Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1 part 11/12

constituted, indeed, in the substrate of matter, but not contemplated in bare qualities alone — as, indeed, he depicts Christ, and for this reason names him a composite nature: none other, that is, than that [nature] which he has fashioned and put together out of bare qualities.

For of whatever things he says there is difference, of these same things [there is] clearly also the union.

For the difference does not belong to some things, and the union to others, but to the same things, and not to different ones.

Therefore the deranged one declares that Christ consists of qualities and is himself qualities, and, in respect of these same [qualities], he again shows him to be divided — since he teaches, not one composite [quality] on account of the union, but different qualities in his case — if indeed this is for him the best definition of the union.

But if one rule prevails in the case of the natures, and again another rule in the case of the qualities, it is his task to show us this — a task of skill, or rather, to speak more fittingly, of sheer derangement — so that we might learn how, according to the union, he recognizes the two natures as one nature, but does not [likewise recognize] the different qualities as one quality.

Or by what reasoning does he speak of a difference of qualities, but not speak of a difference of natures?

And how could the qualities have remained unconfused without a difference, or the natures too have remained unconfused without this same difference?

And how is it that, according to the difference, the qualities are not divided, while according to it the natures are divided?

Or how, not being divided, are they not confessed together with the qualities?

Let whoever is that man's impious lover and advocate be at pains to explain these things clearly to us, so that, by providing a resolution of them, he may jointly dissolve the reproach — or, being unable to do so justly, may be carried away together with that man, incurring even greater condemnation, because he has dared to say that one who is, in every respect, at odds even with himself, is in harmony with the Fathers.

Let these things, O God-honored lord, be said by me in passing, in accordance with your command, for the refutation and abolition of that man and of the shield-bearers of his faction.

It would belong to your God-minded understanding to teach and instruct, with greater and more perfect things, those who, like me, are imperfect and untaught, and to lead [them] to a more divine knowledge, so that you may bring [me] into kinship with God through the true knowledge of the things that are, of which the Word himself — who by nature is above the things that are — stands as cause: our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom, most holy and God-honored Father, may you not cease commending me, unworthy as I am, through your prayers.

And again the divine Maximus [says]:

How then could anyone ever have the power to represent the holy synod at Chalcedon — which beholds and proclaims these things with such reverence and such resounding clarity — as setting aside the definition of the Nicenes, even if he were the most resourceful of all at devising, through falsehood, things that do not exist, against the true and truly existing faith?

But if you revile and blame it as, on the one hand, firmly preserving this [Nicene definition], yet, on the other, perhaps introducing besides a second definition — what then is this second definition introduced by it?

The confession, he says, of the expression 'of two natures' and 'in two natures.'

For the definition of the Nicenes does not contain this;

but it was manifestly introduced by the Fathers at Chalcedon, not having been previously known or named by anyone.

That you are not able to demonstrate even this is clear;

for by many of the holy Fathers before it, this expression was both judged and proclaimed as pious.

And the words of those who proclaimed it bear witness — being more luminous and brighter than every ray of the sun — even though you are ignorant of them through lack of learning, or pretend to be ignorant on account of your slander, [bringing] also a foolish accusation against the pious Fathers and their doctrines.

But even if there had been none — though, as I have said, it is very abundant — what is there to prevent so many holy men (or rather, the whole of Christianity —

for this, properly speaking, is what the most holy synod of orthodox Fathers is) — from authoritatively putting forth this [expression], and legislating against the conflation taught by Eutyches?

By what reasoning, and how, do you accuse the holy synod at Chalcedon — though it manifestly made use of patristic expressions — and, treating it as introducing another definition of faith, revile and disparage it here and there, both in writing and unwritten?

Do not judge according to appearance — for the sake of God who said this — but judge righteous judgment.

What is your accusation against the Fathers at Chalcedon concerning this one and the same matter, and what is the proclamation of those who preceded them?

For if it is possible to accuse [the synod] at Chalcedon of [introducing] another definition of faith on account of the expressions inserted into the definition of the Nicenes, then it will altogether follow, for the same reason, that one must say this also against Cyril and against the hundred and fifty [Fathers].

