講道與短論 第 6 章

QUESTION ONE. Whether the soul is from itself. Everything true is true by truth; and every soul is a soul by that whereby it is a true soul. Every soul therefore has from truth that it is at all a soul. But the soul is one thing, truth another. For truth never suffers falsity, whereas the soul is often deceived. Not, therefore, since the soul is from truth, is it from itself. But truth is God: God therefore the soul has as its author, that it may be a soul. II. On free will. Everything that is made cannot be equal to that by which it is made. Otherwise justice, which must render to each its own, would necessarily be taken away from things. When God therefore made man, although He made him most excellent, He did not make him that which He Himself was.

But a man who is good by will is better than one who is good by necessity. Free will therefore had to be given to man. III. Whether man becomes worse with God as author. With no wise or good being as author does a man become worse. For this is no small fault, nay it is so great that it cannot befall any wise man whatsoever. But God is more excellent than every wise man. Much less, therefore, does man become worse with God as author. For God's will is far more excellent than the will of a wise man. And when it is said 'with Him as author', it is said 'with Him willing it'. There is therefore a defect of the will by which man becomes worse: and if this defect is far removed from the will of God, as reason teaches, it must be asked in what it lies. IV. What is the cause that man becomes worse.

That man should become worse — the cause is either in himself, or in some other, or in nothing. If in nothing, there is no cause. Or if it be taken thus 'in nothing', namely that man was made out of nothing, or out of those things which were made from nothing, then again the cause will be in himself, in that his matter, as it were, is nothing. If in some other, is it in God, or in any other man, or in that which is neither God nor man? But not in God; for God is the cause of good things. If therefore in man, it is either by force or by persuasion. But by force in no way, lest anything be more powerful than God. Since indeed God made man so excellently that, if he willed to remain most excellent, he would be hindered by no resistance.

But if we grant that a man is corrupted by the persuasion of another man, it will again have to be asked by whom the persuader himself was corrupted. For the persuader of such things cannot but be depraved. There remains some I-know-not-what, which is neither God nor good: yet this, whatever it is, either brought force to bear, or persuaded. As to force, the same answer is given as above; as to persuasion, whatever it is, since persuasion does not compel one against his will, the cause of his depravation returns to the will of that same man, whether he was depraved with something or with nothing persuading him. V. Whether an irrational animal can be happy. An animal which lacks reason lacks knowledge. But no animal which lacks knowledge can be happy.

It does not therefore fall to animals devoid of reason to be happy. NOTICE OF THE BENEDICTINE FATHERS. This present Book of the Eighty-three Diverse Questions has been newly revised against fifteen manuscript codices, namely two of the Roman Vatican library, one of the Parisian Royal library, two of the college of Navarre, one of the Sorbonne, one of the greater convent of the Augustinians, one of the abbey of St Genevieve, one of our own monastery of St Germain, likewise one each of St Maur des Fossés, St Bénigne of Dijon, St Michael in Peril of the Sea, two Cistercian ones, and one of the most illustrious lord D. de St Georges, bishop of Clermont.

Variant readings were also employed, which the theologians of Louvain, in their zeal to correct this same little work, gathered from five Belgian manuscripts. Finally, the older editions were collated: 'Rat', that is, the one printed at Lyons by John Trechsel under the care of Augustine of Regensburg in the year 1497; 'Er', which Desiderius Erasmus revised and had published from the Froben press at Basel in the year 1528; and the Louvain edition, which from the recension of the Louvain theologians was printed at Antwerp with the Plantin type in the year 1576. Besides these, we compared all those editions mentioned at the beginning of the Retractations and Confessions, volume 1. VI. On evil. Everything that is, is either corporeal or incorporeal.

The corporeal is contained under a sensible form, the incorporeal under an intelligible form. Everything therefore that is, is not without some form. But where there is any form, there is necessarily some measure, and measure is something of good. The highest evil therefore has no measure; for it lacks all good. It is not, therefore; because it is contained under no form, and this whole name of 'evil' has been found from the privation of form. VII. What is properly called 'soul' in a living being. The soul is sometimes so spoken of that mind is understood together with it; as when we say that man consists of soul and body: sometimes it is so spoken of that mind is excepted. But when it is spoken of with mind excepted, it is understood from those works which the one having it has in common with the beasts.

For beasts lack reason, which is always proper to mind. VIII. Whether the soul is moved of itself. He perceives that the soul is moved of itself who perceives that there is will in himself. For if we will, no other wills on our behalf. And this motion of the soul is spontaneous; for this has been bestowed on it by God. Yet this motion is not from place to place, as in the case of a body. For to be moved locally is proper to a body. And when the soul by its will — that is, by that motion which is not local — nevertheless moves its own body locally, it is not from this shown that the soul itself is also moved locally. Just as we see something moved by a hinge through a great space of place, and yet the hinge itself is not moved in place. IX. Whether truth can be perceived by the bodily senses.

