Praeparatio Evangelica 13 part 5/6

Where, then, would the matters of the judgment after departure from here be found, which in the Phaedo, in describing it, he sets forth thus: 'When the dead arrive at the place to which each one's guiding daemon conducts him... and those who seem to have lived a middling life, having journeyed to the Acheron, and having embarked upon those vessels which serve as their conveyances, arrive on these at the lake, and there dwell and, being purified and paying the penalty for their wrongdoings, are released — if anyone has done wrong — and receive honors for their good deeds, each according to his worth. But those who seem incurable because of the magnitude of their offenses — having committed many great sacrileges, or many unjust and unlawful murders, or other such things as there may be — these the fitting destiny casts into Tartarus, whence they never emerge.'

And concerning the impious, he related matters thus. But concerning the pious, hear what he says: 'But of these very ones, those who have been sufficiently purified through philosophy live thereafter altogether without toils, and arrive at dwellings still more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor is the present time sufficient for it.'

And in the Gorgias also, attend to what he says: 'The one who has passed through life justly and piously, when he dies, departs to the Isles of the Blessed and dwells there in all happiness, apart from evils; but the one who [has lived] unjustly and impiously [goes] to the prison of vengeance and justice, which indeed they call Tartarus... But those who have committed the utmost wrongs, and through such wrongdoings have become incurable, from these the examples come to be, and these themselves no longer derive any benefit, being incurable; but others benefit — those who see them suffering, on account of the greatest sins, the most painful and most fearful sufferings forever, hung up there in Hades in the prison, veritable examples for those of the unjust who are ever arriving, as spectacles and warnings.'

How could these things be made to accord with the accounts of the exchange of bodies, which they say the soul, in its transmigration, chooses? For how could the same soul both undergo punishments and imprisonments and so great a penalty forever after its departure from here, and again, as one released and free of bonds, choose whatever lives it might wish? And if it is again going to choose according to pleasure, then where is that prison of vengeance and justice? Countless other points, too, one might, at leisure, raise against this argument, of which it is not the occasion to prolong the discussion.

And thus the first stumbling of Plato's opinion concerning these matters has been shown in this manner; but the other error — that of the arrangement of the doctrine, by which he determined that one part of the soul is divine and rational, while another part of it is irrational and passible — has also been condemned by his own disciples, as one may learn from the following words.

Concerning the soul according to Plato — which he says was composed by God out of an impassible and a passible essence, as one of the intermediate colors is composed out of white and black — we have this to say: it is necessary that, when in time a separation of these [constituents] occurs, it should vanish, just as the composition of the intermediate color vanishes, each of the elements out of which it was composed being in time, by nature, separated toward its own proper place. But if this is so, we shall declare the soul to be perishable, and not immortal.

For if it is agreed that nothing existing in nature is without its opposite, and that the things in the cosmos have been ordered by God out of the nature of opposites, he having implanted in them friendship and communion — as, for instance, the dry with the wet, the hot with the cold, the heavy with the light, the white with the black, the sweet with the bitter, the hard with the soft, and for all such things one further common bond of all, namely of the impassible essence with the passible — and if the things that have been tempered and mixed together admit, by nature, of separation from one another in time, while the soul is supposed to have come into being out of an impassible and a passible essence, then it is necessary that, just as the intermediate color, so also this [soul] should vanish in time by nature, the opposite elements within its composition hastening each toward its own proper nature.

Do we not see that even what is heavy by nature, if it is carried upward through some lightness added to it, whether by us or by some external natural cause, nonetheless forces itself likewise downward toward its own proper nature? And likewise, does not what is light by nature, when carried downward by similar external causes, force itself likewise upward again? For things brought together into one out of two things mutually opposed to each other cannot possibly remain forever in the same state, unless some third thing, belonging to the substance of existing things, is always present within them.

