Greek original · 63 verses · some words can be tapped for a gloss · long chapter, split into parts; this part covers 12:15.2–12:28.2 (306 verses in all)
ℹ️ This corpus has no verse-level morphological tagging. Lemmas come mainly from word-level tagging of other books in the same language (not from this verse), falling back to dictionary form-matching for the rest. Rare homographs can still be misread; verify against the original and a specialist lexicon where precision matters.
ℹ️ The Chinese and English alongside are this site's own translation, made directly from the original text on this page (not the CUV or the WEB, which follow the Masoretic Text and a different textual tradition).
And Plato likewise, in passing on to the writing of the Laws, emulates the same manner as Moses: at any rate, in the preambles of the Laws, he employs, in his own fashion, ancient history, mentioning the flood and the life after the flood. Beginning then the third book of the Laws, hear what he says: 'Do, then, the ancient accounts seem to you to have some truth in them?' 'What sort of accounts?' 'That there have occurred many destructions of mankind by floods and plagues and many other things, in which a small remnant of the human race was left.' 'Indeed, such a thing seems altogether plausible to everyone.'
'Come then, let us consider one of the many such [destructions], this one which occurred through the flood.' 'What are we to think concerning it?' 'That those who at that time escaped the destruction would have been, roughly speaking, some mountain herdsmen — small sparks of the human race preserved somewhere on the peaks.' 'Clearly so.'
'And surely such people must of necessity be unacquainted with the other arts, and with the devices which men in cities employ against one another for the sake of greed and rivalry, and whatever other mischiefs they contrive against one another.' 'That is likely indeed.' 'Let us suppose, then, that the cities situated in the plains and by the sea were utterly destroyed at that time.' 'Let us suppose so.' 'Then shall we not say that all their instruments perished, and that whatever had been seriously discovered pertaining to art, or to statesmanship, or to any other kind of wisdom, all this was lost at that time?'
And after other things he says: 'Shall we then say that the state of human affairs at that time, when the destruction occurred, was as follows: an immense and dreadful desolation, but a vast abundance of ungrudging land?'
Having said these and other such things, he goes on to treat the lives of men after the flood; then, just as Moses joins the polity of the ancient Hebrews beloved of God to his narrative after the flood, so too Plato, likewise, after [treating] the lives of men after the flood, attempts to compile the ancient history of the Greeks, just as the former did that of the Hebrews; and he mentions those at the time of Troy, and the first polity in Lacedaemon, and the Persians, and those among them who had lived either rightly or otherwise; then, after the history of these, he begins the arrangement of his laws — and in this too he follows Moses.
Since Moses grounded his whole legislation and the polity based upon it upon piety toward the God of the universe, and made the beginning of his legislation from the Creator of all things, and then taught that human goods proceed from divine goods, and referred divine things to the mind that governs all — namely, the God of the universe himself — observe how the philosopher too, walking in these same footsteps, finds fault with the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and expounds the law that pleased Moses, speaking as follows:
'In what way, then, would I still wish you to divide your discourse and to hear it yourself? Do you wish me to tell you?' 'By all means, O Stranger.' 'It should have been said that the laws of the Cretans are not, without reason, especially esteemed among all the Greeks; for they are indeed right, in that they render those who follow them happy; for they provide all good things.'
'Now goods are of two kinds: some human, some divine; and the latter [human goods] depend upon the former; and if a city receives the greater goods, it acquires the lesser also; but if not, it is deprived of both. The lesser goods are those over which health presides, and beauty is second, and third is strength for running and for all the other bodily movements, and fourth is wealth — not blind, but sharp-sighted — provided it is accompanied by prudence.'
'And that which, again, is first among the divine goods and leads the rest is prudence; second, after mind, is the temperate disposition of the soul; and from these, blended with courage, would come justice as third; and fourth, courage. All these are, by nature, ranked before those [lesser, human goods], and thus must the lawgiver rank them too.'
'After these, the other regulations must be enjoined upon the citizens, all having regard to these; and of these, the human should have regard to the divine, and the divine, all of it, should have regard to the governing mind.'
'Concerning marriages contracted with one another, and after these, in the begetting and rearing of children — as many as are male and as many as are female, both while young and as they advance toward old age even unto death — one must rightly attend to them, honoring and dishonoring as is due, and in all their dealings with one another, having examined and guarded against their pains and pleasures and desires and the earnestness of all their loves, rightly to blame and to praise by means of the laws themselves.'
And shortly after he says: 'Then he who established the laws, having observed all this, will set guardians over all these matters, some proceeding by prudence, others by true opinion, so that the mind, having bound all these things together, may declare them to be in accord with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition.'