Everything that a bodily sense touches, which is also called 'sensible', is changed without any interval of time: as when the hairs of our head grow, or the body declines into old age, or flourishes into youth, it is being done perpetually, nor does it altogether cease to be done. But that which does not abide cannot be perceived: for that is perceived which is grasped by knowledge. But that which is changed without intermission cannot be grasped. The sincerity of truth is not therefore to be expected from the bodily senses. But lest anyone say that there are certain sensible things ever abiding in the same manner, and bring against us the question of the sun and the stars, in which he cannot easily be refuted;

this at least there is no one who is not forced to confess: that there is nothing sensible which does not have something like the false, so that it cannot be distinguished. For, to pass over other things, all the things that we perceive through the body — even when they are not present to the senses — we nevertheless undergo their images as though they were altogether present, whether in sleep or in madness. And when we undergo this, we are wholly unable to discern whether we perceive them by the senses themselves, or whether they are images of sensible things. If therefore there are false images of sensible things which cannot be discerned by the senses themselves, and nothing can be perceived except what is discerned from the false, then the judgment of truth is not established in the senses.

Wherefore we are most wholesomely admonished to be turned away from this world, which is assuredly corporeal and sensible, and to be turned with all eagerness toward God, that is, toward Truth, which is grasped by the intellect and the inner mind, which ever abides and is of one same manner, which has no image of the false from which it cannot be discerned. X. Whether body is from God. All good is from God: everything beautiful is good, in so far as it is beautiful; and everything that possesses form is beautiful. But every body, in order to be a body, is contained under some form. Every body therefore is from God. XI. Why Christ was born of a woman. When God delivers, He delivers no mere part, but delivers the whole that is in peril.

The Wisdom and Power of God therefore, who is called the only-begotten Son, having taken up manhood, showed forth the deliverance of man. But the deliverance of man had to appear in each sex. Therefore, because it was fitting that He should take up the male, which is the more honourable sex, it followed that the deliverance of the female sex should appear from this, that that man was born of a woman. XII. The saying of a certain wise man. 'Come, O wretched mortals,' he says, 'do this: take care lest the malignant spirit ever pollute this dwelling; lest, mingling itself with the senses, it defile the sanctity of the soul and darken the light of the mind. This evil creeps in through all the avenues of sense;

it gives itself to shapes, adapts itself to colours, cleaves to sounds, lurks in anger, in the deceit of speech, submits itself to odours, pours itself into tastes, and by the muddy flood of turbid motion darkens the senses with shadowy affections, filling with certain mists all the passages of the understanding, through which the ray of the mind is wont to spread the light of reason. And because it is a ray of the ethereal light, and in it is the mirror of the divine presence — for in it God, in it the innocent will, in it the merit of right deeds shines forth — God is everywhere present; but then He is present at once to each of us, when the unstained purity of our mind has reckoned itself to be in His presence.

For just as the sight of the eyes, if it has been impaired, thinks whatever it cannot see to be not present — for in vain does the present image of things stand around the eyes, if soundness be lacking to the eyes — so also God, who is nowhere absent, is present in vain to polluted souls, whom the blindness of the mind cannot see. XIII. By what proof it is established that men excel the beasts. Among the many things by which it can be shown that man excels the beasts in reason, this is manifest to all: that wild beasts can be tamed and made gentle by men, but men in no way by beasts. XIV. That Christ's body was not a phantom. If Christ's body was a phantom, Christ deceived: and if He deceived, He is not truth. But Christ is truth.

His body therefore was not a phantom. XV. On the intellect. Everything that understands itself comprehends itself. But that whereby it comprehends itself is finite to itself. And the intellect understands itself. Therefore it is finite to itself. Nor does it wish to be infinite, although it could be; because it wishes to be known to itself, for it loves itself. XVI. On the Son of God. God is the cause of all things that are. But that which is the cause of all things is also the cause of His own wisdom: nor was God ever without His wisdom. Therefore He is the eternal cause of His eternal wisdom: nor is He prior in time to His wisdom. Furthermore, if to be an eternal Father belongs to God, and there never was a time when He was not Father, He was never without the Son. XVII. On the knowledge of God. Everything past now is not;

everything future is not yet: everything therefore both past and future is lacking. But with God nothing is lacking: neither the past therefore nor the future, but with God everything is present. XVIII. On the Trinity. Everything that is, is one thing whereby it consists, another whereby it is distinguished, another whereby it agrees. Every creature therefore, if it both exists in some manner, and is very far distant from that which is altogether nothing, and agrees with itself in its own parts, its cause too must needs be threefold: that whereby it is, that whereby it is this, that whereby it is at one with itself. But we call the cause of the creature — that is, its author — God. There must therefore be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent, and more blessed.

And therefore also, when truth is sought, there cannot be more than three kinds of question: whether a thing exists at all, whether it is this or another thing, whether it is to be approved or disapproved. XIX. On God and the creature. That which is immutable is eternal: for it is ever of the same manner. But that which is mutable is subject to time: for it is not ever of the same manner, and therefore is not rightly called eternal. For that which is changed does not abide: that which does not abide is not permanent. And this is the difference between the immortal and the eternal: that everything eternal is immortal, but not everything immortal is with sufficient subtlety called eternal:

because even if something always lives, yet if it suffers mutability, it is not properly to be called eternal, since it is not ever of the same manner; although, because it always lives, it may rightly be called immortal. But sometimes even that which is immortal is called eternal. But that which both suffers change, and by the presence of the soul is said to live — though it is not soul — can in no way be understood as immortal, and much less as eternal. For in the eternal, when it is properly spoken of, neither is anything past as though it had passed away, nor anything future as though it were not yet, but whatever is, only is. XX. On the place of God. God is not anywhere. For that which is anywhere is contained by place: that which is contained by place is a body.

