On the Nature of Man 1 part 8/9

and thus they will run back to the first ones, those who say that all things are according to fate.

And superfluous, too, is the struggle between reason and desire in the case of the continent and the incontinent man.

For if it has been determined of necessity that the one should act and the other should not act, what need is there of the inner conflict and contention in him? But this too is co-fated—not only that he should act, but also that he should act in such and such a way.

But what else does he who says this affirm, than that deliberate choice too belongs to the things fated? For deliberate choice is that which contends with desire, prevailing in the case of the continent, but being overcome in the case of the incontinent.

Therefore the things belonging to their original hypothesis have been overturned;

for deliberate choice is no longer in our power.

On the manner in which Plato speaks of fate. Now Plato speaks of fate in two ways: the one according to substance, the other according to activity;

according to substance, fate is the Soul of the universe; according to activity, it is a divine law, inviolable through a cause that cannot be escaped—and this he calls the ordinance of Adrasteia (Necessity).

And this law, he says, was given by the first and highest God to the Soul of the universe for the ordering of all things, in accordance with which the things that come to be are carried through;

and this fate according to activity he also calls fate according to providence.

For fate is encompassed by providence, since everything that is according to fate also comes to be according to providence;

yet not everything that is according to providence is also according to fate.

And this divine law itself, which he says is at once providence and fate, contains all things within itself—some according to a hypothesis (premise), and others as consequent upon a hypothesis.

For it contains the antecedent causes, as certain first principles, according to a hypothesis—which are the things in our power: assents and judgments and impulses;

but the things that follow upon these of necessity are consequent upon a hypothesis.

And that which is in our power—the choice of things to be done—is according to a hypothesis;

but once the things in our power have been laid down, out of these very things, as from a hypothesis, the things of fate follow.

For example, it lies in our power to set sail;

this is according to a hypothesis;

so then, once our sailing has been laid down, there follow the things arising from this hypothesis—to suffer shipwreck or not.

Therefore he calls 'consequent upon a hypothesis' the things that attend and follow upon the hypotheses that are in our power—that is, upon the first principles and actions;

so that the antecedent things are also in our power, according to a hypothesis;

while the consequent things are 'from a hypothesis' and not in our power, but of necessity.

For that which is according to fate has not been determined from all eternity, but comes about supervening, once the things in our power have gone before.

And with this agrees also the saying, 'The blame is his who chooses; God is blameless,' and that virtue is without a master, and that divinations exist.

And all his argument tends toward this: that the deliberate choices and certain of the actions done by choice are in our power, but that the things that follow upon these, and their ends, depend of necessity upon fate.

But this was shown in what precedes not to be rightly so.

Now insofar as he calls fate the arrangement and will of God, and insofar as he subordinates fate to providence, he differs but little from the divine oracles, which say that providence alone governs all things;

but he differs greatly in asserting that the ends follow of necessity upon the things in our power.

For we say that the things of providence are brought about not by necessity, but contingently.

For if by necessity, then first of all the greater part of prayer has been cut away;

him, so as to choose the better things;

and after the choosing, the things of prayer are henceforth in vain, since the consequences are in every case brought about of necessity.

But we determine that prayer has power even in these matters.

For it depends upon providence whether the one who sails suffers shipwreck or not—yet neither of the two of necessity, but contingently.

For God is not under necessity, nor is it lawful to say that His will is enslaved to necessity;

for He is also the Maker of necessity.

For He imposed necessity upon the stars, so that they always move in the same ways, and He set bounds to the sea, and He set a necessary limit for universal and generic things; and if they wish to call this 'fate' because everything comes to be thus in every way and altogether by necessity—as that all things which are in coming-to-be by succession pass away—there is no argument about it;

for we do not dispute with them about names;

but He Himself stands not only outside all necessity, but is also its Lord and Maker.

