駁歐諾米 第 1 章 第 13/56 段

If, then, bearing these two into the essence of God, they shall attribute them to it — I mean the 'endless' and the 'unoriginate' — they will demonstrate their God to be a concurrence of two contrary and discordant things.

For the contrariety of the end to the beginning is exhibited by the very meaning that is opposed to each of these, and in its own right.

For the things contrary to opposites are altogether contrary to one another as well.

And the statement is true, that all things which by nature are set against those that are contrarily disposed, these also have contrariety toward one another, as one may see in the examples.

Water stands against fire;

therefore also the powers destructive of these will be contrary to one another.

For if moisture is what extinguishes fire, and dryness is what destroys water, the qualities opposed to these have preserved in themselves also the contrariety of water to fire, so that moisture is confessed to be contrarily disposed to the dry.

So then, in this way too, since the beginning and the end are oppositely disposed, the names opposed to these also war against one another in their notion — I mean the 'unoriginate' and the 'endless.'

saying that his essence is circumscribed in the 'unoriginate' alone, but no longer extending it to the 'endless';

but if, bearing both into the account of the essence, they shall lay them down, they will declare nothing other than that it is composed of contraries, in the aforesaid manner, being split according to essence into the 'endless' and the 'unoriginate' by the contrariety of the end to the beginning.

And thus their God is found to be a manifold and composite thing, hammered together out of certain contraries.

But neither is there, nor let there ever come to be, such a doctrine in the Church of God, as to declare the Simple and Uncompounded to be not only manifold and varied, but even composed of contraries.

For the simplicity of the doctrines of the truth posits God as being that which He is: unable to be comprehended by name, or by thought, or by any other apprehending concept; remaining higher than every apprehension, not only human but also angelic and all supramundane; ineffable and unutterable and above all signification by words, having one name that makes known His proper nature — that He alone is above every name;

which indeed has also been granted to the Only-begotten, because all things that the Father has are the Son's as well.

But the word of piety confesses that these utterances are indicative of His eternity, not of His essence — I mean the 'unbegotten' and the 'endless' — since the 'unbegotten' indicates that no beginning and cause lies above Him, while the 'endless' signifies that His kingdom will be brought to a stand at no limit.

'For You are the same,' it says, 'and Your years shall not fail' — by the 'You are' signifying that He does not subsist from any cause, and by what follows setting forth the unceasing and endless blessedness of His life.

But perhaps someone even of the more cautious, having attended to what we have examined concerning the 'eternal,' will say that it is difficult to pass through the discourse concerning the Only-begotten without stumbling by means of what has been said.

For, of two doctrines that are at variance, the argument will be brought to one.

For either we shall establish that the Son too is unbegotten — which is absurd — or we shall not concede eternity to Him — which is proper to blasphemers.

For if eternity is known by the 'unoriginate' and the 'endless,' there is every necessity either to be impious by not confessing the eternity of the Son, or to be carried away into the supposition of unbegottenness in one's surmises concerning the Only-begotten.

What, then, do we say? If he who beholds the Father of the Son beforehand, by the account of causality alone, were setting up some temporal appearance prior to the subsistence of the Only-begotten, our account of the eternity concerning the Son would reasonably be endangered.

But as it is, the 'once not to be' does not admit of application to the pre-eternal nature — equally and alike both to the life of the Father and to that of the Only-begotten [and indeed to the confession of the Holy Spirit as well];

for where there is no time, the 'once' too is done away with.

But if the Son is ever apprehended as being, appearing together with the notion concerning the Father, what fear is there in witnessing eternity to the Only-begotten, to Him who has neither beginning of days nor end of life? For as light from light, and life from life, and from good, good, and wise and just and mighty, and all the rest likewise — from such a one, such a one — so also from the eternal He is altogether eternal.

But the contentious and quarrelsome man snatches up the argument, alleging that this sequence makes the 'unbegotten' also to be surmised from the unbegotten.

But let the one who contends be sober in heart and attend to his own words: that he who confesses the Son to be from the Father has dismissed the supposition of unbegottenness in the case of the Only-begotten, and there is no fear attending upon calling Him both eternal and not unbegotten.

For that the being of the Son is not bounded by any temporal interval, but that both before the ages and after them the infinitude of His life is poured out on every side, He is properly named by the appellation of 'eternal';

and that again, being and being called Son, He gives the notion of the Father to be contemplated together with Himself in conjunction, He has thereby escaped seeming to be in an unbegotten manner, ever being together with the ever-being Father — as that God-inspired utterance of our teacher also said, that being conjoined in a begotten manner to the unbegottenness of the Father.

