Stromateis 1 part 42/42

There are three things connected with speech:

Names, which are symbols primarily of concepts, and consequently also of the underlying things; second, concepts, which are likenesses and impressions of the underlying things (whence concepts are the same for all, since the same impression arises in all from the underlying things, but names are no longer the same, on account of the different languages);

and third, the underlying things themselves, from which the concepts are impressed upon us.

Names, then, are reduced by grammar to the twenty-four universal elements [letters];

for the elements must be determinate in number;

for since particulars are infinite, there can be no knowledge of them, whereas it is proper to knowledge to rest upon universal and determinate principles.

Whence particulars are reduced to universals.

The business of philosophers is occupied with both the concepts and the underlying things.

But since the particulars of these too are infinite, certain elements were found for them as well, under which everything that is sought is subsumed.

And if a thing appears to fall under one of the elements, or even several, we shall declare it to exist; but if it escapes them all, we shall declare it not to exist at all.

Of things said, some are said with combination, as 'man runs'; others are said without combination, as 'man' and as 'runs,' and whatever does not constitute a complete statement nor possesses truth or falsehood.

Of the things said without combination, some signify substance, some quality, some quantity, some relation, some where, some when, some position, some having, some doing, some being-affected; and these we call the elements of the things that exist in matter and are posterior to the first principles.

For these are contemplated by reason, whereas immaterial things are apprehended by the intellect alone, at the first immediate application of the mind.

Of the things ranged under the ten categories, some are said absolutely, in themselves, as are the [other] nine categories, and some are said relatively.

For synonyms are things of which both the name is common to both — 'animal' — and the account is the same, that is, the definition, namely, 'an ensouled substance';

'Heteronyms' are those things which, concerning the same underlying subject, are expressed under different names, as 'ascent' and 'descent';

for it is the same road, whether toward the top or toward the bottom;

but the other kind of heteronyms, such as 'horse' and 'black,' which have both a different name and a different account from one another, and do not even share the underlying subject, must be called 'different things,' not 'heteronyms.'

'Polyonyms' are things which have the same account but a different name, as 'aor,' 'xiphos,' 'phasganon' [all meaning 'sword'].

'Paronyms' are things named after something else, as 'the brave man' is named after 'bravery.'

'Homonyms' are things which use the same name but do not have the same account, as 'man' — both the living animal and the man depicted [in a painting].

Of homonyms, some are homonymous by chance, as Ajax the Locrian and Ajax of Salamis; others by deliberate intent — and of these, some by similarity, as 'man,' both the living animal and the man depicted, others by analogy, as the 'feet' of Mount Ida and our own feet, because they are situated lower down [than the whole]; and others by function, as the 'foot' [sheet] of a ship, by which the ship sails, and our own foot, by which we move.

Things are said to be homonymous 'from the same source and with reference to the same thing,' as a book and a scalpel are both called 'medical,' both from the physician who uses them and with reference to the same medical purpose.

Of causes, some are initiating, some are sustaining, some are cooperating, and some are those without which [the effect cannot occur].

Initiating causes are those which first supply the occasion for something to come about, as beauty [supplies the occasion] of erotic passion for the licentious;

for when seen, it merely produces in them a disposition toward erotic passion, but not by way of compulsion.

'Sustaining' causes are also called, synonymously, 'complete-in-themselves,' since they are of themselves sufficient to produce the effect.

Next, all the causes must be shown in the case of the one who is learning.

The father is the initiating cause of learning; the teacher is the sustaining cause; the nature of the learner is the cooperating cause; and time holds the place of that without which [learning cannot occur].

'Cause,' properly speaking, is that which effectively supplies something, since we say that iron is 'capable of cutting' not only when it is cutting, but also when it is not cutting;

thus, likewise, 'that which supplies' signifies both that which is already operating and that which is not yet operating but possesses the potential to operate.

Some say that causes belong to bodies, others that they belong to incorporeals;

and some say that a body is a cause in the proper sense, while an incorporeal thing is a cause only by extended usage and, so to speak, causally [in a loose sense];

but others reverse this altogether, calling the incorporeals causes in the proper sense, and bodies causes only by extended usage — for instance, that 'cutting,' being an activity, is incorporeal and is the cause of 'to cut' (this too being an activity and incorporeal), and likewise of 'to be cut,' while the knife and the thing cut are bodies.

'Being a cause of something' is said in three ways: first, that which is a cause, such as the sculptor; second, that of which it is a cause, such as the statue's coming into being; third, that to which it is a cause, as to the matter;

for [the sculptor] is, to the bronze, the cause of the statue's coming into being.

'Coming to be,' then, and 'being cut' — that of which something is a cause — being activities, are incorporeal.

In this sense, causes are causes of predicates, or, as some say, of 'sayables' (for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates 'sayables');

or rather — and this is more accurate — some will be said to be causes of predicates, such as 'it is cut,' whose case is 'to be cut'; and others of propositions, as 'a ship comes to be,' whose case, again, is 'a ship coming to be';

but Aristotle [speaks of causes] of appellatives, such as these: 'house,' 'ship,' 'burning,' 'cutting.'

