致馬里努斯神學小品 第 1 章 第 1/12 段

[...]us. Tome I: Minor Theological and Polemical Writings, to Marinus the Most Holy Presbyter. Having set for yourself the aim of attaining that friendship with God which is praised in every hymn, O God-honored Father, you run the course toward it in good order,

circumscribing by reason the nature of beings for the generation of virtue, and by intellect limiting the motion of every age and time for the establishment of unerring union (knowledge);

by which a more fervent longing for God enters in along with them;

extending the motion of your longing coextensively with infinity;

and, by the incomprehensibility of the one longed for, making your desire incomprehensible;

of which longing God Himself is the end;

becoming, for the worthy, the fulfillment of longing, as the self-subsistent enjoyment of good things;

of which reason knows experience alone as comprehension, since it is, clearly, above intellection — a union that in no way whatsoever falls under any intellectual form.

and the nature of life is, [in turn], reason;

truly delineating the new man according to Christ;

bearing, in a way readily imitable, the image and likeness of God the Creator;

which [image and likeness] one must now understand as truth and goodness;

the one being the end of contemplation, the other the end of practice;

and the one the adversary of falsehood, the other of wickedness.

Hence, together with your successful accomplishment of the virtues, the comprehension of the divine dogmas has been joined to you;

held together by the abundance of knowledge and by the power of demonstration;

[Editorial note, not part of the text: there is likewise an indication of the Patrologia page number (marked by ==) whenever the text derives from there.]

having discerned what had been proposed concerning the wills, and having rejected it — [the claim] of those who say that will and wish and counsel and choice and gnome are all identical with one another;

and likewise authority, and opinion, and prudence — differing from one another only in name;

and that there will come to be one will of God and of the saints;

and on this account affirming and insisting that Christ has a single will of deliberate choice;

you were not content with yourself alone for the confirmation of what had been rightly judged, on account of your innate poverty of spirit;

but you deemed me also worthy — though I was reared in a plain, unlearned condition — to be taken as one concurring in what you had rightly come to know,

and I, overcome as I am by the reward of ready obedience,

shall make, of each of these matters in order, a brief and, as it were, definitive account;

not inscribing words of my own;

for how could I, who am destitute of these things — but rather gathering as gleanings the words labored over by others concerning these matters;

these things differ from one another —

I mean, both in name and in reality.

ON THE NATURAL WILL, THAT IS, THE ACT OF WILLING. For the natural will, that is, the act of willing, is a faculty appetitive of that which exists according to nature;

and one that holds together all the properties that essentially belong to the nature.

For essence, being naturally held together by this [faculty], desires to be, and to live, and to move according to sense and intellect, longing for its own natural and complete beingness.

For nature has been constituted as one that wills itself, and all things which by nature serve to constitute it;

being appetitively attached to the principle of its own being, according to which it exists and has come to be.

They say that will is a rational and vital appetite;

and that deliberate choice is a deliberative appetite for the things that are in our power.

The act of willing, therefore, is not deliberate choice;

since the act of willing is a certain simple appetite, rational and vital,

whereas deliberate choice is a conjunction of appetite, counsel, and judgment.

For first we desire, then we deliberate;

and having deliberated, we judge;

and having judged, we choose the better, as shown by the judgment, over the worse.

and the one [the act of willing] depends only on things natural;

whereas the other [deliberate choice] depends only on things that are in our power and that can come to be through us.

Deliberate choice, therefore, is not the act of willing.

ON WISH. But neither is deliberate choice wish.

For wish is a notional appetite for things both in our power and not in our power;

that is, one formed by discursive thought alone.

And the notional appetite belongs to the discursive faculty alone, without the deliberative reason concerning the things in our power;

whereas deliberate choice is a deliberative appetite for the practicable things that are in our power.

The statement of this definition alone, then, having shown the difference between these, would suffice to stop the contentiousness of those who argue to excess;

and [to stop] those who — I know not how to say it with due courtesy — plainly contradict what has been rightly known.

But since those eager to learn desire, in some measure, to attend to the matters sought through a fuller treatment, we shall speak of it also in another way.

Those who have made distinctions concerning these matters say:

It is not the case that, for all things to which choosing is fitting, wishing is also altogether fitting.