But if it is not [possible to say this] against them, how it can be said against that one [Chalcedon], I am unable to comprehend.

But I am prompted to set forth your fury and obstinate resistance in matters that admit of no proof;

if indeed, being thus sufficiently put to shame, you might at last restrain yourselves from so great a madness in constructing falsehood against the truth.

Since even Gregory, the champion of theology, will by no means escape more [than they] from the charge of guilt you bring against the Chalcedonians;

rather, he will fall under it to a very great extent, according to your own rule, since he further articulated beforehand what had been insufficiently stated at Nicaea concerning the Holy Spirit;

because, he says, this question was not even stirred at that time —

knowing the Spirit together with the Father and the Son, and writing to Cledonius that he thus understands and teaches [it].

But you seem to me to imitate the affliction of unsound eyesight, which, being unable to gaze up at and partake of the sun's radiance, blames that very radiance as dim, rather than its own weakness;

you yourselves being diseased on account of the confusion, and slandering those who adequately expose it as impious and unfitting to the truth of the natures that are saved in Christ, [treating them] as though they were not common luminaries, nor revealers of the truth.

For if it is possible to speak the truth about the truth, all — both the God-judged Fathers of the Nicenes, and every synod of orthodox and holy men — did not, by the introduction of their own expressions, introduce any other definition of faith whatsoever, as you declare, raving exceedingly;

but they firmly confirmed that same [definition] as the first and only one legislated by the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers, elucidating it, and, as it were, further expounding and elaborating it, on account of those who wrongly construe and misinterpret it and its doctrines toward their own impiety.

At once, then, when Eunomius and Macedonius wished to injure the principle of theology laid down in it, the hundred and fifty Fathers did not permit this, through their own expressions and doctrines.

So too, when Nestorius contrived to divide what belongs to the economy, the blessed Cyril did not permit it;

just as, then, the honored Fathers at Chalcedon likewise prevented Eutyches, who wished to confuse [the natures].

How then, on behalf of the good — I mean together with those synods — do you not also accept this one, for that same and equal good reason?

Or, in reviling this one as haters of the good, do you jointly revile those others as well?

This indeed you do most of all in your deeds, though guarded in your words, so that, by ostensibly extolling those [other synods] with pretenses of piety over against this one, you might, through this [pretense], also injure those others, bringing upon them the same accusation for the same act.

Who among you, then, could bear such great arrogance against piety and against those who are pious?

CHAPTERS ON ESSENCE AND NATURE, AND ON HYPOSTASIS AND PERSON. That essence signifies the form and the nature — that which a thing is in itself — whereas hypostasis indicates a particular [instance] of the essence.

That essence and that-which-inheres-in-essence are not the same;

just as neither are hypostasis and that-which-is-enhypostatic [the same], even though both are observed in one another, but are one thing and another.

For that-which-inheres-in-essence is what is observed in the nature, and does not exist by itself;

whereas that-which-is-enhypostatic signifies that very thing which exists in a hypostasis, and does not subsist in itself by itself;

that is, not that which has come together into some one thing out of incomplete parts, but that which is observed — out of a complete [element] and an incomplete [element] — in a combination formed according to confusion.

That hypostasis defines a person by [its] characteristic properties.

Whereas that-which-is-enhypostatic signifies that which is not, in itself, an accident;

but that which has its being in another, and is not observed in itself, nor subsists by itself, but is always observed in connection with the hypostasis, just as the qualities called essential and accidental;

which are not essence, nor [subsist] of themselves, but occur in the essence, and apart from it do not have being.

That, just as neither of the qualities — I mean the essential and the accidental — is essence, or a thing subsisting by itself, but they always possess their characteristic in connection with the essence, as colour [does] in a body, and knowledge in a soul;

for it is not possible to say that colour appears apart from a body, or that knowledge is exercised apart from a soul;

so too it is not possible to conceive of that-which-is-enhypostatic or that-which-inheres-in-essence apart from essence or hypostasis.

For they do not have their existence of themselves, but are always observed in connection with the hypostasis.

