Refutation of Eunomius 1 part 2/6

As for the phrase ‘fellow-heir of authority,’ it is better to pass it by as senseless than to refute it as impious.

For what meaning the word ‘fellow-heir’ has cannot be found from the common usage of the term.

They cast lots for the Lord’s garment, as Scripture says, those who did not wish to tear the Master’s tunic apart, but rather to make it the possession of the one to whom the lot should grant it.

Those, then, who cast lots against one another for the tunic could perhaps rightly be called ‘fellow-lot-holders.’

...that the authority of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is present in [their] nature (for the Holy Spirit blows where it wills and operates all things in all as it wishes, and the Son, through whom all things came into being, both visible and invisible, in the heavens and upon the earth, made all things that he willed and gives life to whom he wills, and the Father, by his own authority, appointed the times, and from the times we understand that all things that have come to be in time are subject to the Father's authority);

If then, as we have said, it has been shown that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit possess authority to do what they will, it is not possible to discern what sense the phrase 'co-heir of authority' bears.

For he who is heir of all things, the maker of the ages, who shines forth together with the glory of the Father and bears in himself the very stamp of the Father's hypostasis, himself possesses all that the Father possesses and is lord of all authority — the dignity not being transferred from the Father to the Son, but remaining with the Father and also being in the Son.

For he who is in the Father is in the Father together, evidently, with the whole of his own power, and he who has the Father in himself encompasses the whole of the Father's authority and power.

For he has the whole Father in himself, and not a part of him;

and he who has the whole certainly has his authority as well.

What, then, Eunomius has in mind when he declares that the Father has no co-heir of authority, perhaps his disciples in vanity might say;

for whoever knows how to understand words admits that he cannot comprehend things said apart from sense.

'The Father,' he says, 'has no co-heir of authority.'

For who is it that says the Father and the Son contend with one another over authority by lot? Yet mediating between them, the sacred Eunomius, by way of a friendly settlement, apportions to the Father alone — without any casting of lots — the primacy of authority.

See the ridiculous and childish character of this grovelling exposition of doctrines.

Is it, then, he who upholds all things by the word of his power, who speaks what he wills to come into being and does what he wishes by the power of his command — he whose power runs together with his will, and whose will becomes the measure of his power ('For he spoke,' it says, 'and they came to be; he commanded, and they were created') — he who made all things through himself and established them in himself, apart from whom nothing among existing things either came to be or remains in being — is this one waiting to receive his authority by some casting of lots? Judge, you who hear, whether the one who says such things has his mind in a sound state.

'For there is,' he says, 'one and only one God, the Almighty.'

If, then, he indicates the Father by the title 'Almighty,' he speaks our doctrine, and not an alien one;

but if by 'Almighty' he means someone other than the Father, then let this champion of Jewish doctrines also preach circumcision, if he thinks fit.

For the faith of Christians looks to the Father, and the Father is all things: Most High, Almighty, King of kings, Lord of lords, and everything that pertains to lofty signification belongs properly to the Father;

and all that belongs to the Father belongs to the Son as well, so that, this being so, we receive those [titles] too as belonging to the Son.

But if, setting aside the Father, he speaks of another Almighty, he speaks the doctrines of the Jews, or else he follows the teachings of Plato;

for they say that philosopher too spoke of a certain creator and maker enthroned high above, over certain subordinate gods.

Just as, then, in the Jewish and Platonic doctrines, one who does not accept the Father is not a Christian, even though he professes some almighty being in his doctrine, so also Eunomius falsely usurps the name — judaizing in his thinking, or professing the teachings of the Greeks, while assuming the appellation of Christians.

But the same argument will hold also concerning what is set forth in what follows.

By adding the name 'Father,' we make the expression our own, knowing that the Father is God of gods.

And all that belongs to the Father belongs entirely to the Son as well.

'And Lord of lords.'

The same argument applies to this as well.

'And Most High over all the earth.'

He is Most High over all the earth, in like manner the oversight of earthly things coming from above, from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit alike.

But also the things that are appended next, following what has been said:

'Most High in the heavens, Most High in the highest, heavenly, true in that he ever is what he is and abides, true in works, true in words.'

For all these things the eye of the Christian beholds equally in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

If, then, Eunomius apportions these things to only one of the persons handed down in the faith, let him dare to say that the one who said, 'I am the truth,' or the Spirit of truth, is not true in words; or let him refuse to acknowledge as true in works the one who works judgment and righteousness, or the Spirit that operates all things in all as it wills.