The same account holds for us concerning the Holy Spirit as well, having its difference in the order alone.

For as the Son is conjoined to the Father, and, having His being from Him, is not later in respect of existence, so again the Holy Spirit holds to the Only-begotten, the subsistence of the Spirit being beheld beforehand, by the account of causality, in thought alone;

but the temporal extensions have no place in the pre-eternal life.

So that, the account of causality being set aside, the Holy Trinity is in nothing discordant with itself.

Now the first of the contests against Eunomius has already been sufficiently accomplished, by divine alliance, in our earlier labours, as is available to those who wish to learn from our very toils how in the former of the discourses the deceit has been refuted with all might, and how the falsehood has no strength any longer against the truth in the matters examined — at least for those who are not too vehemently shameless toward the truth.

But since a second labour against piety, like some robber band, has been mustered together by him, again, with God fighting on our side through us, the truth arms herself against the array of the enemies, like some general leading the van of our discourses and directing them as seems good to her against the foes; and following in her tracks we shall, taking courage, venture upon the second of the contests, in no way dismayed at the array of falsehood, even if it should appear in a multitude of words;

for faithful is He who promised that a thousand shall be pursued by one, and myriads put to flight by two — inasmuch as it is piety, and not multitude of hands, that holds the might in war.

For just as the fleshy Goliath, brandishing that heavy spear against the Israelites, brought no cowardice upon a man who was a shepherd and untrained in the agility of war, but grappling with him in the battle became headless, his hope being turned to the contrary — in the same manner also our Goliath, the leader of the alien knowledge, thrusting out his blasphemy like some drawn and naked broadsword against those arrayed against him, and glittering withal with newly-whetted sophisms, did not appear terrible and hard to withstand to us laymen, so that he might, as by right, exult in the wilderness of any who oppose him;

but he found us to be improvised warriors from the Lord's flock — men who had neither learned to wrangle in words nor deemed it a loss not to have learned, men who slung against him the plain and rustic word of the truth.

For he who is severed from the faith has his head cut off, even more than the alien had.

For since the head of every man is Christ, as the Apostle says, and it is altogether reasonable that the believer be named a 'man' (for surely Christ would not be the head of the unbelievers either), the one who is cut off from the saving faith would altogether be headless, like Goliath, being divided from the true Head by his own sword which he whetted against the truth — which head it is not our task to cut off from him, but to show it as already cut off.

And let no one suppose that it is out of some love of glory and desire for human honour that I readily descend to grapple with the enemy in this truceless and heraldless war.

For if it were possible to spend life quietly and free from trouble in a peaceable existence, it would be far from what is right to disturb the quiet willingly, stirring up against our very selves a self-chosen war by provocation.

each one; so also altogether the punishment upon the neglect of the labours according to one's power.

And just as in human wars those who surpass the rest in courage and strength, and who, secured with weapons and having acquired the experience of warfare by their exercises against dangers, stand at the front of the phalanx, braving danger before those stationed in the depth, while the rest of the throng, contributing only to the appearance of a multitude, seem by their very shield-wall to bring some gain to the common cause — so also in our contests, the noble soldier of Christ and vehement combatant against the aliens, the great man-at-arms of the Spirit, Basil, who has put on the apostolic panoply and, secured with the shield of faith, ever holds forth the defensive weapon, I mean the sword of the Spirit — he indeed fights in the van of the Lord's army in the discourse toiled out against the heresy, both living and defending and playing the hero against the enemies; while we, the multitude, hiding ourselves beneath the shield of the champion of the faith, will not abstain from the contests according to our power, wherever the general leads the way against the foes.

Since, then, that man, in refuting the deceived and unsubstantial fancy of the heresy, says that the appellation of 'unbegottenness' is in no other way than by conception applied to God, and adduced his demonstrations secured both by the common notions and by the testimonies of Scripture, while Eunomius, the inventor of the deceit, neither agrees with what has been said nor is able forcefully to overturn it, but, being hemmed in by the truth — the more brilliantly the doctrine of piety shines forth, the more, like the nocturnal animals, he is dim-sighted toward the light, and, not finding even the accustomed hiding-holes of his sophisms, he wanders in vain and, entering into the impassable maze of falsehood, is coiled about the same things, and almost the whole of his second labour is occupied with this drivel — for this reason it is well that our battle against those arrayed against us should take place in this very matter, in which our champion also took the lead by his own discourse.