But God is not a body: therefore He is not anywhere. And yet, because He is, and is not in a place, all things are rather in Him, than He is anywhere. Nor yet are they in Him in such a way that He should be their place: for a place is in space, which is occupied by the length and breadth and height of a body; and God is nothing of such a kind. All things therefore are in Him, and He is not a place. Yet the temple of God is by an abuse of language called the place of God, not because He is contained by it, but because He is present to it. And this is understood to be nothing better than a pure soul. XXI. Whether God is not the author of evil. Whoever is the author of all things that are, and to whose goodness it belongs only that whatever is should be, in no way can it belong to Him that a thing should not be.

But everything that fails, fails from being — that which is — and tends toward non-being. Now to be, and to fail in nothing, is good; and it is evil to fail. But He to whom non-being does not belong is not the cause of failing, that is, of tending toward non-being; because, so to speak, He is the cause of being. He is therefore the cause of good only: and for this reason He Himself is the highest good. Wherefore He who is the author of all things that are is not the author of evil: because in so far as things are, in so far are they good. XXII. That God does not suffer necessity. Where there is no want, there is no necessity: where there is no defect, there is no want. But there is no defect in God: there is therefore no necessity. XXIII. On the Father and the Son.

Everything chaste is chaste by chastity, and everything eternal is eternal by eternity, and everything beautiful by beauty, and everything good by goodness. Therefore everything wise too is wise by wisdom, and everything like by likeness. But 'chaste by chastity' is said in two ways: either because it begets chastity, so that it is chaste by that chastity which it begets, and to which it is the beginning and cause of being; or otherwise, when a thing is chaste by participation of chastity, which can at some time be not chaste; and so it is to be understood of the rest. For the soul too is understood or believed to attain eternity, but it becomes eternal by participation of eternity. But God is not eternal in this way, but in that He is the author of eternity itself.

This may be understood also of beauty and of goodness. Wherefore when God is called wise, and is called wise by that wisdom without which it is impious to believe that He ever was, or could be, He is not called wise by participation of wisdom, as is the soul, which can both be and not be wise: but because He Himself begot that wisdom by which He is called wise. Likewise those things which by participation are either chaste, or eternal, or beautiful, or good, or wise, receive — as has been said — that they can be neither chaste, nor eternal, nor beautiful, nor good, nor wise:

but chastity itself, eternity, beauty, goodness, wisdom in no way admit either corruption, or — so to speak — temporality, or baseness, or malice. Therefore even those things which by participation are like admit unlikeness: but likeness itself can in no part in any way be unlike. Whence it comes that, when the Son is called the likeness of the Father — because it is by participation of Him that whatever things are like, whether to one another or to God, are like (for He is the first form, whereby they are, so to speak, 'formed', and the form whereby all things are shaped) — He can in no part be unlike the Father.

The same therefore as the Father, so that this One is the Son, that One the Father, that is, this One the likeness, that One He whose likeness it is; this One substance, that One substance, whence there is one substance. For if it is not one, the likeness receives likeness; which most true reason denies can come to pass. XXIV. Whether sin and right action lie in the free choice of the will. Whatever happens by chance happens at random: whatever happens at random does not happen by providence. If therefore some things happen in the world by chance, the whole world is not administered by providence. If the whole world is not administered by providence, there is then some nature and substance which does not belong to the work of providence. But everything that is, in so far as it is, is good.

For that is supremely good, by participation of which the rest are good. And everything that is mutable is good — not through itself, but by participation of the immutable good — in so far as it is. Further, that good, by participation of which the rest, whatever they are, are good, is good not through another but through itself, which we also call divine providence. Nothing therefore happens by chance in the world. This being established, it seems to follow that whatever is done in the world is done partly by divine agency, partly by our own will. For God is far and incomparably better and more just than any man, however good and just.

But the Just One, ruling and governing all things, allows no punishment to be inflicted on anyone undeservedly, no reward to be given undeservedly. But the desert of punishment is sin; and the desert of reward is right action. Now neither sin nor right action can justly be imputed to anyone who has done nothing by his own will. There is therefore both sin and right action in the free choice of the will. XXV. On the cross of Christ. The Wisdom of God took up manhood as an example whereby we might live rightly. But it belongs to a right life not to fear the things that are not to be feared. But death is not to be feared. It was fitting therefore that this very thing should be shown by the death of that man whom the Wisdom of God took up.

But there are men who, though they do not fear death itself, nevertheless dread some particular manner of death. Yet none the less, just as death itself is not to be feared, so no manner of death is to be feared by a man living well and rightly. None the less therefore this too had to be shown by the cross of that man. For among all the manners of death there was nothing more execrable and more dreadful than that manner. XXVI. On the difference of sins. Some sins are of infirmity, others of ignorance, others of malice. Infirmity is contrary to virtue, ignorance is contrary to wisdom, malice is contrary to goodness. Whoever therefore knows what the virtue and wisdom of God is, is able to estimate which are venial sins.