For if he does not attest these things of the persons handed down in the faith, he altogether repudiates the faith of Christians.

For how could anyone consider worthy of belief one who is false in his words and not true in his works? But let us proceed to the next part of the discourse.

For he says: 'higher than all rule, subjection, authority, and kingdom.'

This is our own doctrine, proper to the catholic Church: to believe that the divine nature is higher than every rule, and that it holds subject to itself everything whatsoever that is conceived among existing things.

And the divine nature is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

But if he attributes this power to the Father alone, and if he declares that he alone is free from turning and change, and if he says that he alone is incorruptible, it is quite plain what is being constructed from this: that whoever does not possess these attributes is altogether subject to turning, corruptible, changeable, and perishable.

Therefore Eunomius teaches these things as doctrine concerning the only-begotten God and the Holy Spirit;

for he would not have employed this contrast, setting the Father apart in opposition to these, had he not held this opinion concerning the Son and the Spirit.

For the rest, brethren, judge for yourselves whether one who holds such opinions is not a persecutor of the faith of Christians.

For who would accept as worthy of reverence something that turns, changes, and is perishable? Therefore the whole aim of the one who constructs such notions is to cast out of the Church the faith in the Son and the Holy Spirit, by which arguments he contrives that neither Truth itself nor the Spirit of truth is incorruptible, or unturning, or unchangeable.

Let us also see what he adds to what has been said.

'Not,' he says, 'dividing his own essence in begetting, nor is the same one both begetter and begotten, nor does the same become both father and son;'

Such, perhaps, is what the prophet says concerning the impious: that 'they weave a spider's web.'

For just as in that case there is the shape of a web, but no substantial reality in the shape (for the one who touches it touches nothing that subsists, since the spider's threads are utterly destroyed by the mere touch of the fingers), such also is the insubstantial web-spinning of these vain words.

'Not,' he says, 'dividing his own essence in begetting, nor is the same one both begetter and begotten.'

Must one call what is said 'reasoning,' or rather a mass of phlegm coughed up from some dropsical excess? For what does it mean to divide one's own essence in begetting, and to be oneself both begetter and begotten? Who is so deranged, who so out of his mind, as to utter this statement which Eunomius supposes himself to be fighting against? For the Church believes that the true Father is truly the father of a Son who is his own — as the apostle says — and not of one alien to him.

For thus he declared in one of his epistles:

'Who did not spare his own Son' — thereby distinguishing, by the addition of 'own,' those who are deemed worthy of adoption by grace and not by nature.

But what does he say who slanders this our conception? 'Not dividing his own essence in begetting, nor is he himself both begetter and begotten, nor does the same become both father and son;'

Does he thus defile the pure doctrine of the Word who came forth from the Father, with these shameful and stinking notions, by saying that he does not divide the essence in begetting? O the loathsomeness of these shameful and filthy notions!

How does the one who says such things not understand that even God, when manifested through flesh, did not admit the passion of human nature for the constitution of his own body, but rather a child was begotten for us of the power of the Holy Spirit, and neither did the Virgin suffer, nor was the Spirit diminished, nor was the power of the Most High divided in part? For the Spirit remains whole, and the power of the Most High remained undiminished, and the child was begotten whole, and did not violate the mother's incorruption.

Then, if flesh is begotten from flesh without suffering, does Eunomius refuse to admit that the radiance of glory is from that very glory, since glory, in begetting light, is neither diminished nor divided? And is human reason begotten indivisibly from the mind, while God the Word cannot be begotten from the Father unless the Father's essence be divided? Is anyone so foolish as not to perceive the absurdity of this doctrine? 'Not,' he says, 'dividing his own essence in begetting.'

For in whose case is his own essence divided in begetting? For essence, in the case of human beings, is human nature; and in the case of irrational creatures, generically it is the irrational nature, but specifically, in the case of oxen and of sheep and of all irrational creatures, it is that nature considered according to the differences of their properties.