But in truth the soul is not some third thing composed of two things mutually opposed, but is simple, and by its very nature impassible and incorporeal; wherefore Plato and his followers declared it to be immortal.

But since it is the common account of all that man has come to be out of soul and body, while the affections that occur in us, apart from the body, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are said to belong to the soul, most men, inferring from this that its substance is subject to passion, say that it is mortal and corporeal in kind, and not incorporeal.

But Plato was compelled, alongside its impassible nature, to weave in also a substance subject to passion. That the matter stands in neither of these two ways, as either party has stated it — Plato and the others — we shall try to demonstrate by argument, setting forth the powers that operate within us.

Let this much, from Severus the Platonist's On the Soul, be set before us. But consider, in addition to what has been said, also the following concerning the origin of heaven and of the luminaries within it.

In agreement with the Hebrews, having also given an account concerning heaven and the things that appear in it, according to which they came to be, made by the Cause of all things, and partake of a corporeal and perishable substance, he nevertheless no longer agrees with the Hebrews: he ordains that they be worshiped and reckoned as gods, speaking thus in the Epinomis.

'Now whom, then, do I mean and honor when I speak of god, O Megillus and Clinias? Heaven, more or less — whom it is most just, as all the other daemons and gods together do, to honor and to pray to above all; and that he has become for us the cause of all our other good things, we would all agree.'

Then, going further on in the same work, he adds this: 'As for the visible gods, greatest and most honored and seeing most keenly in every direction, one must first speak of the nature of the stars, and of all that we perceive to have come to be along with them; and after these, and next below these, the daemons — an aerial race, holding a third and middle seat, the cause of interpretation — whom it is very needful to honor with prayers, for the sake of their auspicious mediation.'

Having through these words said that the ones indicated are gods, discoursing on natural philosophy concerning their first constitution in the Timaeus, he goes on as follows: 'As fire is to air, so is air to water; and as air is to water, so is water to earth — he bound and constituted together a visible and tangible heaven. And on this account, out of such elements as these, four in number, the body of the cosmos came into being, agreeing through proportion, and it acquired friendship from them, so that, having come together with itself into one, it became indissoluble by anything else except by the one who had bound it together.'

Then he adds: 'And having set soul in the midst of it, he extended it throughout, and further covered the body around it from outside; and thus he established heaven, circle turning within circle, as one alone and solitary.'

And again, going further on, he adds, saying: 'So then, out of such reasoning and thought of God with a view to the coming-to-be of time, in order that time might come into being, the sun and moon, and five other stars bearing the name of "wanderers," came to be for the marking-off and safeguarding of the numbers of time; and God, having made bodies for each of them, set them in the orbits in which the revolution of the Other was going.'

And he adds: 'And their bodies, bound with living bonds, became living creatures, and learned that which had been enjoined upon them.'

And in the tenth book of the Laws he declares generally concerning every soul, speaking thus: 'All things, indeed, that partake of soul undergo change, possessing within themselves the cause of the change; and having changed, they are borne along according to the order and law of destiny: those that have changed less in character travel a lesser distance over the plane of the region, but those that have fallen into greater and more unjust change [travel] into the depth.'

If, then, all things that partake of soul change, possessing within themselves the cause of change, and heaven and sun and moon partake of soul according to Plato himself, then these too, according to his own argument, would change, possessing within themselves the cause of change. How then does he again say that they are eternal and are therefore gods, although they exist in a perishable body and are capable of being dissolved?

He says, then, again in the Timaeus: 'Now when all of them — both those that visibly revolve, and those that appear as gods to the extent that they wish — had received their generation, he who begot this universe spoke to them thus: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the craftsman and the father of your works, you are indissoluble so long as I am unwilling. Now everything that has been bound is indeed dissoluble; but to wish to dissolve what has been well fitted together and is in good condition is the mark of an evil being. For this reason, since you have come into being, you are not immortal, nor altogether indissoluble; yet you shall by no means be dissolved, nor shall you meet the portion of death, having obtained a bond of my will greater still and more sovereign than those with which you were bound together when you came into being."'

