Praeparatio Evangelica 12 part 4/5

'But this is what I really want to ask about it: will it be a coastal city, or an inland one?' 'The city we have just been speaking of, stranger, is about eighty stadia from the sea.' 'And what of harbors? Are there any along its coast, or is it altogether harborless?' 'It has good harbors indeed, in that respect, as good as possible, stranger.'

'My word, what you say! But what of the surrounding land — is it productive of everything, or does it lack in some respects?' 'It lacks in scarcely anything.' 'And will there be some neighboring city nearby?' 'Not at all; that is precisely why it is being colonized: for some ancient emigration that took place in that region has left this country desolate for an inconceivably long time.' 'And what of plains, mountains, and woodland — what portion of each has fallen to our lot?' 'It resembles the nature of the rest of Crete as a whole.' 'Would you say it is more rugged, or more level?' 'Decidedly the former.'

'Then it would not be incurable with respect to the acquisition of virtue. For if it were to be a coastal city with good harbors, and not productive of everything but lacking many things, it would need some great savior and certain divine lawgivers, if it were not, being of such a nature, to acquire many varied and base characters; but as it is, it has the consolation of its eighty stadia.'

'However, it lies nearer to the sea than is desirable, insofar as you say it has rather good harbors. Nevertheless, even this is to be welcomed with gratitude. For a sea lying close to a country is, from day to day, a pleasant thing, yet in truth a very briny and bitter neighbor; for by filling itself with commerce and money-making through retail trade, it engenders in men's souls shifting and untrustworthy habits, and makes the city itself untrustworthy and unfriendly toward itself, and likewise toward other men. But as a consolation against these things it also possesses the advantage of being productive of everything; and being rugged, it is clear that it could not be both highly productive of a single crop and productive of everything at once. For if it had that abundance, providing a great deal for export, it would in turn be filled up again with silver and gold coin — than which, one might almost say, no single thing could be a greater evil for a city with respect to the acquisition of noble and just habits.' But since we have demonstrated so much up to this point, let us consider how, having approved the manner of education among the Hebrews through what we have said, he rejects the Greek manner, writing thus in the tenth book of the Republic:

'Let this be said to you — for you will not report me to the tragic poets and all the other imitative ones — all such things seem to be a corruption of the mind of those who hear them, as many as do not possess the antidote of knowing what they really are.' 'In what sense,' he said, 'do you mean this?' 'It must be spoken,' I said, 'although a certain affection and reverence which I have had for Homer since childhood restrain me from speaking.'

'For he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these fine tragic poets. But indeed a man is not to be honored before the truth, and what I am saying must be spoken.' 'Certainly,' he said.

Then he goes on to say: 'Let us not, then, in regard to other matters, demand an account from Homer, nor from any other of the poets, by asking whether any of them was actually skilled in medicine, rather than merely an imitator of medical language — which of the ancients or moderns is said, like Asclepius, to have made anyone healthy by his poetry, or what students of medicine he left behind, as that man left his descendants; nor again let us ask him about the other arts, but let it pass.'

'But concerning the greatest and finest matters, which Homer undertakes to speak of — wars, and generalships, and the administrations of cities, and the education of men — it is surely fair to ask him, inquiring: "Dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth in respect of virtue, a maker of images, whom we defined as an imitator, but even second, and were capable of knowing what practices make men better or worse in private and in public life, tell us which of the cities was better governed because of you, as Sparta was because of Lycurgus, and many other cities, great and small, because of many other men."'

'What city credits you with having been a good lawgiver and with having benefited them? Italy and Sicily credit Charondas, and we credit Solon; but who credits you? Will anyone be able to name one?' 'I do not think so,' said Glaucon; 'indeed it is not even said by the Homeridae themselves.' 'But then, what war in Homer's time is remembered as having been fought well under his command or counsel?' 'None.'

'Well then, are there many ingenious and resourceful inventions in the arts, or in other practical matters, attributed to him, as to the works of a wise man — such as are told of Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis the Scythian?' 'Nothing of the sort whatsoever.'

