Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1 part 2/12

For of whatever natures he himself was the hypostasis, of these he also naturally received the essential principles;

but if he received the essential principles of those natures of which he himself was the hypostasis, he also fittingly possessed the natural, ensouled operation of the flesh, whose essential principle is implanted in that nature;

but if, as man, he had a natural operation whose principle was constitutive of his human nature, then clearly, as God too, he had a natural operation whose principle was declarative of his supra-essential Godhead.

For being perfect God, and the same one perfect man, he operated naturally according to each nature of which he was the hypostasis, without being divided;

but if, according to each nature of which he was the hypostasis, he operated naturally without being divided, it is clear that, together with the natures of which he was the hypostasis, he also possessed their essential and constitutive operations, of which he himself was the union;

operating in a manner proper to himself, and by that through which he operated, confirming the truth of those natures out of which, in which, and which he was.

Christ, then, is one out of two natures:

of Godhead and of manhood;

the only-begotten Word, and Son, and Lord of glory;

in which natures he is known, and as truly existing in which he is believed;

possessing two natural and generic movements — that is, operations — constitutive of the natures out of which he was, whose particular effects were the individual acts of operation;

put forth from him, and brought to completion by him, without division of the natures out of which he was, and without any confusion whatsoever.

For he does not undergo division or confusion who is never subject to change, and who bestows on all existing things both their permanence in being, and in how they exist, and their constitution.

Let these things, holy Father, be said briefly for the sake of your command;

so that, if they bring anything of use, you may have a means of repelling the idle chatter of those fond of talk, which has taken license from the difficulty of the times.

And do not overlook your servant in his poverty;

but enrich him with the divine Spirit, repaying his obedience with your powerful supplications;

and do not cease commending him to Christ, the great God and maker of all things, who is worshiped by all creation, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, unto the ages.

By reason, the nature of beings is circumscribed with a view to the generation of virtue, according to procession;

that is, the complete denial of nature which pertains to virtue.

By the mind, the movement of every age and time is bounded, for the establishment of an unerring union, according to ascent;

that is, a transcending of those things in which nature exists;

I mean place and time, in which is the hypostatic existence of beings.

But the restoration according to grace toward him from whom are all things, and through whom, and unto whom, as the end of all things, comes about according to assumption;

which is, on the one hand, a passion of that which is assumed;

but, on the other hand, an operation of him who assumes.

Person, that is, hypostasis:

for essence — that is, reason — is that which is according to the image;

but that which is according to likeness — that is, the manner of life — is the hypostasis; out of both of these together virtue has been brought to completion.

For virtue is the hypostasis of wisdom;

and they say that wisdom is the essence of virtue,

and the foundation of virtue is constituted by the principle of the contemplation of things practical.

And the most unerring character of both is the unswerving gaze fixed upon That Which Properly Is.

That man is not immutable by nature;

That the will is characteristic either of essence or of hypostasis;

and there is no middle term between these, nor any common and composite [term] made of both;

That "deliberate choice," when said of Christ, signifies the natural act of willing,

that is, the appetitive power of nature.

Behold the mystery of the economy —

that is, concerning essence, and power, and operation.

May you too, Neilos, hear these things,

and may you think what the teachers of truth think.

50. That Severus maliciously says that hypostasis is the same as nature, so that by means of the one nature he may establish the confusion and escape refutation, saying that by "nature" he had understood "hypostasis";

and that again he may introduce division, while professing that the union is from hypostasis;

and that he may seem to escape notice by saying that, instead of "natures," he understands "hypostases."

And again, when accused, on the ground of a "mere difference," of teaching the non-existence of the natures, he may find as a refuge for his defense the mere difference in natural quality.

And that, just as Nestorius, by calling the union "mere," introduced a real division,

so also Severus, by calling the difference of natures "mere," makes the confusion a real one.