Which, then, of these divides its own essence through offspring? Does not the nature remain always entire, through the succession of those that come after, in each of the animals? Then, when a man begets a man from himself, he does not divide the nature, but it is whole both in the begetter and in the begotten — not split off and transferred from the one to the other, nor curtailed in the former when it becomes complete in the latter, but entirely present in the one and entirely found in the other;

for indeed, even before he begot the one from himself, the man was a rational, mortal animal capable of mind and knowledge; and when he begot such a man, [he begot one of the same nature].

so that all the properties of the nature were displayed in that offspring, since the father did not lose his being a man by begetting a man from himself, but remained after this what he was before it, having lost nothing of his own nature by the coming into being of the man from him;

And though man is begotten from man and the nature of the begetter is not divided, Eunomius does not accept that the only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, is truly from the Father, fearing lest he should mutilate the incorruptible nature of the Father through the hypostasis of the Only-begotten; but having said that [the Father does] not [divide] the essence in begetting, he added: 'nor is the same one both begetter and begotten, nor does the same become both father and son,' and he supposes that by these incoherent statements he can undermine the true doctrine of piety, or procure some strength for impiety — not knowing that by the very means he devises for constructing his absurdity, he is found to be an advocate for the truth.

For we too affirm that he who has all that belongs to his own Father is nothing other than that Father himself, except in respect of being Father; and that he who has all that belongs to the Son displays the whole Son in himself, except in respect of becoming the Son;

so that the construction of absurdity which Eunomius now builds becomes an ally of the truth, once the sense has been more clearly distinguished by us in accordance with the guidance of the gospel word.

For if he who has seen the Son sees the Father, then the Father has begotten another self, neither departing from himself nor ceasing to appear wholly in him — so that, through these very words which seemed to be spoken against piety, an alliance with sound doctrine is demonstrated.

'But,' he says, 'neither dividing his own essence in begetting, nor is he himself both begetter and begotten, nor does the same become both father and son;'

O the necessity of this conclusion!

Because he is incorruptible? Then, if someone is of a corruptible nature, does he cut his essence in begetting, and is he begotten by himself, and does he beget himself, and does he become his own father and son, because he is not incorruptible? But if this is so, then Abraham, because he was corruptible, did not beget Ishmael and Isaac, but rather begot himself through both the slave-girl and the lawful wife — or else, according to the other monstrosity of this doctrine, he divided his own essence among those born of him;

And first, in the case of the birth through Hagar, being divided into two halves, in one of the half-portions he becomes Ishmael, and in the other half there remains a half-Abraham; and afterward, the remaining portion of Abraham's essence, being further divided off, gave subsistence to Isaac.

Therefore a quarter of Abraham's essence was divided into Isaac's twin offspring, so that an eighth came to be in each of the grandsons.

How could one further subdivide that eighth into fractions among the twelve patriarchs, or among the seventy-five souls with whom Jacob went down into Egypt? But why do I speak of this, when I ought to expose the folly of these statements from the very first man?

For if it belongs to the incorruptible alone not to divide its nature in begetting, and Adam was corruptible — he to whom it was said, 'You are earth, and to earth you shall go' — then, according to Eunomius' argument, he certainly divided his own essence, being cut up into those begotten from him;

And as the multitude of descendants increased, the portion of essence found in each necessarily being divided according to the number of those born, the essence of Adam would be exhausted before ever reaching the hypostasis of Abraham, scattered among the countless myriads sprung from him through those minute and indivisible fragments; and no remnant of essence would any longer be found passing on, divided from Adam to Abraham and to those descended from him, since it had already been used up beforehand among the countless myriads born before him, through the minute subdivision of the portions of that nature.

See the folly of one who does not know what he is saying, nor concerning what he makes his assertions.

Since he is incorruptible, he neither divides his essence, nor begets himself, nor becomes his own father — thereby he granted that one should understand, by logical consequence, that in the case of everything subject to corruption, those things occur at begetting which he insisted are absent from the incorruptible alone.

But though there are many other points as well capable of demonstrating the vanity of what is said, I think what has been said suffices to prove the folly of it.

Now this is altogether admitted by those who know how to look to the logical consequence: that by attesting incorruptibility to the Father alone, he constructs the position that everything conceived of after the Father is, by contrast with the incorruptible, corruptible — so that he does not even show the Son to be free of corruption.

If, then, he sets the Son over against the incorruptible, he not only determines that he is corruptible, but also constructs concerning him all the other things which he says are absent only from the incorruptible.

For necessarily, if the Father alone neither begets himself nor is begotten by himself, then everything that is not incorruptible both begets itself and is begotten by itself, and becomes both its own father and its own son, its essence being transformed to fit each of the two.

For if to be incorruptible belongs to the Father alone, and it is the property of the incorruptible not to be these things, then according to the reasoning of the heresy the Son is certainly not incorruptible, and all these things are certainly true of him: that his essence is divided, that he begets himself and is begotten by himself, that he becomes both his own father and his own son.

