I. WHAT IS GOD? God is that which no conception attains; for He is more than whatever can be said or thought. Yet let us say something which, though unequal to the task, may nevertheless agree by some reasoning with those things which seem worthy of God. For each nature, according to its capacity, forms a surmise concerning God, so that, as far as one nature is distant from another, so far is one opinion distant from another as to what God is. For since He is above all things, it is necessary that He surpass the minds of all. For men, as far as they can extend the keenness of their mind, perceive what God is by opinion, not by definition; the angels, however, who are superior to men, since they perceive something more concerning God, there is no doubt; the archangels indeed yet more amply;
but the cherubim and seraphim, who are said to be the powers nearest to God, perceive greater things concerning God, yet do not comprehend wholly what God is, for no one knows the Father except the Son, nor the Son except the Father. God therefore is, as it appears to men, a Spirit simple in nature, unapproachable light, invisible, inestimable, infinite, perfect, lacking nothing, eternal, immortal in every way, from whom all things have obtained their beginning; to be venerated, to be loved, to be feared; outside of whom there is nothing, nay rather, in whom are all things whatsoever that are above, below, highest and lowest; almighty, all-holding, truly rich in all things, since there is nothing that is not His; good, just, merciful: good, because He caused to exist the things that were not;
just, because the things He made, that they might advance, were left to their own free will of choice — since they are not so perfect that they cannot fall, He decreed that the seeds of law should be within them by nature, adding the aid of the revealed law, that its authority might be a means of progress for men —; but merciful, because He does not readily repay sinners, but bears with them, that He may pardon them when they are converted. He is also severe, that by fear the things well founded by Him may be preserved, lest negligence should bring forth the headlong ruin of life; and — that I may not pass over what is more wonderful — so great is His clemency that, having suffered insults from those whom He made, He endures them and is the first to call them to peace. Is not this of greater power than to have founded the creature?
If the creature were to remain in this, His excessive goodness would harm it. Hence sometimes He wills to be loved, sometimes to be feared, lest those wandering from Him should utterly perish. Hence it is that, lest His patience should be thought wholly contemptible — not indeed to His own loss, but altogether to ours — He says: 'I have held my peace; shall I always hold my peace?' Therefore God is good, and all the things He made are good. Whence then comes evil? There is no evil except the transgression of the good, when things not permitted are presumed, or things permitted are done in a disordered way, so that what is commanded in one place is done in another: as when what is permitted in a wife is done with a harlot; and what was to be offered to God is offered to the devil; and since one takes not his own, but another's; and when, though it is lawful to slay a transgressor, an innocent man is slain.
No nature, therefore, is proved to be evil. But the will is an accident of nature, conceived from causes, which is moved badly when it exceeds measure, so as to do those things which are not of its own nature. And the causes of transgression arise from the senses, when we see or hear something amiss. This error is wrought by the fact that man is not God, who alone cannot err. The nature of men, therefore, has been left to its own free will, that it may be able to do what it wills, so that if the exercise of it improves the good of its nature, it is a matter of honor; but if it weakens its own vigor, it is held worthy of dishonor of this kind. For it does what is against itself.
It is no small thing that has been granted to man, that when he follows the right, he may rejoice in himself through this, that he sees himself the better by his own work, or at least may reckon it to himself, since he, when he could, gave no effort to improve himself by good things. But if man were not in his own power, he would have been subject to necessity, so that he would have neither the glory of a good work nor the punishment of an evil one, but would have been one among the cattle.
Since therefore we were made capable of both — that through negligence we may sin, if what we ought to hear and see well, we hear and see badly, that is, outside nature and reason; but through the vigilance of nature we may guard the good — and we cannot always be on guard, because, as I have said, we were made capable of both: if we sin, we are not yet condemned, unless we sin again, now as it were ruined men. For he who has once sinned ought to repair himself, lest he sin anew, lest he be like to that which had conquered him; so that, if he sin no more, he is now held the superior, since, once cast down, he has twice triumphed. This is justice: that, since there is a wrestling in the world, he who is more inclined toward not sinning should be crowned.
Nothing therefore in God's work is evil; and if certain things are called evil by some — as poison, as darkness — since our bodies cannot bear the force of poison, it is called evil, as though they bore fire or water; and iron or lead, because it differs much from gold, is called evil. For in comparison with light they condemn darkness, though they know it to be necessary in its place, like lead or a potsherd. For surely they give rest after labor. Therefore everyone who wrestles in the world ought so to strive that he depart not vanquished in a hard struggle and become guilty, repairing himself scarcely or slowly, and perchance amid these things his end come, and he depart hence with sin.
