Panarion (Against Heresies) 1 part 69/82

not being ashamed, so that the intelligent, having tested him by the fruits of his licentiousness and shallowness, might not pluck of his fruits.

For grapes cannot be harvested from thorns, so that gravity might be seen to come even from bad teaching.

But these things we have heard occurred and happened concerning the man;

As for the things consistent with his words — dared, as I have said, in a madness of denial against the Lord — they are many; but I will set forth a few out of the many, and, with the help the Lord grants for their overthrow, we too will speak against them.

And such is the wrangling of this Anomoean's faith, and these comparisons drawn from his arguments — spoken as though from the Scriptures, yet not bearing that sense, but having a different force, though taken up by him in this way:

He asserts, right at the outset, that the unbegotten cannot be like the begotten.

For indeed they differ even in name;

the one is unbegotten, the other begotten.

But the whole of this is foolish, and has turned the man to madness.

For if we should seek a begetter for the Unbegotten — lest by the same reasoning we lose the true opinion concerning Christ — it will be found that the Father is no longer one, nor is there one father of a father, but fathers of fathers sought without limit; and there will no longer be one God, who exists forever, who had nothing before him, and who continues and abides forever, from whom the only-begotten true Son has been begotten and exists, and from whom his Holy Spirit is — but instead the beings so sought will be many gods, and in the end all things will be deceit and not truth.

But one must also know that there is one God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom also comes the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son.

And this is the one Godhead: one God, one Lord — Father and Son and Holy Spirit; the Son is not some blending with the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit, but the Father is Father, the Son is Son, and the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit — three perfect persons, one Godhead, one God, one Lord, just as we have often rendered this doxology concerning God throughout our treatment of all the heresies.

Therefore, since God is one, and it is not possible to conceive of another besides him who is, the Father is, wonderfully, both unbegotten and uncreated; and the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of him, is not in every respect unlike him, but is the same as the Father and equal in every dignity, even though the one has been begotten and the other is unbegotten.

For if he has indeed begotten the Son from himself, it is impossible for the Son not to be equal to and like the Father;

for everything that begets, begets what is like itself, and not merely like, but equal in identity.

For man begets man, and God begets God; but man begets by the intertwining of bodies, whereas God alone, in a manner beyond telling, has begotten the only-begotten — not by any flowing, contraction, or expansion, but the Father, being Spirit, begot the Son from himself without beginning and without time, like him in all things and equal, as the holy Gospel says: that the Jews sought to kill him, not only because he broke the Sabbath, but because he also called himself the Son of God, making himself equal to God.

For how is he not like the Father and equal in all things, he who has life in himself and says, 'Just as the Father raises the dead, so the Son also raises the dead,' and who says, 'He who has seen me has seen the Father'?

He who signifies the Father through himself, and who says, 'He who knows me knows the Father,' and 'He who has seen me has seen the Father,' cannot be estranged from him, since he is none other than the Father;

just as the Father † and the Son also indicate: 'Let us make man according to our image and likeness.'

For if the Son were not like the Father, how then did man come to be according to image and likeness? For the Father did not say, 'Let us make man according to my image' or 'according to your image,' but 'according to our image.'

How, then, can he who says, 'I am in the Father, and the Father is in me,' as I have already said, be neither equal nor like? For not only does he himself say this in the Gospel, but Isaiah too, prophesying by the Holy Spirit, knew the Son to be in the Father and not alien or different from the Father, as the saying goes, which runs in this sequence — from the Hebrew, thus: 'phthoou saareim, ouiabo gōi sadik, sōmēr emmouneim, iesro samōch, thesar salōm salōm, chi bak batoou, betou baadōnai ada ōth, chi baia adōnai sōr ōlemeim';

and from Aquila's translation, thus: 'Open the gates, let the righteous nation enter, one that keeps faith, a formation firmly established, a guarding of peace, for they have trusted in him;'

'Trust in the Lord forever, for in the Lord is the Lord who has established the ages'; but according to the Seventy, thus: 'Open the gates, let the righteous people enter, who keep truth and hold fast to truth and keep peace,'

'for they have hoped in you, O Lord, forever, O great and eternal God.'