For we say that we wish to be healthy, and to be rich, and to be made immortal;

but we do not say that we choose to be rich, and to be healthy, and to be made immortal;

since wish concerns both things possible and things impossible;

whereas deliberate choice concerns only things possible, and things that can come to be through us.

And again, wish pertains to the end;

whereas deliberate choice pertains to the things that lead to the end.

They say, then, that the object of wish is the end;

and that the object of deliberation is that which leads to the end;

for example, the means to health.

The same proportion, then, which the object of wish has to the object of deliberation, wish is said to have to deliberate choice;

since we choose only those things which we think can come to be through us.

But we wish also for things that cannot come to be through us.

And it will be shown, moreover, that deliberate choice is not deliberation, that is, counsel, either.

ON COUNSEL, THAT IS, DELIBERATION. They say that counsel, that is, deliberation, is an inquiring appetite arising concerning some practicable thing among those that are in our power.

And the object of choice is that which has been judged as a result of counsel.

But choice concerns the things already preferred by judgment.

And this is clear not from the definition alone, but also from the etymology.

For that which is an object of choice is that which is chosen in preference to another.

But no one prefers a thing without having first deliberated;

Choice, therefore, is not deliberation, that is, the act of deliberating.

ON CHOICE. They say that choice is a deliberative desire for the practicable things that are in our power.

For choice is something mixed, and compounded of many elements;

composed of desire, deliberation, and judgment.

For choice does not consist in any one of these considered by itself;

for it is neither desire alone by itself, nor deliberation alone, nor judgment alone;

but it is compounded of these, just as man, as we know him, is composed of soul and body.

For it is then that choice comes to be, and the thing preferred through deliberation—the very thing that choice concerns—becomes an object of choice, when it takes on desire.

Necessarily, then, choice concerns, after judgment, the very things that deliberation concerned before judgment.

For those things we choose are the very things concerning which we deliberate.

CONCERNING WHAT THINGS WE DELIBERATE. We deliberate about the things that are in our power and can come to be through us;

and that have an uncertain outcome.

Now 'in our power' is stated, since we deliberate only concerning practicable things;

for we do not deliberate concerning self-subsistent wisdom.

For we deliberate neither concerning God, nor concerning the things that happen of necessity and always in the same way;

such as the cyclical motion of the seasons;

nor concerning the things that do not always exist, but that always come to pass in the same manner, such as the rising and setting of the sun;

nor concerning the things that occur by nature, yet not always in the same manner, but for the most part;

such as a sixty-year-old man turning grey, or a twenty-year-old growing a beard;

nor concerning the things that occur by nature, but indeterminately, now in one way, now in another;

such as rains, droughts, and hail.

since indeed we do not deliberate concerning all men (all human affairs), nor concerning every matter;

nay, not even concerning all the things that are in our power and come to be through us;

but it is necessary also to add: 'and that have an uncertain outcome.'

For if a thing is manifest and agreed upon, we no longer deliberate concerning it;

even though it is in our power, and comes to be through us.

It has also been shown that deliberation concerns not the end, but the things that lead to the end.

For we do not deliberate to become rich as such;

but how, and by what means, we shall become rich.

And, to speak concisely, we deliberate only concerning those things whose performance is equally possible either way;

and that is equally possible which we are able both to do, and also its opposite.

But if we were able to do only one of two opposites, this one would be agreed upon as beyond doubt;

while the opposite would be impossible.

For instance, when bread and a stone are set before someone, no one deliberates as to which of the two he will make his food;

the latter being clearly impossible.

These, then, are the things we choose—the things equally possible, concerning which we also deliberate.

ON GNOME. But choice is not the same as gnome, even though most people readily suppose this;

since indeed they say that gnome is an inherent desire for the things in our power, out of which choice arises;

or a disposition toward the things in our power that have been deliberated with desire.

after which—or, more properly speaking, out of which—choice arises.

Gnome, then, stands in the same relation to choice as habit stands to operation.

ON POWER. But choice is not power either.

For choice, as I have often said, is a deliberative desire for the practicable things in our power;

whereas power is a lawful mastery over the practicable things in our power;

or an unhindered mastery over the use of the things in our power;

or an unenslaved desire for the things in our power.