But first I say that we must run over in summary the whole of our own supposition concerning the doctrines and the disagreement of the enemies toward us, so that the examination of the matters before us may proceed for us along the way.

This, then, is the sum of the piety of Christians: to believe that the Only-begotten God, who is Truth and true Light and the Power of God and Life, is truly all that He is said to be — both the other things, and, before the others, these;

God and Truth, that is, being ever truly God — that which He is thought and named — and neither ever not being nor ever going to not be; whose 'being,' whatever it is according to essence, escapes every apprehending approach and inquisitiveness.

But for us, as somewhere the word of Wisdom says, from the greatness and beauty of created things there comes, by a certain analogy of the things known, a coming to the knowledge of His being — granting only faith through the operations, not the knowledge of what He is.

This notion, then, having prevailed among all Christians who are truly worthy of this name — I mean those who, having learned from the Law to worship nothing that is not true God, by the very act of worshipping confess the Only-begotten God to be in truth God and not a God falsely so named — there came the corrupting blight of the Church, which renders useless the pious seeds of the faith, the advocate of the Jewish deceit, having also something of the Greek godlessness.

For in fashioning a created God it becomes the advocate of the deceit of the Greeks, while in not receiving the Son it establishes the Jewish error.

with (the truth) shining round about, these murky notions have no foothold; disregarding all the names found by Scripture for some God-befitting doxology — names spoken alike of the Father and of the Son — they came upon the name of 'unbegottenness,' which was fabricated by these very men for the setting-aside of the majesty of the Only-begotten God.

For, whereas the pious confession lays down as doctrine faith in the Only-begotten God, 'that all may honour the Son even as they honour the Father,' these men, having thrust aside all the pious utterances by which the majesty of the Son is signified as of equal honour with the dignity of the Father, thence devise for themselves the principles and hypotheses of their godless transgression concerning the doctrine.

For since the Only-begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is from Him, they, having transferred this notion into other names, through those names tear apart the true faith.

For, whereas the truth teaches that the Father is not from any superior cause, these men named such a notion 'unbegottenness,' and they signify the subsistence of the Only-begotten from the Father by the word of 'begetting'; then, having combined the two utterances — 'unbegottenness' and 'begetting,' which are contradictorily opposed to one another — they thence mislead the senseless among their followers.

For 'it was begotten' and 'it was not begotten,' to clarify the matter by an example, are of the same sort as 'he is seated' and 'he is not seated,' and all the expressions that are said after this manner.

But these men, wresting such expressions away from the meaning that naturally belongs to the words, contend to fasten upon them another sense, for the overthrow of true religion.

For since, as has been said, the meaning of the words 'he is seated' and 'he is not seated' is not equivalent (for in one of the two things signified the other is in a manner abolished), they craftily argue that this opposition regarding the form of utterance is indicative of a difference according to essence, defining begetting to be the essence in the one case and non-begetting in the other.

And yet, just as it is not possible to reckon a man's sitting or not sitting to be the essence of the man (for one would not give the same account when defining a man's seat and when defining the man himself), so too the unbegotten essence, according to the analogy of the example we have given, is by its own proper account something altogether other than what is signified by its not having been begotten.

But these men, looking to that wicked aim of theirs—that the denial of the divinity of the Only-begotten might be most firmly established for them—do not say that the essence of the Father exists in an unbegotten manner, but reversing the argument they define unbegottenness itself to be the essence, so that by the contrast with what is begotten they may, through the opposition of the names, construct a difference of nature.

And toward impiety they see with countless eyes, but toward the impossibility of their zeal in this matter they are dim-sighted, as though the eyes of their soul were closed.

For who, unless the perceptive faculties of his soul are altogether bleared, does not see through the instability and incoherence of the very foundation of their doctrine, and how their argument that makes unbegottenness to be essence rests upon nothing? For thus is their deception constructed.

I will state it as forcibly as I am able in my own words, putting forward the argument of our adversaries by way of objection.

They say that God is named unbegotten, that the Divine is simple in nature, and that what is simple admits of no composition.

If then God, to whom the name of the unbegotten belongs, is uncompounded according to nature, the term 'unbegotten' would be the name of the nature itself, and the nature is nothing other than unbegottenness.

To these men we say this: that the thing signified by 'uncompounded' is one thing, and that signified by 'unbegotten' is another.