But Severus, hard pressed by these arguments and unable to bear the trial of truth, again, as is his custom, sets forth falsehood as his ally,

asserting that in the case of the economy, hypostasis is the same as nature,

and that the difference in natural quality is the same as the real difference according to nature,

because every quality is also natural, and is also called a "thing."

so that if, being caught, he is exposed by the refutations as clearly professing, through the one composite nature, both the fantasy of Mani and the confusion of Apollinaris, and also the contraction of Eutyches, who professed that after the union the things united come into one essence, then, like a chameleon changing its colors, he may change his own statement, saying that by "nature" he had understood "hypostasis";

or if he is shown to hold the division of Ebion, of Paul of Samosata, and of Nestorius, and to be decreeing that the operation of the Logos is by grace, as in a prophet, he may again have falsehood ready as his advocate, declaring that he had said "hypostases" instead of "natures";

And if again he is justly accused of teaching, on the ground of the "mere difference," the non-existence of the things united, he may find as a refuge for his defense the [claim of] a difference as in natural quality,

saying that after the union there is, in the case of Christ, a difference of natural qualities, but not of natures, that is, of essences;

through the expression that dissolves the confusion —

that is, "difference" — the cunning sophist, all the more, tightening the confusion

of the opposites according to the law of nature, not effecting the resolution of the opposites, but their combination, contrary to the definition and law of nature;

and becoming, with regard to "difference," for the deception of his hearers, such a one as Nestorius was proved to be with regard to "union."

For that one, while naming the union only by a mere appellation, introduced in actual operation the division of the things [united];

and this one, while professing a mere difference after the union, holds that the existence of the things differing is only in conception,

while in actual operation he brings about their confusion.

For if Nestorius had not held the union to have come about as a mere one, he would have spoken of the one composite hypostasis of Christ, brought to completion from the union of the natures;

and this one, if he were not proclaiming a mere difference, would not refuse to say that in Christ, after the union, there is the uncut and undivided quality of the differing things, knowing that with every difference, quantity is of necessity introduced together,

and to every quantity is joined the number that indicates it.

For it is impossible either for a difference of quantity to exist apart, or for a quantity to be discerned apart from the number that indicates it.

And the one, knowing in the case of Christ only the quantity of the natures, but not knowing the oneness, by composition, of the hypostasis from the natures, makes the mere appellation of "union" a covering, through and through, for the division of the natures;

while the other, professing oneness according to nature alone instead of according to hypostasis, but not knowing the quantity according to nature, makes the mere difference in natural quality a covering for the confusion of the natures.

And the one, professing a union of the natures only in a deliberative quality, denies the one hypostasis, not enduring to say that the coming-together of the things has occurred as true according to essence;

for authority, and dignity, and such-like willing, of which Nestorius said the union consisted, are clearly movements of the gnome, but not of nature.

But the other, saying that after the union there is a mere difference only in natural quality, manifestly effects the abolition of the things united, denying the difference, according to essence, of the very things united, in natural otherness.

And to speak briefly concerning these things:

the one devised the union of gnomic qualities so as to result in the division of the things that exist by nature;

while the other, on the contrary, contrived the difference of natural qualities so as to result in the confusion of the things.

Truly an evil pair of lawless men, madly and wickedly bent, by opposite means, on tearing apart the truth of the orthodox doctrines.

For the one, by introducing a union of gnomic qualities, effects a division of the natures which, according to him, were not united at all;

while the other, saying that after the union there is only a difference of natural qualities, likewise introduces a confused alteration of the natures which, according to him, were not united at all —

not knowing even what they are saying.

For it was necessary, if indeed they had resolved to be consistent with themselves, that Nestorius, saying that the union came about from gnomic qualities, should not divide the natures of which, from the very beginning, he had not at all professed a union;

but should rather acknowledge, of those [qualities] of which he asserts the union to be, a difference after the union;

positing that, after the union, he does not confuse the natures — of which we do not permit him to speak of a union — for as long as he remains ignorant of their difference after the union.

For the difference of the things united is beheld after the union, even though Nestorius rages against it;

and the union of the things differing after the union [is likewise beheld], even though Severus arrays himself against it, and makes great advocacy on behalf of falsehood.