And whoever knows what the goodness of God is, is able to estimate for which sins a certain punishment is due, both here and in the age to come. When these things have been well handled, it can with probability be judged who are not to be compelled to a sorrowful and lamentable penitence, although they confess their sins; and for whom no salvation at all is to be hoped, unless they have offered to God, through penitence, the sacrifice of a contrite spirit. XXVII. On providence. It can come to pass that through an evil man divine providence both punishes and gives aid. For the impiety of the Jews both supplanted the Jews, and was for the salvation of the Gentiles. Likewise it can come to pass that through a good man divine providence both condemns and helps, as the Apostle says: To some we are the savour of life

unto life, but to others the savour of death unto death (2 Corinthians 2:16). But since all tribulation is either the punishment of the impious, or the exercise of the just — because the same threshing both crushes the chaff and strips the grain from the chaff, whence 'tribulation' took its name — and again, since peace and rest from temporal troubles both profit the good and corrupt the wicked: all these things divine providence moderates according to the deserts of souls. Yet nevertheless the good do not choose for themselves the ministry of tribulation, nor do the wicked love peace. Wherefore these very ones, through whom that is done which they know not, receive the wage not of the justice which is referred to God, but of their own ill-will.

Just as it is not imputed to good men that harm befalls someone even though they wished to benefit him, but the reward of benevolence is granted to their good intention: so also the rest of creation, according to the merits of rational souls, is either felt or hidden, either burdensome or agreeable. For since the most high God administers well all that He has made, nothing is disordered in the universe, and nothing is unjust, whether we know it or not. But in one part the sinful soul is afflicted: yet because, according to its merits, it is there where it is fitting for such a one to be, and suffers those things which it is just for such a one to suffer, it in no way deforms the whole kingdom of God with any foulness of its own.

Wherefore, since we do not know all the good that the divine order works concerning us, in good will alone do we act according to the law; but in other things we are acted upon according to the law, since the law itself remains unchangeable and governs all changeable things with a most beautiful governance. "Glory therefore to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will" (Luke 2:14). XXVIII. Why God willed to make the world. He who asks why God willed to make the world seeks the cause of God's will. But every cause is efficient. Now everything that effects is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought. XXIX. Whether there is anything up or down in the universe.

"Mind the things that are above" (Col 3:2). We are bidden to mind the things that are above, namely spiritual things, which are to be understood as being above, not by the places and parts of this world, but by the merit of their excellence; lest we fix our mind upon a part of this world, of which whole world we ought to divest ourselves. But up and down exist in the parts of this world. For the universe itself has neither up nor down. For it is corporeal, since everything visible is corporeal. But in the whole body there is nothing up or down. For since motion seems to occur in six directions—the motion that is called straight, that is, which is not circular—forward and backward, to the right and to the left, upward and downward;

there is no reason at all why for the whole body there should be no before and after, and no right and left, yet there should be an up and down. But those who consider thus are deceived, because it is hard to resist the senses and habit. For the turning of the body—which happens if one wishes to be moved head-downward—is not so easy for us as the turning from right to left, or from front to back. Wherefore, setting words aside, one must engage the mind by itself, that it may be able to discern this. XXX. Whether all things were created for the use of man. As there is a difference between the honorable and the useful, so also between enjoying and using. For although it could be subtly maintained that everything honorable is useful and everything useful honorable:

nevertheless, because that is more properly and more usually called honorable which is to be sought for its own sake, while that is useful which is to be referred to something else: according to this distinction we now speak, keeping this indeed in mind, that the honorable and the useful in no way be opposed to each other. For these are sometimes thought, ignorantly and vulgarly, to be opposed. We are therefore said to enjoy that thing from which we take pleasure. We use that which we refer to that whence pleasure is to be taken. And so every human perversion, which is also called vice, is to wish to use things to be enjoyed, and to enjoy things to be used. And again, every right ordering, which is also named virtue, is to enjoy things to be enjoyed, and to use things to be used. Now the honorable is to be enjoyed, but the useful to be used.

I call the honorable the intelligible beauty, which we properly call spiritual; and the useful, the divine providence. Wherefore, although there are many beautiful visible things which are less properly called honorable, yet beauty itself, from which whatever things are beautiful are beautiful, is in no way visible. Likewise there are many useful visible things; but usefulness itself, from which whatever things profit us do profit, which we call divine providence, is not visible. Let it be well known that under the name of visible things all corporeal things are contained. We ought therefore to enjoy the invisible beautiful things, that is, the honorable ones: but whether all of them, is another question; though perhaps it is fitting to call honorable only those things which are to be enjoyed.

But useful things are all to be used, according as there is need of each of them. And even beasts are thought—not so absurdly—to enjoy food and any bodily pleasure; but nothing can use anything except a living being that partakes of reason. For to know to what each thing is to be referred is not given to those who lack reason, nor even to rational fools. No one can use a thing whose reference he does not know; nor can anyone know it except the wise man. Wherefore those who do not use well are more rightly said to abuse. For that which one uses badly profits no one; and what does not profit is certainly not useful. But whatever is useful is useful in the using: thus no one uses anything but the useful.

Therefore whoever uses badly does not truly use. The perfect reason of man, then, which is called virtue, uses first itself to understand God, that it may enjoy Him by whom also it was made. It uses the other rational living beings for fellowship, and the irrational ones for pre-eminence. It refers even its own life to this, that it may enjoy God: for thus it is blessed. Therefore it uses even itself; which indeed begins misery through pride, if it be referred to itself and not to God. It uses also certain bodies to be given life, for beneficence; for thus it uses its own body:

using some things, to be taken up or rejected, for health; some, to be endured, for patience; some, to be ordered, for justice; some, to be considered, for some proof of truth: it uses even those things from which it abstains, for temperance. Thus it uses all things, both those perceived and those not perceived; nor is there any third kind. But it judges concerning all the things it uses: concerning God alone it does not judge, because it judges concerning the rest according to God; nor does it use Him, but enjoys Him. For God is not to be referred to anything else. Since everything that is to be referred to another is inferior to that to which it is to be referred. And there is nothing superior to God, not in place, but in the excellence of His nature.

