Against Eunomius 1 part 1/56

Preface: that it is not profitable to attempt to confer benefit upon those who will not accept the good done to them.

That we rightly undertook the refutation, being deeply grieved when our brother had been unjustly accused.

That, finding nothing great in the force of the argument contained in Eunomius' book, we reasonably took courage for the refutation.

That Eunomius employed much vanity and superfluous verbiage in his own discourse, being not at all diligent about matters of real importance.

That he did wrong in mocking the bishops Eustathius the Armenian and Basil the Galatian in his own writings.

A mention of Aetius, the champion of impiety, and of Eunomius himself, briefly setting forth in a few words both the origins and the pursuits of these men.

That Eunomius is refuted by his own self, having composed his Apology as though he had never been accused.

That the abusive terms which he employed against Basil are shown from the facts themselves to befit him rather than the other.

That, in charging Basil with failing to defend the doctrine at the time of the contests, he shows himself no less liable to the same charge.

That all the insulting words which he applied to him are proved false by the facts themselves.

That he made frigid use of the sophism about the prize, by which he tries to establish that we admit that he has been judged and did not make his defense as one uncharged.

That he reproaches with cowardice, and to no purpose, the very man who displayed such great courage in the contests before emperors and prefects.

A rehearsal of the things he stated dogmatically, and, point by point, the contest against what was said.

That he did wrong in his mention of the saving doctrine, not naming Father and Son and Holy Spirit as it has been handed down, but employing other names according to his own will.

That he did wrong in saying that the essence of the Father alone is most sovereign and highest, establishing by implication that the essence of the Son and of the Spirit is subordinate and lower.

An examination of what is signified by 'subjection,' according to which he says that the nature of the Spirit is made subject to the essence of the Father and of the Son;

wherein it was established that the Holy Spirit is ranked together with Father and Son, not subordinated to them.

An examination of which operations are according to nature—those which he says follow upon the essence of the Father and of the Son.

That he acts unreasonably in dividing the doctrine into a plurality of essences, offering no demonstration that these things are so.

That, while calling the divine essence simple, he concedes its simplicity only in name.

That he does wrong in conceiving beforehand a certain operation productive of the hypostasis of Christ, prior to the existence of the Only-begotten.

That the blasphemy of these men is more grievous than the Jewish error.

That one ought not to dogmatize about 'greater' and 'lesser' in the case of the divine essence;

wherein there is also a skillful exposition of the ecclesiastical doctrines.

That the teaching of the faith is not without witness, being secured by the testimonies of Scripture.

That he talks vainly, treating as a matter of art the magnitudes and differences of works and operations within the doctrines of true religion.

That he who establishes the Father as prior to the Son by some notion of interval will be compelled to say that not even the Father is without beginning.

That such a consideration as was examined in the case of the Son and the Father will not fit the creation either—the thing which those men force through—but one must contemplate the Son as eternally with the Father, while confessing that the creation had its beginning from a certain determined time.

showing that the operations are diverse.

That he vainly supposed that an inviolable sequence could be constituted in the concord of natures.

That he vainly thought to resolve the ambiguity in the operations from the essences, and conversely.

That there is no divine word which commands the seeking out of such things;

wherein it was also established that the philosophy expended on these matters is vain.

That the apprehension gained through providence is sufficient for the knowledge of the identity in essence.

That the assertion is unintelligible of him who said that the mode of the begetting follows the mode of the likeness.

That he vainly declared that the mode of the begetting is displayed by the natural dignity of the one begetting.

A rehearsal of the things said by him to the disparagement of the consubstantiality, and the contest against what was said.

A demonstration that the doctrine of the Anomoeans inclines toward Manichaeism.

Again a mention, in passing, of the ecclesiastical doctrine.

A defense of the things said by the blessed Basil but slandered by this man, in which our teacher says that the appellation 'Father' and that of 'unbegotten' can signify the same meaning.

A contest against his sophistical syllogisms, by means of numerous counter-arguments.

A reply to the question put forward by him: whether He who is is begotten.

That he coldly attempted to establish his own position, having been refuted by the blessed Basil.

That what follows is not the same as that which it follows upon.

An interpretation of the meaning of 'unbegotten' and a contemplation of the 'eternal.'

The second book expounds the incarnation of God the Word and the faith given by the Lord to the disciples, and it declares that the heretics who overturn this and who have contrived additional names are of the devil their father. Book II.

Then he proceeds through a fuller interpretation of the eternal Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

Then the ineffability of the name of the Holy Trinity, and the relation of the persons to one another, and further the unknowableness of the essence, and His condescension toward us, and the birth from the Virgin, and His second coming, and the resurrection from the dead and the recompense.