That when some say that there is no nature without hypostasis, this is rightly said by them, but is not rightly understood;

and [it is not rightly understood] when they take the 'not without hypostasis' to amount to hypostasis itself, rather than [understanding it as] being observed in the hypostasis.

That, just as if someone says, 'There is no body without shape or without colour,' he speaks rightly, yet he does not rightly conclude, when he says that the shape or the colour is a body, rather than that it is observed in a body;

so too, if someone were to declare, saying:

'There is no nature without hypostasis' —

and then reduces the 'not without hypostasis' to hypostasis [itself], he does not rightly distinguish.

That nature could never be without hypostasis, yet nature is not, for that reason, hypostasis;

nor is the 'not without hypostasis' to be regarded as [equivalent to] hypostasis.

For hypostasis is, in every case, also nature;

just as shape, too, is always body.

For it is not possible to conceive of a hypostasis without nature;

nor, again, [is it possible to conceive of] shape or colour without body;

but nature is not, in every case, also hypostasis.

That nature holds the common principle of being, whereas hypostasis holds also the principle of being-in-itself.

That nature holds only the principle of species, whereas hypostasis is also indicative of a particular [this-one].

God is a divine essence: something eternal and without beginning, something incorporeal and uncircumscribed, and the cause of the things that are.

Essence is that which subsists completely.

Nature is the truth of things, or that which inheres essentially in them.

But according to others, it is the coming-into-being of things that have come to be something.

And according to yet others, it is the providence of God producing in things that come to be both their existence and the manner of their existence.

OF THE ALL-WISE MAXIMUS, DEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS. A composite hypostasis is a certain composite essence, comprehending, in its own individual instance, all the properties of the particular things that exist.

For that which is observed in common among the individuals under the same species characterizes essence, that is, nature — primarily in the individuals under it, but generically, the common property of all the individuals under the composite species.

Of the most blessed Eulogius, Pope of Alexandria: Seven Chapters concerning the Two Natures of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.

If our Lord Jesus Christ is of one nature according to the union, tell me, of which — of the nature that assumed, or of the nature that was assumed?

But if both exist, how is he one, unless out of both one composite nature was constituted?

But if this is so, how is Christ not of a different essence, since the Father is uncomposite?

If our Lord Jesus Christ has never been confessed to be of two natures, how is it possible to speak of Christ as being of one nature after the union, or indeed to speak of a union at all?

But if it has been confessed that Christ came to be of two natures, tell me, when was Christ of two natures, and when did he come to be of one?

Is God the Word consubstantial with the flesh assumed by him, or of a different essence?

But if he is consubstantial, how has the Godhead not become a Tetrad instead of a Triad?

But if the flesh of God the Word is of a different essence, how is Christ not of two natures?

Some say that there is one incarnate nature of God the Word;

and I think that you too speak in this way.

But if this must be understood as meaning that God and the flesh are of one essence, how can the created be the same as the uncreated, and the eternal the same as that which is under time?

But if it is meant as one nature having another, or being had by another, who could endure to say 'one and one' — not two, but one?

If God the Word and the Father are one nature, how is it not the case that God the Word, and the Father, and the flesh are one nature?

If God the Word and the flesh are in no respect two, how are God the Word and the flesh not one in every respect?

And if God the Word and the flesh are one in every respect, how will the Word not be flesh, and the flesh Word, and co-eternal with the Father and consubstantial as God the Word is?

But if God the Word and the flesh are not one in every respect, how are God the Word and the flesh not two in some respect?

If it is impossible for God the Word and the flesh to be united more closely than that by which God the Word and the Father are united, how is it that God the Word and the flesh, though united, are in no respect two?

ON ESSENCE AND NATURE AND HYPOSTASIS. Essence is that which signifies the common and unlimited reality, as the term 'man' does.

For he who says this signifies the common nature, not circumscribing by the word some particular man, the one known individually by his own name.

Nature is that which is contemplated equally in all those designated under the same species.

Hypostasis is that which presents and circumscribes the common and unlimited reality individually in some particular, as, for instance, 'so-and-so.'

Hypostasis is that which, along with the universal, also possesses something particular.