All things therefore that have been made, have been made for the use of man, because reason—which has been given to man—uses all things by judging. And before the fall it did not indeed use things to be endured, nor after the fall does it use them except when converted; and although before the death of the body, yet already, as far as it can, a friend of God, because willingly His servant. XXXI. The opinion of Cicero, how the virtues of the soul were divided and defined by him (Cicero, book 2 of On Invention). 1. Virtue is a habit of the soul consonant with the manner of nature and with reason. Wherefore, when all its parts are known, the whole force of simple honorableness will have been considered. It has therefore four parts: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance.

Prudence is the knowledge of things good, evil, and neither. Its parts are memory, understanding, foresight. Memory is that by which the soul recalls those things which have been. Understanding, that by which it perceives those things which are. Foresight, that by which something future is seen before it is done. Justice is a habit of the soul which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth. Its beginning proceeded from nature; then certain things came into custom by reason of utility; afterward the fear of laws and religion sanctioned things both proceeding from nature and approved by custom. Natural right is that

which no opinion begot, but a certain innate force implanted, such as religion, piety, gratitude, requital, respect, truth. Religion is that which brings care and ceremony toward a certain higher nature which they call divine. Piety is that by which a benevolent duty and diligent regard is rendered to those joined by blood and to the fatherland. Gratitude is that in which is contained the remembrance of friendships and services on the one part, and the will to requite on the other. Requital is that by which force or injury, and in general everything that will be harmful, is repelled by defending or avenging. Respect is that by which we deem worthy, with a certain regard and honor, men excelling in some dignity.

Truth is that by which the things which are, or have been, or will be, are stated unaltered. By custom, right is that which either, lightly drawn from nature, use has nourished and made greater—as religion; and if we see any of the things we mentioned before, proceeding from nature, made greater on account of custom—or that which antiquity has led into practice by the approbation of the common people. Of this kind are the compact, equity, law, the adjudged. A compact is what has been agreed among certain parties. Equity is that which is equal for all. The adjudged is that concerning which it has already been established by the judgments of someone or of several. By law, right is that which is contained in that writing which is set forth to the people to observe. Fortitude is a considered undertaking of dangers and endurance of labors.

Its parts are magnificence, confidence, patience, perseverance. Magnificence is the handling and administration of great and lofty matters with a certain broad and splendid purpose of soul. Confidence is that by which the soul, in great and honorable matters, has placed in itself much assurance with sure hope. Patience is the voluntary and lasting endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of the honorable or the useful. Perseverance is a stable and perpetual continuance in a well-considered plan. Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over the other wrongful impulses of the soul. Its parts are continence, clemency, modesty.

Continence is that by which desire is ruled by the governance of counsel. Clemency is that by which minds rashly enticed and stirred to hatred of someone are held back by kindness. Modesty is that by which honorable shame procures a clear and stable authority. And all these are to be sought for their own sake alone, so that no gain be added. To demonstrate this neither pertains to our present purpose, and is far removed from the brevity of precept-giving. But for their own sake are to be avoided, not only those things contrary to them—as cowardice to fortitude, and injustice to justice—but also those which seem near and neighboring, yet are very far off. Of this kind, contrary to confidence is diffidence, and by that fact it is a vice;

rashness, on the other hand, is not contrary, but placed alongside and neighboring, and yet a vice. Thus for each virtue a neighboring vice will be found, either already called by a definite name—as rashness, which is neighbor to confidence; obstinacy, which is neighbor to perseverance; superstition, which is near to religion—or without any definite name: all of which likewise, as the contraries of good things, we shall place among the things to be avoided. And concerning that kind of honorableness which is sought for its own sake in every respect, enough has been said. Now it seems that something must be said concerning that in which utility too is joined, which we nevertheless call honorable. 3. There are therefore many things which draw us both by their dignity and also by their own fruit. In which kind are glory, dignity, greatness, friendship.

Glory is frequent report about someone accompanied by praise. Dignity is someone's honorable authority, worthy of regard and honor and reverence. Greatness is power, or majesty, or a great abundance of some resources. Friendship is a will toward someone of good things, for the sake of that very person whom one loves, with an equal will on his part. Here, because we are speaking of civil matters, we add fruit to friendship, that it may seem to be sought also for their sake, lest perhaps those who thought we were speaking of friendship in general should reproach us. Although there are those who think friendship is to be sought only for utility, there are those who think it for its own sake alone, and there are those who think it both for its own sake and for utility.

Which of these is to be most truly determined, there will be another place to consider. XXXII. Whether one person understands any thing more than another, and thus the understanding of the same thing goes on to infinity. Whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived; and everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived. Whoever therefore understands any thing otherwise than it is, does not understand it. Therefore nothing can be understood except as it is. But we understand something as not being as it is—for instance, this very fact, that nothing is understood which is not understood as it is. Wherefore it is not to be doubted that there is a perfect understanding, than which nothing more excellent can be;

and therefore the manner in which each thing is understood does not go on to infinity, nor can one person understand it more than another. XXXIII. On fear. It is doubtful to no one that there is no other cause of fearing except lest we either lose what we love once obtained, or fail to obtain what we hoped for. Wherefore, whoever has loved and possessed this very thing—not to fear—what fear is there that he might lose it? For many things which we love and possess, we fear to lose; and so we guard them by fear. But no one can guard "not-to-fear" by fearing. Likewise, whoever loves not-to-fear, and does not yet have it, and hopes he will have it—must he not, as is fitting, fear lest he not obtain it? For by this fear nothing else is feared than that same fear.