If, then, according to Nestorius, the union came about only of the gnomic acts of willing, let him also state the difference of these after the union, and abandon the division of the things that were in no way united;

and let him bring together, along with the difference of the gnomic acts of willing, also the variation of the gnome,

according to which it is not the difference according to nature that is naturally shown, but that according to hypostasis, producing, in the difference of the gnomic acts of willing, a relaxation and an intensification of goodness;

and it has made sinful the man who, according to him, was being deified by progress,

inasmuch as he did not have, in every mode and principle, the same gnomic act of willing as God.

For the difference of the gnomic acts of willing, as I have said, produces the variation of the gnome;

and the variation of the gnome introduces the diminution of goodness,

by which whoever is still held fast in any respect has not yet become perfectly sinless according to the gnome.

Therefore Nestorius, not accepting the one according to hypostasis from the coming-together of the natures, thereby also dissolved the union of the gnomic acts of willing, being unable to say what the one thing is that is shown to result from the union of the gnomic acts of willing.

For he cannot speak of an identity of goodness, since the difference of the gnomic acts of willing after the union clearly manifests to them an otherness according to intensification and relaxation.

For of whatever things there is a coming-together, of these it is altogether necessary also to speak of the difference.

And in vain was the term "identity of counsel" devised by him, even though it is fitting for showing the division of the persons.

For "identity of counsel" is a union of counsels that preserves the difference of the things united according to it, provided that, unconfused, the division of the persons who will [it] is contemplated together with them.

51. That the Fathers, in saying that there are two wills in the case of Christ, signified the natural laws, not the gnomic inclinations.

But let no one hold to account the argument that forbids the duality of the wills of knowledge,

finding that almost all the glorious teachers say there are two wills;

nor again, on the other hand, should the pious mind for this reason shift over to one will, after the manner of Severus, lest it make one evil the successor of another evil —

I mean, confusion succeeding division.

For the divinely-inspired Fathers did not speak, in the case of Christ, of a plurality of gnomic wills, but of natural ones;

rightly naming as 'wills' the essential and natural laws and principles of the natures that were united —

for indeed they wisely called 'will' the natural appetite of the flesh that was intellectually ensouled — not the gnomic [appetite] of some particular man who reasons by discursive movements of thought — an appetite possessing the natural power of longing for that which truly is, being naturally moved and formed by the Word for the fulfillment of the economy;

without which it is impossible for human nature to exist.

For natural will is an appetitive power of that which exists according to nature, and a power holding together all the properties that essentially belong to the nature;

according to which power, 'being naturally disposed to will' is always innate in that which is by nature capable of willing;

but 'being naturally disposed to will' and 'to will' are not the same;

for that which is capable of speech is always naturally so disposed, but it does not always speak;

since the one belongs to essence, being bound up with the principle of nature;

while the other belongs to counsel, being formed by the gnome of the one who speaks;

so that it belongs to nature always to be naturally disposed to speak;

but how to speak belongs to hypostasis;

just as it is also with being naturally disposed to will, and to will.

But if 'being naturally disposed to will' and 'to will' are not the same (for the one, as I said, belongs to essence;

while the other belongs to the counsel of the one who wills) —

then the incarnate Word, as man, possessed 'being naturally disposed to will,' moved and formed by his own divine will.

For 'his willing,' says the great Gregory, 'is in no way opposed to God, being wholly deified.'

But if it had been deified, it had clearly been deified by its connatural union with that which deifies;

but that which deifies and that which is deified are certainly two;

yet not one and the same in nature.

For if indeed that which deifies and that which is deified belong to the class of relatives;

and relatives are always by nature introduced together with one another, and the one is conceived along with the other.

Therefore, being so by nature, and willing also the shrinking-back toward death, the Savior, as man, manifests this in the flesh together with the rest of the [blameless] passions, showing the economy to be pure of all illusion, and redeeming the nature from the sufferings that had been condemned against it because of sin.

And again he displays the impulse, having put death to death in the flesh;

so that, as man, he might show in himself that which naturally belongs [to human nature] as being preserved, and, as God, might display the Father's ineffable and great counsel being fulfilled in bodily form.