Let the reader note that 'God' stands in place of 'Lord,' and 'the great one' stands in place of 'in the Lord,' according to the Seventy.

And how much more could be said on this? But I fear lest I drive the treatment of these matters to excessive length.

For all things are clear in the divine Scripture to those who wish to approach the divine word with pious reasoning, and who do not conceive a diabolical energy within themselves so as to cast themselves down into the pits of death — as this pitiable man and those persuaded by him have taken up arms against the truth, surpassing all who before them had been blasphemers against God and his faith.

And that the Son cannot be unlike the Father we have demonstrated; yet we did not say these things resting on this argument alone.

For he is not only like, but also equal — the same in Godhead, the same in eternity and in power.

And we do not say 'of the same essence in an identical sense' [ταυτοούσιον], lest this term, as used by some, be likened to Sabellius.

Rather, we say he is the same in Godhead, in essence, and in power, and equal in all things to the Father and to his Holy Spirit; and we call him 'consubstantial' [ὁμοούσιος], as the holy faith holds, so that by the prefix 'homo-' the perfect persons may be clearly signified — that the Son is perfect, from the perfect Father, and the Holy Spirit too is perfect.

By a first, a second, and a third testimony these men will be exposed.

For if it is confessed at all that he was begotten by him as Son, it will necessarily also be confessed that he is like the one who begot him.

It is clear that in word he calls him 'offspring,' but plainly holds and has come to believe that he exists as a creature, and that he is called Son only by way of grace — as this 'definer of the boundaries of the heavens,' this 'divider of the indivisible,' this 'surveyor of our salvation in Christ' has determined.

But the argument of all those who introduce the notion that he is a creature collapses, and this man's argument will fall in just the same way.

For I will say to him, most justly:

Tell me, you there — what would you say concerning the Son of God? Do you call him a creature, or an offspring? For if you say he is a creature, no longer plausibly conceal the corruption of your teaching by calling him, in mere name, the Father's 'offspring.'

For nothing created is begotten, and if it is begotten, it is not created.

Give up, then, even calling him 'begotten' in mere word.

For it is not fitting for you at all — not even in a single word — to bear the words of truth upon your lips; rather, declare the whole of your scheme, that we may learn who you are and so flee from your plot, you hunter of souls and schemer against those persuaded by you.

Do you, then, worship the Son of God, or do you not? 'Yes,' he says, 'I worship him.'

Do you worship him as God, or not? 'Yes,' he says, 'I worship him as God.'

...neither in heaven, nor on the earth, nor in the waters; and the apostle says, 'They served the creation rather than the Creator, and became fools.' How then does he command that nothing be worshiped, and yet was pleased that this one be worshiped? Is there, then, partiality with God? Far be it!

For in that the One is worshiped, he showed that the one worshiped is altogether other than creation, and that creation — which is worshiped [by the ungodly] — is other than the worshipful Lord, the Son of God, begotten of the Father;

for because he was begotten of him, he is like him and is truly a Son;

and for this reason he is also worthy of worship by all;

through him he made all things, and without him not one thing came into being.

For in him, and in his Holy Spirit, which proceeds from him and receives from the Son, he made all things and established them.

For by the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath of his mouth all their host.

For when the Only-begotten says, as I have stated above, 'that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent,' he set himself apart from creation, just as the apostle also says: 'one God, from whom are all things, and we through him;'

'and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him.'

And you see how he showed the Father to be the one God, and the one begotten of him to be the one Lord;

one God, and one Lord — not reckoned along with all the things that have come from him, but rather one Lord through whom are all things.

But if there is one Lord through whom are all things, he is not one among all things, but the maker of all things, being the creator of everything that has been created.