Power, then, and choice are not the same;

since indeed it is by power that we choose;

but it is not by choice that we exercise power;

and the one, choice, is only selected;

whereas the other, power, makes use of the things in our power, and of the things concerned with the things in our power, that is, of choice, judgment, and deliberation.

For it is by power that we deliberate, and judge, and choose, and are set in motion, and make use of the things in our power.

Now they say that irrational opinion is a simple and ready-at-hand knowledge;

as when someone puts forward an opinion belonging to another, without knowing its cause.

For instance, saying that the soul is immortal, without giving a demonstrative cause of its immortality.

But rational opinion, they say, is knowledge constituted through the completion of discursive reasoning;

as when someone, having reasoned through something, also renders its cause with scientific demonstration.

For example, someone proposes to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, and says:

Since the soul is self-moved;

and the self-moved is ever-moving;

and the ever-moving is immortal;

Since the soul is incomposite;

and the incomposite is indissoluble;

and the indissoluble is immortal;

and he proceeds from the premises, through the syllogisms, to the conclusions, and thus produces rational opinion.

And again, opinion concerns not only the things in our power, but also the things not in our power;

But choice concerns only the things that are up to us;

And we call opinion both true and false;

but choice we do not call true or false;

and opinion concerns universals;

but choice concerns particulars;

for choice concerns things that can be done;

For if opinion, being constituted by the completion of discursive thought, is knowledge;

while choice is a deliberative desire for the things that can be done and are up to us, choice is not the same as opinion.

CONCERNING DISPOSITION, THAT IS, PRUDENCE. But neither is choice the same as disposition, that is, prudence,

if indeed they call prudence a contemplative desire for rational and cognitive branches of learning;

or a state that stands opposed to both mindlessness and to excess of intellection;

whereas choice, as the reasoned account has variously set forth, is a deliberative desire for the things that are up to us.

And they say that prudence comes about in the following manner:

the intellection concerning something they call a notion;

and this notion, when it persists and imprints the soul with respect to the thing being thought, is called reflection;

and reflection, when it remains fixed upon the same thing and scrutinizes itself, is named prudence;

and prudence, when it is broadened, produces reasoning—

called by those skilled in these matters the inward word—

which, in defining it, they say is a most complete movement of the soul occurring within the discursive faculty, without any vocal utterance;

from which they say the uttered word proceeds.

And again they say that disposition is the knowledge of the thing thought about, which comes to be in the one possessing prudence as a result of prudence;

for they speak of prudence, and the object of prudence, and the one capable of prudence, and disposition.

And prudence is the relation;

the object of prudence is the thing thought about;

and disposition is the knowledge, arising from prudence in the one capable of prudence, of the thing thought about.

If, then, this is so;

but choice is not so;

then choice is not disposition.

But if they should say that they are altogether identical with one another, because desire—that is, the appetitive power of nature—is predicated of all of them equally as a genus;

let them also say that all the species too—both land-dwelling, winged, and aquatic—are identical with one another, because 'animal,' as the more generic term, is predicated of all of them equally as a genus; then the ordering of the whole universe will vanish for them,

there being no real subsistence of things that differ, but only a manifestation of empty names.

[...] GOD. Choice, then, having taken up impulse and use with regard to the things that are up to us, is the terminus of the rational movement of desire in us,

for that which is rational by nature possesses as a natural power the rational desire, which they also call the willing of the noetic soul—

for they say that wish is not the simply natural desire, but the particular one;

that is, the willing directed toward some particular object;

and one who wishes seeks;

and one who considers deliberates;

and one who makes use [of a thing] ceases from the appetitive movement toward it.

For no one makes use [of a thing] without having first been impelled toward it;

and no one is impelled without having chosen;

and no one chooses without having judged;

and no one judges without having deliberated;

and no one deliberates without having considered;

and no one considers without having sought;

and no one seeks without having wished;

and no one wishes without having reasoned;

and no one reasons without desiring;

and no one desires rationally without being rational by nature.

Man, then, being by nature a rational animal, is capable of desire, and capable of reasoning, and capable of wishing, and capable of seeking, and capable of considering, and capable of choosing, and capable of impulse, and capable of use.