These are the words of Plato. Reasonably, then, do Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews forbid the worship of these things and the reckoning of them as gods, while, leading one up to the all-sovereign God, they ordain that one hold as the only God him who is the very craftsman of the sun and moon and stars and of the whole heaven and cosmos, who has bound and fitted all things together by his divine word, and that one render reverent honor to him alone, saying: 'Lest, having seen the sun and the moon and all the stars and all the array of heaven, you go astray and worship them.'

Philo, who was trained in the doctrines of the Hebrews, explains and elucidates these matters at length, speaking somewhat as follows, word for word: 'Some have supposed the sun and moon and the other stars to be self-ruling gods, to whom they have attributed the causes of all things that come to be. But to Moses the cosmos appeared to be both a created thing and the greatest city, having rulers and subjects: rulers, namely, all the beings in heaven, such as the wandering and the fixed stars; and subjects, the natures below the moon, in the air, and around the earth.'

The aforesaid rulers are not self-governing, but are subordinate officers of the one Father of all, not imitating an oversight of their own devising but rightly discharging it, he presiding by justice and law over each of the things that have come to be; but those who do not see the charioteer mounted upon them fasten the causes of the things that happen in the cosmos upon the yoked animals beneath him, as though these were the authors of the deeds. It is their ignorance that the most sacred lawgiver reshapes into knowledge, speaking thus: 'Lest, having seen the sun and the moon and the stars and all the array of heaven, you go astray and worship them.'

Very aptly and rightly did he call the acceptance of the aforementioned things as gods a 'wandering.' For those who saw that the yearly seasons are constituted by the approaches and withdrawals of the sun, in which the generations of animals, plants, and fruits are brought to completion within fixed periods of time; and that the moon, as servant and successor of the sun, has taken up by night the care and oversight of the things the sun attends to by day; and that the other stars, according to their sympathy with earthly things, work and effect countless things for the preservation of the universe — these men wandered into an endless wandering, supposing that these alone are gods.

But if they had striven to walk by the road that does not wander, they would immediately have recognized that, just as sense-perception has become the sub-servant of mind, in the same way all sensible things have been constituted as servants of the intelligible.

And he adds, saying: 'So that, having by reasoning passed beyond all visible substance, let us go to the honor of that which is formless and invisible and apprehensible by mind alone, who is not only God of things intelligible and sensible, but also the maker of all. But if anyone assigns the worship due to the eternal maker to another, more recent and created being, let him be recorded as deranged in mind and liable to the greatest impiety.'

These are, in truth, the pure and divine teachings of Hebrew piety, which we have honored above that philosophy which has been puffed up with conceit. What need have I to prolong the matter and bring the rest of Plato's writings to light, when it is possible from these very passages also to infer what I have now passed over in silence? Yet it was not for the sake of slander that I was led to say these things, since I myself especially admire the man, and consider and honor him as a friend beyond all the Greeks — one who has held opinions dear and akin to my own, even if not entirely equal throughout — only showing, by comparison with Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews, the deficiency of his understanding.

And yet it was open to one prepared to find fault to bring countless charges against him — such as those solemn and 'wise' regulations of his concerning women in the Republic, or such as the things solemnly extolled concerning unlawful love in the Phaedrus. But if you too desire to hear about these things, take up and read these his own words.

'Perhaps, then,' I said, 'contrary to custom, many things about what has just now been said would appear ridiculous, if it is to be carried out as it is described.' 'Indeed, very much so,' he said. 'What,' said I, 'do you see as the most ridiculous of them? Is it not plainly this, that the women be seen exercising naked in the wrestling-schools together with the men — not only the young, but even the older women too, just like old men in the gymnasia, who, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, nevertheless are fond of exercising?'