'Well then, if not publicly, is Homer said, while he himself was alive, to have been a private guide in education to certain people, who loved him for his companionship and handed down to those who came after a certain "Homeric" way of life — as Pythagoras himself was especially loved for this very thing, and his successors, even now calling their way of life "Pythagorean," seem somehow to be distinguished among others?'

'No, indeed,' he said, 'nothing of the sort is said either. For Creophylus, O Socrates, the companion of Homer, would appear even more ridiculous than his name with regard to education, if what is said about Homer is true.'

'For it is said, I believe, that during his own lifetime there was great neglect of him.' 'Yes, it is so said,' I replied. 'But do you think, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better, being capable, in these matters, not merely of imitating but of knowing, he would not have made many companions and been honored and loved by them?'

'And yet Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and very many others, are able to persuade those of their own time, by consorting with them privately, that they will not be capable of managing either their household or their city unless these men themselves oversee their education; and for this wisdom they are so intensely loved that their companions all but carry them about on their heads.'

'Yet as for Homer — or Hesiod — would his contemporaries, if he had really been able to benefit men with regard to virtue, have let him go about reciting rhapsodies, and would they not rather have clung to him more than to gold, and compelled him to stay at their side; or if they could not persuade him, would they not themselves have followed him about wherever he went, until they had received a sufficient share of education?'

'I think you are entirely right, Socrates.' 'Then let us lay it down, beginning with Homer, that all poetic imitators are makers of images of virtue and of the other things about which they write, but do not lay hold of the truth; rather, as we were just saying, the painter will make what appears to be a shoemaker, though he himself understands nothing of shoemaking, and will do so for those who likewise understand nothing of it, but who judge from the colors and shapes.'

'Certainly.' 'So too, I think, we shall say of the poetic man that he applies to each of the arts, by means of names and phrases, certain colors, understanding nothing of the art itself, but only imitating, so that to other such people who judge from the words alone, it seems — whether he speaks of shoemaking in meter and rhythm and harmony, it seems to be very well said, or of generalship, or of anything else whatsoever.'

'So great is the natural enchantment which these things themselves possess; since, once stripped of the colors of music, the sayings of the poets, spoken just by themselves, I think you know what they appear like. For you have observed this, have you not?' 'I have indeed,' he said.

Since these matters stand thus, it seems good to me to go through briefly a few passages of Plato, in which he establishes a more rational account concerning God and providence, thereby standing close, even in this, to the doctrines of the Hebrews. But first let us observe how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists.

'Some, I believe, say that all things which come to be, have come to be, and will come to be, come to be some by nature, some by art, and some through chance.' 'Well then?' 'It is likely, surely, that wise men speak rightly.' 'Nevertheless, following them, let us examine what those from that school actually happen to think.'

'By all means.' 'It seems, they say, that nature and chance produce the greatest and finest of these things, while art produces the lesser ones — art which, receiving from nature the generation of the great, primary works, molds and fashions all the smallest things, which we all call the products of art.'

'What do you mean?' 'I will speak yet more clearly in this way. They say that fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature and chance, and none of these by art; and that the bodies that come after these, namely earth, sun, moon, and the stars, came into being through these, which are wholly soulless; and that, being carried by chance according to the power proper to each of them, in whatever way they happened to combine suitably with one another — hot with cold, or dry with wet, and soft with hard, and all the mixtures that were, by necessity, blended together by chance according to the combination of opposites — in this way and according to these same processes they generated the whole heaven and everything in the heaven, and moreover all animals and all plants, all the seasons having arisen from these, not through mind, they say, nor through any god, nor through art, but, as we say, by nature and chance.'