After this he most wisely refutes, point by point, the empty and blasphemous exposition of Eunomius concerning 'that which is.'

Then he marvelously overturns the unintelligibility of Eunomius' statements, which say that the essence of the Father is not separated, nor divided, nor becomes anything else.

Then in this way he shows the unity of the Son with the Father, and Eunomius' being uninitiated in and ignorant of the Scriptures.

In addition to these things he shows that the Only-begotten is not only from the Father, but also, having been begotten impassibly from the Virgin by the Holy Spirit, did not divide the essence; nor is human nature, when begotten, divided or split off from those who beget it, as was most wisely demonstrated from Adam and Abraham.

Upon these matters he most fittingly goes through the interpretation of 'Only-begotten' and of 'firstborn,' spoken four times by the Apostle.

Then again, having treated as a matter of art the begetting of the Only-begotten and various other begettings, both material and immaterial, he magnificently demonstrates that the Son is the radiance of glory and not a creature.

Then, having variously examined the saying 'The Lord created me' and the discourse concerning the beginning of the Son, and the deceitfulness of Eunomius' words, and the saying 'My glory I will not give to another,' he interpreted them well.

Then, having elucidated the dignity of the Almighty and the eternity of the Only-begotten and the phrase 'having become obedient,' he shows the folly of Eunomius in saying that He did not receive His being as Son out of His obedience.

and he most beautifully treats of the seal of the operation of the Almighty and of His works.

After this he interprets the evangelical saying, 'The Father judges no one';

further, concerning the man—assumed by the Lord together with soul and body—he elucidated the transgression of Adam and death and the resurrection from the dead.

In addition to these he expounds the doctrine which the Church, and which Eunomius, hold concerning the Holy Spirit, and that there are not three gods but one—the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit;

in addition to which he sets forth various forms of subjection, in which he showed that the subjection of all things to the Son and the subjection of the Son to the Father are one and the same.

Then, having demonstrated through many arguments the unintelligibility of Eunomius—who at one time says that the Holy Spirit is created and the most excellent work of the Son, but at another confesses Him God from His operations—he completes the discourse.

This third book shows the third fall of Eunomius, as one refuting himself: at one time saying that the Only-begotten must be named Son because of His being begotten according to nature, as Holy Scripture, he says, declares this from above; and at another that, because of His being created, He should no longer be called Son but a thing made.

Then again, having most beautifully and fittingly and accurately examined the saying 'The Lord created me,' he sets it forth.

Then he shows the non-alienation of essence between the begotten and the unbegotten, from Adam and Abel and other examples.

Then in this way he shows the unity of the Son with the Father, and the identity of essence and the commonality of nature;

wherein there is also a natural discussion concerning the generation of wine, and that both the Son and the offspring, in the appellation of 'Only-begotten,' possess a kinship of the same kind.

In addition to these he treats of the incomprehensibility of the divine essence and interprets what was said to the Samaritan woman, 'You worship what you do not know.'

After these things he sets forth the calling of the Son and of the offspring, and very many differences of sons—of God, of men, of rams, of perdition, of light, and of day.

In addition to which, having interpreted the divine and human appellations of the Only-begotten, and having examined the begotten and the unbegotten, he completes the discourse.

This fourth discourse clearly expounds the natural doctrine concerning the Offspring, and the impassible generation of the Only-begotten, and the words 'In the beginning was the Word,' and furthermore the birth from the Virgin.

Then in this manner, having convicted Eunomius of having said these things concerning the Only-begotten which befit rather the subsistence of an earthly being, he refutes him who wished to show Him to be mutable and created.

Then he wonderfully treats once more of the doctrine concerning the First-born, which is mentioned four times by the Apostle.

After this he treats again of the impassibility of the Lord's generation, and of the folly of Eunomius, who said that the begotten essence bears the appellation of the Son, yet then again forgot himself and denied the relation of the Son to the Father;

among which matters he also treats of the drug of Circe and of the mandrake.

Again he shows Eunomius, constrained by the truth, unwittingly advocating for the orthodox doctrine, confessing as most authoritative and primary not only the essence of the Father but also that of the Only-begotten.

Then he rehearses the argument concerning what is 'begotten,' 'made,' and 'created,' and demonstrates the immediacy and indivisibility of the essence, and refutes the impious statements uttered by Eunomius and Theognostus concerning the relation to the Creator and Maker.

