self-determining power of nature is his own work and creation, and yet the incarnate Word, according to them, did not assume this together with the nature in the ineffable union, then either, having condemned his own creation as not good, he cast it away from himself;

or else, begrudging us the healing of it, both depriving us of complete salvation and showing himself to be subject to passion—either by not willing, or by not being able, to save completely.

These things, then, concern the fact that the incarnate God the Word is by nature possessed of will also insofar as he is man;

and concerning the fact that the same one is by nature possessed of will also insofar as he is God, we shall come to know from what follows.

For our Lord and God himself, the very Truth, says of himself in the Gospels as follows:

"Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those sent to her—"

"how often I wanted to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing."

"Behold, your house is left to you desolate."

By these words, though he willed to gather the [human] nature to himself from the error of external things, it was not willing.

"As the Father raises the dead and gives life,"

"so also the Son gives life to whom he wills."

If "as" is a comparative adverb,

and comparisons are made between things of the same essence,

then this cannot possibly be said with reference to the human [element] in the case of Christ.

The Savior, therefore, has taught us that, just as the Father, being God, gives life to the dead by will, so also he himself, being consubstantial with the Father and of one will with him, gives life to whom he wills.

These are the doctrines of the evangelists, the apostles, and the prophets.

What greater proof, then, beyond these could there be concerning the fact that the same one is by nature possessed of will both insofar as he is God and insofar as he is man?

Nothing is clearer than these for proving that the wills are natural.

How, then, did Vigilius, who was then presiding as pope of the Romans, receive the libellus submitted by Menas, who had become bishop of the imperial city, containing one will—and this even though it was made manifest in the imperial secretum, in the presence of the one then reigning as emperor of the Romans, and of the senate?

I am amazed that you, being patriarchs, dare to lie.

Your predecessor, writing to Honorius, said that "It was dictated, but it was not submitted, nor was it made manifest"; but you yourself, in your letter to John, the pope among the saints, said that "It was submitted and made manifest, having been read aloud by Constantine the Quaestor."

For it is not possible that both are true.

And thus it is written to my predecessor:

"What can you say openly to my predecessor about Honorius, who dogmatized one will of our Lord Jesus Christ?"

The same person, therefore, writing again on this matter to the holy Constantine, who had become emperor, in the person of John, the pope among the saints, said: "We spoke of one will in the case of the Lord, not [meaning] of his divinity and his humanity together, but of his humanity alone."

For when Sergius wrote that some say there are two contrary wills in Christ, we wrote back that Christ did not have two contrary wills—

I mean, [contrary wills] of flesh and of spirit, such as we have after the transgression—

but one only, that which naturally characterizes his humanity. And a clear proof of this is that mention was made both of members and of flesh;

which does not allow those things to be understood also with reference to his divinity.

Then, also forestalling an objection in advance, he says:

"You made no mention of his divinity."

We say that, first, the answer was given in response to the question that was asked;

and then also, following the custom of Scripture, as in all things, so also in this;

at one time speaking from the standpoint of his divinity;

as when the Apostle says:

"Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God";

and at another time from his humanity alone, as when the same [Apostle] says:

"The foolishness of God is stronger than men,"

"and the weakness of God is stronger than men." PYRRHUS [said]:

My predecessor, having attended to the wording rather too simply, accepted this.

Nothing so alienated me from your predecessor as his fickleness—

that is, his continually shifting from one notion to another, and being settled in no fixed conviction.