'Thus, O strangers, I myself would have wished you — and I still wish now — to go through, point by point, how in the laws said to be of Zeus, and those of Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, all these things are present, and in what way, having taken on their order, they are evident to one skilled in the art and in certain customs concerning laws, but to the rest of us they are in no way manifest.'
And among us too it is said: 'Seek ye first the kingdom and the righteousness [of God], and all these things shall be added unto you.' But Moses, long before, having made his beginning from the teaching concerning God, and having then fitted to this his own polity and the laws concerning contracts and concerning the common life, appoints for all rulers and guardians those consecrated to God, as the oracles also teach — just men, hating arrogance, some proceeding by prudence, others by true opinion.
'I say then, and I affirm, that whoever is going to be a good man of any kind must practice this very thing from childhood onward, both in play and in earnest, in each of the matters appropriate to that pursuit; for instance, the one who is to become a good farmer, or some kind of builder — the one destined to be a builder ought to play at constructing some children's buildings, and the future farmer likewise at farming, and the one rearing each of them ought to provide small tools, imitations of the real ones, for each; and indeed, of the branches of learning too, whatever it is necessary to have learned beforehand, they should learn beforehand — for instance, the future carpenter to measure or to use the level in play, and the future soldier to ride horseback in play, or to do some other such thing — and one should try, through these games, to direct the pleasures and desires of the children toward that very point at which, upon arriving, they must attain their end.'
'We call the chief point of education the right kind of nurture, which will lead the soul of the one who plays, as much as possible, into a love for that very thing which he will need, once he has become a man, in order to be perfect in the virtue proper to that pursuit.'
And anticipating this, Moses had already legislated, saying: 'And these words, as many as I command you this day, shall be in your heart and in your soul, and you shall diligently teach them to your sons.' This indeed is the customary practice among the children of the Hebrews, rearing all the young, from tender age, in the teachings of the reverence of God; and this, even to this day, is zealously observed among the Jewish nation, according to a certain ancestral custom.
Let not, then, what we call education be left undefined. For now, in blaming and praising the upbringing of each person, we call one of us educated, another uneducated, sometimes even in the case of men very highly 'educated' in retail trade, or in shipping, or in other such things. For since it seems that those who speak this way do not consider these things to be education, our present discussion would not concern that, but rather the education from childhood toward virtue, which produces one who desires and loves to become a perfect citizen, knowing how to rule and be ruled with justice.
This present discourse, having thus marked off this kind of nurture, would now, as it seems to me, wish to call this alone education, while that which tends toward wealth, or toward physical strength, or toward some other kind of skill apart from mind and justice, would be called vulgar and illiberal, and not worthy at all to be called education.
But let us not differ over the name itself; rather, let the statement now agreed upon between us stand: that those who are rightly educated generally become good, and that education must never be dishonored, since it is the first of the finest things to come to the best of men; and if it ever goes astray, and it is possible to set it right, this must always be done, throughout life, by everyone, according to his ability.
And in the second book of the Laws he adds: 'I call education that virtue which first comes to children — when pleasure and friendship and pain and hatred arise rightly in their souls, in those not yet able to grasp reason, and, once they have grasped reason, are found to be in harmony with reason, having been rightly habituated by fitting habits; this harmony, taken as a whole, is virtue, while that part of it which has been rightly trained with regard to pleasures and pains — so as to hate what one ought to hate, straightway from the beginning even to the end, and to love what one ought to love — if you were to cut off this very thing in your account and call it education, you would, in my opinion at least, be calling it rightly.'
These are Plato's words. But David, having anticipated him in the psalms, teaching men to hate what they ought to hate and to love what they ought to love, speaks as follows: 'Come, children, listen to me; I will teach you the fear of the Lord. Who is the man who desires life, loving to see good days? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking guile. Turn away from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.'
And Solomon likewise says: 'Hear, O children, the instruction of a father; for I give you a good gift: do not forsake my laws.' And again: 'Get wisdom, get understanding; do not forget it.' 'And say that wisdom is your sister, and secure prudence as your own acquaintance.' 'And do not walk in the ways of the ungodly, nor be jealous of the ways of transgressors.' You would find countless other such sayings in the writings of the Hebrews, instructive toward the attainment of piety and virtue, suited both for the young and for those mature in years.