'And that art, coming later, arising after these things, itself being mortal and sprung from mortal beings, has later on given birth to certain playthings that do not participate much in truth, but are certain images akin to themselves, such as painting produces, and music, and all the arts that are their fellow-workers. And if any of the arts produce anything serious, these, they say, are those which have shared their power with nature, such as, again, medicine, and farming, and gymnastic. And indeed they say that the political art shares a small part with nature, but for the most part is a matter of art; and likewise that all legislation is not by nature but by art, whose enactments are not true.'

'What do you mean?' 'These men say, O blessed one, that the gods, first of all, exist by art, not by nature, but by certain laws, and that they differ from place to place, according to however each people agreed among themselves in legislating. And indeed that noble things are one thing by nature, but another by law; and that just things do not exist at all by nature, but that men continue disputing them with one another and are forever altering them; and whatever they alter, and whenever, these then become authoritative, coming into being by art and by laws, but not at all by any nature.'

'These, my friends, are all the doctrines of wise men, propounded among the young — both private individuals and poets — who assert that the most just thing is whatever one prevails at by force. Hence impieties fall upon young men, on the ground that the gods do not exist such as the law commands one to believe, and factions arise on account of these teachings, as men are drawn toward the life that is "right by nature" — which is, in truth, to live mastering others, and not being enslaved to others according to law.' 'What an account you have gone through, stranger, and how great a corruption of young men, both publicly in cities and privately in households!'

And after other matters, he says: 'But come, tell me again, Cleinias, you too — for you must be a partner in the discussion — for it seems likely that he who says these things holds fire and water and earth and air to be the first of all things, and calls these very things "nature," and soul to be derived from these later. And it does not seem merely likely, but really to signify this to us in his account.' 'Certainly.'

Have we then, by Zeus, discovered a kind of spring of senseless opinion belonging to all the men who have ever laid hold of inquiries concerning nature? Consider, examining every argument; for the difference is by no means small, if those who lay hold of impious arguments should appear also to be leading others astray, and using their arguments not well, but erroneously. It seems to me, then, that this is so. — You speak well; but try to explain in what way. — It seems, then, that we must lay hold of rather unfamiliar arguments.

And a little later he adds: 'Nearly everyone, my friend, runs the risk of being ignorant of what soul actually is and what power it has — both concerning its other properties and, in particular, its origin: namely, that it is among the first of things, having come to be before all bodies, and that it governs, more than anything else, all their change and every rearrangement. And if this is so, must it not follow of necessity that the things akin to soul came to be prior to those belonging to body, since soul itself is older than body?' — 'It must.'

Opinion, then, and forethought, and mind, and art, and law would be prior to hard things and soft, heavy and light; and indeed the great and primary works and actions would belong to art, being among the first things, while the things done by 'nature' — as they themselves incorrectly name it — and 'nature' itself would be posterior to this, and would have their beginning from art and mind. — In what way incorrectly?

By 'nature' they wish to mean the origin concerning the first things. But if soul shall be shown to be first — not fire, nor air, but soul having come to be among the first things — it would most correctly be said to exist by nature in a distinctive sense. These things are so, if one shall demonstrate that soul is older than body; but otherwise, in no way. — You speak most truly.

Come now, if ever we ought to call upon god, let this now be done: let them be called upon with all earnestness for the demonstration of their own existence, that they are; and holding fast to this as to some sure cable, let us make our way into the present argument. And to me, when examined on such matters by questions of this kind, it appears safest to answer along the following lines.

Stranger, whenever someone says, 'Do all things stand still and nothing move, or is it entirely the opposite of this? Or do some of them move, while others remain at rest?' — 'Some of them move, I should say, and others remain.' — 'Is it not, then, in some place that the things at rest stand still, and the things in motion move?' — 'How could it be otherwise?' — 'And some of them would do this in a single seat, so to speak, and others in several.'

'You mean,' we shall say, 'that the things which take on the power of things at rest in their center move in a single place, just as the revolution of circles said to be at rest turns about?' — 'Yes.'