For he who strives with all his strength, if perchance he be cast down, falls as a man, and no one is angry with him, but rather by some encouragement restores his spirit. For he saw that he had the purpose of conquering, and hopes that such a one can advance to victory, whom the enemy cast down not without weariness to himself. For he who is easily conquered has no spirit of resisting, nor is he conquered, but consents. This man sins more bitterly; such a one is scarcely to be admitted to pardon, who has the desire of transgressing. For he who takes thought lest he sin, even if he should sin, does not sin grievously. For upon the diligent lesser sins sometimes creep in unawares. For the lesser they are, the more subtle, and while they are despised, they are not avoided.
For the greater sins appear far off, and through this, he who sins in greater matters, the crime is of his own will. But since we have said above that sins take their origin from the senses, when, against the command of law or against reason, we look upon or hear something — that is, if, seeing the sun, we should think it to be adored on account of its beauty, then we see badly, because it pertains to the injury of the common Creator that what is owed to Him alone should be assigned to a creature, especially since it has been forbidden by Him through the law. Or when we see bodies well composed and comely, or if we covet anything of our neighbor's, we look upon them otherwise than the law commands, then the sin is committed which is called evil. But perhaps it may be said:
'Nothing beautiful ought to have been made, lest we should sin,' so that our safeguard might consist in the deformity of others; nor should there be iron, lest from it murders should be committed; nor should a lamp be in use, lest thieves use its light for breaking in — so that what is greatly useful to all should be lacking on account of the idle talk of certain men; whereas it is established that we always behold all things and yet do not always covet, because it is not their fault, but ours, when we are negligent. This is established by the interval of creation, because we are not what God is. So too we hear badly, if, hearing it, we consent that idols are gods, or if we lend an ear to those singing base things. But then we hear well, if, hearing of God that He is one, we take delight therein.
But if anyone, hearing something against the law, assents to it, he sins: this will be to hear badly. II. WHY GOD MADE THE WORLD. He made it because He is a maker; or let it be denied, if He is not. But the works themselves manifest His being. He made it therefore that there might be what before was not, since without doubt it is better to be than not to be. But it is said: 'Was there some empty space where He might make it, or what was there before, where He made it?' This 'vessel of election' resolves in few words. For he says, when speaking of God: 'In Him we live and move and have our being' — that is, that all things are in God, because He is everywhere and before all things alone, eternal, invisible to every creature.
And lest we should seem to have passed over the mystery, or rather to have been ignorant of why the world was made, we say that the apostasy of the devil drew with it many angels, that is, spiritual powers, into transgression, while he wished to claim a kingdom for himself by impious presumption. This the prophet Isaiah signifies, saying: 'How is Lucifer fallen from heaven, who rose in the morning?' — that is, who appeared more shining than the rest. For he was as it were the prince of many, among whom he was the more illustrious, in whose company he descended to the impious contest.
For seeing beneath himself many spiritual powers — since in the paradise of God he was the more excellent in the knowledge of the heavenly mystery — puffed up by that very elation, he wished to be called God, by that same reasoning, indeed, by which we see even in the present life certain men imitate his example: men who, by reason of a soldiery gathered around them through ostentation, being exalted by their satellites who furnished the kindling of conspiracy in this matter, wished to claim sovereignty for themselves. Hence it is that God, in order to destroy his presumption not by power but by reason, founded matter, which was the confusion of things, out of which He might make the world. For things distinguished, which together had been confused, furnished this adornment which we behold.
For when the substances were separated from one another, by their joining together it is called a world ('mundus'), because each several thing, set apart from another, appeared unto adornment ('mundum'); so that man, here placed, created from things above and things below — that is, from things heavenly and things earthly — might show forth the lordship of the one God, not by voice only, but also by the image whereby, being one, he was made by one God, from whom the rest should arise. For therefore did One make one, that He might teach that all things are from One, and through this that God is one; that the higher creature, to its own confusion, might learn in man, who is fashioned from earth, the truth. From this the devil became the enemy of man; for he perceived that man was made for his accusation.
Hence by his subtlety he wrought this, that he might lead man into the same transgression into which he himself had rushed, that he might make his accuser a partaker of his own damnation. For by transgression he promised him divinity, in aspiring to which he himself had been cast down. And since every nature is free from blame, names arise from accident — for first the thing, afterward the signification — and through this, 'Satan' and 'devil' are names composed from his act, so that it is the signification not of his nature, but of his will.