For the one sets forth the simplicity of the subject, the other its not being from a cause; and the significations of the names do not interchange with one another, even though both are predicated concerning the one being.

But from the appellation 'unbegotten' we learned that he who is so named is without a cause, while from that of 'simple' we learned that he is pure of composition.

But neither of these is said in place of the other.

There is therefore no necessity that, because the Divine is simple in nature, its nature should be named unbegottenness.

Rather, insofar as it is without parts and uncompounded, it is called simple; but insofar as it was not begotten, it is called unbegotten.

But if the term 'unbegotten' does not signify being without a cause, but simplicity enters instead into the signification of such a name, and on this account, according to the reasoning of the sect, he is called unbegotten because he is simple and uncompounded—and if the signification of 'simple' and 'unbegotten' is one—then the simplicity of the Son too will assuredly be named unbegottenness.

They will not deny God the Only-begotten, unless indeed they should also deny that he is God.

Therefore simplicity, according to its signification, will have no fellowship with the unbegotten, such that on account of being uncompounded the nature should be called unbegottenness—lest they draw upon themselves one of two absurdities, either denying the divinity of the Only-begotten, or ascribing unbegottenness even to him.

For since the Divine is simple in nature, and, according to them, 'unbegotten' is the name of simplicity, either they will make the Son to be compounded—whereby it is jointly proved that he is not even God—or, if they should confess divinity in him, and the Divine is, as has been said, simple, they will assuredly make the same to be also unbegotten on account of his simplicity, if indeed simplicity is reckoned to be the same as unbegottenness.

But that what is said may become clearer, I will take up again what has been stated.

We say this: that to each of the names there underlies some proper thing signified, and neither is 'without parts' interpreted by 'unbegotten' nor 'unbegotten' by 'simple.'

But in 'simple' we understood the uncompounded, while in 'unbegotten' we were taught its not being from any cause.

And we think it right to believe that the Son, being God of God, is himself also simple, because the Divine is pure of all composition; and in the same way in his case too, that the simplicity of the essence is neither signified by the appellation 'Son,' nor again is the thing signified by 'Son' set forth by 'simplicity,' but from the former his subsistence from the Father is made manifest, and from 'simple' that which such a term expresses.

Since then the account of simplicity according to essence is one and the same, whether it be said of the Father or of the Son, differing neither by any diminution nor by any increase, but 'begotten' has, according to what is signified, much difference from 'unbegotten' (for it is possible to conceive in the one of the names that which is not in the other), on this account we say that there is no necessity, the Father being unbegotten, that because his essence is simple, his essence should be called unbegottenness.

For neither, though the Son is simple, and the same is believed also to be begotten, do we call the essence simplicity; but just as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also it is unbegotten and not unbegottenness.

In the same way, the Son being begotten, the argument is far removed from every necessity of defining his essence to be begetting because his essence is simple; but here too each of the names has its own proper signification.

For the appellation 'begotten' sets before you the being from something, and 'simple' the being freed from composition.

But these things do not seem so to those men.

For they wish that, since the essence of the Father is simple, it should be reckoned to be nothing other than unbegottenness, because he is also called unbegotten.

To these men this too may be said: that since they also name the Father Creator and Maker, and he who is so named is according to essence simple, it is high time for these wise men to declare creation and craftsmanship to be the essence of the Father, seeing that the argument from simplicity leads back to the essence every signification of the name that is predicated concerning him.

Either, then, let them separate unbegottenness from the definition of the divine essence, letting it remain within its own proper signification; or, if indeed on account of the simplicity of the subject they define the essence by unbegottenness, let them for the same reason contemplate creation and craftsmanship also in the essence of the Father—as though it were not the power in the essence that creates and fashions, but the power itself that is conceived to be a creature and a work of craft.

But if they cast this off as wicked and absurd, let them be persuaded by the sequence of reasoning to cast off that argument along with this one.

For as the essence of the Maker is not a work of craft, so neither is the essence of the unbegotten unbegottenness.

But for the sake of brevity and clarity I will take up the same argument again.

If it is not on account of not having been begotten, but on account of being a simple and uncompounded essence, that the Father is called unbegotten, then for this same reason the Son too will be named unbegotten.

For he too is an essence of one form and uncompounded.

But if we shall of necessity confess the Son to be begotten because he was begotten, it is clear that the Father too, because he was not begotten, we shall call unbegotten.