And next he adds: Let us also say this further, and answer ourselves once more. If all things should somehow come to stand still together, as most of those who hold such views dare to say, which of the motions mentioned would necessarily be the first to arise among them?

That, surely, which moves itself. For it could never previously be changed by another, since there was no previous change at all among them.

Then we shall say that the self-moving motion, being the origin and first among motions, arising both among things at rest and existing among things in motion, is necessarily the oldest and mightiest of all changes, while that which is altered by another, but moves other things, is second. — You speak most truly.

Since, then, we have arrived at this point in the argument, let us answer this. — What is it? — If we should somewhere see this motion arising in something earthy, or watery, or fiery, whether separate or mixed, what condition shall we say is present in such a thing?

Are you asking me whether we shall call it alive, when it moves itself? — Yes. — Alive; how could it be otherwise? — But then, when we see soul present in certain things, must we not agree that this is the very same as being alive? — Nothing else. — Wait now, by Zeus; would you not be willing to think of three things concerning each thing?

What do you mean? — One, the essence; one, the definition of the essence; and one, the name. And indeed, concerning everything that is, there are two kinds of questions. — How so? — At one time each of us, when the name is proposed, demands the definition itself; at another, when the definition itself is proposed, we ask in turn for the name. Is this, then, the sort of thing we now wish to say?

What sort of thing? — There is, for instance, that which is divided into two equal parts, among other things also in number. Now for this thing, considered numerically, the name is 'even,' while the definition is 'a number divided into two equal parts.' — Yes.

That is the sort of thing I mean. — Then, do we not, in either case, call it the same thing — whether, being asked for the definition, we give the name, or, being asked for the name, we give the definition — calling it 'even' both by name and by definition, as a number divided in two, being one and the same thing? — Absolutely so.

Now, that to which 'soul' is the name — what is its definition? Do we have any other than the one just now stated: the motion that is able to move itself? — You mean, then, that 'to move itself' is the definition possessing the very same essence as the name which we all call 'soul.'

I do say so. And if this is so, do we still miss anything in the demonstration that soul is the same as the first origin and motion of things that are, that have come to be, and that will be, and of all things opposite to these as well, since it has been shown to be the cause of all change and of every motion for all things? — No, but it has been most sufficiently demonstrated that soul is the oldest of all things, having come to be the origin of motion.

Is it not, then, the motion which arises in another thing on account of something else, and never itself brings about that anything move within itself, that is second — and as many-numbered as one might wish to count it, however many one likes — being, in fact, the change of a body that is truly soulless? — Correctly said.

Rightly, then, and properly, most truly and most completely, we would have said that soul came to be prior to body for us, and that body is second and posterior, coming under rule, according to nature, of the soul which rules. — Most truly indeed.

We remember, indeed, having agreed earlier, that if soul should be shown to be older than body, then the things belonging to soul would also be older than those belonging to body. — Quite so, indeed.

Then characters, and dispositions, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and cares, and memories would have come to be prior to the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if indeed soul is prior to body. — It is necessary.

Must we not, then, next agree that soul is the cause both of good things and of bad, of things noble and shameful, just and unjust, and of all opposites, if indeed we shall posit it as the cause of all things? — How could it not be so?

Since soul governs and dwells within all things that are moved in every way, must we not necessarily say that it governs heaven also? — Of course. — One soul, or more? — More; I will answer on your behalf: let us posit not fewer than two, at any rate — the beneficent one, and the one capable of accomplishing the opposite.

You have spoken very correctly indeed. — Very well. Soul, then, leads all things in heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, whose names are: wishing, considering, taking care, deliberating, forming right opinion or false, rejoicing, grieving, taking courage, fearing, hating, loving; and by all the motions akin to these, or the primary ones, taking up in turn the secondary motions of bodies, it leads all things to growth and decay, and to separation and combination, and to the heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, harshness, sweetness, and bitterness that follow upon these — and by employing all these, when it takes on ever-divine mind rightly, it guides all things rightly and blessedly toward the gods; but when it consorts with folly, it accomplishes, in turn, all the opposite of these.