Therefore, that the purpose of God, which He decreed in the cause of created man, might stand, and that the deed of the devil, by which he circumvented man, might serve to the heaping up of his own guilt, Christ deigned to come from the holy seats to the earth, that He might both free man from the sentence of transgression and reveal the future perdition of the devil, lest anyone should imitate his deed. Therefore the apostle John said: 'For this the Son of God came, that He might destroy the works of the devil.' But if the devil were evil by nature, to promise him punishment would be the part either of a madman or of an unjust man. For why should He accuse him whom He sees do nothing otherwise than his nature allows?
If fire can be blamed because it burns, or water because it chills, when surely it does this not by will but by nature? Hence too the devil, if he were evil by nature, would have no will. For he could not discern, but in one and the same manner would plunge himself blindly upon all. But further, he does this by a certain judgment; for those who do his will he spares, from certain newcomers he holds back, against those wishing to flee to God's help he sets stumbling-blocks and impediments, he lays snares for the servants of God, and against those readier in His service he is the more hostile. Whence it is manifest that his will lies in the crime. Wherefore the apostle Peter says:
'Be sober and watch, for your adversary the devil, like a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour.' He does not seek the Gentiles, he does not seek the Jews, he does not seek those of evil life and conversation, but he seeks the servants of God and of Christ, whom he knows to be his enemies, because they condemn his deed and presumption. Finally, when the law was given, he burned with greater envy against those who were under the law, knowing that the documents of the law deliver the one God and a good conversation to men. Therefore, if he is thought to do these things naturally, he cannot be made guilty, because he does what is of his nature and what he can, and does not do what he cannot, because it is not of his nature; and so he is neither to be praised nor to be condemned.
He is not to be praised, because the things he does are harmful; but he is not to be condemned, because he does these things not by will but by the impulse of nature. For we know some who, suddenly made mad, have harmed many with iron, club, stones, and bites, and some have even killed; but when caught by exertion and brought before the courts, they were by no means made guilty, because they did these things not by will, but driven by some force I know not what, doing them unknowingly. For how is one made guilty who does not know what he has done? So too the devil, if he knows not the good, why is he judged to be condemned, who does not do what he does not know? Nay rather, if it could be so, he would be praiseworthy, because he does what he knows. But we are rightly made guilty, because we do otherwise than we know we ought to do.
But since throughout all Scripture we see the devil constituted guilty, and on that account read that Gehenna is prepared for him, we know that he is to be condemned by the laws, because, though he knew and was able to do good, he did evil. For God, who is just, would not condemn him because he had not done the good which he did not know, or because he had done the evil which he knew. I think it therefore made manifest that no nature ought to be called evil, because all evil, as has become clear, arises from the will, which befalls nature through the senses. III. WHAT NEED WAS THERE TO SET FORTH, THROUGH MOSES AND NOT BEFORE, THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD AND THE ORDER OF CREATION? It ought not to have been described earlier, because as yet no such great error existed among men from this cause.
But when error grew among the human race, so that even the children of Israel in Egypt heard, contrary to this account, doctrines handed down by the philosophers of the Egyptians — by whom also Moses had been instructed in all Egyptian learning — which asserts that a certain Saclas made this world through evil angels, and that this same one is to be regarded as the prince of the world, that is, Satan (which opinion Marcion followed and rushed into death; for the Manichaeans too say that man was made by the same Saclas, not this world — being more foolish than the rest);
for since it is established that the world was fashioned for the sake of man, they say that the world was made by God, albeit out of another's material, but that man was created by the adversary, so that in another's house one set up a master — it was fitting therefore that Moses, in order to betray and remove this error, should make manifest that God is the author of the world and of fashioned man. For having received authority through the signs and wonders which he did, he taught without doubt that that was true which he handed down with signs as witnesses. For who would not believe him, whose so great signs existed in deeds done? Finally, hence it is that those who hold contrary to this teaching are known to err, because they strive to allege their assertions with bare words.
And so, that he might teach that nothing is co-eternal with God, he sets forth the very order of created things, so that, while he records lesser things made first and greater things afterward, none of these may be held to be uncreated; because the things that are lesser in time are greater in power — so that if they should suppose the latter to lay claim in respect of time, they may be refuted by that very weakness whereby they are subjected to the later things; or if these, presuming on the score of power, should claim primacy for themselves, they may be humbled by their very posteriority, so that none of these may seem not subjected at the beginning. First indeed heaven was made and earth; then light, which in its office is day; after this the firmament, which was called heaven, and the gatherings of waters which He called seas, that the earth might appear in which it would be possible to dwell.