But perhaps it is vain to dwell any longer on these foolish notions; let us instead move on to what follows in the discourse.

...not, in creating, standing in need of matter or parts or natural instruments;

for he is in need of nothing.

This notion — even though Eunomius states it in rather feeble language — we nonetheless do not reject as impious.

...encompassing, together with matter, also the qualities — so that all things are present to him, and in place of all things there is the impulse of his all-powerful will: matter, instrument, place, time, essence, quality — everything whatsoever that is conceived to exist within creation.

For at the very moment he willed that which was needful to come to be, the productive power of beings coincided with the thought, making the will into a deed.

For thus the great Moses philosophizes concerning the divine power in his account of the origin of the world, attributing the making of each thing that appears in creation to commanding utterances.

For he says, "God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light;"

and likewise concerning the other things, he made mention neither of matter nor of instrumental agency.

Therefore, in this respect, Eunomius' statement is not to be rejected.

For God, in creating whatever things received their origin through creation, needed neither any underlying matter nor instruments for their fashioning;

for the power and wisdom of God has no need of any external help.

Now Christ is the power and wisdom of God, through whom all things came to be, and without whom nothing of what exists came into being, as John testifies.

If, then, all things — visible and invisible — came to be through him, and the will alone suffices for the coming-into-being of beings (for the will is a power), then Eunomius, in his feeble wording, has stated our own argument.

For he who sustains the universe by the word of his power — of what instrument, and of what matter, could he possibly stand in need, in sustaining by his all-powerful word the coming-into-being of beings? But if what we have believed concerning the Only-begotten with respect to creation, he constructs instead concerning the Son — as though the Father created him in the same manner as creation came into being through the Son — then we take up again the argument stated above: that such a supposition is a denial of the deity of the Only-begotten.

Since, then, we have been taught to believe that the Only-begotten is God, we confess together, through believing that he is God, that he is neither recent nor alien.

If, then, he is God, he is not recent;

and if he is not recent, he is certainly eternal.

The eternal one, then, is not recent; nor is he alien to the true deity who is from the Father, and is in the bosom of the Father, and has the Father in himself.

So that he who cuts off the Son from the nature of the Father either altogether rejects worship, lest he worship an alien god, or else worships an idol, having set up as the object of his worship a creature and not God, and having set the name of Christ upon the idol.

That he looks precisely to this intention in his supposition concerning the Only-begotten would become clearer from what he sets forth concerning the Only-begotten himself, which runs as follows:

"We believe also in the Son of God, the Only-begotten God, the firstborn of all creation, a true Son, not unbegotten, truly begotten before the ages, named Son not apart from the begetting that precedes his existence, having come into being before all creation, not uncreated."

I think that the mere reading of what has been set forth suffices, even apart from our own examination, to reveal the impiety of the doctrine.

For having called him "firstborn," lest he should create in his hearers any ambiguity about his not being created, he immediately added "not uncreated," so that the meaning of "Son," once understood in its natural sense, might never let some pious notion concerning him arise in those who heard it;

For this reason, having first confessed him to be Son of God and Only-begotten God, he immediately, by what follows, diverts the understanding of his hearers away from the pious supposition, toward the heretical notion.

For one is naturally led, guided by the hand through the signification of these terms, to the conclusion that no difference of nature is introduced by the word "God" and by the meaning of "Son."

For how could he who is truly the Son of God and is himself God be conceived as anything other than the nature of the Father? But lest the thoughts of piety, through these names, should get ahead and become impressed upon the hearts of the hearers, he immediately says that he is firstborn of creation, named Son not apart from the begetting that precedes his existence, having come to be before all creation, not uncreated.

So then, that it may be made evident that this evildoer holds out even the first terms as bait to men, so that the poison, sweetened as if with a kind of honey by the more pious-sounding names, might be accepted — let us dwell a little longer on the discourse.

Who does not know how great is the difference in meaning between "Only-begotten" and "firstborn"? For "Only-begotten" is not conceived along with brothers, nor is "firstborn" conceived without brothers; rather, the firstborn is not the only-begotten;

for he is certainly firstborn of brothers;

whereas the only-begotten has no brother;

for he would not be only-begotten if he were numbered among brothers.

And further, besides this, of whatever essence the brothers of the firstborn are, of that same essence the firstborn also will certainly be.