In addition, he wisely and skillfully refutes the incomparability of the beings that came to be after the Son, and the idolatry maliciously devised by Eunomius and concealed, through the appellations 'Only-begotten' and 'Son,' for the deception of his hearers.

Then in this manner he shows the essence of the Father and the Son to be without difference;

Thereafter, having clarified both essence and generation, he calls the empty talk and drivel of Eunomius as like a rattle.

Then, having wisely refuted the things said by the great Basil concerning the generation of the Only-begotten, which had been wickedly misrepresented by Eunomius, he brings the discourse to completion.

The fifth discourse promises to speak of the things said by the voice of the Apostle Peter, but defers this; and first it discourses concerning the creation, that nothing in it is worthy of worship, but that men, led astray by an untaught and feeble understanding and marveling at its beauty, deified the parts of the world;

in which he also most beautifully interpreted the saying of Isaiah, 'I am God, the first.'

Then he treats of the saying of Peter, that 'God made Him both Lord and Christ';

in which he also, in a restrained manner, set forth the objection made by Eunomius against the holy Basil on account of such a saying, together with his revilings and insults.

Against these there is a marvelous and extraordinary rejoinder, and a demonstration of the power of Him who was crucified, and that the exaltation was of the human nature, not of the Only-begotten from the Father, and an interpretation of the shape of the cross and of the appellation 'Christ,' and of the good things bestowed on humanity from the Godhead that was commingled with it.

Then he shows to be false the slander of Eunomius, who said that the great Basil taught that a man was emptied into a man, and he declares that the self-emptying of the Only-begotten came to pass for the recalling of the man who had suffered.

After this he demonstrates that there are not two Christs nor two Lords, but one Christ and one Lord, and that the divine nature, mingled with the human, preserved the properties of each nature unconfused, and that by reason of their union the operations too are named in common; and he set forth most wisely, through many arguments, that the divine took up into itself even the sufferings of the servant, and that the human is glorified together with the lordly honor, and that by the power of the commingled divine nature the human was transformed into it.

And the sixth discourse shows that He who came for the salvation of men was not a mere man—as Eunomius falsely alleged, calumniating the great Basil as having said so—but the Only-begotten Son of God, who put on human flesh and became a mediator between God and men, passible in the flesh, impassible in the Godhead; and having thus established his point, he proved Eunomius a slanderer.

Then again he recalls the saying of Peter, 'He made,' and the saying from the Epistle to the Hebrews which says that Jesus was made an apostle and high priest by God; and having sufficiently made his defense concerning the charges brought against him by Eunomius, he shows Eunomius himself to be advocating the words of the great Basil and saying that the Only-begotten Son became Lord when He put on flesh.

Thereafter he wonderfully treats of the word spoken by the Lord to Philip, 'He that hath seen Me'—Me who am in the transfigured body—'hath seen the Father';

in which he also most beautifully treated of the Lord's suffering according to His love for mankind, and of the Father's impassible, creative, and providential activity, and of the composite nature of men and their dissolution into the elements of which they were composed.

Then again, taking up the saying of Peter, that 'God made Him both Lord and Christ,' and having most wisely clarified it through many syllogisms, he shows in it that Eunomius advocates the orthodox doctrine;

in which, having fitted both the divine and human names to each nature on account of the commingling of the natures, he completes the discourse.

smitten by his own darts.

Then he says that the natural relation of names to things is unchangeable; and thereupon he most excellently treats of the argument concerning the begotten and the unbegotten.

After which, treating of the variation of names and things, concerning the unbegotten and non-existent things that are without cause—such as the skindapsos and the Minotaur and the blituri and the Cyclops and Scylla, which were never begotten at all—he goes on to show that things alien in essence are mutually destructive of one another, as fire is of water and the rest of one another;

but in the case of the Father and the Son, since the essence is common and their properties are in one another, no injury is brought upon the nature.

Then he says that all the things existing in the creation have been named by men, even if they are called differently by each nation, just as the appellation of 'unbegotten' too has been named by us;

but that of the divine essence itself, an appellation properly bearing the sense of the divine nature either altogether does not exist, or is unknown to us.

And having discoursed much concerning the Existent and the Unbegotten and the Good, and concerning consubstantiality, and human souls, and the consubstantiality of bodies, and furthermore of the heavenly powers, having shown that there is no variation of essence but only a difference of dignities, he completes the discourse.

and he demonstrates that He has neither beginning nor end, but that those who say He came into being recently out of things non-existent are idolaters;

among which matters he also most beautifully interprets 'the radiance of the glory' and 'the impress of the substance.'

Then, treating of the will of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, he shows that the good will, which is the Son, is from eternity, existing in the Father, just as the light exists in the flame and the activity of seeing in the eye, being connatural with the will.