Nature is, according to those outside [the Church], the principle of motion and rest.

Nature is a qualified existence belonging to the whole.

'Nature' (physis) is so named from 'to have grown' (pephykenai).

First essence is everything that subsists by itself, as, for instance, a stone.

Third essence is ensouled and sentient, as an animal, a horse.

Fourth essence is ensouled, sentient, and rational, as man.

The name 'Christ' is not indicative of a nature, but of a composite hypostasis.

That is, the whole Christ is both Lord and God, and almighty; having in himself also — that flesh which, for our sake and for our salvation, he put on indivisibly and unconfusedly — passible flesh, and not almighty, created, visible, circumscribable flesh, which is not almighty by nature, but possesses, in Christ, an almighty will.

For Christ is not, in respect of hypostasis, both mortal and immortal;

nor again, powerless and almighty, visible and invisible, created and uncreated;

but the one according to nature, the other according to hypostasis.

And, simply put, not by opposition of gnome, but in the property of nature.

For Christ is one, as I said before, possessing both naturally.

For the saying, 'Not as I will, but as thou wilt,' shows nothing else than that he was truly clothed with flesh that feared death.

For to fear death, and to shrink back, and to be in agony, belongs to that flesh.

Now, therefore, he leaves it deserted and bare of its own operation, so that, having shown its weakness, he might also confirm its nature.

But at other times he does not hide it, so that you may learn that he was a mere man.

For just as, if he had displayed the human things throughout, this would have been supposed;

so, if he had performed the things of the Godhead throughout, the principle of the economy would have been disbelieved.

You who refuse to say or confess two wills in the case of the one and only Christ — this one will, which you assert concerning him, is it without beginning, and co-unoriginate, and co-eternal with the Father and the Holy Spirit, wholly divine in measure, simple and uncomposite, as belonging to the divine essence — or does it seem to you something different on account of the incarnation?

Then indicate of what sort it is, and tell us what the name of this will is.

For I myself will indicate the name of that will which is before the incarnation, that is, of the divine will.

it exists as uncomposite in its entirety;

Behold, then, I have spoken of that will which is before the incarnation;

and all will agree with me, as with one who has spoken the truth.

And you yourself too, whether you wish it or not.

Tell us, then, what name that will which comes after the incarnation has.

You tell us the name of this one will which you devise as belonging to Christ.

But perhaps, since the divine will is called divine, and the human will is called human, would you say that Christ has a theandric will?

Since the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have a theandric will...

Or perhaps you would dare to call it composite?

Likewise, again, this would be something new for the Godhead.

and you too will introduce confusion, like Severus;

for it is impossible for two natures, or two natural wills, to become one nature, or one natural will, without confusion.

and again you will estrange the Son from the Father, and by introducing three acts of willing you will be shown to hold them as not agreeing with one another, just as also the hypostases.

If you say that the will and operation are one on the ground that he is one, you will be compelled to say the same of the Father as one, and of the Spirit as one — a will and an operation — whether you wish it or not; and the argument will be found to fall into polytheism.

You introduce the personal division of Nestorius.

And if you also say it is contrary to nature, you destroy the existence of the one who wills;

for that which is contrary to nature is corruption to nature, as the Fathers have defined.

Or again, will you tear apart the monad, and set us to reckoning in fractions — two-thirds and a third — of this one will of yours, so that we might find out how much of it is divine, and how much human?

Likewise also how much is uncreated, and how much created, and, simply, however it pleases you to say.

Tell us the name of the will which is advocated by you concerning Christ; set it down together with the anonymous Psalms, so that at least there it may find room and place.

Since, most learned sir, we are unable to confess anything whatsoever as nameless.

As is likely, it has not until now been made manifest to any of the earth-born.

Inscribe it, then, definitively from the teachings of the Fathers, and set forth for us the explanation of the name.

For what we enumerate, these same things we also confess, according to the great and God-revealing Basil.

I say that the life-giving flesh of the Son of God possessed, in God the Word himself, all the things beyond the nature proper to it, the two natures converging into one person and one hypostasis of God the Word.