Since the divine oracle said to Moses, 'See that you make all things according to the pattern shown you on the mountain,' and the sacred word says more plainly that they 'served a copy and shadow of the heavenly things,' teaching that the symbols in Moses contain, directly, an image of the more divine realities among the intelligibles — hear how Plato too interprets similar things in the sixth book of the Republic, writing thus:
'The philosopher, then, who consorts with that which is divine and orderly, becomes himself orderly and divine, so far as is possible for a man; yet there is much slander in all things.'
'Certainly, indeed.' 'If, then,' I said, 'some necessity should come upon him to practice putting what he sees there into the characters of men, both privately and publicly, and not merely to mold himself alone, do you think he will turn out to be a poor craftsman of temperance and justice and the whole of civic virtue?' 'Least of all,' he said.
'But if the many should perceive that we speak the truth about him, will they then be angry with the philosophers and disbelieve us when we say that a city could never otherwise attain happiness, unless those painters who make use of the divine pattern should sketch it out?'
'They will not be angry,' he said, 'if indeed they perceive it. But what manner of sketching do you mean?' 'Taking the city and the characters of men,' said I, 'as a tablet, they would first make it clean — which is not at all an easy thing.'
'Yet you know that in this very point they would at once differ from all others: they would be unwilling to lay a hand on either a private person or a city, or to write laws, before receiving it clean, or making it so themselves.'
'Then, I think, as they worked it out, they would look frequently in both directions — toward what is by nature just, beautiful, temperate, and all such things, and again toward that likeness existing in men — blending and mingling from their practices the image of a man, taking their measure from that quality which Homer called, when it arises in men, godlike and god-resembling.'
'Rightly,' he said. 'And they would, I think, erase one thing and inscribe another in its place, until, as far as possible, they had made human characters dear to god.'
'It seems to me that our argument, having come round now for the third or fourth time, arrives at the same conclusion: that education is the drawing and leading of children toward that right principle which is declared by the law, and which is agreed by the most reasonable and eldest, through their experience, to be truly right.'
'So that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and grief contrary to the law and to what has been established by the law, but may follow along, rejoicing and grieving at the same things as the aged man does — for this reason, those things which we call songs have in truth become, for souls, incantations, composed in earnest with a view to that very concord of which we speak; but because the souls of the young cannot bear seriousness, they are called, and practiced, as games and songs — just as, for those who tend bodies that are sick and weak, one tries to administer wholesome nourishment in the guise of pleasant foods and drinks, while giving what is harmful in unpleasant ones, so that the sick may embrace the one and be rightly habituated to hate the other.'
'In the same way, the right lawgiver will persuade — and if he cannot persuade, will compel — the poet, by means of fine and praiseworthy words, to compose rightly, fashioning in his rhythms the figures, and in his harmonies the melodies, belonging to temperate, courageous, and altogether good men.' It is fitting, then, that among us too the children are accustomed to practice the songs composed by the divine prophets, and the hymns to God.
'Compel the poets to say that the good man, being temperate and just, is fortunate and blessed, whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or not; but that if he should be richer than Cinyras or Midas, yet be unjust, he is wretched and lives a life of misery.'
'And,' the poet will say to you, if indeed he speaks rightly, 'I would neither mention nor count as worthy a man who does not, together with justice, accomplish and possess all the things called good, and who, being such a man among the foe, reaches out to plunder when standing near at hand; but being unjust, may he neither dare, at the sight of bloody slaughter, nor outrun the Thracian Boreas in a race, nor may any other of the so-called good things ever come to him' — for the things called good by the many are not rightly so called.
'For it is said that health is the best thing, beauty second, and wealth third; and countless other things are called good: to see and hear keenly, and to have all one's senses functioning well, and further, to be able, as a tyrant, to do whatever one desires, and that the very end of all blessedness is, having acquired all these things, to become immortal as quickly as possible.'
'But you and I, I suppose, say this: that all these things, beginning with health, are for just and holy men the best of possessions, but for unjust men, all of them the worst. Indeed, to see, to hear, to perceive, and simply to live, is the greatest evil if one is immortal for all time and possesses all the so-called goods except justice and virtue entire; but a lesser evil, if such a one lives on for as short a time as possible.'
'I think, then, that you will persuade — and compel — the poets among you to say these very things which I say, and moreover, giving them rhythms and harmonies to follow accordingly, to educate your young men in this manner. Do you see? For I say plainly that the things called evil are good for the unjust but evil for the just, while the things called good are truly good for the good but evil for the wicked. So, to return to my question — do you and I agree, or how is it?'