At one time, accepting those who call this one will divine, he introduced [the notion] that the incarnate one was God alone;

at another time, [accepting] those who call it deliberative, he introduced [the notion] that he was a mere man, disposed deliberatively just as we are, and differing in nothing from Pyrrhus and Maximus;

at another time, calling it hypostatic, he introduced together with the difference of the hypostases also the difference of wills among those of the same essence;

and at another time, accepting also those who call it authoritative, he introduced a merely relational union;

for authority, and sovereignty, and such things, are clearly movements of the gnomic will, but not of nature;

and at another time, adopting those who call it a matter of choice and gnomic, and thereby making [men] masters over themselves, he introduced the Lord not only as a mere man, but also as mutable and sinful—

since indeed the gnomic will is judicative concerning things opposed, inquisitive concerning things unknown, and deliberative concerning things unclear.

and at another time, [accepting] those who call it 'economic,' he introduced [the notion] that before the [incarnate] economy he was without will, together with whatever other absurdity follows from this argument;

and he was carried off into countless other absurd suppositions, having no foundation in the truth—

which, were I to wish to commit accurately to writing, together with those same absurdities, not even all the time to come would suffice.

But what need is there to produce documents and to tear apart the holy Church of God?

He was not even able to perceive the thing most common to all.

For either—that we might concede to you [for argument's sake] that the documents contain the doctrines of the councils, as you claimed, though not speaking truly—we still have no need of your documents, since we accept and embrace these doctrines both formerly and now;

Or else they do not possess what belongs to synods, and it is all the more just to turn away from and flee them.

Since, then, the promulgation of these same documents was, on either count, unjust and unlawful, their abrogation too, on either count, stands as just and canonical.

Sophronius, who a little before had become patriarch of Jerusalem, made us do this even against our intention, by raising the discourse concerning the energies at an unfitting time.

I am utterly at a loss as to what defense you expect to offer, accusing so bitterly one who is blameless.

Tell me, by the truth itself: when Sergius wrote to Theodore of Pharan -- sending him also the libellus of Menas, as he calls it, through the mediation of Sergius Macaronas, bishop of Arsinoe -- urging him to state his opinions concerning the one energy and one will contained in the libellus, and Theodore wrote back accepting these things, where then was Sophronius?

Or when he wrote, in Theodosiopolis, to Paul the One-Eyed, who came from the Severians, sending him too the libellus of Menas, along with the assent of the man of Pharan and of himself?

Or when he wrote to George, surnamed Arsas, who was a Paulianist, having proof-texts sent to him concerning their one energy, inserting also this in the letter, that on the basis of these he was effecting the union of the Church with them?

Whence, although he wished to bring about his deposition for this reason, he was prevented by the invasion of the Persians that then took place in Egypt.

Or when he wrote to Cyrus of Phasis concerning one energy and two, in reply to his question, sending him too the aforementioned libellus of Menas?

Since Sergius, in many ways, publicly set forth his own malady and ruined the greater part of the Church, the blessed Sophronius admonished him with the humility befitting his rank, prostrating himself at his feet, and, instead of every entreaty, offering him the life-giving sufferings of Christ our God, that he might not renew the voice of heretics, rightly extinguished long ago by the holy Fathers who had gone before in life -- he himself became the cause of such scandal.

The argument has duly effected the overthrow of everything that was proposed, and the inquiry concerning the wills lacks nothing at all.

Since the inquiry concerning the wills has reached its conclusion, do you wish that we also conduct that concerning the energies?

Being ignorant of the argument that the wills are natural, in keeping with this ignorance I also accepted the argument concerning the energies;

and whatever was said to me, whether unwritten or in writing, was said with this purpose in view.

But now, since "being naturally disposed to will" and "being naturally disposed to act" are confessed synecdochically, everything concerning this that was formerly not established has been annulled;

and I consider it superfluous, henceforth, to raise any discourse at all concerning this.

Since God, on account of our purpose foreknown by him, has called us to the recognition of his truth, it is not necessary to put to examination the things said concerning this, whether in writing or unwritten, to certain persons, on account of those who, as is likely, have carelessly come upon them, or who still do so, being rather too credulous.

If the examination bears at all upon this, it is necessary.

For to take thought for the safety of the more simple-hearted is an imitation of divine loving-kindness.

If then this is an imitation of divine loving-kindness, let us begin from here the examination concerning this.

In your writings I found that you had dogmatized one energy of Christ, as of a whole.

If then there is one energy, as of a whole, and the whole is his hypostasis, then this one energy will be hypostatic;

and there will be a different energy, just as also a different hypostasis, belonging to the Father and to the Mother;

since neither of them is Christ.