And this is not the only thing signified by this term, but also that both the firstborn himself, and those who came into being after him, have their existence from the same source, the firstborn contributing nothing toward the begetting of those who follow.

so that, by these means, the statement of John testifying that "All things came to be through him" is made out to be false.

For if he is firstborn, he certainly differs from those who came after him only by the precedence in time, there being another through whom the power to exist came to be both for him and for the rest.

But lest we give any occasion for suspicion to those who slander us, as though we did not accept the divinely inspired words by which we are opposing this teaching, we shall first set forth our own understanding, which we hold concerning these names, and thus we shall then submit to the hearers a judgment as to which is the better understanding.

The great Paul, knowing that the Only-begotten God, who holds the first place in all things, is the source and cause of every good, testifies of him that not only did the creation of beings come to be through him, but also that, the ancient creation of mankind having grown old and vanished away, as he himself calls it, and another, new creation having come to be in Christ, no one else took the lead in this creation either, but he himself is the firstborn of all the creation of mankind that has come to be through the gospel.

And that the sense of this matter may become clearer, we shall analyze the argument as follows.

Four times the divine apostle makes mention of this word: once, saying thus, that he is "firstborn of all creation"; again, that he is "firstborn among many brothers"; a third time, that he is "firstborn from the dead"; and after these, he sets forth the term absolutely and without any pairing, saying:

"But when he again brings the firstborn into the world, he says, 'Let all the angels of God worship him.'"

Therefore, whatever sense we understand in the other pairings of this name, we shall accordingly apply that same sense also to "firstborn of creation."

For since it is one and the same word, it is altogether necessary that the meaning signified also be one.

And since it was also necessary for him to deposit in nature the power of the resurrection from the dead, he again becomes the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep and "firstborn from the dead," the first to loose, through himself, the pangs of death — so that for us too a way might be opened for the regeneration from death, the pang of death by which we were held fast being loosed through the resurrection of the Lord.

Just as, then, by partaking of the regeneration through the washing, he becomes firstborn of brothers, and again, by making himself the firstfruits of the resurrection, he is called "firstborn from the dead," so also, holding first place in all things after all the ancient things have passed away, as the apostle says, he becomes the firstborn of the new creation of mankind in Christ — through the twofold regeneration, both that of holy baptism and that of the resurrection from the dead, having become for us, in each respect, both the author of life and firstfruits and firstborn.

This firstborn, then, also has brothers, concerning whom he says to Mary: "Go and tell my brothers, I am going to my Father and your Father, and my God and your God."

For by these words the entire purpose of the economy concerning man is summed up.

For men, having fallen away from God, became enslaved to those who by nature are not gods, and, though being children of God, were made kin to the evil and falsely-named father.

"I go, through myself, to make the true Father, from whom you were separated, your Father, and to make, through myself, the true God, from whom you departed, your God;"

"for through the firstfruits which I took up, I bring the whole of humanity, in myself, to God and Father."

The firstfruits, then, having made him who truly is God its God, and the good Father its Father, the good is set right for the whole nature, and he becomes, through the firstfruits, Father and God of all men.

"And if the firstfruits is holy," he says, "so also is the lump."

And where the firstfruits is Christ — and Christ is the firstfruits — there also are those who belong to Christ, as the apostle says.

In those instances, then, where he has made mention of "firstborn" in conjunction with something else — having mentioned the dead, and creation, and brothers — he intends these and such things to be understood;

but where, apart from such an addition, he says, "But when he again brings the firstborn into the world, he says" — the addition of "again" points to the manifestation of the Lord of all that is to take place at the end.

For just as at the name of Jesus every knee bows, of beings in heaven and on earth and under the earth, even though the Son does not bear the human name, since his is the name above every name, so too he says that the firstborn — so named for our sake — is worshiped by the whole supra-mundane creation as he again enters into the world, when he shall judge the world in righteousness and the peoples in equity.

Thus, by the argument of piety, both the meaning of "firstborn" and that of "only-begotten" are distinguished, each of the two names retaining its appropriate signification;

but he who refers the name "firstborn" up to the pre-eternal existence — how does he preserve the concept of "only-begotten"? Let the intelligent hearer consider whether these things are compatible with one another, seeing that "firstborn" cannot be conceived without brothers, nor "only-begotten" with brothers.

For when he says, "In the beginning was the Word," by this we understand the Only-begotten;

but when he adds, "The Word became flesh," by this we receive in our understanding the firstborn;