And he adds next: 'But the man who laughs at naked women exercising for the sake of the best, plucking as it were the fruit of the wisdom of the ridiculous, does not even know, it seems, at what he laughs.'

He also says in the seventh book of the Laws: 'That it will accordingly be necessary that both boys and girls learn, evidently, to dance and also to exercise; and for the boys there would be male dancing-masters, and for the girls female dancing-mistresses, no less suited to the training.' And he also sets down in it the following: 'Our maiden and mistress, in her turn, delighting in the education of the dance, did not think it fitting to sport with empty hands, but, adorned with full armor, thus to carry through the dance — things which it would surely be altogether fitting for both boys and girls alike to imitate.'

And concerning women making war too he legislates somewhat as follows: 'That resident aliens, hired for these wages, should teach all the studies pertaining to war to those who attend, as well as all that pertains to music — not that the son whom the father wishes should attend and the one he does not wish be let off from education, but, as the saying goes, every man and child, so far as possible, must of necessity be educated, as belonging to the city rather than to their begetters.'

'And the same things, indeed, my law would say concerning the females also: that the females must be trained equally in the very same things as the males; and I would say this without any fear — neither concerning horsemanship nor gymnastic — as though these were fitting for men but would not be fitting for women.'

And again, going further on, he says: 'Let us establish gymnastic exercises and all the bodily exertions relating to war — archery and every kind of throwing, and light-armed combat, and every kind of armed fighting, and tactical maneuvers, and every kind of march of armies and encampments, and whatever pertains to the study of horsemanship. For of all these there must be common instructors, receiving pay from the city, and their pupils must be the boys and men in the city, and the girls and women, all skilled in these things — the girls, while still girls, having practiced every dance in arms and combat, and the women being versed in maneuvers and formations and the setting-down and taking-up of arms.'

But not even to these things would the account of the Hebrews assent; rather, it will speak the opposite, attributing the successful outcome of wars not to the strength of men — let alone of women — but referring everything to God and to the alliance that comes from him. It says accordingly: 'Unless the Lord build the house, in vain do those who build it labor. Unless the Lord guard the city, in vain does the watchman keep vigil.'

But behold how the marvelous philosopher also brings women into athletic competition, speaking somewhat as follows: 'For women — for pre-pubescent girls, naked, [there shall be] the stadium-race, the double-course, the horse-race, and the long-distance race, competing in the running itself; and for those from thirteen years old who remain [unmarried] until marriage, not longer than twenty years nor less than eighteen — clothed in fitting attire, these must go down to the contest of these races.'

'And let this much be said about the races for men and women; but as regards feats of strength, instead of wrestling and such heavy events as are now practiced, [let there be] combat in arms — one contending against one, and two against two.'

And having said next: 'It is likewise necessary that those who summon the masters of armed combat should be commanded to enact this by law,' he adds, saying: 'And let the same things be enacted by law also concerning the females, those up to the time of marriage.'

Then, having joined next to these the laws concerning light-armed combat and the pancratium and archery, and the throwing of stones by hand and by sling, and concerning contests of horses, again here too he adds concerning the females, saying: 'Concerning these matters it is not fitting to compel the participation of females by laws and ordinances; but if, from the very training habituated beforehand, their nature admits it and they do not chafe at boys or maidens sharing in it, one should permit this and not find fault.'

So much for Plato concerning women. And this admirable law of his also stands: 'If anyone leaves behind only female children, [inheritance] is to pass back through brothers and brothers' children, first among the males, and afterward among the females of the same family; and let the judge, examining the fitness or unfitness of the age for marriage, decide, viewing the males naked, and the females naked as far as the navel.' But he also says that at the festivals they must dance naked, in the sixth book of the Laws, speaking thus:

'For the sake of such earnestness, then, it is necessary also to hold the games with dancing, both boys and girls dancing, and at the same time both watching and being watched, with reason and at an age having plausible pretexts, naked — both males and females — up to the point of the modest shame proper to each.'