For he did not become man primarily in order that he might suffer, but that he might save.

'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;'

'yet not as I will, but as you will.'

showing, together with the shrinking-back, also the impulse of the human will, being formed and coming to be within the connatural union with the divine [will], according to the interweaving of the principle of nature with the mode of the economy;

if indeed the incarnation is a clear demonstration of nature and of economy —

I mean, of the natural principle of the natures that were united, and of the mode of the union according to hypostasis: the one being confirmed [intact], while the other innovates upon the natures, without change or confusion.

But he was not in need of the same thing, in the same respect, being both nullified and brought into actual operation — which would be absurd —

since the Father's will is, by nature, the Son's will.

The Savior, then, as man, possessed a natural will, formed by his own divine will, not opposed to it;

for nothing natural is ever at all opposed to God, since it is not even gnomic;

where indeed a division according to person is also observed, provided it accords with nature;

since otherwise the Maker would have to be held responsible for the fault, as having made for himself that which contends against nature.

But how would the incarnate Word have truly become man, if he were bereft of that which most of all characterizes the nature as rational?

For that which is deprived of the appetitive movement according to desire would also be wholly without any vital power.

And that which does not have vital power from nature clearly does not have any soul whatsoever, without which not even flesh could ever subsist.

Therefore he made the economy a mere illusory shaping of flesh;

but not [an economy fulfilled] by the nature of flesh, intellectually and rationally ensouled, which the Word, having been incarnate according to hypostasis, fulfilled — since, according to Severus, he did not have a natural will as man;

for if, as man, he truly lacked a natural will, then he did not truly become a perfect man, nor did he become man at all.

For what existence does an incomplete nature have, of which there is not even a principle?

The aim, then, of Severus and those around him is, by means of some natural deficiency, altogether to expel the nature that was assumed in the ineffable union;

and thereby to ratify the abomination of Mani's illusion, and of Apollinarius's confusion, and of Eutyches's commingling of essence.

For I recall that, while sojourning on the island of Crete, certain false bishops of the party of Severus disputed with me;

[claiming that there are] wills following upon these [operations], by which a duality of persons is necessarily introduced together;

but neither, again, can [there be] a single [will], since it cannot be understood as simple;

rather, we say — according to Severus — that there is one will, and that every divine and human operation proceeds from one and the same incarnate God the Word.

Against whom one might indignantly bring forward that portion of prophecy:

'Escape to Zion, you who dwell with the daughter of Babylon.'

For truly Severus's mind is 'the North,' having become a gloomy place, deprived of the sojourn of the divine light;

and the 'daughter of Babylon' is the confused teaching of false dogmas, wretchedly begotten from the most vile disposition that came upon him — [a teaching] which those inhabit who have turned their face away from the light of knowledge, and who are unwilling to be saved by returning to Zion, I mean, the Church.

For the reasoning of Severus, when put to the test, is overthrown alike in theology and in economy together.

For if, according to him, wills naturally follow upon operations, and persons are introduced by wills, just as effects [follow] causes;

not to mention what the proof of this would be —

and clearly, according to him, there is a will for every person;

and to this [will] there will certainly be introduced together a corresponding operation.

For the principle of a relative term, having an indissoluble relation, accordingly produces an equal reciprocal correspondence of the related terms.

Therefore, since what is said without qualification has many meanings: if the wills that are introduced together with the persons by reciprocal correspondence are natural, then, according to Severus, the blessed Monad will also be a Trinity of natures;

but if [they are] gnomic, then, as a Trinity of persons, it will certainly be at odds with itself, its wills not agreeing;

or else, altogether, if indeed the supra-essential Trinity has one will, the tri-named Godhead will be of a single person.

And again, if, according to Severus's proposition, a will altogether follows upon operation;

and a person is introduced together with this [will], then necessarily, when the operation is abolished, the will that follows upon it is abolished together with it, and so too is the person introduced together with it.

And if the will [follows] upon operation;

and the person is co-abolished with the will, then, according to Severus, Christ will be without hypostasis.