For being Authority, and a nature possessing authority, He does nothing either by the necessity of nature or by the ordinance of law, but all things are contingent (possible) for Him, even the necessary things.

And in order that this might be shown, He once stayed the course of the sun and the moon, which are carried by necessity and always behave in the same way, so that He might show that nothing comes to be for Him by necessity, but all things by authority, contingently.

And once only did He make such a day, as the Scripture also indicated, that He might merely give a demonstration and not dissolve the ordinance which had been set by Him from the beginning for the necessary movement of the stars.

So also He preserves certain of men in life, as Elijah and Enoch, who were mortal and subject to corruption, that through all these things we might perceive His authority and His will that cannot be constrained.

But the Stoics say that when the planets are restored to the same point, in both longitude and latitude, where each was at the beginning when first the cosmos came into being, they bring about, in fixed periods of time, a conflagration and destruction of existing things; and again from the start the cosmos is restored to the same state; and, the stars being likewise carried round again, each of the things that came to be in the former period is accomplished without any variation.

For there will again be a Socrates and a Plato and each of mankind, with the same friends and fellow-citizens, and they will suffer the same things, and meet with the same persons, and handle the same matters; and every city and village and field will likewise be restored;

and the restoration of the universe comes to pass not once but many times;

or rather, to infinity, and without end the same things are restored;

and that the gods, who are not subject to this destruction, having observed one period, know from it all the things that are going to be in the succeeding periods;

for there will be nothing strange beyond the things that happened before, but all things alike, without variation, down even to the smallest details.

And on account of this restoration some say that the Christians imagine the resurrection, being greatly deceived.

For the oracles of Christ teach that the things of the resurrection will be once for all, and not according to a cycle.

On that which is in our power, that is, on free will. The discourse concerning free will, that is, concerning what is in our power, has first this inquiry: whether there is anything in our power;

for there are many who oppose this;

second, what the things in our power are, and over what things we have authority;

third, to examine the cause for which God, who made us, made us self-determining (endowed with free will).

Taking up, then, the first point, let us speak of it first, demonstrating that there is something in our power from the very things that are also agreed upon among those others.

Of all things that come to be, they say that the cause is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or fortune, or the spontaneous (chance).

But the work of God is substance and providence;

and the movement of the things that are always in the same state belongs to necessity;

To fate belongs the fact that what comes about through it is accomplished of necessity (for fate too pertains to necessity);

to nature belong generation, growth, decay, plants and animals;

to chance belong things rare and unexpected (for they define chance as the concurrence and coincidence of two causes that have their origin in choice, but which bring about something other than what was intended, as when a man digging a ditch finds a treasure;

for neither did the one who deposited it place it there so that this man should find it, nor did the finder dig in such a way as to find a treasure;

but the one buried it that he might take it up whenever he wished, and the other dug that he might make a ditch, yet there came about something other than what both had purposed).

To the spontaneous belong the accidental occurrences of inanimate or irrational things, apart from nature and art.

To which, then, of these shall we assign the things done through men, if indeed man is not the cause and principle of actions? But it is not lawful to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes base and unjust;

nor to necessity (for they do not belong to things that are always in the same state);

nor to fate (for the things of fate belong not to what is contingent but to what is necessary);

nor to nature (for the works of nature are animals and plants);

nor to chance (for men's actions are not rare and unexpected);

nor to the spontaneous (for these are the accidental occurrences of inanimate or irrational things).

It remains, therefore, that man himself, the one acting and doing, is the principle of his own works and possessed of free will.

Furthermore, if man is not the principle of any action, then to deliberate is superfluous;

for to what purpose will he use deliberation, being lord of no action? But to declare the fairest and most honourable thing in man to be superfluous would be among the most absurd of things.

If, then, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action;

for all deliberation is for the sake of action and on account of action.

Furthermore, of those things whose activities are in our power, the actions too that follow the activity are in our power;

and the activities according to the virtues are in our power;

therefore the virtues too are in our power.