Since the Son was begotten of the Father and derives from the Father, through whom all things have come to be, he is unlike all things, inasmuch as he is indeed the creator of them all;

since there is one — and one God, the Father, from whom are all things — and the Lord Jesus, through whom are all things, the sentence above being bound together by the repeated 'one' and by 'from whom' and 'through whom,' it has on the one hand clearly shown the Son to be from the Father, and on the other has wonderfully declared that the Son is no longer to be counted among the rest [of created things], by saying 'through whom are all things,' so as to show that he who is the Father is Father, and that the Son, being from the Father who is, is the only-begotten Lord.

The apostle was saying these things, borne along by the Holy Spirit;

therefore he had no need to declare anything concerning the Spirit — not because the Spirit is not glorified together with the Father and the Son, nor so as to number it among all the things created through the Son;

for it sufficed that the Spirit be numbered with the Father and the Son through the Son's own sure confession, in the words, 'Go and baptize into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.'

So then, when the apostle spoke — or rather, when the Holy Spirit spoke in him — he was not declaring anything about himself;

for the knowledge concerning him was clear, not even disputed by the Jews;

but it was held in reserve, so that the Holy Spirit might not appear to be self-constituted.

But the apostle, borne along with the Holy Spirit, spoke of the Father and the Son, so that the Trinity might be shown to exist forever and never cease to be.

Do not marvel, then, if you hear, 'one God, from whom are all things,' and 'one Lord, through whom are all things.'

For by calling the Son 'Lord,' the apostle did not thereby deny that the Lord is also God; and by saying 'one God, through whom are all things,' he did not deny that God is also Lord.

For he is at once both Lord and God, and both God and Lord, and it makes no difference regarding the things truly preached to us for our salvation, from God, through the apostles.

But this same Anomoean, and those who came from him, having forsaken the way of truth, turned aside into falsehood, having wickedly devised interpretations of God's sayings, and, twisting their minds aside into disputations and quarrels of words, they leapt away from the truth and fell from the things of heaven.

For every word will refute them, if they are willing to give their own mind over to the illumination of the Gospel.

...in the covenant [does it say], 'I have created the Son for you'; but rather, 'The Father sent me,' and 'I came forth from the Father, and have come,' and 'he who is in the bosom of the Father,' and 'the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'

And there is much to consider concerning our salvation, so as not to be swept away by the sleight-of-hand teaching of this devil.

For the devil, wishing to destroy the human race, being possessed by envy at man's glory, devised various contrivances:

The first through ignorance, the second through idolatry, at another time through wickedness, and now, finally, through the error and deceit of heresies, so that from every side he might overthrow man away from the things of heaven.

How much, then, will the mind of our lowliness be able to say to you, O Anomoean? For rightly are you called 'Unlike,' you who have turned aside both the manners and the understanding away from the men who possess the understanding of God and hold the faith of the truth.

For you have not become unlike men by advancing toward the good, but by turning aside from the way of truth you have become unlike the sons of the church of God;

taking as your pretext the Son of God — who is like his own Father — and saying that he has become unlike the Father, you yourself have become 'Unlike,' having been allotted this name, no longer being like those who are being saved in God.

But that I may not waste time being worn down over his questions, let us, from the very words which he himself set forth in writing dialectically to certain persons, proceed to refute what concerns him.

For he seemed to display a certain dialectical error in his very treatise, which does not contain even a single word of faith — of that faith which is most simple and most sound, and adorned in a holy and gentle spirit.

I have set out first, whole and entire, his so-called little treatise which has come into our hands, so that from it we may proceed to make the rest of our refutation of his argument.

The Little Treatise (Syntagmation) of Aetius the Anomoean

Since, at the time of the persecution brought upon us by the Chronitae, certain of the aforementioned persons, having appropriated it along with many other little writings, corrupted by insertions and deletions the little treatise which I had diligently composed particularly concerning the Unbegotten God and the begotten, and published it, having altered its proper sequence; and afterward this treatise came into our hands again, since one of our own zealous men had brought it to us, I was compelled, as a father, to purify it once more and send this composition out to you, O all you pious male and female contestants, so that you might know, in accordance with the sense of the holy Scriptures, that this brief discourse was indeed spoken by us, by which you will be able, through concise refutations, to stop every man who attempts to contradict you concerning the Unbegotten God and the begotten from persisting in shamelessness — above all, the aforementioned Chronitae.