Shall we posit that these things are so? Or do we still doubt whether it is somehow otherwise? — Not at all. — Shall we then say that it is the kind of soul which is prudent and full of virtue that has come to be in control of heaven and earth and the whole revolution, or the kind that possesses neither of these? Do you wish, then, that we answer this as follows? — How?

If, O wondrous one, we shall say, the entire course and motion of heaven, and of all the things within it, has a nature similar to the motion, revolution, and reasonings of mind, and proceeds in a kindred manner, then it is clear that we must say that the best soul cares for the whole cosmos and leads it along that very course. — Correctly said.

But if it proceeds madly and disorderly, then it is the evil soul. — That too is most correctly said. — What sort of nature, then, does the motion of mind have? This is now a difficult question, my friends, to answer sensibly. Therefore it is right that I too should now take part with you in the answering. — You speak well.

Let us not, then, make our answer as if looking directly at the sun, thereby bringing on night at midday — as though we should ever see and know mind sufficiently with mortal eyes; but it is safer to observe by looking at an image of that which is asked about.

What do you mean? — Let us take, as an image, that motion among the ten motions which mind resembles; recalling it together with you, I shall make our answer in common. — You could not speak better. — We remember, then, this much at least of what was said before, that we posited that, of all things, some move and some remain at rest. — Yes.

And of the things in motion, in turn, some move in one place, while others are carried about in several. — It is so. — Now of these two motions, that which is carried in one place must always move around some center, being an imitation of turned circles, and it is, as far as possible, the motion most akin and most similar to the revolution of mind.

What do you mean? — Surely, if we say that both mind and the motion carried in one place move according to the same manner, and in like fashion, and in the same place, and about the same things, and toward the same things, and according to one reason and one order, being likened to the revolutions of a turned sphere, we should never appear to be poor craftsmen, in our account, of beautiful images.

You speak most correctly. — Then, is not this motion, in turn — the one which never proceeds in like fashion, nor according to the same things, nor in the same place, nor about the same things, nor toward the same things, nor moving in one place, nor in order, nor in arrangement, nor according to any reason — akin to all folly?

It would indeed be most truly so. — Now, then, it is no longer at all difficult to say plainly that, since it is soul that revolves all things for us, we must necessarily say that it is either the best soul or the opposite that, taking care of and ordering it, revolves the revolution of heaven.

Stranger, but from what has now been said, it is not pious to say otherwise than that it is a soul, one or more, possessing every virtue, that revolves these things. — Most excellently, O Clinias, have you followed the argument. But listen further to this in addition.

What is it? — The sun, moon, and the other stars — if indeed soul revolves all things, does it not revolve each one individually as well? — Of course. — Let us, then, make our arguments concerning one of them, which will appear to us to fit all the stars as well.

Concerning which one? — Of the sun: every man sees its body, but no one its soul — nor indeed the soul of any other body, whether of living or of dead creatures; but there is every likelihood that this whole kind is by nature imperceptible to all the bodily senses, and is intelligible only. Let us, then, by mind and thought alone, grasp the following about it.

What point? — If soul revolves the sun, in saying that it does one of three things, we shall scarcely fail to hit the truth. — Which three?

Either, being within this visible spherical body, it carries the whole thing about everywhere, just as the soul within us carries us about entirely; or, having procured for itself from somewhere outside a body of fire or of some kind of air, as some maintain, it forcibly pushes body by body; or, thirdly, being itself bare of body but possessing certain other surpassing powers, it leads the way by some marvel. — Yes. — This much, at least, is necessary: that soul, doing one of these things, conducts all things.

These things, then, are said by the philosopher in the tenth book of the Laws. And in the Philebus also, hear how he establishes the same conviction: 'For all the wise agree, truly exalting the matter, that mind is king for us of heaven and earth. And perhaps they speak well. But if you wish, let us make our inquiry into this very class of thing at greater length.'