That the activities according to virtue are in our power is shown also by what was well said by Aristotle concerning the moral virtues:

for the things we learn by doing, these we do once we have learned;

for by learning to master pleasures we become temperate;

and having become temperate we master pleasures.

It is also possible to speak thus:

that to practise and to train oneself is agreed by all to be in our power;

and the practisings are decisive of our dispositions (for habit is an acquired nature);

and if practice is decisive of the disposition, and practice is in our power, then the disposition too is in our power;

and of those whose dispositions are in our power, the actions according to those dispositions are also in our power, for the actions correspond to the dispositions.

He, then, who has a just disposition will do just deeds;

therefore it is in our power to be just or unjust.

That certain things are in our power is shown also by exhortations and admonitions;

for no man exhorts another not to hunger or not to thirst, nor not to fly;

it is clear, then, that the things concerning which exhortations are made are in our power.

Furthermore, if nothing were in our power, laws would be superfluous;

but naturally every nation makes use of certain laws, knowing that it has the authority to do what it enacts;

and most nations ascribe their laws to gods as lawgivers, as the Cretans to Zeus and the Lacedaemonians to Apollo.

Naturally, therefore, the knowledge of what is in our power is sown together in all men.

The same things as these must be said concerning blame and praise and all that overthrows the claim that all things come to pass according to fate.

Concerning the fact that certain things are in our power.

That certain things are in our power, and that we are lords of certain actions, has been sufficiently demonstrated.

It remains for us to state what things are in our power.

We say, then, generally, that all things done by us voluntarily are in our power;

for it could not be said to be done voluntarily if the action were not in our power;

and simply, those things upon which blame or praise follows, and those concerning which there are exhortation and law;

for this too was shown in what precedes.

But properly speaking, in our power are all the things of the soul and those concerning which we deliberate.

For it is as being in our power to do or not to do the thing set before us that we deliberate.

And it was shown in the preceding sections that deliberation is concerned with things equally possible either way.

And that is equally possible either way which we ourselves are able to do, and its opposite as well.

Our mind makes the choice of this, and it is the principle of actions;

and these are the things in our power, the things equally possible either way—such as to move and not to move, to be impelled and not to be impelled, not to reach out after things not necessary and to reach out after them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in the things one ought and not to rejoice, and all such things, in which lie the works of vice and of virtue;

for of these we have free will.

Among things equally possible either way are also the arts.

For art is the generation of things capable both of being and of not being, and whose principle is in the maker but not in the thing made.

For nothing among things eternal and existing of necessity, nor among things coming to be of necessity, is said to come to be by art;

nor yet is it said that anything comes to be by art among things that come to be in the realm of what is contingent and able to be otherwise, but which have within themselves the productive cause, as in the case of animals and plants.

But if in the case of things that come to be by art the productive cause is from without, who then is the cause of the things that come to be by art but the craftsman who makes them? For the making lies in the craftsman.

He, then, is the principle and cause of the actions.

Therefore in our power are also the activities according to art, and the virtues, and all actions both of the soul and of the reason.

And it was shown in what precedes what kinds of activities are of the soul.

But the multitude, supposing that free will is asserted with respect to every action and acquisition and fortune, reasonably reject the argument;

and the sharper among them, bringing forward for refutation the word of Scripture, 'the ways of a man are not in his own power,' say: 'Good sirs, how is man possessed of free will, when his way is not in his own power, and the reasonings of men are vain,' as though we were unable to bring to effect the things we intend—and they say many such things, being ignorant of the sense in which free will is asserted.

For we do not have authority to be rich or poor, or to be always in health, or to be strong by nature, or to rule, or in general over things called instrumental or fortuitous goods, or over things that receive their end according to providence;

but we have authority over the actions and choices and impulses according to virtue and vice, and over those things whose opposites we are equally able to do, since choice precedes every action, and not only the action but also the choice is liable to judgement.