Further, all fear flees something, and nothing flees itself. Therefore fear is not feared. But if anyone thinks it is not rightly said that a fear fears something, since it is rather the soul that fears by the fear itself, let him attend to this, which is easy to grasp: that there is no fear except of a future and imminent evil. Now it is necessary that he who fears should flee something. Whoever therefore fears to fear is assuredly most absurd, because by fleeing he possesses the very thing he flees. For since nothing is feared except lest some evil happen, to fear lest fear happen is nothing else than to embrace what you spurn. And if that is contradictory—as it is—then in no way at all does he fear who loves nothing else than not to fear.

And therefore no one can love this alone and not have it. But whether this alone is to be loved is another question. Now him whom fear does not dismay, neither does desire lay waste, nor does sickness of soul wear down, nor does exulting and vain joy toss about. For if he desires—since desire is nothing else than the love of passing things—he must fear lest he either lose them when he has obtained them, or not obtain them. But he does not fear: therefore he does not desire. Likewise, if he is tormented by grief of soul, he must also be agitated by fear; since where there is anxiety over present evils, there is also fear of imminent ones. But he is free of fear: therefore also of anxiety. Likewise, if he rejoices vainly, he rejoices over those things which he can lose:

wherefore he must fear lest he lose them. But he in no way fears: therefore in no way does he rejoice vainly. XXXIV. Whether nothing else is to be loved than to be without fear. If not to fear is a vice, it is not to be loved. But no most-blessed man fears, and no most-blessed man is in vice. Therefore not to fear is not a vice. But rashness is a vice. Therefore not everyone who does not fear is rash—although everyone who is rash does not fear. Likewise, every corpse does not fear. Wherefore, since not-to-fear is common to the most blessed, to the rash, and to the corpse—but the most blessed has it through tranquility of soul, the rash through recklessness, the corpse because it lacks all sensation—not-to-fear is not to be left unloved, since we wish to be blessed;

nor is it to be loved alone, since we do not wish to be rash and lifeless. XXXV. What is to be loved. Since whatever does not live does not fear, and no one would persuade us that life is to be forgone so that we might also be without fear, to live without fear is to be loved. But again, because a life lacking fear, even if it lack understanding, is not to be desired, to live without fear with understanding is to be loved. Is that alone to be loved? or is love itself also to be loved? Yes indeed, since without this those things are not loved. But if love is loved for the sake of other things which are to be loved, it is not rightly said to be loved. For to love is nothing else than to seek some thing for its own sake.

Is love then to be sought for its own sake, seeing that whenever what is loved is lacking, there is undoubted misery? Then, since love is a certain motion, and there is no motion except toward something, when we ask what is to be loved, we are asking what that is toward which one ought to be moved. Wherefore, if love is to be loved, certainly not every love is to be loved. For there is also a base love, by which the soul pursues things lower than itself, which is more properly called desire—the root, namely, of all evils. And therefore that is not to be loved which can be taken away from a love that abides and enjoys. The love, then, of what thing is to be loved, except of that which cannot be lacking while it is loved? And that is what it is nothing else to have than to know.

Further, as for gold and every body—to have them is not the same as to know them: therefore they are not to be loved. And since something can be loved and not had—not only among things which are not to be loved, as some beautiful body, but even among those which are to be loved, as the blessed life; and again, something can be had and not loved, as fetters—it is rightly asked whether anyone can, in the case of that which to have is nothing else than to know, not love it when he has it, that is, has come to know it. But since we see some who learn numbers for no other reason than that by that same discipline they may become wealthy, or please men—which, when they have learned it, they refer to the same end which they had set for themselves when learning it; and since to have any discipline is nothing else than to know it:

it can happen that someone has something—which to have is the same as to know—and yet does not love it. Although a good that is not loved, no one can perfectly have or know. For who can know how great a good is, which he does not enjoy? But he does not enjoy it if he does not love it; therefore he who does not love does not have what is to be loved, even if he who does not have it were able to love it. Therefore no one knows the blessed life and is miserable; since, if it is to be loved—as it is—then to know it is the same as to have it. 2. Since these things are so, what else is it to live blessedly than to have something eternal by knowing it? For that is eternal, in which alone one rightly trusts, which cannot be taken from him who loves it; and that itself is what it is nothing else to have than to know.