In addition to all these, hear also these words in the Republic concerning the law that the women be held in common. 'This law, then,' said I, 'follows, I think, upon the others that have gone before, this one.' 'What is it?' 'That all these women be common to all these men, and that no woman cohabit privately with any one man; and, again, that the children be common, and that neither a parent know his own offspring, nor a child his parent.'

And he adds next: 'Likely,' he said. 'You, then,' said I, 'as their lawgiver, having selected the women just as the men, will hand them over [to one another], so far as possible, [pairing] those of similar nature; and they, since they have common houses and common messes, and no one privately possesses anything of the sort for himself, will be together, and, being mingled together both in the gymnasia and in all their other upbringing, will be led, I think, by an innate necessity, to intercourse with one another. Or do you not think that what I say is necessary?' 'Not by geometrical necessities, indeed,' he said, 'but by erotic necessities, which are likely to be sharper than the former at persuading and dragging along the great mass of people.'

But perhaps someone will explain the meaning of this passage differently, saying that he does not mean to imply what is customarily supposed. For [he might say that Plato] did not say without qualification that all women are common, as though it were permitted for any chance persons to indulge in licentiousness, but that the distribution of them to the men lies within the authority of the rulers. For in this sense they are 'common,' just as one might also say that public funds are common, being distributed to those to whom it is fitting by those entrusted with the task. Well then, let this matter stand thus.

But what would you say when you learn that he even commands that those conceived not be brought out to the light, speaking thus? 'For a woman,' said I, 'beginning from twenty years of age up to forty, to bear children for the city; and for a man, once he has passed the sharpest peak of his running prime, from then on to beget for the city up to fifty-five years of age.'

To which he adds: 'And when, I suppose, both the women and the men have passed beyond the age for begetting, we shall then, I think, release them to consort freely with whomever they wish.' And he adds: 'having exhorted them to be most eager, above all, not to bring any conceived offspring to the light, should one occur; but if anyone should force the matter, to dispose of it on the understanding that there is no nourishment for such a one.' Such, then, are the things concerning the upbringing of women. Now hear what sort of things are said concerning unlawful love.

'But when he continues doing this for a long time, and draws near with touching, both in the gymnasia and in other associations, then indeed the spring of that stream, which Zeus, in his love for Ganymede, named "desire" (himeros), flows abundantly toward the lover; part of it sinks into him, and, when he is filled to overflowing, the rest flows out again; and just as a breath, or some echo, bounding back from smooth and solid surfaces, is carried back again to the place whence it began, so the stream of beauty, passing back again through the eyes into the beautiful one — by the path along which it is naturally disposed to travel to the soul — arriving there and giving wings again to the passages of the feathers, waters them and stirs them to grow feathers, and in turn fills the soul of the beloved with love. He is in love, then, but is at a loss as to with what; and he neither knows what he has experienced, nor is he able to explain it, but, as though he had caught an eye-inflammation from another, he has no reason to give.'

And he adds next: 'He desires, in a manner similar to that other, though more weakly, to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down together with him; and indeed, as is likely, he soon after does these things. So then, in their lying down together, the licentious horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and claims that, in return for many toils, he should enjoy some small pleasure; but the horse of the beloved boy has nothing to say, but, swelling with desire and at a loss, embraces the lover and kisses him, as greeting one exceedingly well-disposed toward him; and when they lie down together, he is of such a disposition as not to refuse, for his own part, to gratify the one who loves him, should he ask to obtain it.'

If, then, the better elements of the mind prevail, leading to an ordered way of life and philosophy, they pass their life here in blessedness and harmony of mind, being masters of themselves and orderly.

Then after other matters he adds: 'But if they adopt a coarser and more ambitious way of life, then perhaps somewhere in drunkenness or through some other carelessness, their two unruly steeds, catching their souls off guard, bring them together to the same point, and they choose and accomplish that course which is accounted blessed by the many; and having accomplished it, they continue thereafter to practice it, though rarely, since they do not act with the full consent of the whole mind.'