And this is shown by that saying in the Gospel:

'Whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart;'

and Job used to offer sacrifice to God on behalf of the transgressions committed in the thoughts of his children.

For choice is the principle of sin and of righteous doing.

For the deed is sometimes permitted by providence, and sometimes prevented;

For since that which is in our own power exists, and providence also exists, it follows of necessity that things which come to pass come to pass according to both.

For if things came to pass according to one of these alone, the other would not exist.

But since the things that come to pass are of a mixed nature, they will sometimes turn out according to what is in our own power, sometimes according to the principle of providence, and sometimes according to both.

And since providence is in one respect general and in another particular, it is necessary that particular things should share the same affections as universal things.

For when the surrounding air is dry, bodies are dried, even if not all in the same manner; and when a mother has not lived well but has indulged in luxury, her offspring are accordingly born with bodies of poor temperament and with impulses that go astray.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it happens that a man falls into an unfortunate bodily temperament, whether through the common condition of the surrounding air, or through the voluntary manner of life of his parents, or because those parents themselves have been corrupted by luxury.

So that bad temperaments are sometimes brought about from a voluntary origin, and it is not always providence that is the cause of such things.

Whenever, therefore, the soul, yielding to the temperament of the body, gives itself over to lusts or to fits of anger, or is crushed or made slack by chance circumstances—such as poverty or wealth—it undergoes a voluntary evil.

For the soul that does not yield sets itself aright and conquers the ill-tempered constitution, so that it changes it rather than is changed by it;

and it restores the dispositions of the soul to good condition by wholesome discipline and a suitable manner of life.

It is clear, therefore, from those who set themselves aright, that those who fail to do so sin voluntarily.

For it is in our own power either to run along with the ill temperaments of the body, or to resist and prevail over them.

But the many, putting forward the ill temperament as the cause of the passions, ascribe their vice to necessity and not to free choice;

and for this reason they say that not even the virtues are in our own power—speaking absurdly.

For what cause we have been made possessed of free will.

It remains to say for what cause we have been made possessed of free will.

We say, then, that free will enters in at once together with rationality, and that change and mutability are innate in created things, especially in those that have come into being out of an underlying matter.

For their coming-to-be is a change of the underlying matter.

One might understand what is being said by looking at all plants and animals—those of the land, and the winged, and those that live in water.

For their change is continual.

And that free will enters in together with rationality is quite evident, from what has been said about there being something in our own power, to those who have listened not carelessly.

Yet perhaps it is not out of place even now to recall the same points, since the sequence of the argument requires them.

Of the rational faculty, one part is contemplative, the other practical;

the contemplative is that which understands how things are;

the practical is the deliberative, which determines the right principle for things to be done.

And they call the contemplative part 'intellect';

and the one they call wisdom, the other prudence.

Now everyone who deliberates does so on the supposition that the choice of things to be done lies with himself, in order that he may choose what has been preferred through deliberation, and having chosen it may act.

It is therefore altogether necessary that he who has the power of deliberating should also be master of his actions.

For if he were not master of his actions, deliberation would be superfluous;

and if this be so, then free will of necessity subsists together with rationality;

for either a thing will not be rational, or, being rational, it will be master of its actions;

and being master of its actions, it will altogether be possessed of free will.

And it has also been shown that things created out of an underlying matter are subject to change.

From both, therefore, it is gathered that man is of necessity both possessed of free will and subject to change;

subject to change because he is created, and possessed of free will because he is also rational.

Those, then, who blame God because He did not make man incapable of vice but possessed of free will, unwittingly blame God for having made man rational and not irrational;

for one of two things is necessary: either man must be irrational, or, being rational and occupied with things to be done, he must be possessed of free will.

Of necessity, therefore, every rational nature is possessed of free will and is subject to change according to its own nature.