...the operation, because the will that is abolished together with it entails the abolition together of the person that is co-introduced with the will.

And again, if, according to him, wills altogether follow upon operations, and persons are introduced together with the wills;

and he says that every divine and human operation proceeds from one and the same incarnate God the Word;

and every will according to him (namely, both divine and human), as following upon the operations together with the persons introduced with them in equal number, will altogether be brought forth together from one and the same incarnate Word;

Therefore, according to Severus, by the abolition of the natural operations Christ will be without essence;

and by the exclusion of the one [operation], again without volition and without hypostasis;

and by the entire production of divine and human operation, of many volitions and of many persons;

or, to speak more properly, of infinite volitions and infinite persons.

For he who has said 'every operation' has thereby made an indication of innumerable quantity.

Therefore, according to the conversion of Severus's proposition, the doctrine of theology has collapsed for him, since he introduces an Arian polytheism and a Sabellian atheism, and a nature of divinity that, in the manner of the Greeks, fights against itself;

and according to the proposition [itself], clearly the doctrine of the economy has been corrupted for him, in declaring the one Christ to be without essence, without volition, without hypostasis;

and again for him who professes the same [Christ] to be of infinite volitions and infinite persons.

See where the canon of Severus, in its course, leads away those who are persuaded by it.

For every such argument turns out to be of this kind, not having truth as its unconquerable foundation.

But in saying that Christ has one will, O best of men, how, and of what kind, do you say this to be?

You have alienated him by nature from both Father and Mother, since he is united according to essence to neither.

For Christ, by nature, is neither of the two.

And how will you escape the danger of polytheism in saying this?

But if it is [a will] of gnome, it will be characteristic of his hypostasis alone.

For that which pertains to gnome is definitive of a person;

and he will clearly be shown, according to you, to be of a different will from the Father and the Spirit, and at variance [with them].

But if it is of his divinity alone, then divinity will be subject to passion, given over, contrary to nature, to eating and drinking.

But if it is of his humanity alone, it will not be operative by nature.

For how could it be, if indeed it is human?

And the display of the miracles will clearly be shown to be a monstrous portent.

But if it is common by nature to both, how will there be one common will belonging to things whose nature is different?

But if [it is common] as belonging to a composite whole, this is added to the novel myth and fabrication.

For what is a composition of will?

Again you have alienated him from the Father, having characterized, by a composite will, only a composite hypostasis.

Thus, then, the argument, advancing, uproots every planting which the Father did not plant;

since it is not natural to preserve a foreign cultivation.

But, as it seems, Severus abolished the natural will of the humanity in Christ, not knowing that the most proper and primary property, especially of every rational nature, is the movement that consists in its appetency;

which the Fathers, having considered, confessed brilliantly to be a difference of natural, and not of gnomic, wills in Christ.

For they would never have spoken of a difference of gnomic wills in Christ, lest they make him of two gnomai and two volitions, and, so to speak, at odds with himself in the disposition of his reasonings;

and for this reason represent him as two-personed;

they who indeed know that it is solely on this account that the difference of gnomic wills has arisen in [our] life —

namely, the entrance of sin, and our separation from God.

For evil consists in nothing else except only in the difference of our will according to gnome from the divine will;

to which [difference] there is altogether introduced an opposing multiplicity, and the number that signifies it, showing our gnomic will's antipathy toward God.

There is, then, one and the same aim of impiety belonging to both Nestorius and Severus, even though the manner is different.

For the one, fleeing confusion on account of it, avoiding the union according to hypostasis, makes the essential difference into a personal division;

while the other, on account of division, not speaking of an essential difference, works the union according to hypostasis into a natural confusion;

whereas it is necessary [to confess] neither confusion in Christ, nor division;

but to confess union of the things that differ in essence, and difference of the things that are united in hypostasis, so that both the principle of the essences and the mode of the union may be piously proclaimed;

the one [confessing] only the union of gnomic qualities;

and the other, having ratified only the difference of the natures after the union — both have fallen away from the truth of the realities;

while [they], having boldly condemned confusion of the mystery...