If it is because of the difference of the two natures in Christ that you speak of energies, and not one on account of the singularity of the person, then two energies will also be found in man, on account of the essential difference between his soul and his body.

And if this is so, there will be three energies of Christ, and not two.

The very things which you put forward for the destruction of the natural wills and energies -- these same things are also put forward against the natures by those who war against them.

For this alone is your "clever" point: that in everything you go about in step with them.

Whence we too bring against you, as suffering from the same malady as they do, the refutations that the Fathers brought against them:

namely, that if it is because of the difference of the natures in Christ that you too, together with us, speak of two natures, and not one on account of the singularity of the person, then two natures will likewise be found in man, on account of the essential difference between his soul and his body;

and if this is so, there will be three natures of Christ, and not two natures.

But if, though speaking of two natures on account of the difference of natures, together with us, you do not say there are three natures in Christ --

how then can you object to us for speaking of two energies on account of the difference of natures?

For the things which you say, together with us, against those who put forward these arguments against the natures -- these same things will also suffice for us, concerning the energies, against you;

but in this way the argument has struck you down on equal terms, exposing the irrationality of the objection.

But going further, we say that the "one" according to the species of man is not the same as the "one" according to the essence of soul and body.

For the "one" according to the species of man indicates the unvarying sameness present in all the individuals under that nature;

hence we do not even say it without qualification, but add "of man".

But the "one" according to the essence of soul and body destroys their very being, thrusting it into complete non-existence.

If then the "one" according to the species of man is not the same as that essential "one", it is therefore not necessary for us, in speaking of one energy according to species, either to call this hypostatic, or to speak of three energies, since the energy has regard to nature.

But, according to Nestorius, persons are introduced together with the energies;

and it follows necessarily that those who speak of two energies must uphold his abominable dogmas.

And yet Nestorius, while speaking of two persons, dogmatizes one energy.

But if, according to you, persons are introduced together with the energies, then consequently the energies will also be gathered together with the persons;

and you will be forced, in following your own rules, either, on account of the one energy of the holy Godhead, to say also that it has one person;

or, on account of its three hypostases, to say three energies also;

or, like Nestorius, to speak of a relative union;

for the union of this relative union is its one energy, as Nestorius himself and those of his faction have demonstrated in their own writings.

And in our own case too, since the energy according to species is one, but the hypostases are many;

either, on account of the one energy according to species, you would be compelled to say also that there is one person of all men;

or, on account of the many persons, to say many energies also;

and thus the assertion falls entirely away from -- is condemned by -- the Fathers, namely the assertion which states:

"Things of the same essence are also of the same energy." Moreover, if, according to them, a person is introduced together with an energy, and they have granted that many energies proceed from the one and the same incarnate God the Word, they will also have to grant the persons introduced together with the energies that have proceeded;

if indeed they have resolved to be consistent with themselves;

and it will be found that the persons, and the energies, of that same one, are infinite.

And again, if, according to their premise, a person is introduced together with the energy, then when the latter is removed, the former is entirely removed along with it.

And if this is true, then, with the removal of the two energies, and of the one, the two persons and the one person are removed along with them;

and Christ, so far as it lies with them, has passed from being -- and from being-beyond-being -- into non-being;

than which what could be more impious?

And if someone should wish, out of great abundance of leisure, to exercise this argument also with regard to each one of us individually, he will find that we too, at one and the same time, are both reasoning and walking;

or even thinking of one set of things, while conversing about other things with those we happen to meet;

which Moses too is recorded to have done: at one and the same time both interceding with God on behalf of the people, and conversing with the people, urging them on to good hopes;

and neither, by acting in a twofold manner appropriate to his natures, does each individual thereby become two;

nor, because the one who acts in a twofold manner is himself one, does he confuse the motions that essentially belong to his natures.