And in the form of verses I have set apart one difficulty from another, and one solution from another, for the sake of the ready graspability and clarity of the arguments, making my beginning concerning the Unbegotten God:

Whether it is possible for the Unbegotten God to make the begotten unbegotten.

If the Unbegotten God is superior to every cause, for this reason he would also be superior to generation.

But if he is superior to every cause, it is clear that he is superior also to generation.

For he has neither received his being from another nature, nor has he himself furnished being to himself.

But if he did not furnish being to himself — not because of any weakness of nature, but because he has transcended every cause — how then could anyone concede that the nature which was made to subsist has, in relation to the nature which caused it to subsist, an identity of essence, since such a subsistence does not admit of generation?

If God remains endlessly in an unbegotten nature, and the offspring is endlessly an offspring, the false doctrine of 'homoousios' and 'homoiousios' will be exposed.

And the incomparability in essence stands firm, each nature remaining unceasingly in the proper dignity of its own nature.

He was begotten — yet from an essence which caused him to subsist.

For no pious reasoning permits that the same essence be both begotten and unbegotten.

If the unbegotten were begotten, what would prevent the begotten from having become unbegotten? For every nature hastens all the more from what is foreign to it toward what is proper to it.

If God is not wholly unbegotten, nothing prevents him from having begotten substantially.

But if he is wholly unbegotten, he did not extend himself into generation substantially, but by his authority caused the offspring to subsist.

If the Unbegotten God is wholly generative, then that which was begotten was not begotten substantially, since his whole essence has the property of begetting, but not of being begotten.

But if, having been transformed, the essence of God is called an offspring, then his essence is not immutable, the change having produced the formation of the Son.

But if the essence of God is both immutable and superior to generation, then what pertains to the Son will be confessed only up to a bare appellation.

If the offspring existed seminally in the Unbegotten God, then, after the begetting, having received something from outside, he — so to speak — grew to maturity.

The Son, therefore, is perfect not from that out of which he was begotten, but from that which he received in addition.

For things that receive something in a kindred manner, as though constituted out of what they received, are naturally disposed to admit the name 'perfect' in a different sense.

If the offspring was perfect, then it is an offspring within the begotten, and not from that out of which the Unbegotten begot it.

For it is not possible for a begotten nature to exist within an unbegotten essence.

For the same thing cannot both be and not be.

For an offspring is not unbegotten, and that which is unbegotten was never an offspring, since to apply such a heterogeneous notion to God bears the mark and outrage of blasphemy.

If God the Almighty, being of an unbegotten nature, does not know himself as of a begotten nature, while the Son, being of a begotten nature, knows himself to be precisely what he is, how could 'homoousios' not be a falsehood, since the one knows himself to be unbegotten, and the other knows himself to be begotten?

If 'unbegotten' does not represent the subsistence of God, but the incomparable name is merely a human conception, then God owes gratitude to those who conceived it, on account of the concept of 'unbegotten,' since he does not bear the excellence of that name in his own essence.

If 'unbegotten' is observed of God from outside, then those who made the observation are better than the one observed, having procured for him a name superior to his nature.

If the unbegotten nature does not yield to generation, this is what is meant by the term:

but if it does yield to generation, then the passions of generation would prevail over the subsistence of God.

If the offspring is immutable in nature because of the one who begot him, then the Unbegotten is an immutable essence — not on account of a decision of will, but on account of the dignity inherent in his essence.

If 'unbegotten' is indicative of essence, it is reasonably set in contrast to the essence of the offspring;

but if 'unbegotten' signifies nothing, much more does 'offspring' indicate nothing.

But how could nothing be set in contrast to nothing? But if the utterance 'unbegotten' is set in contrast to the utterance 'begotten,' and silence succeeds the utterance, then it follows that the hope of the Christians comes into being and passes away, since it is situated in a differing utterance, and not in natures that actually are as the meaning of the names would have them.