And it is agreed that the case is incorporeal;

wherefore that sophism, too, is resolved in this way:

'What you say passes through your mouth' — which is true; 'but you say house; therefore a house passes through your mouth' — which is false;

for we do not utter the house, which is a body, but rather the case, which is incorporeal, of which 'house' happens to be [the expression].

And we say that the builder builds with reference to that which is to come to be.

thus also we say that a cloak is being woven;

for 'the one making' indicates activity;

and the maker is not of one thing while the cause is of another; rather, they belong to the same thing—both the cloak and the house.

for insofar as something is the cause of a thing's coming to be, in that very respect it is also the maker of that coming to be.

Therefore the same thing is at once cause, maker, and 'that on account of which.'

And if something is both a cause and a maker, it is certainly also 'that on account of which'; but if something is 'that on account of which', it is not necessarily also a cause.

For many things concur toward one single effect—things on account of which the result comes about—yet not all of them are causes.

For Medea would not have killed her children had she not been enraged; nor would she have been enraged had she not been jealous; nor would she have been jealous had she not fallen in love; nor would that have happened had Jason not sailed to Colchis; nor that, had the Argo not been built; nor that, had the timbers not been cut from Mount Pelion.

For in all these instances, though each is something 'on account of which' the deed occurred, not all of them are causes of the child-killing—only Medea is.

Therefore that which does not hinder is inoperative; and for this reason it is not that-which-does-not-hinder that is a cause, but that which does hinder.

for a cause is conceived in terms of acting and doing something.

Moreover, that which does not hinder is separated from the thing that comes about (indeed, it is precisely because that which could hinder is not present that the result is accomplished), whereas the cause stands in relation to the thing that comes about;

therefore that which does not hinder could not be a cause.

'Cause' is spoken of in four ways: the efficient cause, as the sculptor; the material cause, as the bronze; the formal cause, as the outward shape; and the final cause, as the honor paid to the gymnasiarch.

The bronze holds the position of a 'that without which not' with respect to the statue's coming to be, and in this sense it too is a cause.

For everything without which the effect could not possibly come about is, of necessity, a cause—though not a cause in the unqualified sense.

for the 'that without which not' is not a sustaining cause, but a co-operating one.

everything that acts produces its effect together with the aptitude of that which is acted upon;

for the cause disposes its object, while each thing is affected in the way it is by nature suited to be affected, the aptitude serving as that which supplies this and holds the place of a 'that without which not.'

The cause, then, is powerless without the aptitude; yet the aptitude itself is not a cause, but a co-worker, since every cause is conceived in terms of acting.

but the earth would not make itself, and so it could not be the cause of itself either.

It is ridiculous to say that it is not the fire that is the cause of the burning, but the wood; nor the knife the cause of the cutting, but the flesh; nor the strength of his opponent the cause of the athlete's being thrown, but his own weakness.

The sustaining cause has no need of time;

for the cauterizing iron produces the pain the very instant it is pressed against the flesh.

Of antecedent causes, some require time until the effect comes about, while others do not, as the fall that causes a fracture.

Perhaps, then, these are called timeless not in the sense of a total absence of time, but by way of diminution—just as 'suddenly' likewise does not occur wholly without time.

Every cause, qua cause, must be apprehended by a twofold act of understanding, since it is conceived both of something and in relation to something: of something—namely, the effect, as the knife is the cause of cutting; and in relation to something—namely, that which is suitably disposed, as fire is in relation to wood.

for it will not burn adamant.

for it is conceived according to its relation to another thing, so that we must attend to two things in order to conceive of the cause as a cause.

The same account applies also to the demiurge, the maker, and the father.

Nothing is the cause of itself, nor is anyone the father of himself, since otherwise the first would become the second;

for indeed the cause acts and disposes, while that which comes to be by the cause is acted upon and disposed.

And the same thing, taken in relation to itself, cannot at once both act and be acted upon, nor be at once both son and father.

And moreover, the cause is prior in existence to that which comes to be by it, as the knife is prior to the cutting.

And the same thing cannot, in the same respect, both be prior in time to the matter—insofar as it is a cause—and at the same time be posterior and later in time—insofar as it is the effect of that cause.

Being differs from becoming;

thus, likewise, something is the cause of that which comes to be, and the father of a son.

for it is not possible for the same thing, in the same respect, both to exist and to come into being at once.

Nothing, then, is the cause of itself.

Causes are not causes of one another in the same respect, but they are causes for one another in different respects.

...of the coming to be of the fever;

and the fever, once already present, is a cause not of the spleen, but of the intensifying of the diseased condition.

Thus also the virtues are, for one another, causes of the predicate 'not being separated,' on account of their mutual entailment; and the stones of an arch are, for one another, causes of the predicate 'remaining in place,' though they are not causes of one another; and likewise the teacher and the learner are, for one another, causes of the predicate 'making progress.'