These sayings are not far removed from the psalms of David, who, anticipating them by the divine Spirit, composed through songs and hymns who is truly blessed and who is his opposite, having thus instructed us. From this very point, indeed, his book begins, where he says: 'Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly,' and the like. Having transformed these words, Plato says that the poets must declare that the good man, being temperate and just, is fortunate and blessed, but that if he is unjust, he is wretched. This very same thing David likewise expressed elsewhere through the psalms, saying: 'If riches increase, set not your heart upon them.' And again: 'Fear not when a man grows rich, and when the glory of his house is multiplied.' Indeed, you would find each of the philosopher's sayings lying almost word for word throughout the whole sacred Scripture of the psalms.
This too is exceedingly fit for a lawgiver and a statesman. But you would find other trivial things there as well; yet what he says here about music is true and worth pondering — namely, that it was indeed possible to legislate firmly and confidently concerning such things, trusting in melodies that provide correctness by their very nature. And this would be the work of a god, or of some divine man.
It was fitting, therefore, that among the Hebrews too it had been legislated not to accept, in the divine teachings, any hymns or songs other than those composed by the divine Spirit through divine and prophetic men, together with the melodies appropriate to them, sung according to the customary manner among them.
'I too concede this much to the many: that music must be judged by pleasure — not, however, the pleasure of just anyone, but that music is nearly the finest which delights the best and sufficiently educated men, and above all, that which delights the one man who is preeminent in virtue and education.'
'For this reason we say that the judges of these matters need virtue, because they must partake both of prudence in general, and, in particular, of courage.'
'For the true judge ought not to render judgment by learning it from the theater, being overwhelmed by the clamor of the crowd and by his own lack of education; nor again, knowing better, should he, out of unmanliness and cowardice, pronounce his verdict falsely and carelessly out of that very same mouth with which he called upon the gods when about to judge. For the judge sits not as a pupil among the spectators but rather, as is right, as their teacher, one who will oppose those among the spectators who render their pleasure improperly and incorrectly.'
Among the Hebrews too, in ancient times, it was not the multitude's role to judge the words brought forth by the divine Spirit and the divinely inspired songs; rather, there were few and rare men, themselves also partakers of the discerning divine Spirit concerning what was spoken, to whom alone it belonged to approve and consecrate the books of the prophets, and to reject those of men who were not such.
'And what our argument at the outset wished to demonstrate — namely, that the aid rightly attributed to the chorus of Dionysus is well spoken of — has now, to the extent possible, been stated. Let us then consider whether this has actually come to pass. Such a gathering, I suppose, necessarily becomes ever more tumultuous as the drinking proceeds — which is precisely what we assumed at the outset must inevitably happen with regard to the matters now under discussion.' 'Necessarily so.'
'And every man, in such a state, is lifted up lighter than his own weight, is filled with delight, brims over with frankness and an unwillingness to listen to those around him, and, being confident, deems himself a competent ruler both of himself and of others.' 'Of course.'
'Did we not say that, when this happens, the souls of the drinkers, like iron heated red-hot, become softer and younger, so that they become easy to lead for one who is able and skilled to educate and to mold them, just as they were when they were young?'
'And this molder is the very same one as before — the good lawgiver — whose laws for the symposium must be able, whenever that man becomes over-confident and bold, and more shameless than is fitting, and unwilling to endure order and his proper turn in silence, speech, drink, and music, to instill in him instead — as he tries to force his way in with unseemly boldness — the fairest counter-fear, capable of contending justly against it, which we have named the divine fear of reverence and shame.' 'This is so.' 'And the guardians of these laws, and fellow-craftsmen with them, ought to be those who remain undisturbed and sober.'
It is fitting, therefore, that we too have received a tradition of singing, at our banquets, songs and hymns composed to God, while our own guardians take care of the proper order.
'If, then, some city, treating this as a serious matter, uses the practice now described together with laws and order, employing it as a discipline for the sake of temperance, and likewise, by the same reasoning, does not abstain from the other pleasures either, but contrives means of mastering them — this practice should be used by all in this manner. But if it is used merely as play, so that whoever wishes may drink whenever he wishes and with whomever he wishes, along with any other pursuits whatsoever, I would not cast my vote that this city, or this man, should ever indulge in drunkenness. Rather, I would go even further than the custom of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and add to the law of the Carthaginians that no one whatsoever, while on campaign, should ever taste this drink, but should keep to water for that entire time; and that in the city no male or female slave should ever taste it at all; nor should magistrates, during the year in which they hold office; nor, again, should pilots or judges while actively engaged in their duties taste wine at all; nor anyone gathering to deliberate in a council of any weight; nor should anyone at all taste it in daytime, except for reasons of bodily exercise or illness; nor again at night, when a man or a woman is intending to beget children. And one could mention very many other occasions on which those possessed of sound mind and right law ought not to drink wine — so that, by this reasoning, no city would need many vineyards at all, but the rest of its agriculture, and its whole manner of life, would be regulated accordingly.'