For that which is beyond sense-perception knows no satiety;

nor indeed does that which is beyond conception know any restriction whatsoever.

For the one has, by nature, risen above all flux and efflux;

and the other transcends every form and figure;

and that former one, as is lawful, effects a manifestation of what is hidden;

while this latter one provides the comprehension that is attainable;

and as much as suffices for the ravishing of the mind, and for the grasping of the Holy Spirit.

For it is up to this point, and for this reason, that the loving condescension of him who is above man, through manifestation, has come to be;

deifying by grace those who ascend together with it by gnome;

and who, by the kenosis of the Word, receive the corresponding fullness, in the completion of the fulfilment of the commandments;

according to which, having yourself been led up to the perfection of prudence and courage, you soberly discipline that which is visible, and justly enrich that which is hidden;

so that in the former you might exhibit the mortification of Jesus, wholly obliterating all sin;

and in the latter you might display the life, putting forth every virtue in a manner that transcends the world;

from which, having rightly accomplished both sacred practice and contemplation, you have obtained salvation as a sacred end;

which, in order to impart also to others, and to make it known, in godlike imitation, you have chosen — toward me, unworthy, lowly, and unknown as I am — to make use of honored words;

and first, to make me wise by word, and to grant me understanding;

and further, also to sanctify me through the grace that dwells in you, which is distributed to all everywhere;

for it is uncircumscribed, having as its cause the uncaused Word.

and then also to lead me sufficiently to knowledge of the new mystery of the divine fashioning according to man, of God the Word who for our sake was made flesh and perfectly became man;

not wishing, by your question, to learn what is elementary;

for you already possess in sum all things that are good;

but to be advanced to a more perfect initiation — namely, that which has not yet received the lesser [teaching].

And having greatly admired your pious manner, I put forth this discourse according to my ability.

declaring that the human [nature] in the Savior is not, according to nature, one thing, while that which is ours is another;

but the same in essence and without variance, since indeed it was taken from ours, according to the ineffable assumption from the virginal, undefiled blood of the all-pure Mother of God;

to which, being united after the manner of seed, the Word became flesh, without departing from being God according to essence;

and he was accounted a perfect man like us, sin alone excepted;

on account of which we often rise in revolt, and wrestle against God in our act of willing, since we possess its inclination toward either extreme;

but he, being by nature free from all sin, inasmuch as he was not a mere man, but God who became man, had nothing opposed [in himself];

but preserved our nature undefiled, and in every respect truly unstained;

'Now the ruler of this world comes, and finds nothing in me';

namely, of those things by which we, falsifying our nature, display the opposition of the will;

on account of which even Christ is said to be, in that which is ours, 'unsubjected,' until he release us also from it by the power of the incarnation;

confirming the truth of which, he became all things for our sake, and did all willingly on our behalf, in no way at all falsifying our essence, nor anything of its blameless and natural [properties];

though he deified it together with all those [properties], after the manner of iron set aglow with fire, rendering it wholly theurgic, having, on account of the union, interpenetrated it entirely and to the utmost;

and having become, without confusion, one with it — the same and single hypostasis.

Whence the human [nature] in him differs from ours, not by reason of the principle of nature, but by reason of the strange manner of his generation;

being the same according to essence;

but not the same in respect of its being without seed, since it was not a bare [human nature], but truly that of him who for our sake became man.

Just as, then, his willing too, while properly natural even as ours, is yet shaped in a divine manner, beyond us;

yet it is distinguished within that same nature, just as also unbegottenness and begottenness [are distinguished within one Godhead].

Since, perhaps, if the Word as man had had a difference from our nature on account of this difficulty [that has been raised],

for unbegottenness and begottenness are not the same.

we too shall have [such a difference] in relation to the ancient Adam and Eve, who came to be without seed;

for the one [Adam] was a fashioning of the Fashioner;

but she [Eve] was a portion of the thing fashioned.

But indeed the Son is the same as the Father in respect of the Godhead;