But those natures that have come into being out of an underlying matter possess changeableness in two ways: both in respect of the matter and in respect of the very fact of their coming-to-be;

whereas those that have not come into being out of an underlying matter are changeable in one way only, that of their coming-to-be.

And again, of these immaterial natures, those that are among earthly things, being engaged in things to be done through their fellowship with men, are more changeable than the rest;

but those which, through the eminence of their nature, draw near to God in relationship and reap blessedness in the contemplation of Him, and being turned toward themselves and toward God alone, have wholly estranged themselves from things to be done and from matter, and have attached themselves to contemplation and to God—these remain unchangeable;

being possessed of free will because they are rational, yet not changing, on account of the aforementioned causes.

For indeed, among men also, those who, having become contemplative, have separated themselves from things to be done, have remained unchangeable.

I think it has been demonstrated together with what has been said, that in the beginning all rational natures were most excellently created, and that if they had remained just as they were fashioned from the beginning, they would have been outside of all vice;

but vice comes to them according to their own choice;

and thus indeed those that have remained according to their original constitution possess blessedness.

And of the incorporeal beings, the angels alone were changed—and not even all of them, but certain ones out of them, namely those who, having inclined toward the things below, conceived a longing for earthly things, and departed from their relationship with the things above and with God.

Accordingly, from what has been shown it is clear that, because we are by nature subject to change, we have our faculties of choice changeable; yet no one could on this account blame God for our being evil, on the ground that we have changeable faculties.

For vices do not lie in the faculties, but in the settled dispositions;

and the settled dispositions are according to choice;

so it is according to choice that we become evil, and we are not so by nature.

One might learn what is being said more precisely in this way.

In what precedes we were saying that there is a faculty from which we are able to do each of the things that we do.

But every faculty of choice is one and the same for opposites;

for one and the same faculty is that of lying and of speaking truth, and one and the same faculty is that of being temperate and of being licentious.

But the settled dispositions of contrary things are contrary.

For to be temperate belongs to the disposition according to virtue;

and to be licentious, to that of vice;

vices, therefore, do not belong to the faculties, but to the settled dispositions and to choice.

For it is not the faculty that furnishes us to be licentious or to lie, but the choice.

For it was in our own power to speak truth and not to lie.

If, then, vice is not a faculty but a settled disposition, it is not He who gave the faculty that is the cause of our evils, but the disposition that comes to us from ourselves, through ourselves, and on account of ourselves.

For it was possible to acquire the contrary disposition through exercise, and not the base one.

And a faculty differs from a settled disposition in that all faculties are natural, whereas the dispositions are acquired from without;

and in that the faculties are without teaching, whereas the dispositions accrue from learning and habit.

If, then, the faculty is something natural and untaught, but the disposition is acquired and taught, it is not nature that is the cause of our evils, but our having been badly brought up, and thereby having acquired an evil disposition.

For every settled disposition has been shown to be acquired.

And that the faculties are by nature is clear from the fact that all men have the same faculties, except for those who are maimed.

That habits are not natural is clear from the fact that not all men possess the same habits, but some have these and others those.

For the things that exist by nature are the same in all.

Concerning Providence. That man is possessed of free will, over what things he has free will, and for what cause he came to be endowed with free will—these things have been sufficiently set forth in the foregoing.

But since not everyone who purposes to commit murder actually commits it in every case—rather, sometimes he does murder and sometimes he does not, the deed being hindered and not running its course toward its aim—and since we said that providence, and not fate, is the cause of these outcomes, the discourse concerning providence follows naturally upon that concerning the things within our power.

And this too is divided into three parts:

first, whether providence exists; second, what it is; third, over what things it extends.

But a Jew, not even in madness, could be ignorant of providence, since he knows the wonders in Egypt, has heard of those in the wilderness—in which providence appeared to men more radiantly than the things visible—and has perceived in the prophets and in Babylon many works of providence that admit of no doubt whatever.