Then in this manner, passing over the matters concerning the essence of the Son as already examined beforehand, he treats of what is signified by 'generation,' speaking of various generations—from matter and art, as of buildings; and from the succession of living creatures; and those from effluence, as in the case of the sun and its ray, of the torch and its light; of spices and perfumes and the quality proceeding from them; and of the words proceeding from the mind; and of those from the rotting of wood and the compression of fire, and countless others—he treated most wisely.

In addition to these, he shows the operations concerning God by way of human examples;

for indeed, what hands and feet and the other members of the body are—with which men fashion their works—this alone, in place of them all, exists in the case of God, namely the will.

and thus too the matter concerning generation turns out to be different;

wherefore He is called 'Only-begotten,' because the creation has no fellowship with any other generation, nor any sister relation; but being called 'the radiance of the glory' and 'the fragrance of the perfume,' He shows the conjoined and coeternal character of His relation to the Father.

Then, having shown that the subsistence of the Creator and Only-begotten does not have a beginning like the created works—as Eunomius says—but is without beginning and eternal, and that the Only-begotten has no fellowship with the creation either from essence or from names, but is with the Father from eternity, as the all-virtuous Wisdom says, being the beginning and end and middle of the ages;

and having said much concerning the deity and eternity of the Only-begotten, and furthermore concerning souls and angels and life and death, he completes the discourse.

The ninth discourse says that the theology of Eunomius, up to a certain point, was rightly stated.

Having mingled with his own words the saying of Philo, 'God, before all things that are begotten,' on account of the kinship of thought, and having further added 'He masters His own power,' he marvelously refutes the excess of the absurdity, holding it in abhorrence.

Then he most wisely showed that the generation of the Son is not according to the saying of Eunomius—who says, 'Then He begat, when the Father willed, and not before'—but that the Son, being the fullness of all good and beautiful things, is ever beheld in the Father; and he made his advocacy for such a demonstration out of the very words of Eunomius.

And that the pre-eternal generation of the Only-begotten is not to be inferred according to common and fleshly generation, but is without beginning and without end; and not as Eunomius foolishly fabricates it from the things said by Plato concerning the soul and from the Sabbath rest among the Hebrews, not knowing their meaning.

Then, having shown to be false the slander made by Eunomius against the great Basil, as if he called the Only-begotten unbegotten, he again treated most wisely of the eternity and being and endlessness of the Only-begotten, and of creation and light and darkness, and completes the discourse.

The tenth discourse treats of the unattainability and incomprehensibility of the discovery of the things that are;

in which he also sets forth marvelously the matters concerning the nature and formation of the ant, and treats of the evangelical saying 'I am the door and the way,' and of the appellations and interpretations of the divine names, and of the history of the sons of Benjamin.

Then he marvelously demonstrated to those who do not confess it that eternal life is Christ, and he dramatically raised over them the lament of Jeremiah concerning Jechoniah, as fitting for those who hold with Montanus and Sabellius.

After this he shows the eternity of the Son's generation and the inseparable identity of essence with Him who begat; but he likens the folly of Eunomius to infants who play with sand.

After this he shows that He who is properly the Son and is in the bosom of the Father is simple and non-composite, and is neither ruled over by the Father nor a servant—He who delivered us from servitude;

and that if this were not so, not He alone, but the Father too, as being in the Son and being one, would be a servant;

and that from 'to be' the appellation of 'the Existent' has been formed.

and having examined all these things nobly and marvelously, he completes the discourse.

The eleventh discourse shows that the appellation of 'the Good' is not owed to the Father alone—as says Eunomius, the imitator of Mani and Bardesanes—but that the appellation of 'the Good' is owed also to the Son, who out of love for mankind and goodness fashioned man, and by cross and death fashioned him anew.

But he also says that the authority over the things that have come to be belongs to Him.

Then he sets forth the ignorance of Eunomius and the incoherence and ridiculousness of his words, since he calls the Son 'an angel of the Existent' and inferior to the divine nature, by as much as the Son surpasses His own created things.

against which the opposition is noble and vehement, and the refutation more indignant; and that He who dealt with Moses is Himself the Existent, the Only-begotten Son, who said to Moses when he asked, 'If Thou Thyself go not up with us, bring me not up hence,' 'This word also of thine will I do';

who is also called 'angel' both by Moses and by Isaiah, in which passage it was declared, 'Unto us a child is born.'

After this, fearing the great length of the refutation, he passed over the many arguments of his adversary as already overthrown beforehand.