Now, things are said to be causes for one another, sometimes of the very same thing—as the merchant and the retailer are, for one another, causes of making a profit—and sometimes of different things—as the knife and the flesh;

for the knife is, to the flesh, the cause of being cut, while the flesh is, to the knife, the cause of cutting.

'An eye for an eye, and a life for a life.'

For he who strikes someone a mortal blow is, to him, the cause of death, or of death's coming about; but if he in turn is struck a mortal blow by that same person, he has him as a counter-cause—not in the respect in which he became a cause to him, but in another respect.

For he became to him the cause of death, but it was not death itself that in turn inflicted upon him the mortal blow, but rather the man himself who had been wounded; so that he himself became the cause of one thing, but had another as his cause. Likewise, the wrongdoer becomes, to another, the cause of the wrong he suffers; but the law that commands retaliation is a cause not of wrongdoing, but of vindication for the one and of correction for the other.

So that causes are not, as causes, causes of one another; rather, they are causes for one another.

It is further asked whether, when many things concur to produce one effect, they thereby become many causes.

For the men who join together are the cause of the ship's being launched;

but not each one individually is a cause—rather, each is a cause together with the others, unless indeed a joint-cause is also to be counted as a cause.

But others say that, if there are many causes, each one individually becomes the cause of one thing.

For instance, although being happy is one thing, the virtues, being many, are its causes; and likewise there are many causes of being warmed, and many causes of feeling pain.

Is it not, then, that the many virtues are, in respect of power, one and the same—just as the things that warm and the things that cause pain likewise share one power?

And the multitude of the virtues, being one in genus, becomes the cause of one thing—namely, of being happy.

In reality, however, antecedent causes of a single thing occur in greater number both by genus and by species: by genus, of being sick in some manner or other—for instance, chilling, overheating, fatigue, indigestion, drunkenness—but by species, of fever in particular.

But sustaining causes are many only by genus, no longer also by species.

For although being made fragrant is, by genus, one thing, there are many causes of it by species—for instance, frankincense, rose, saffron, storax, myrrh, perfumed ointment;

for the rose would not be as fragrant as the myrrh.

The same thing becomes the cause of opposite effects—sometimes owing to the magnitude and power of the cause, sometimes owing to the aptitude of that which is acted upon.

This happens on account of a particular degree of power, for instance:

the same string, according as it is tightened or loosened, produces a sharp or a low tone.

And this happens on account of the aptitude of the things acted upon, for instance:

honey tastes sweet to the healthy but bitter to those with fever; and one and the same wine leads some to anger, but others to cheerful relaxation; and the same sun melts wax but hardens clay.

Of causes, then, some are manifest, some are grasped by inference from observation, some are non-evident, and some are grasped by analogical reasoning.

And of the non-evident, some are non-evident only for a time—hidden at one time, but at another clearly seen again—while others are by nature non-evident, incapable of ever becoming manifest at any time whatsoever.

And of those that are non-evident by nature, some are apprehensible—which some call 'not non-evident', being grasped through signs by way of analogical reasoning, as the symmetry of the pores discernible only by reason—while others are inapprehensible, incapable in any way of falling under apprehension; and these indeed are called 'non-evident' in the absolute sense.

And of causes, some are antecedent, some are sustaining, some are joint-causes, and some are auxiliary.

And some [causes belong] to what is according to nature, others to what is contrary to nature, and others to disease; and, in a subordinate way, some belong to the affections themselves, others to their magnitude, and others to times and seasons.

Now when the antecedent [causes] are removed, the effect nevertheless remains; but the sustaining cause is that in whose presence the effect remains, and…when it is removed, [the effect] too is removed.

They also call it, synonymously, 'self-complete,' since it is sufficient in itself, of itself, to produce the effect.

But if the 'self-complete' cause is indicative of a self-complete activity, then the…cooperating [cause] signifies a service, and a function performed together with another.

If, then, it contributes nothing, it will not even be called cooperating; but if it does contribute, it certainly becomes the cause of precisely that which it contributes, that is, of what comes about through it.

The cooperating cause, then, is that in whose presence the effect came about…thus, when [it was] evidently present, [the effect followed] evidently; and when [it was] obscure, obscurely.

And the joint-cause, too, belongs to the class of causes, just as a fellow-soldier…is [nonetheless] a soldier, and a fellow-youth is a youth.

The cooperating cause, then, helps the sustaining cause toward the intensification of what comes about through it; but the joint-cause is not of the same notion.

For a thing can be a joint-cause even if it is not at all a sustaining cause.

For the joint-cause is conceived as being together with another, since it is itself unable, on its own, to produce the effect—being a cause together with [another] cause.

The cooperating cause differs from the joint-cause in this: the joint-cause contributes to the effect together with another [cause], in a case where that other does not, on its own, produce the effect; whereas the cooperating cause, while not itself producing [the effect] on its own, comes alongside another [cause] that does produce it on its own, and cooperates with it so that the effect comes about more forcefully.

And above all, the fact that a cooperating [cause] can arise out of an antecedent [cause] shows that the power of the [antecedent] cause extends [even] to becoming a cooperating cause.