And if both truth and the sequence of the premises compel this, it is quite evident that 'unbegotten' is not the name of an essence, but is significative of a certain difference of concepts—that difference which distinguishes what has been begotten from what has not been begotten.

Then let us also examine this further, in addition to what has been said.

If we shall suppose that we are not being taught [the mere fact of not being begotten], but that this term is indicative of the nature itself—as it were flowing forth in some manner from the underlying reality, and by the utterance of its syllables uncovering the thing sought—then there is every necessity either that God is not unbegotten, or that he is not so called, since no term furnishes such a signification of him in a peculiar and proper way.

For if unbegottenness, as these men say, does not signify the being without a cause, but indicates the nature, their sophism will assuredly be turned round against themselves into its opposite, and 'unbegotten,' according to their own doctrine, will be found to escape and slip away from being said of God.

For since no other word or name sets forth the Father's not having been begotten, and since 'unbegotten,' according to their wisdom, interprets something else and not his not having been begotten, the argument is gone, and has flowed together with Sabellius, having slid down into his position with them.

For there is every necessity, through this sequence, that the Father should be reckoned to be the same as the Son, the difference according to 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' having been snapped off from their doctrine—so that one of two things follows: either they will withdraw their opinion concerning the name, as signifying a difference of the peculiarity of each and not a nature, or, remaining with what has come to be recognized concerning this term, they will agree with Sabellius.

For there is no way that the difference of the hypostases will have its unconfused character, unless it be distinguished by the begotten as over against the unbegotten.

So that if the name signifies a difference, the essence will be left unsignified by this appellation.

For the account of the difference is one thing, and that of the essence another.

But if they drag the signification of the term down toward the nature, they will consequently be drawn along into the deception of those called 'Son-Fathers,' the clear distinction according to the hypostases having been withdrawn from the argument.

But if they say that nothing prevents both that the contrast with the begotten should be signified by unbegottenness, and that it should also set forth the essence itself, let them distinguish for us the meanings that belong to the name, so as to be able properly to fit them to each of the two conceptions of 'unbegotten' after it has been cloven asunder.

For the disclosure of the difference from this name has no ambiguity, being established by the account of the contrast.

For, in place of 'the Son has been begotten and the Father has not been begotten,' that the one is called unbegotten and the other begotten, according to a certain derivation of words, we too consent.

But from what conception the demonstration of the essence will be made clear by means of this appellation, they would not be able to say.

But passing this over in silence, the new theologian goes through for us other pieces of nonsense, stringing them together in his foregoing composition.

'Because,' he says, 'being simple, God is called unbegotten, on this account God is unbegottenness.'

What has the account of simplicity in common with the notion of the unbegotten? For indeed the Only-begotten too is both begotten and is not disputed to be simple.

'But he is also,' he says, 'without parts and uncompounded.'

What has this too to do with the matter in question? For neither is the Son of many forms and composite, but nevertheless he is not on this account unbegotten.

'But he is also,' he says, 'alien to quantity and to magnitude.'

For indeed the Son too is unbounded in magnitude and without quantity, and nevertheless is Son.

But this is not the matter in question.

For what has been set forth is to be demonstrated: according to what signification of 'unbegotten' the essence is made known.

For just as from this term the account of the difference of the properties was apprehended, so I claimed that the indication of the being also should be beyond doubt, drawn from some one of the things signified by means of this same appellation.

But this he passes over in silence, and instead says that 'unbegotten' ought not to be ascribed to God by way of conception.

'For things so spoken,' he says, 'naturally dissolve together with the utterances.'

But which of the things spoken is not dissolved at the same moment as it is spoken? For we do not, like potters or brick-makers, preserve undissolved the things uttered by the voice according to some impression once made in the mouth of speech; rather, at the same moment that the word has been brought forth through the sound, the thing said no longer is.

For again, when the breath of the voice has been drawn back into the air, no trace of the things said has been impressed upon the place in which the diffusion of the voice took place.

So that if by this he characterizes the argument that is according to conception—namely, that no reasoning remains, but vanishes away together with the voice of the speaker—he would not be far from calling every argument a mere conception, since no subsistence remains in any reasoning after the utterance.

For not even unbegottenness itself, which he removes from conception, will he be able to show to be undissolved and stable after it has been uttered, since the saying that has been brought forth through the sound out of the mouth does not abide together in the air.

The notions will receive their marking by means of letters, but that which has no subsistence will have no share in the marking that is in letters.