But the earth, which he says was made after heaven, he does not wish to be understood as the earth alone, but signified matter, that is, all lower things, which advanced into every species of the world. And the heaven he contends was made in the beginning, not this carnal heaven, but that supernal one which is spiritual; so that when he says heaven was made first, then earth, he might signify that in heaven all invisible things and in earth all visible things were created by God. For he comprehends the highest and lowest of all nature, so that whatever is in between may without doubt be believed to have been made. But the luminaries, which He established for the governing of the world, he asserts were made on the fourth day, so that the greater they are in power, the lower they may be in time.
But man He established on the sixth day, that He might bring an inhabitant into a house already made. Hence it is that what displeases certain people was said: 'And God saw the light, that it was good.' So that, since all things were said to have been made by an evil one and could not be believed good, Moses, in order to prove good the things that were made, showed that the things He made were pleasing to God Himself, so as to make him guilty to whom they should be displeasing. For how could He fail to know the light, who said, 'Let there be light,' and light was made? Does anyone make what he does not know? And the light, once made, pleased Him who made Himself. What craftsman does not rejoice in his work? If it is said, 'God saw the light, that it was good,' and there are those who say, 'it is evil,' what then, if it had been left without testimony?
Therefore, the fabric of the world and the origin of the first man having been described, he held to the lineage of the race of Seth, who was given in place of Abel, and came in order to Abraham, the father of the Jews, in order to show that Abraham believed in this God, who is the maker of the world, and that this same God gave the law, in which the future Christ was promised, who should free the human race from the dominion of the devil. From these things our faith is proved reasonable; for the recorded origin gives testimony to it, that from the beginning the race of Christians exists. For from Seth, the son of Adam, one comes to Enoch; from Enoch to Noah; from Noah to Abraham; from Abraham one descends to David; and from David, of Mary, by the Holy Spirit, Christ is born.
Therefore all those of former times, as many as held the faith in the one God whom the Savior proclaimed, ought rightly to be called Christians; for from the beginning the Savior was promised as one who would come. Hence in the Apocalypse it says: 'the Lamb who was slain from the foundation of the world.' And so there has always been Christianity. For all these whom I have mentioned above, from the first man created in the world, through whom the lineage is extended down to the Savior, held the faith of this God, of whom Christ spoke, saying: 'And this is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only and true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.' One may object to the contrary:
'If Christianity existed beforehand, what knowledge came through Christ?' This advance of understanding the coming of Christ conferred, because he revealed the mystery of the one God who had been proclaimed, demonstrated what belongs to which Person, and, to fulfill the righteousness of the Law, added the things that had been held in reserve. IV. WHY DID HE NOT GIVE THE LAW AT THE VERY BEGINNING? First, the Law put into writing ought not to have been given at the start, because it is in a certain manner implanted in nature itself, and the knowledge of the Creator did not lie hidden from one's lineage. For who would not know what befits a good life, or be ignorant that what he does not wish done to himself ought by no means to be done to another?
But when the natural law had vanished, crushed beneath the habit of sinning, then it was fitting that it be made manifest, so that in the Jews all might hear it—not because it had been utterly obliterated, but because they lacked its full authority: idolatry was practiced; the fear of God was not upon the earth; fornication was at work; through covetousness men were greedy for their neighbor's goods. Therefore the Law was given, so that the things which were already known might possess authority, and the things which had begun to lie hidden might be made manifest. For we find that before Moses sins were not only not hidden, but were even punished. For which reason many are found to have been righteous; for knowing God to be the avenger, they feared to sin.
When this began to be neglected, it was fitting that the natural law be revealed, so that all might know by clear reasoning that the Lord would call human deeds to account. Although it is recorded that vengeance was executed through the Flood and upon Sodom and Gomorrah, yet the forgetfulness of antiquity had covered these things over; whence, through Moses, for the sake of terror they were recalled to memory, to correct discipline and to restore faith in God. Wherefore the Apostle also says: 'The law is not laid down for the just, but for the unjust,' for idol-worshippers, fornicators, and the like. Now let us see whether it is fitting for those who, hearing of the judgment of God, laugh at it as future—whether it will profit or harm, whether it is fortified by truth or lacks reason. The Law indeed was given to the world, but we see it lapse in regard to many: it does not, therefore, appear just.