Moses too, having foreseen this, legislates that the priests should not taste wine at the time of the sacred ministry, saying: "And the Lord spoke to Aaron, saying, 'You and your sons with you shall not drink wine or strong drink, whenever you go into the tabernacle of testimony, or when you approach the altar, lest you die — it is a perpetual statute throughout your generations.'" The same one also legislates for those who vow a vow, saying: "A man or a woman who vows a great vow, to consecrate a consecration to the Lord, shall be consecrated from wine and strong drink, and shall drink no vinegar of wine, nor vinegar of strong drink." But Solomon too excludes rulers and judges from its use, saying: "Do all things with counsel; drink wine with counsel. Rulers are prone to wrath; let them not drink wine, lest, having drunk, they forget wisdom and their labors." And the apostle too, for the sake of illness, permits Timothy, saying: "Use a little wine for your stomach's sake, and your frequent infirmities."
'If, then, there is any necessity that a city devoted wholly to philosophy should either have come into being in the boundless time that has passed, or should even now exist in some barbarian land, far off and beyond our sight, or should yet come into being hereafter — concerning this we are ready to contend by argument that the constitution we have described has come to be, and is, and indeed will come to be, whenever this very Muse gains mastery over a city. For it is not impossible for it to come into being, nor do we speak of impossible things.'
'But must a man think of himself, in relation to himself, as an enemy toward an enemy, or how else are we to put it?' 'O Athenian stranger — for I would not wish to address you otherwise, since you seem to me worthy to be called rather by the title of the god — by rightly tracing the argument back to its beginning, you have made it clearer, so that you will more easily discover that what was rightly said by us just now — that all are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and each man to himself — is true.'
'What do you mean by this, my admirable friend?' 'Here too, O stranger, to conquer oneself is, of all victories, the first and best; while to be defeated by oneself is, of all things, at once the most shameful and the worst. For this signifies that there exists, within each of us, a war against ourselves.'
And afterward he adds, saying: 'Shall we, then, posit each of us as one person?' 'Yes.' 'But possessing within himself two counselors, opposed to each other and unwise, which we call pleasure and pain?' 'This is so.' 'And besides these two, again, opinions about future things — of which the common name is expectation, but individually, fear is the expectation preceding pain, and confidence is that preceding its opposite. And over all these, reasoning — as to which of them is better or worse — which, once it becomes a common decree of the city, has been named law.'
And next he says: 'But this we know — that these passions within us, like sinews or cords, pull us this way and that, dragging against one another in opposition, toward opposing actions; and it is precisely there that virtue and vice lie distinguished. For reason declares that one must always follow a single one of these pullings, and never abandon it, drawing with it against the others, whatever their kind; and that this is the golden and sacred leading of reasoning, called the common law of the city; while the others are hard and made of iron, but this one alone, being golden, is soft, and the rest resemble every kind of substance. And one must always cooperate with the finest leading of law; for since reasoning is fine, gentle, and not violent, its leading has need of helpers, so that within us the golden race may prevail over the other races. And thus this myth about ourselves, as though we were marvelous puppets in the service of virtue, would be preserved, and it would become somewhat clearer what is meant by being stronger or weaker than oneself, and that both city and individual — the one having grasped a true account within himself concerning these pullings — must live in accordance with it.'
'And the city, having received this account — either from some god, or from this very man who has come to understand these matters — and having established it as law, should conduct its relations both with itself and with other cities accordingly; and thus vice and virtue would be more clearly articulated for us.'
And among us too, the divine word teaches the same things, saying: "I delight in the law of God according to the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind." And again: "their thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another," and whatever else is akin to these sayings.
'We remember, indeed, having agreed earlier that if the soul should be shown to be older than the body, then the things belonging to the soul would also be older than those belonging to the body.' 'Certainly.' 'Then manners, characters, wishes, reasonings, true opinions, cares, and memories would have come into being before the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if indeed the soul too is prior to the body.' 'Necessarily.'
'Is it not necessary, then, to agree, following upon this, that the soul is the cause both of good things and of bad, of the beautiful and the shameful, of the just and the unjust, and of all opposites — if indeed we are to posit it as the cause of all things?' Let these words too stand as set forth from the tenth book of the Laws. And Moses agrees with them, having often said in his laws: "And if a soul sins and commits a trespass"; and whatever else is spoken by him in a manner similar to this.