For the most excellent of all things is that which is eternal; and therefore we cannot have it except by that thing by which we are more excellent, that is, by the mind. But whatever is held by the mind is held by knowing; and no good is perfectly known which is not perfectly loved. Nor, as the mind alone can know, can it thus also love alone. For love is a certain appetite; and we see that appetite is present also in the other parts of the soul, which, if it agrees with the mind and reason, in such peace and tranquility the mind will be free to contemplate what is eternal. Therefore the soul ought to love, with its other parts also, this so great thing which is to be known by the mind. And since that which is loved necessarily affects the lover from itself;

it comes about that the eternal, when thus loved, affects the soul with eternity. Wherefore that alone is the blessed life which is eternal. But what is eternal, which affects the soul with eternity, except God? Now the love of things to be loved is better called charity or dilection. Wherefore, with all the powers of thought, that most wholesome precept is to be pondered: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind" (Matt 22:37); and that which the Lord Jesus says: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent" (John 17:3). XXXVI. On the nourishing of charity. 1. I call charity that by which those things are loved which are not to be despised in comparison with the lover himself:

that is, that which is eternal, and that which is able to love the eternal itself. God, therefore, and the soul by which He is loved, is properly called charity—most purified and consummated—if nothing else is loved: this it pleases us also to call dilection. But when God is loved more than the soul, so that a man prefers to be His rather than his own, then truly and supremely is provision made for the soul, and consequently for the body also—we not caring for it with any busy appetite, but only taking what is ready and offered. Now the poison of charity is the hope of obtaining or retaining temporal things. Its nourishment is the diminution of desire; its perfection, no desire. The sign of its progress is the diminution of fear; the sign of its perfection, no fear:

because "desire is the root of all evils" (1 Tim 6:10); and, "perfect love casts out fear" (1 John 4:18). Whoever therefore wishes to nourish it, let him press on with diminishing his desires. Now desire is the love of acquiring or obtaining temporal things. The beginning of diminishing this is to fear God, who alone cannot be feared without love. For it is directed toward wisdom, and nothing is truer than what is said: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord" (Sir 1:16). For there is no one who does not flee pain more than he seeks pleasure; since we see even the most savage beasts deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pains—which, when it has turned into a habit for them, they are called tamed and gentle.

Wherefore, since there is in man a reason which, when it serves desire by a miserable perversion so that men are not feared, suggests that things committed can lie hidden, and contrives most cunning deceits to cover up secret sins; from this it comes about that men whom the beauty of virtue does not yet delight—unless they be deterred from sinning by the punishments which are most truly preached through holy and divine men, and unless they consent that what they hide from men cannot be hidden from God—are tamed with more difficulty than wild beasts. But that God may be feared, it must be inculcated that the universe is ruled by divine providence;

not so much by reasonings—for he who can enter upon these can already also perceive the beauty of virtue—as by examples: either recent ones, if any occur, or from history, and especially those which, by the very working of divine providence, whether in the Old or in the New Testament, received the most excellent authority of religion. But at the same time one must treat both of the punishments of sinners and of the rewards of the rightly-done. 2. Now indeed, when some habit of not-sinning has persuaded one that what was thought burdensome is easy, let the sweetness of piety begin to be tasted, and the beauty of virtue to be commended, so that the liberty of charity may stand out above the servitude of fear.

Then, once the sacraments of regeneration have gone before—which must move them greatly—it must be inculcated to the faithful what difference there is between the two men, the old and the new, the outer and the inner, the earthly and the heavenly; that is, between him who pursues carnal and temporal goods, and him who pursues spiritual and eternal ones: and they must be warned not to expect from God perishable and passing benefits, in which even wicked men can abound, but firm and everlasting ones—for the receiving of which all things that in this world are thought good and evil must be utterly despised.

Here that most excellent and unique example of the Lord's manhood is to be set forth—who, though He showed by so many miracles that He held such great power over things, both spurned those things which the ignorant think great goods, and endured those which they think great evils. And lest anyone dare the less to undertake such conduct and discipline, the more highly it is honored, it must be shown—both from His promises and exhortations, and from the multitude of imitators: Apostles, martyrs, and innumerable saints—that those things are not to be despaired of. 3.

But when the enticements of carnal pleasures have been overcome, care must be taken lest there creep in and follow the desire of pleasing men—whether through certain wondrous deeds, or through difficult continence or patience, or through some bounty, or in the name of knowledge or eloquence: in that kind is also the desire of honor. Against all these let there be brought forward the things which are written of the praise of charity, and of the emptiness of boasting; and let it be taught how shameful it is to wish to please those whom you would not wish to imitate. For either they are not good, and it is nothing great to be praised by the bad; or they are good, and one ought to imitate them. But those who are good are good by virtue; and virtue does not seek what is in the power of other men.

He therefore who imitates the good seeks the praise of no man; he who imitates the bad is not worthy of praise. But if you wish to please men for this reason, that you may profit them toward loving God, then it is no longer this, but something else, that you desire. But he who desires to please still has a necessary fear: first, lest by sinning secretly he be reckoned among the hypocrites by the Lord; then, if he seeks to please by good deeds, lest, hunting after this reward, he lose what God is about to give. 4. But when that desire is overcome, pride must be guarded against. For it is difficult that one who no longer desires to please men, and thinks himself full of virtues, should deign to associate with them. And so fear is still necessary, lest even that which he seems to have be taken away from him (Matt 25:29);

and, with hands and feet bound, be cast into the outer darkness (Matt 22:13). Wherefore the fear of God not only begins, but also perfects, the wise man. And he is wise who supremely loves God, and his neighbor as himself. But what dangers and difficulties are to be feared on this journey, and what remedies one ought to use, is another question. XXXVII. On the ever-born. Better is the ever-born than he who is ever being born. For he who is ever being born is not yet born; and he never is born nor will have been born, if he is ever being born. For it is one thing to be born, another to have been born. And through this there is never a son, if never born; but the Son, because born, is always Son: therefore always the born one. XXXVIII.