But if, along with the rest, man is also by nature an animal capable of choice;

and choice concerns the things that are up to us, and that are able to come about through us, and that have an uncertain outcome;

and up to us also is the principle of the virtues, being the law of the powers according to nature, actively at work;

and also the mode arising from the misuse of these same powers, which gives subsistence to the passions contrary to nature;

therefore everyone who is by nature capable of choice is both receptive of opposites and able to judge between them.

But if he is able to judge between opposites, then he is altogether capable of choice as well;

and if he is capable of choice, inasmuch as the movement toward either alternative lies within his own power, he is not by nature immutable.

As for matters that are ambiguous: once the self-subsistent truth, manifest to all, has been demonstrated, choice—which is moved through the intermediate things that are also up to us—no longer exists;

because judgment, too, no longer exists—the judgment that draws a distinction between opposites, of which we choose the better in preference to the worse.

But if, then, according to the law of nature that now prevails, choice does not exist once every ambiguity concerning existing things has passed away, there will remain, for those who are thus by nature capable of desire, only an active noetic desire,

having ineffably laid hold only of the mystical enjoyment of that which is desirable according to nature, toward which it had, through the stages enumerated, its movement;

of which the satiety consists in the unending intensification, unto infinity, of the very desire of those who enjoy it;

each one participating, in a manner surpassing nature, to the very extent that he longed [for it];

and there will be an immediate commingling with that very thing which is by nature desired.

But if to the extent that one has longed, to that extent he will participate in the thing longed for,

then, according to the principle of nature, the willing of all will be shown to be one;

but according to the mode of movement, it will be shown to be diverse.

But if, according to the mode of movement, the willing of all men is not one;

then never, in every mode, will the willing of God and of those being saved become one, as it has seemed to some;

even though the thing willed is one for both God and the saints—namely, the salvation of those who are being saved—

being a divine purpose, as the end of all the ages conceived beforehand.

Concerning this, an agreement will come about, according to the act of willing, both among those who are being saved with one another and with God who saves;

God — who fills all things by the measure of grace — comprehending the whole generically in all, and each particular thing individually;

and being fulfilled in all, after the manner of members, according to the proportion of the faith present in each of those who have been united by nature to him;

For if the will of God is by nature that which saves, while that of men is by nature that which is saved, then that which by nature saves and that which by nature is saved could never be the same;

even though the aim of both is one — the salvation of all —

put forward, on the one hand, by God,

and chosen, on the other, by the saints.

But if the divine and the human will are to be the same and numerically one, according to those who say this — since God brought all the ages into existence by will — then the choir of the saints too will be creator by the same will, whether natural or gnomic;

and, simply put, by that will through which they are by nature identified with the divine;

which is absurd, and, I think, the work of a mind alone that is wandering.

For [this would hold] so long as not all are creators, or apostles alone, or prophets alone;

and again, among these, either Peter alone, or Moses alone;

and so long as there are not many mansions but one, with God and the Father, for the saints;

[it would follow that] the human will, moved by imitation toward the will that is good by nature, is the same as it in natural quality and quantity — which is impossible (for how could that which by nature participates be the same as that which by nature is participated in?); it is impossible that there be, in every respect, one gnome of both God and the choir of the saints;

even though, as I said, the thing willed by both is one — the salvation of all —

around which the union of the wills takes place.

But, it seems, being unaware of what sort of absurd reasoning arises for them from what they say, they thoughtlessly allow their own mind to be carried toward things to which it ought not be carried.

For if the will, however it is conceived or spoken of, is not unrelated, and yet does not have the category of relation predicated of it,

it is a quality — though not one of those existing in themselves, since it is evidently contemplated in another.

But if the will belongs to those things contemplated in another, it is altogether an accident;

and if an accident, it will be characteristic either of essence or of hypostasis (for between these there is nothing intermediate considered in itself, that is, participating in neither, or composed of both);

and if of essence, they will be predicating one nature of both God and the saints —

all things having undergone, through the one will, a contraction into one essence.

For that which is predicated generically and equally of certain things is indicative of the essence under which they fall.

But if of hypostasis, there will be one hypostasis of both God and the saints, all being fused together into the same,

for that which is implanted in a hypostasis, if it is contemplated identically in others without variation, confounds all with one another,

and renders the principle of how each exists wholly indiscernible.