And likewise in the case of the spoken word, we see both the concept inherent in the word, and the word underlying the concept, and their thoroughgoing mutual interpenetration;

and neither is a difference of persons introduced by their difference, nor is confusion introduced by their utmost union.

...while it preserves them, and displays these properties through all things at once and in the very same instant.

For neither is its burning separated from its cutting after the union, nor its cutting from its burning;

and neither, on account of the twofold character of the natural energy, does it introduce two red-hot swords;

nor, on account of the singleness of the red-hot sword, does it produce a mingling or confusion of their essential difference.

If then the one who operates is one, then the operation too is one, as belonging to one [subject].

For again I will ask you the same things, bringing you back to the same points as above:

Is he one in hypostasis, or in nature?

For in nature he happens to be twofold.

But if he operated in a twofold manner while being one and the same, then the number of persons is not thereby introduced together with the number of operations.

But if he operated singly, on account of the singleness of the person, the same argument concerning this will incur the same absurdities on the same grounds.

For if the operation is hypostatic, then a difference of operations will likewise be contemplated in proportion to the multitude of hypostases.

Not at all — it was not because he operated in a twofold manner that his operations were two;

but because the one who operated was one, [the operation] was one.

This another also says to you concerning the natures: that it is not because his nature is twofold that the natures are therefore already two, and are so called;

but because his hypostasis was one, his nature is one, and is so called.

But, that I may pass over everything else that can be said on this subject, when you speak of one operation, what kind of operation do you hold this to be?

Divine, or human, or neither?

But if divine, then you say Christ is God alone;

but if human, then [you say he is] not God at all, but a mere man only;

but if neither of these, then [you say he is] neither God nor man, but you dogmatize that Christ does not exist at all.

When we speak of one operation of the divinity of Christ and of the humanity that belongs to him, we do not say that this belongs to him by reason of nature, but by way of the union.

If, according to your argument, the operation came to him from the union, then before the union he was without operation;

and, according to you, an act of violence took place, in his having created [the world].

And again, if the capacity to operate came to him from the union;

but the Father and the Holy Spirit were not united to flesh according to hypostasis, then they are not operative.

But if they are not operative, neither are they creators;

not to mention that they would not exist at all.

And again, since the union is a relation, and not a thing, then Christ's operation is likewise a relation, and not a thing.

Furthermore, you will be compelled to call this [operation] either created or uncreated;

since between created and uncreated there exists absolutely no middle ground.

And if you say it is created, it will indicate a created nature alone;

but if uncreated, it will characterize an uncreated nature alone;

for the natural properties must in every case correspond to the natures;

and how could it be possible, the nature being created and having a beginning, for the operation to be uncreated, beginningless, infinite, creative, and sustaining?

Or how could [the operation] of an uncreated and beginningless [nature] be created, having a beginning, finite, and held together by another power in order to remain indissoluble?

Do you not accept and agree with us when, speaking of the result of the works done by Christ, we call it one operation?

The result of one action differs from that of another, and is not one, as was shown in the case of the fire-heated blade.

For even if the operation of the fire and that of the sword are united with each other,

yet we see that the result of the fire is burning, and the result of the iron is cutting;

even though they are not separated from one another in the burnt cut, or in the burning.

just as the effect of heaven is one thing, of earth another, and of the sun yet another.

It is not possible, then, to speak of one result, unless the action too were one and only one.

If then, looking to the result of the works done by Christ, you decreed one operation, then decree one action as well;

or, on account of the infinite actions, [decree] infinite operations as well.

Yet indeed our inquiry does concern the works;

for our argument is not about things outside Christ, but about the things within Christ himself;

that is, concerning the natural principle of the essences of Christ — whether it remained deficient as a result of the union, or remained undiminished;

and if deficient, whether it is possible for a deficient nature to have existence at all;

but if undiminished, whether the operation is contemplated within it — I mean, within the constitutive principle of the essence — or whether it belongs among external things.

But that the operation according to nature does not belong among external things is clear from this: that nature can exist without works;

but without the operation according to nature, it is possible neither for nature to exist, nor to be known.