Speak as you wish, Socrates, taking no account of length for our sake, since we shall not be displeased. — Well said. Let us then begin, questioning again in some such way as this. — How? — Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things together, and this so-called universe, are governed by the power of the irrational and the random, and by whatever happens to occur; or, on the contrary, as those before us used to say, that mind and a certain wondrous wisdom, ordering all things, steer them?

These are by no means the same thing, O wondrous Socrates; for what you now say seems to me not even pious; but to say that mind orders all these things is worthy of the appearance of the cosmos, and of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolution; and I, for my part, would never speak otherwise about them, nor would I think otherwise.

Do you wish, then, that we too should agree in accordance with what was said before, that these things are so? And that we should not merely think it right to state the opinions of others without risk, but should also share in the risk and take part in the blame, whenever some formidable man declares that these things are not so, but disorderly? — How could I not wish it? — Come, then, consider now with us the argument that follows concerning these matters.

Just speak. — Concerning the nature of the bodies of all living creatures, do we not observe fire, water, and breath — and earth too, as those who are storm-tossed say — present in their constitution? — Very much so. — For indeed we are truly storm-tossed by perplexity in our present discussion. Come then, take the following point concerning each of the elements present in us.

What point? — That each of these is present within us in a small amount, and inferior, and in no way whatsoever pure, and possesses a power unworthy of its true nature. Taking one instance, understand the same to hold concerning all. For example, fire exists, no doubt, within us, and it also exists in the universe.

Of course. — Then is not the fire within us something small, weak, and inferior, while that in the universe is wondrous in abundance, beauty, and in every power belonging to fire? — What you say is very true indeed. — And what of this: is the fire of the universe nourished, generated, and originated from the fire within us, or is it, on the contrary, from that universal fire that mine, and yours, and that of all other living creatures obtain all these things? — This is a question not even worth answering.

Correctly said. For you will say the same, I think, concerning the earth present in living creatures here and the earth in the universe, and concerning the other elements as well, of which I asked a little earlier — you will answer in the same way. — For who, answering otherwise, could ever appear to be in his right mind?

Scarcely anyone at all. But follow along with what comes next. Did we not, seeing all these things just now mentioned as composed together into one, name it 'body'? — Of course. — Take the same view, then, concerning this thing which we call the universe; for in the same manner it too would be a body, being composite from the same elements. — You speak most correctly.

Is it, then, from this universal body that the body within us is derived as a whole, or is it from ours that this universal body is nourished, and has received and possesses whatever we just now said about these things? — This too, Socrates, is another question not worth asking. — And what then? Is this next question worth asking, or how will you answer?

Say what it is. — Shall we not say that the body within us possesses soul? — Clearly we shall say so. — Whence, dear Protarchus, did it obtain it, unless the body of the universe likewise happened to be ensouled, possessing the same things as this one, and indeed in every way more beautiful? — Clearly from no other source, Socrates.

For surely, Protarchus, we do not think that those four things — limit, the unlimited, the mixed, and the class of cause present as a fourth in all of them — this class, being present within us, provides soul, produces bodily training, and, when the body has stumbled, medical art, and in other cases contrives other things, and, being exercised, is called every kind and manner of wisdom — while these very same things, existing in the whole of heaven and in its great parts, and being moreover beautiful and pure, have there, on the contrary, not contrived the nature of the most beautiful and most honored things. — But that could in no way make sense.

Then, if this is not so, we would speak better if we followed that other argument, namely, that there exists — as we have often said — much of the unlimited in the universe, and sufficient limit, and a certain cause over them that is not inferior, ordering and arranging years, seasons, and months, which is most justly called wisdom and mind. — Most justly indeed.

Yet wisdom and mind could never come to be apart from soul. — No, indeed not. — Then will you say that in the nature of Zeus there is present a kingly soul and a kingly mind, on account of the power of that cause, while in other beings other excellent things are present, according to whatever is agreeable for each to be called?