On the conformation of the soul. Since nature is one thing, discipline another, use another, and these are understood in one soul with no diversity of substance; likewise since natural talent is one thing, virtue another, tranquility another, similarly of one and the same substance; and since the soul is of another substance than God, although made by Him—but God Himself is that most sacred Trinity, known in word to many, in reality to few: it must be most diligently investigated what the Lord Jesus says, "No one comes to me unless the Father draw him" (John 6:44); and, "No one comes to the Father except through me" (John 14:6); and, "He will lead you into all truth" (John 16:13). XXXIX. On nourishment.

What is it that receives that thing which it transforms? as an animal food. What is it that is received and transformed? as the same food. What is it that is received and not transformed? as light for the eyes, and sound for the ears. But these the soul receives through the body: what is it, however, that it receives by itself, and transforms into itself? as another soul, which by receiving into friendship it makes like itself. And what is it that it receives by itself, and does not transform? as the truth. Wherefore one must understand both what was said to Peter, "Kill and eat" (Acts 10:13); and what is said in the Gospel, "And the life was the light of men" (John 1:4). XL. Since the nature of souls is one, whence come the diverse wills of men?

From diverse things seen there is a diverse appetite of souls; from diverse appetite, a diverse success in acquiring; from diverse success, a diverse habit; from diverse habit, the will is diverse. But it is the order of things that makes the things seen diverse—hidden indeed, yet certain under divine providence. It is not therefore to be thought that the natures of souls are diverse because the wills are diverse; since even the will of one soul is varied according to the diversity of times. For at one time it desires to be rich, at another time, despising riches, it desires to be wise; and in the very appetite for temporal things, at one time trade pleases one man, and at another time military service. XLI.

Since God made all things, why did he not make them equal? Because they would not be 'all things' if they were equal; for there would not be those many kinds of things by which the universe is completed, having its creatures ordered as first and second and so on down to the last. And this is what is meant by 'all things.' XLII. How Christ was both in his mother's womb and in the heavens. Just as a man's word, which even if many hear it, each hears it whole. XLIII. Why did the Son of God appear in a man, and the Holy Spirit in a dove? Because the former came to demonstrate to men an example of how to live; the latter appeared in order to signify that very gift by which, through living well, one arrives at the goal.

Both, moreover, were done visibly for the sake of carnal men, so that they might be led by the steps of the sacraments from those things which are perceived by bodily eyes to those which are understood by the mind. For words too sound and pass away; yet the things signified by the words, when something divine and eternal is being expounded in speech, do not likewise pass away. XLIV. Why did the Lord Jesus Christ come so long afterward, and not at the beginning of man's sin? Because all that is beautiful is from the highest Beauty, which is God; but temporal beauty is accomplished by things departing and succeeding one another. And each single age, from infancy to old age, has its own proper comeliness in each single man.

Just as, therefore, he is absurd who would wish only the age of youth to exist in a man subject to time—for he would begrudge the other beauties which, in the other ages, perform their alternations and order—so he is absurd who desires one single age in the whole human race itself; for it too, as though it were one man, passes through its ages. Nor was it fitting that a Teacher should come from on high, by whose imitation one might be formed unto the best morals, except in the time of youth. To this pertains what the Apostle says: that little ones were kept under the Law as under a schoolmaster (Gal. III, 23, 24), until He should come for whom it was reserved, who had been promised through the Prophets.

For it is one thing that divine providence deals as it were privately with individuals, and another that it takes counsel for the whole race as it were publicly. For whoever as individuals have arrived at any certain wisdom, have been illumined by no other than that same Truth, according to the opportunity of their several ages; and it was by that very Truth that, so that the people might become wise, man was taken up at the opportune age of the human race itself. XLV. Against the astrologers. 1. The ancients did not call 'mathematici' those who are now so called, but those who investigated the numbers of the seasons by the motion of heaven and the stars; concerning whom it is most rightly said in the holy Scriptures: 'Yet again, neither are these to be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much as to be able to estimate the world,'

how did they not more easily find the Lord of this world? (Wis. XIII, 8, 9) For the human mind, judging concerning visible things, is able to recognize that it is itself better than all visible things. Yet since it confesses that it too, on account of its defect and its progress in wisdom, is mutable, it finds that above itself is the immutable Truth; and thus cleaving after it, as it is said, 'My soul hath cleaved after thee' (Ps. LXII, 9), it is made blessed, finding within itself the Creator and Lord even of all visible things; not seeking outwardly for visible things, though they be heavenly ones—

which either are not found, or with great labor are found in vain, unless from the beauty of those things which are outside there be found the Artificer who is within, who first works in the soul the higher beauties, and then in the body the lower ones. 2. But against those who are now called astrologers, who wish to subject our acts to the heavenly bodies and to sell us to the stars, and to receive from us the very price for which we are sold, nothing truer and briefer can be said than that they give no response except upon receiving the constellations. And in the constellations are noted the parts—of which they say the zodiacal circle has three hundred and sixty—

and that the motion of the heaven is accomplished through one hour in fifteen parts, so that in such a delay as one hour occupies, fifteen parts rise. And these single parts are said to have sixty minutes each. But the minutes of minutes they do not now find in the constellations from which they claim to predict future things; whereas the conception of twins, since it is effected in a single act of intercourse—as the physicians attest, whose discipline is much more certain and manifest—occurs in so small a point of time that it is not stretched into two minutes of minutes. Whence then, in twins, comes such a diversity of actions and of outcomes