For we worship one Son together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, as one of the Holy Trinity, as he was before the ages, now, and unto all the ages, and after the ages of ages.

Ten Chapters concerning the two wills of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ

Written to the Orthodox.

If, just as the Word is of one hypostasis with the flesh, so too, according to some, O blessed ones, there is one will, then it is necessary that, just as in hypostasis, so also in will, he differ both from us and from the Father.

And how will the identity of nature with the Father be demonstrated through the difference of wills?

In whatever respects the Word has the one thing in common with the flesh, in those respects he is separated from the Father; and in whatever respects he has the one thing in common with the Father, in those respects he is distinguished from the flesh.

But if, according to some, O blessed ones, there is one will with the flesh, then he has thereby been separated from the Father in will.

If, in whatever respects the Word is united to the Father and the Spirit, in these respects he is judged to differ from the flesh;

and according to the common belief of Christians he is united in will to the Father and the Spirit; therefore in the will of the flesh he differs from the Father and the Spirit;

just as the Fathers themselves have defined, both for themselves and for us, and which we, O blessed ones, are zealous to keep.

This one will they must necessarily call, O blessed ones, either natural or hypostatic;

since indeed the constitution of beings is considered in terms of essence and hypostasis.

For what other term, besides these, could there even be to speak of — matters concerning which nothing beyond was permissible?

But if they call it natural, they will thereby be asserting, even against their will, one nature of the Word and the flesh.

But if hypostatic, they will be compelled, on account of the three holy hypostases, to say that the wills are three as well — if indeed they have determined to be consistent with themselves.

If the will of the nature of the Word is creative of all things that have come into being;

and this, according to them, O blessed ones, is also the will of the flesh, then clearly the flesh of the Word too will be creator of the things that have come into being.

And thus indeed the common belief of Christians — that it is created — is overthrown.

For how can that which creates out of things that are not be a creature — possessing as it does the distinguishing property proper to the divine nature?

If, because of the one will of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, their one nature was demonstrated by the God-inspired Fathers;

and, according to them, O blessed ones, there is one will of the Word and the flesh, then in the same way there will also be one nature of the Word and the flesh.

But if, in the case of the flesh and the Word, the one will does not imply one nature, then neither in the case of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit will the one will imply one nature — and our faith is vain, and the preaching of the Fathers is vain.

This one will is either a matter of deliberate choice, or it is natural.

But if it is natural, then, as has already been shown, there will be one nature of the flesh and the Word as well;

but if it is a matter of deliberate choice, then, just as in hypostasis, so also in deliberative inclination, Christ will be separated from the Father and the Spirit.

If, according to the great Cyril, things that are of the same essence and nature also possess the same will, how can things not of the same nature possibly have the same will?

If, according to the Golden Mouth, John [Chrysostom], the flesh possesses by nature the property of not willing to die;

and the Word united it to himself, unchangeably, according to hypostasis, together with all the properties naturally belonging to it — how do those who deny the properties naturally belonging to it not also, along with the natural properties, deny the nature itself?

If they say that a person is introduced together with the will, and for this reason — fearing a fear that does not exist — they cannot tolerate speaking of two wills in the case of Christ, lest two persons also be necessarily introduced along with them, then they will be compelled, if indeed they wish to show the reasoning of their own doctrine to be coherent, either — because of the one will of the Godhead — to say also one person;

since, according to them, a person necessarily follows upon the will;

or, because of the three persons, to introduce three wills as well, thereby bringing in both the fusion of Sabellius and the division of Arius.

But since, O blessed ones, equivocation often becomes a cause of error, the hearer passing over to a different meaning from the one the discourse intended, I entreat your understanding in Christ — for the sake of a clear and unconfused disclosure of the things signified — to clarify for you first of all whether "will" exists at all, and to what signified things, that is, realities, this name applies;

and whether, among the things designated by this name, some are composite and others simple;

And, if so, whether the composite ones have their parts simultaneous, or not simultaneous;

and which are prior to which;

and which are posterior to which.

And what is the demonstrative and defining account of each part, so that we may have some intelligible content when we accept the phrase "the one will."

For the discourse of the Fathers concerns not words, but realities.