For by the very things that each thing naturally operates, it is confirmed, unchangingly, to be what it is.

Since, then, it was not even with regard to a work that you decreed your fabricated 'one operation' — after the fashion of a goat-stag — but with regard to the natural principle of the united essences;

and the unfailing proof of this is the chapters decreed by Cyrus, which were received by you graciously and with the utmost warmth;

in which, having decreed one [operation], he said that by that same [operation] both the divine and the human things were wrought —

thereby contradicting not only Holy Scripture and the holy Fathers, but even the very nature of created things.

For none of the things that exist, so long as it remains within the bounds of its nature, is by nature able to do contrary things. Fire does not both heat and cool;

nor does ice both cool and heat;

nor does earth both dry and moisten;

nor does water both moisten and dry.

If then this is observed in none of the things that exist, how is it that you do not fear to say that the incarnate Word, having become man in essence, accomplished by one operation both the miracles and the sufferings — which differ from one another by reason of nature?

What, then, did Cyril, the luminary of the Church, decree as contrary to the pious understanding that has now emerged from our inquiry, when he said that Christ displayed one kindred operation manifested through both [natures]?

This present quotation does not at all conflict with the two operations;

on the contrary, it even confirms them.

For he did not say that there is one natural operation of the divinity of Christ and of his humanity;

since otherwise he would not elsewhere have said that no sound-minded person would grant one operation of Maker and thing made — but rather, wishing to show that the operation of the divinity is one and the same, both without flesh and with flesh.

As if someone, wishing to show that the operation of fire is one both with matter and without matter, should say that fire burns both without matter and with matter.

Thus the Father [Cyril] too did not say that the operation of the two natures is one;

but he said that the operation is one — the divine and paternal operation — essentially inherent in God the Word incarnate, according to which he wrought the divine signs not only incorporeally by an all-effective command, as he himself says —

seeing that even after the incarnation he is a fellow-worker with his own begetter, who operates incorporeally;

but he also displayed these [signs] bodily, by the touch of his own flesh.

and [this operation] belongs to no other, on account of the pure union with him;

but, on the contrary, [the union] preserves it for its own manifestation;

just as the soul too, working through the instrument of its own body, both offers the properties belonging to its natural operation, and its own operation according to nature.

For the stretching out of the hand, and the touching, and the grasping, and the mixing of the clay together with it, and the breaking of the bread —

and simply put, everything that was performed through the hand, or another member, or part of the body, belonged to the natural energy of the humanity of Christ;

according to which the man himself was active — he who by nature is God, and who works divine things naturally;

so that, through each of the two, he might confirm each nature according to nature, thereby showing himself in truth to be perfect God and perfect man, apart from sin alone.

The Father, then, was not ignorant of the distinctive property peculiar to each nature, which is also inclusive of the other natural properties;

I mean the creative energy, and the vital energy imparted to his body from the soul;

which the incarnate God the Word, preserving them in himself, showed to be distinct and unconfused;

the creative energy, in that he created essence and quality and quantity;

from which, and in which, and by which the existence of beings both is and is contemplated.

For even if those among the Greeks who philosophized extend beings into ten categories,

still the whole is nonetheless held together and encompassed by these;

essence, by supplying the eyes that were lacking to the blind man;

and quality, by changing the water into wine;

and quantity, by multiplying the loaves;

and he showed the vital energy in breathing, speaking, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, eating and drinking;

in moving his hands, walking, sleeping, and the rest of those things which, in all things subject to nature, display the invariable sameness of the operation according to nature.

Piously and without constraint you have set forth the Father's meaning, showing it not to conflict, but to agree throughout with the two energies.

Is 'newness' a quality, or a quantity?

Then it also introduces, along with itself, a nature of that same sort —

if indeed the definition of every nature is constituted by the principle of its essential energy.

And not only that, but also when the Apostle says, 'Behold, all things have become new,' he says nothing other than, 'Behold, all things have become one';

and whether you wish to call this 'by nature' or 'by energy,' let that be left to our discretion.