Therefore, since their reasoning has proved weak in these matters,

then neither, in passing over to our Lord and God and Savior of all, Christ, and contriving to establish one will, however styled, in him, could it ever prove strong.

For if they should call this will of Christ natural, they will thereby be shown to be afflicted with the Manichaean fantasy, since they proclaim one nature of Christ — which neither is nor shall ever be — as signified by a corresponding will;

and they will at once be caught emulating both the madness of Arius and the consubstantiation of Apollinaris,

as though they had estranged Christ, in respect of essence, from God the Father and from the immaculate Mother.

For the natural will characterizes a nature;

and if it characterizes a nature, it is clear that those who say this are proclaiming Christ as a nature.

But if Christ is a nature, he is truly neither God by nature, nor indeed man by nature,

since the Father is not truly Christ by nature, nor is the Mother truly Christ by nature.

But if Christ is God by nature, insofar as he is Christ by nature, then whoever says this holds to many gods,

positing one nature of the Father as God, since the Father is not by nature Christ,

and another nature of Christ, maintaining him to be God, since he is by nature Christ;

and the end of such a monstrous tale, for them, will be condemnation to polytheism.

But if [the will] is one of deliberate choice, which they call gnomic, it will altogether be either according to nature, having the mode of the use of the things practicable in Christ concurring throughout with the principle of nature —

in which case Christ will be shown, according to them, not to be impassible, but rather merely self-controlled amid the passions,

and good by progress, whatever he may be by nature;

for such is deliberate choice according to nature with respect to the practicable things pertaining to the one who chooses — making the better choiceworthy in preference to the worse —

or else [it will be] contrary to nature, and will show the mode of the use of the things pertaining to him to have become destructive of the principle of nature,

for such is deliberate choice contrary to nature with respect to the practicable things pertaining to the one who chooses — making the worse preferable in preference to the better.

For once the judgment of the one who chooses, made by deliberation concerning the things practicable that pertain to him — of which deliberate choice is, so to speak, the casting vote — has either been rightly directed or has gone astray, either the principle according to nature comes to subsist in him through right use, or the mode contrary to nature comes to subsist alongside through misuse;

while he becomes the messenger of the deliberate choice that is contrary to nature.

And if the deliberate choice of Christ were according to nature, we would not only accuse them again on the same grounds, for rashly contriving another nature of Christ intermediate between the Godhead and creation,

but we would also laugh at their nonsense, since, after the manner of Nestorius, they make Christ receptive by deliberate choice of things naturally opposed, as though he were a mere man.

But if it is contrary to nature — I pass over the blasphemy in silence, lest, unawares, in the very refutations against them, I should defile my tongue.

For in asserting that the will in Christ is one of deliberate choice, they have altogether shown the hypostasis of Christ to be capable of moving both according to nature and contrary to nature,

for such, as I have already said, is deliberate choice;

and if it is characteristic of the hypostasis of Christ, then by this very will they have marked him off from the Father and the Spirit as one of a different will and a different mind.

For that which is contemplated particularly in the Son according to hypostasis is wholly incommunicable to the Father and the Spirit according to hypostasis.

As many, then, of the holy Fathers as have made mention of deliberate choice with regard to the humanity in Christ have thereby indicated, essentially, the appetitive power of nature —

signifying that it is our own deliberate choice that inheres, by appropriation, in the God who became flesh.

This, above all, your servant and disciple, having considered, called ‘deliberate choice’ in the work addressed to my most holy lord and teacher, Thalassius, concerning the difficulties of Holy Scripture,

knowing that, if the Maker of men became man for our sake, he has evidently also, for our sake, secured the immutability of deliberate choice, as the creator of immutability —

receiving, on the one hand, essentially and by his own authority, through actual experience, the passions that belong to our punishment,

and taking up, on the other hand, out of love for mankind, by appropriation, the passions that belong to dishonor —

of which he made the appropriation the cause, for our race, of impassibility in deliberate choice,

and bestowed the experience as a faithful pledge of the natural incorruption that follows.