Whence we find the Fathers conceding flexibility in respect of words;

In addition to these, it must be asked what deliberate choice is, and what deliberative inclination is;

what will is, and what pertains to deliberate choice.

For all these things must come together for the exposition of the wills.

And he who does not know these things with precision, and yet discourses about the wills, is a blind man groping in the dark, knowing neither what he is saying, nor that concerning which he makes his assertions.

Of the Same. From the questions put to him by Theodore the Monk.

Nature is, according to the philosophers, the principle of motion and rest;

but according to the Fathers, a form predicated, in respect of what sort of thing something is, of many things that differ in number.

Essence is, according to the philosophers, a self-subsistent thing, not requiring another for its constitution;

but according to the Fathers, the natural being predicated of many things that differ in their hypostases.

The individual is, according to the philosophers, a collection of properties, the sum of which cannot be observed in any other;

but according to the Fathers, such as Peter or Paul, or anyone else who, by his own personal properties, is distinguished in himself from other human beings.

Hypostasis, according to the philosophers, is essence together with properties;

but according to the Fathers, each individual human being, marked off personally from other human beings.

The act of willing and the operation of God is the productive and providential cause of every time, place, and age, and of every nature.

The act of willing is the rational faculty of the intellective soul concerned with what is in our power, existing as its self-determining faculty.

The act of willing is an appetitive intellect, and a discursive appetite giving assent toward the thing willed.

Of Clement the Stromatist [Clement of Alexandria], from the treatise On Providence.

The act of willing is a natural power, appetitive of that which exists in accordance with nature.

The act of willing is a natural appetite, proper to the nature of the rational being.

The act of willing is natural — the self-determining movement of a self-governing intellect;

or an intellect moving of its own accord toward something.

Self-determination is intellect moving in accordance with nature;

or the self-governing intellective movement of the soul.

Of St. Alexander, Pope of Alexandria, from his Letter against the Arians to Aiglon, Bishop of Cynopolis.

The act of willing is natural — a self-determining power belonging to every intellective being, inasmuch as such a being has nothing involuntary even in respect of its essence.

Of Saint Eustathius, Patriarch of Antioch, from his treatise On the Soul.

The act of willing is a natural movement of the reason that is in us.

The act of willing is a rational and vital appetite.

Of Saint Athanasius, Pope of Alexandria, from his longer treatise On the Faith.

The act of willing is the self-determined movement of the intellective soul.

The act of willing is the first property of the intellective soul, and it is declarative of its essence.

The mind of the Lord is not yet Lord, but rather the act of willing, or the wish, or the operation.

Of Saint Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, from his treatise Against Apollinarius.

The act of willing is a kind of intellection, and a disposition regarding something.

Self-determination is the self-mastering movement of the will.

The act of willing of the intellective soul is its choosing, by its own authority, the things that accord with gnome, through the act of willing that belongs to deliberate choice.

The act of willing is, of every rational nature, its life according to its nature.

The privation of such life is the abolition of essence.

Self-determination is the act of willing of the rational soul, occurring without hindrance toward that which it wishes.

Of Saint Anastasius, Patriarch of Antioch.

The will is a word turning in the heart, able to be made manifest only through operation.

The will is a wish of the soul that, unless [checked from without], cannot be restrained from within itself.

Of Saint Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa.

The act of willing is a deliberative appetite for the things that are in our power and able to come to be through us, and that have an uncertain outcome.

In what respect man is rational, and what the interior word is, and what the uttered [word] is.

The interior word is the movement of the soul that occurs within the reasoning faculty itself, without any utterance;

whence often, while keeping silence, we go through an entire discourse within ourselves, and we converse in dreams.

And it is especially according to this that we are all rational;

but not as according to the uttered word;

For indeed those who are deaf-mute from birth, and those who have lost their voice through suffering or through illness, are no less rational.

But the uttered word has its operation in the voice and in the [various] languages.

Of Saint Maximus, from his syllogisms concerning the wills:

what is the natural will, and what is the gnomic [will].

The natural will is the impulse and appetite of the natural constituents [of a being], possessed simply and invariably.