As for Christians, all these things also teach them that providence exists; but above all, the most divine work of providence—the one most incredible by reason of its surpassing love for mankind—namely, the incarnation of God for our sakes.

But since the discourse is directed not only to these but also to the Greeks, come, let us also demonstrate through other means—those in which they place their trust—that providence exists.

That there is a providence, then, one might demonstrate by the very same means through which we showed that there is also a God.

For the permanence of all things—and especially of those in generation and corruption—and the position and order of existing things ever preserved in the same manner, and the course of the stars that never in any way varies, and the cycle of the year and the restoration of the seasons, and the yearly equality of nights and days (each of them by turns increasing and diminishing by neither a lesser nor a greater measure)—how could all this have continued to be carried on in like manner, if none exercised providence? Moreover, the punishment that attends transgressions, or rather even the disclosure of the transgressions themselves—when, though there is no one able to convict, it is brought to light through certain circumstances—shows that providence exists.

Both the writings of the Hebrews and the compositions among the Greeks are full of such narratives.

Of such a kind is the case of Susanna's misfortune related in Scripture, and among the writings of the Greeks the case of Ibycus the poet.

For this man, being murdered by certain persons and having neither ally nor witness of the plot, beheld some cranes and said, 'You, O cranes, avenge my murder for me.'

And when the city was seeking the murderers and could not find them, while a theatrical performance was being held and the populace was seated, cranes flew past overhead;

and the murderers, seeing them, laughed and said, 'Behold, the avengers of Ibycus.'

And one of those seated nearby, having heard this, reported it to the authorities; and being arrested, they confessed to the murder.

Should one wish to gather such instances together, he would extend the discourse to boundless length.

And if the same manner of conviction is not brought upon all who sin, but some even seem to escape, let no one on this account deny providence.

For it does not exercise its care for men in one manner only, but in many and various ways.

Not least does the constitution of bodies subject to generation and corruption, and their proportion preserved always in like manner, show that providence exists.

For in every part of the body the forethought of providence is displayed—things which the diligent may cull from various treatises.

And the variety of colours in animals, ever preserving the same order, cries aloud that providence exists; and that which is commonly acknowledged among all men—the necessity of praying to and serving the Deity with offerings and enclosures—is indicative of providence.

For if the universe were without providence, to whom or for what would anyone pray? And the zeal concerning acts of kindness, naturally cherished in those whose nature is not perverted, likewise displays providence.

For it is in expectation of the reward from this that we choose to do good even to those who are unable to repay us.

But if providence is done away with, injustice is granted free rein to those able to do wrong, while almsgiving and the fear of God are abolished; and along with these, virtue and piety are likewise abolished.

For if God does not exercise providence, then He neither punishes, nor apportions rewards to those who do well, nor wards off the harms suffered by the wronged.

Who, then, would any longer worship God, if He contributes nothing to us in any respect? And prophecy too is done away with, and all foreknowledge.

But these things do not accord with what is seen well-nigh every day.

For many are the manifestations of the Deity in times of need, and many are the helps given through dreams to the suffering, and many foreknowledges have been brought forth in every generation; and many who have committed murder or perpetrated some unlawful deed are terrified both by night and by day.

Besides, God is good;

and being good, He is beneficent;

and if beneficent, then also provident.

What need is there to speak of the works of creation, and its proportion and harmony and position and order, and the use which each thing furnishes to the whole, and how it is impossible for things to be well otherwise than as they now are, and how it admits neither of addition nor of any of the existing things falling short, but all things are perfect and beautiful, created wisely and with providence? But let us defer the setting-forth of these things to the discourse on creation, lest we suffer what many who have written on providence have suffered.

For they extol creation in place of providence, whereas creation, though it leads us to the discourse on providence, differs greatly from it.

For providence and creation are not the same thing.

For it belongs to creation to make well the things that come to be;

but to providence, to care well for the things that have come to be.

And these do not by any means always coexist with one another, as one may see from those engaged in each craft and discipline.