Why is it that here those who sin through power are secure, others mock the laws, the poor are oppressed, accusations are contrived against the just, those who act well are held in reproach, the godly are in want, the wicked flourish, the unjust and corrupt are held in honor, the greedy and the rapacious grow rich, and the judge is for sale? Does it not seem unjust if the Founder of all things does not call these things to account—so that those who here are unjustly oppressed may be relieved, those who lacked while living well may be rewarded, and those who for righteousness' sake were held in reproach may be honored;
But those who through power despised the laws or by evasion mocked them, pursuing iniquity, so gloried in these things that they seemed to insult righteousness itself—that they should be humbled and confounded, and subjected to torments in the sight of those in whose evils and contempt they had rejoiced, so that these too, glad at their punishment, might give thanks to God, with whom alone respect of persons ceases? V. WHY WAS ABEL'S SACRIFICE ACCEPTED AND CAIN'S REJECTED? From the very words of the reading itself this can be gathered, for the history is not veiled by literary artifice. For the word of Scripture indicates Abel to be prudent and devout in that very act, but Cain to be negligent and improvident, and thereby less devout.
Abel therefore chose the better of his choice possessions to offer to God the Creator, so that of those very things which He had created he might offer Him the choicest, whereby he might prove both his dedication and Abel's own merit, so as to display both his own reverence and God as the Author. Cain, like a rustic, could not perceive this. For sinking his whole mind into the earth, he could not lift the eyes of his mind to heaven, to behold what might be worthy of the Creator; for he offered to God gifts of whatever sort. This same fault is detected also in the Jews, of perverse mind. For they were often rebuked when they offered their gifts improvidently upon the altar of God, gifts that did not seem worthy even of men, the Lord saying: 'You offer me the blind and the lame; I will not accept these from your hands.'
Offer these to your prefect or to your commander—will he accept them? since it is agreed by all that to a person of high rank the greatest gifts ought to be offered. And therefore Cain's gifts were rejected, God saying to him: 'Why art thou downcast, and why has thy countenance fallen? If thou offerest rightly but dividest not rightly, hast thou not sinned? Be still. Its turning is toward thee, and thou shalt rule over it.' You see, then, that the division incurred the sin. While he did not consider what might be worthy of God, he reserved the better things for his own uses. And so it was not because he made an offering that he was rebuked, but because he offered unworthy things; nor was he condemned for it, but admonished to amend his deed.
For He says, 'Its turning is toward thee, and thou shalt rule over it,' that is, 'Since I do not accept it, the gift offered by thee has reverted to thine own dominion,' so that thereafter he might know what to do. Hence envy was kindled, that he might slay his brother—that he who had first shown forth righteousness might be slain by the unjust, and a wicked example be given to men. For he was so blinded by the rivalry of jealousy that not only did he fail to give thanks—seeing that he had not been made guilty, and had moreover learned how to amend this—but he even added another, graver deed, by which he deserved to be condemned.
Such is the case of the improvident parricide Cain, just as it is of that wicked servant who, when his debt had been forgiven by his master, became ungrateful and, going out, throttled his fellow-servant, so that he might be condemned as inexcusable both for his earlier offense, unknown to himself, and for the impiety committed against his fellow-servant. And yet for the present Cain was not condemned, but was sent away confounded and guilty under terror upon the earth, so that, if he should repent, he might be pardoned. Then, fearing lest someone should slay him for this deed, he said to God: 'My case is too great for me to be forsaken. If thou castest me out this day from before thy face, I will hide myself also from the face of the earth, and I shall be groaning and trembling upon the earth. And it shall be that everyone who finds me will slay me.'
Terrified by the words of the just Judge, God, Cain fears to be despised by God, so that he thinks he must flee also from the sight of men, being certain that one who lives with God angry against him can be slain even by a man. But what did the Lord reply to him? 'Not so,' He said—that is, 'I have remitted thee to this end, though thou dost not deserve to live, not that thou shouldst be slain by anyone, but that thou shouldst groan and tremble, as one who first gave a wicked example upon the earth, since the fruit from the soil did not answer to thy labors.' And so 'everyone who slays Cain,' He says, 'shall pay seven vengeances.' This sentence shows that Cain was rightly to be condemned. For when he saw a law given under such a threat, lest anyone imitate his deed, he began to fear all the more, knowing what evil he had committed.
He promises, therefore, seven vengeances, if anyone should aspire to this crime, so that, seeing Cain made guilty by this deed even while as yet there was no manifestation of a law, he might know that he would be punished with sevenfold penalty if he did not avoid this—so that the knowledge of the law would add six plagues beyond what Cain had deserved, so that with Cain's own plague the vengeances would number seven. With this same number too are to be rewarded those who, having left all things, follow the Lord and shall have eternal life in the world to come. This is the sign which God set upon Cain, lest anyone who found him should slay him.