If 'unbegotten' assigns nothing more, in respect of the superiority of essence, over against the offspring, then the Son, being surpassed only in name, will recognize as better than himself those who gave him that name — not the God and Father who was himself so addressed.

If the unbegotten essence is superior to generation, having this superiority from itself, then it is essence-in-itself, unbegotten.

For it is not by willing — because it wills — that it is superior to generation, but because it is so by nature.

Being, then, itself the unbegotten essence, God permits by no reasoning that generation be conceived with respect to himself, but drives every examination and every reckoning to be directed toward the things that are begotten.

...being God, which is precisely himself, of himself?

If privations are the removal of possessed states, then 'unbegotten,' as applied to God, is either the privation of a state or a state of privation.

But if it is the privation of a state, how could that which is not present be reckoned, as though present, among the attributes of God? But if 'unbegotten' is a state, it is necessary to presuppose beforehand a begotten essence, so that, having thus received a state, it might be named 'unbegotten.'

But if the begotten essence partook of the unbegotten essence, then, having undergone the loss of that state, it has been deprived of unbegottenness.

It would then follow that the essence is begotten, while 'unbegotten' is merely a state.

But if 'offspring' is indicative of a passage, it is clear that it signifies a state, whether it has been reshaped out of some essence, or whether it is precisely what it is called — an offspring.

If 'unbegotten' is a state and 'begotten' is a state, then essences are prior to states, while states, though secondary in relation to essences, would nonetheless be held in greater esteem.

But if 'unbegotten' is the cause of 'begotten,' and 'offspring' — signifying being — contributes the cause together with its own essence, then 'offspring' is indicative of essence, not of a state;

whereas the unbegotten nature introduces nothing together with itself — how, then, could the unbegotten nature not be an essence, but instead a state?

If every essence is unbegotten, such as that of God the Almighty, how could anyone call the one passible and the other impassible? But if, by an allotment of unbegotten nature, the one remains superior to quantity and quality and, simply put, to all change, while the other is subject to passions, and yet this latter is granted to have identity of essence with the former because the one who favors this view concedes it as a matter of course, in accordance with what has already been said, then it would at least follow, consistently, that one should call the essence that acts 'unbegotten,' and the one that undergoes change 'begotten.'

If the unbegotten nature is the cause of that which came to be, but 'unbegotten' were nothing, how could nothing be the cause of what came to be?

If 'unbegotten' is a privation, and privation is the loss of a state, and loss either perishes altogether or is transferred to another, how is it possible for the essence of God to be named, by the appellation 'unbegotten,' after a state that is either being transferred or perishing?

If 'unbegotten' indicates a privation that is not present in God, how do we say that he is unbegotten, and that he is not begotten?

If 'unbegotten,' applied to God, is a bare name, and yet this bare utterance exalts the subsistence of God above all begotten things, then the utterance of men is more honorable than the subsistence of the Almighty, since it is this utterance that has adorned God the Almighty with incomparable superiority.

If a cause is allotted to everything begotten, but the unbegotten nature is without cause, then 'unbegotten' does not indicate a cause, but signifies subsistence.

If everything that has come to be has come to be by another, but the unbegotten subsistence has come to be neither by itself nor by another, then 'unbegotten' must necessarily indicate essence.

If the unbegotten subsistence is co-manifested with the essence of the offspring as its cause, possessing consistency with respect to every cause, then it is an incomparable essence-in-itself, not manifesting its inaccessibility from without, but itself being incomparable and inaccessible, since it is also unbegotten.

If the Almighty surpasses every nature, he surpasses it on account of being unbegotten, which is the cause of continuance for begotten things.

But if 'unbegotten' is not indicative of essence, from where would the nature of begotten things obtain its preservation?

If none of the invisible things pre-exists itself seminally, but remains within its allotted nature, how could the Unbegotten God, being free from any such allotment, at one time see his own essence as secondary, in the offspring, and at another as prior, in the unbegotten, according to the order of first and second?