For the human [will] of God has not been moved by deliberate choice as ours is — [a choice] effected through deliberation and judgment discerning between opposites —

lest it be thought mutable by nature in respect of deliberate choice;

but, having received its very existence together with its union to God the Word, it possessed, as its natural appetitive movement — that is, its act of willing — a movement undoubting, or rather, at rest;

or, to speak more properly, it possessed in itself a rest unmoved, wholly deified by God the Word according to the most pure essential union;

which he, forming and moving naturally as his own, and as the natural [movement] of his own soul, fulfilled, without illusion, the great mystery of the dispensation on our behalf,

having diminished nothing whatsoever that is natural to the assumed [humanity], save sin alone —

the principle of which has never once been sown in any of the things that exist.

Now that the difference of the names has become clear to us, through the definition clearly fitted to each, let us not be troubled when we hear those who use the names indiscriminately, unto the confusion of the things conceived;

since truth for us lies in the things themselves, and not in names;

nor let us suppose that what is not the same is the same;

but believing in accordance with piety, let us confess that Christ is truly perfect God and truly perfect man, the same one existing so in reality, properly, and according to truth, and not being called this by a mere bare title;

and therefore, since he is not without flesh, let us proclaim him to have two natures, of which he himself is the hypostasis;

and two natural wills, according to the Fathers;

since he is not without soul and without mind, let us boldly declare that he possesses these;

and let us not presume to coin a new expression, for which we have no refuge in the authority of the Fathers.

For that Christ has one will — whether natural or of choice — is a thing that those zealous for piety fear to say, not only on account of the absurdity already demonstrated, but also because none of the saints has ever been shown to have said this;

knowing truly that deliberate choice belongs to things capable of moving toward both alternatives —

I mean, both the good and the evil — belonging to things capable of being moved toward either;

which, applied to Christ — who is truly the essence and source of the good things — is, even to conceive, let alone to say, utterly filled with every impiety.

So much, then, concerning these matters.

But concerning the "one operation" set down in the seventh chapter of the Ambigua on the great Gregory, the explanation is clear:

for, describing the condition that shall belong to the saints in the age to come, I said that there is one operation of God and of the saints — the operation that deifies all the saints — belonging to the blessedness that is hoped for;

belonging to God according to essence, but having come to belong to the saints according to grace.

Or rather, I added that it belongs to God alone;

since the deification of the saints according to grace is the effect of the divine operation alone, whose power we do not have implanted in our nature.

But of those things whose power we do not possess, neither do we possess the act, which is the fulfillment of a natural power.

The act, then, is dependent upon power;

and power is dependent upon essence; for the act proceeds from power, and power proceeds from essence and exists in essence.

These three, then, as they say, are bound to one another:

the capable [subject], power, and the possible.

And they call the capable [subject] the essence;

power, that by which we have the movement of being able;

and the possible, that which is by nature apt to come to be by us according to power.

But that which is by nature apt to come to be by us, we possess according to natural power.

But deification is not among the things by nature apt to come to be by us according to power, since it is not among the things that are in our power;

for there is, within nature, no principle of the things above nature.

Deification, then, is not an act of our power, since we do not possess the power for it according to nature;

but is an act of divine power alone, not existing as a recompense for the righteous works of the saints;

but as a demonstration of the bounty of him who made them;

seeing that he, by an act of gracious institution, has made the lovers of the good to be that which he himself is by nature — as shall be shown, according to principles that he himself knows —

so that he might be both perfectly known, and remain utterly incomprehensible.

I did not, then, abolish the natural operation of those who shall undergo this deification — an operation which has by nature ceased from what it was apt to accomplish — but showed it only as undergoing the enjoyment of the good things;

but indicated only that it is the supra-essential power, productive of deification, which has come to belong to the deified according to grace.

And let no one suppose from this that one operation of Christ is being proclaimed.

For we do not proclaim Christ as a man who has been deified, but as God who became perfectly man, and who has made manifest the infinite — infinite, infinite-times infinitely supra-infinite — power of his own ineffable Godhead, through flesh that is by nature operative and intellectually ensouled;

the same one being wholly God, and truly man;

the same one perfect and most complete in both natures;

possessing without deficiency everything whatsoever that is natural according to both natures, sin excepted, of which there is no principle in nature.