These two, then, are friends—though less so than the former pair—and they live on, both while in love and after they have come out of it, believing that they have given and received from each other the greatest pledges, which it is not lawful to break so as ever to come to enmity.

And at the end, unwinged indeed, but having set out to grow wings, they depart from the body, so that they carry off no small prize of their erotic madness; for it is no longer lawful for those who have already begun the journey beneath heaven to go into darkness and the journey under the earth, but, having led a bright life, to be happy as they journey together with one another, and to grow wings together for love's sake. These, then, are the many and divine gifts which the friendship of a lover will bestow upon you, my boy.

Such, then, are the teachings of Plato, but not those of Moses, who explicitly legislates the opposite of these things, proclaiming in a loud voice the fitting penalty against pederasts. He says, at any rate: 'Whoever lies with a male as with the bed of a woman, both have committed an abomination; let them be put to death, they are guilty.' And: 'Cursed is everyone who lies with a male as with the bed of a woman.' What need is there now to expose further how the wisest of men passed over the pederast—for not even in the Laws did he see fit to establish the penalty of death against pederasts—yet he commands that a household slave who does not disclose a treasure found by someone else be punished with death? But listen also to the following, lest you suppose me to be slandering him.

'Whatever the god,' he says, 'decrees concerning stolen property and the one who removed it, this let the city do, following the oracles of the god. And if the informer is free, let him gain a reputation for virtue, but for not informing, one for baseness; but if he is a slave, the informer would rightly be made free by the city, which pays his master due compensation; but for not informing let him be punished with death.'

And here it is not the one who has moved something forbidden who is punished with death, but the one who, when another has transgressed, does not disclose it. And elsewhere he declares a master to be clean even if he should kill his own slave in anger. He says, at any rate: 'One who kills his own slave shall be purified; but if in anger he kills another's slave, let him pay double the damage to the owner.'

Hear also this from his laws which he ordained concerning murderers: 'If someone kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done without premeditation, occurring in some fit of anger, in other respects let him suffer what would be fitting for one who kills without anger to suffer; but let him necessarily go into exile for two years, chastening his own anger.'

And to this he next adds another law of this kind: 'But he who kills in anger, yet with premeditation, shall in other respects be treated as the former, but let him go into exile for three years—since the other went into exile for two—being punished for a longer time on account of the greatness of his anger.'

Then next, concerning one who commits murder a second time, he legislates as follows: 'But if either of these, having returned, is again overcome by anger and does this same thing, let him flee and no longer return.'

And again he next says: 'But if—which happens, though rarely—through anger a father or mother kills a son or daughter by blows or by some violent means, let them be purified with the same purifications as the others and pass three years in exile; and when the killers have returned, let the wife be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and let them never again beget children together.'

And to these he adds: 'But if a husband kills his wedded wife in anger, or a wife likewise does this same thing to her own husband, let them be purified with the same purifications, and let them complete three-year periods of exile. And when one who has done such a thing has returned, let him not share in sacred rites with his own children, nor ever become a companion at their table.'

And if a brother in anger kills a brother or sister, or a sister kills a brother or sister, let it be said that the same purifications and periods of exile must take place for these as have been stated for parents and offspring, since he has deprived brothers of brothers and parents of children; but let him himself never become a fellow-hearth-dweller with these, nor a partaker of sacred rites.

But if a brother kills a brother when a faction-fight has occurred, or in some such manner, defending himself against one who began the violence first, let him be clean, as one who has killed an enemy. And likewise if a citizen kills a citizen, or a foreigner a foreigner. But if a foreigner kills a citizen, or a citizen a foreigner, in self-defense, let him likewise be clean; and likewise if a slave kills a slave. But if, in turn, a slave in self-defense kills a free man, let him be liable to the same laws as one who kills a father.