The living creatures and plants of creation, not existing before their own generation—this too the Lord is [and likewise concerning the generation of frogs];

Again, Eunomius calls Him Lord and God and Creator of all intelligible and sensible creation, [as having received from the Father the power of creation and the commission, just as a craftsman is entrusted with the work by his employer,] and as having received the power acquired and from outside of creation, out of the power allotted to Him according to the various conjunctions and separations of the stars, with Fate spinning out to those being born the allotments of their lives.

and passing over the many things, he refutes the blasphemy from the things written by Eunomius himself, that the Maker of all things came into being similarly to earth and to angels, and that the subsistence of the Only-begotten is in nothing out of tune with the generation of all things;

obeying neither divine mystery, nor custom, nor any of the teachers of piety toward God for the discovery of true religion, except Mani, Colouthus, Arius, Aëtius, and those like them; regarding all the doctrines of Christians as nonsense and the customs of the Church as child's play and its venerable mysteries as trifles, in no way differing from the Greeks, who supposed from our doctrine that there is a great God surpassing the rest.

thus therefore this new idolater likewise proclaims that baptism too takes place into a Creator and a created being, not fearing the curse pronounced upon those who make an addition or subtraction in the divine Scriptures;

and demonstrating him to be an antichrist, he completes the discourse.

This twelfth discourse marvelously interprets the word spoken by the Lord to Mary, 'Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended.'

Then, having set forth the blasphemy of Eunomius that was refuted by the great Basil—when he set apart the Only-begotten God into the portion of darkness—and the defense, or rather the resolution, of the blasphemy uttered by him, he demonstrates that his present blasphemy is greater than the former by reason of that very defense;

in which he also treated most wisely of the unapproachable and true light.

In addition to these, he interpreted extraordinarily the evangelical saying 'In the beginning was the Word,' and 'the life,' and 'the light,' and 'the Word became flesh,' which had been wrongly understood by Eunomius; and he refuted the blasphemy, and shows that the economy of the Son came to pass through love for mankind, not through weakness, and by the cooperation of the Father.

Besides these things, he again refutes Eunomius, [showing] that he has learned the notion of ingeneracy from the hieroglyphic writings and from the myth-making and idolatry of the Egyptians, introducing Anubis and Osiris and Isis into the doctrine of the Christians; and that man owes no thanks to the Only-begotten [as one who received the passions by necessity and not willingly, just as neither does fire owe thanks for its heat nor water for its flowing], since he refers what has come to be not to an authoritative power, but to the necessity of nature.

Then again, having discoursed concerning the true and unapproachable light, concerning Father and Son, concerning the property and the community [and] of essence, and concerning the begotten and the unbegotten—that it possesses no contrariety in respect of its meaning, but demonstrating [it to be] a certain opposition and an unmediated distinction—he brings the discourse to completion.

It was not, as it seems, the case that to wish to benefit all, and to bestow one's own grace without examination upon whatever men one chances upon, is in every respect good and free from the censure of the many; nor does squandering the supply of medicines upon those incurably diseased, with a view to their benefit, bring anything worthy of the effort, either for those who receive the profit or for those who are ambitious for the praise.

On the contrary, indeed, such a thing often comes to be an occasion of what is worse.

the Gospel [teaches that], in the lavish scattering of pearls, those who are benefited become worse.

Wherefore it seems good to me, as the divine word has foretold, to separate the worthless from the precious in the bestowal of what is precious, so that the one who tramples the pearl and, by his insensibility toward good things, insults the benefaction, may not grieve the goodness of him who bestows it liberally.

These things it occurred to me to say when I reflected both upon him who ungrudgingly shares his own good things with all—I mean the man of God, the mouth of piety, Basil, who in the abundance of his spiritual treasures often poured out the grace of wisdom, even upon malicious souls, without examination—and upon Eunomius, ungrateful toward those who were eager to do him some good.

For this man, by the excess of that sickness of soul with which he was diseased concerning the faith, seemed pitiable to all who share in the Church (for who is so devoid of fellow-feeling as not to pity one who is perishing?); yet he moved to undertake the cure that one alone who, in the superabundance of his love of mankind, dares even at things past remedy for the sake of healing—who, being deeply pained at the man's ruin because of his natural sympathy toward those in misery, labored the discourse Refutative of the heresy as a kind of antidote against wicked poisons, having as his aim to save the man again through these means and to restore him to the Church.

But he, as though stricken in his understanding by a frenzy, grows savage toward the one who heals him, and wages war and fights, and reckons as an enemy the one who forces him to be lifted up out of the pit of impiety.