If God remains in an unbegotten nature, then the claim that he knows himself both in generation and in unbegottenness must be set aside.

But if it is conceded that he extends his own essence into both the unbegotten and the begotten, then he himself is ignorant of his own essence, being driven about by generation and unbegottenness.

He knows himself, while evidently being ignorant of the unbegotten participation;

For it is not possible for him to have knowledge concerning himself of both an unbegotten essence and a begotten one.

But if the begotten thing is easily despised on account of its aptitude for change, then [immutability] is a prerogative of nature: substance unchangeable, since the unbegotten substance is acknowledged to be superior to every cause.

If the unbegotten is exempt from every cause, and there were many unbegotten things, they would possess an unvarying nature.

For unless it had partaken of some allotment of a nature both common and particular, it would not be that the one made, while the other came to be.

If every substance is unbegotten, then neither will differ from the other in respect of being unruled by any master.

How then could one say that the one is changed while the other changes it, since these premises do not allow God to bring [anything] into existence from a substance not already subsisting?

If every substance is unbegotten, every one is unvarying.

And since substance possesses this unvarying character, the acting and the being acted upon must be attributed to spontaneity.

And since there are many things unbegotten and unvarying, they will differ from one another beyond number.

For things that stand apart from one another, whether wholly or in part, could not be numbered, since every distinction manifests some allotment, there still being posited an unbegotten nature set apart.

If 'unbegotten' and 'God' signify, in parallel, the same thing, then the Unbegotten begot an unbegotten.

But if 'unbegotten' signifies one thing and 'God' another, it is not absurd that God should have begotten God, each of the two having received existence from an unbegotten substance.

But if there is nothing prior to God, as indeed there is not, then 'God' and 'unbegotten' signify the same thing, the begotten not admitting the [term] 'unbegotten'.

Therefore it does not admit of being pronounced together with 'God' as also 'His Father'.

May the self-begotten God who is — who alone for this reason has been proclaimed true God by the sent Jesus Christ, who truly subsisted before the ages and is truly of a begotten subsistence — keep you, men and women, in good health, [safe] from impiety, in Christ Jesus our Savior, through whom be all glory to God and the Father, both now and always and unto the ages of ages.

The treatise of Aetius is here completed.

And this, as I said, is the beginning — of his corruption-bearing words that have come to us in part — which is here refuted by us.

For they say that he composed altogether three hundred chapters of a similar kind to these, full of every blasphemy.

But here, just as when the body of a reptile has perished and rotted, some zealous schemer gathered up, from the remains of the reptile, the bones, for the ruin of certain persons — a plot which he boasts, in writing to some, that he had contrived, as though, forsooth, 'out of love for what is good I have appended this little treatise' — of which the beginning runs thus:

For this reason let us also, by the working of God, having gathered the healing words of divine Scripture from beginning to end, prepare a refutative antidote for those wishing to be healed of his venom, setting forth, directly against each expression, refutations of his same syllogistic chapters, thus:

Since, at the time of the persecution brought upon us by the Chronites, certain of those aforementioned appropriated to themselves — along with many other writings — a little work we had composed with particular care concerning the Unbegotten God and the begotten, and, having corrupted it by insertions and omissions, published it, having altered the sequence that followed; and since this afterward came into our hands, one of our zealous [followers] having brought it to us, I was compelled, as a father, to purify it once more and send you this treatise, O all you pious athletes, both men and women, so that you may know, according to the sense of the holy Scriptures, that this little discourse was uttered by us, by means of which you will be able, with brief refutations, to make every man who attempts to contradict you concerning the Unbegotten God and the begotten cease from his shamelessness — and above all, the aforementioned Chronites.

...of arguments, having made the beginning concerning the Unbegotten God.

Word for word I shall make the refutation of your dialectical bombast and syllogistic vain labor, neither passing over nor placing in second rank the countless number of your words, whether those that seem weighty to you or even the brief ones.