Against Celsus 1 part 1/42

AGAINST THE TREATISE OF CELSUS ENTITLED 'THE TRUE DOCTRINE', BY ORIGEN, IN EIGHT BOOKS. PREFACE. Our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ, when falsely accused, kept silence, and when slandered made no reply, persuaded that his whole life and his deeds among the Jews were better than any voice that might refute the false testimony and than any words spoken in defence against the accusations.

But you, O Ambrose, lover of God, I know not how, wished me to make a defence against the false accusations brought by Celsus in his writings against the Christians, and against his charge in a book against the faith of the churches, as though there were no clear refutation in the facts themselves, and no doctrine stronger than all writings, which both does away with the false testimonies and gives the accusations not even any plausibility of being able to achieve anything.

Concerning the fact that Jesus kept silence when falsely accused, it is enough for the present to quote the words of Matthew;

for Mark wrote what is equivalent to it.

The words of Matthew run thus:

Now the high priest and the council sought false witness against Jesus, that they might put him to death, and found none, though many false witnesses came forward.

But afterwards two came forward and said:

I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it in three days.

And the high priest stood up and said to him:

Do you make no answer? What is it that these testify against you? But Jesus kept silence. And that he made no reply when accused, this also is written:

And Jesus stood before the governor;

and he questioned him, saying:

Are you the King of the Jews? And Jesus said to him: You say so.

And while he was being accused by the chief priests and elders, he made no answer.

Then Pilate said to him:

Do you not hear how many things they testify against you? And he gave him no answer, not even to a single word, so that the governor marvelled greatly.

For it was indeed worthy of admiration, in the eyes of those capable of even moderate judgement, that one who was accused and falsely witnessed against, who was able to defend himself, to show that he was guilty of no charge, to recount the praises of his own life and of his mighty works as having come from God, so as to give the judge an opening to pronounce more favourably concerning him - that such a one did not do this, but despised and with high-minded magnanimity overlooked his accusers.

And that, had he made a defence, the judge would have released Jesus without hesitation, is plain from what is written about him, where Pilate said:

Which of the two do you wish me to release to you, Barabbas, or Jesus who is called Christ? and from what the Scripture adds, saying:

For he knew that it was out of envy that they had delivered him up. Jesus, then, is always falsely accused, and there is no time, so long as wickedness exists among men, when he is not accused.

And he himself even now keeps silence in the face of these things, and does not answer with a voice; but he makes his defence in the life of his genuine disciples, which proclaims aloud the excellences and is stronger than every false testimony, refuting and overturning the false witness and the accusations.

I venture, then, to say and to affirm that the defence which you ask me to make weakens the defence that lies in the facts, and the power of Jesus that is manifest to those who are not insensible -

the power which overturns the arguments that can shake no believer.

And may it never be found that anyone has so received the love of God in Christ Jesus that his resolve could be shaken by the trifling words of Celsus or of any like him.

But Paul, in enumerating the countless things that are wont to separate from the love of Christ and the love of God in Christ Jesus - all of which were overcome by the love that was in him - did not reckon argument among the things that separate.

For note that he first says:

Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? As it is written: For your sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.

But in all these things we more than conquer through him who loved us. And, setting forth a second class of things naturally fitted to separate those who are unballasted in godliness, he says:

For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. And truly it is fitting that we should glory in a tribulation that does not separate, or in the things enumerated after it, but not Paul and the apostles, nor anyone who has become like them, because they are far above such things, since they say:

In all these things we more than conquer through him who loved us - which is something greater than to conquer.

And if the apostles too must glory in not being separated from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, they would glory in this, that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities, nor any of the things that follow, is able to separate them from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Therefore I do not rejoice with the man who has believed in Christ in such a way that his faith could be shaken by Celsus - who no longer even lives a common life among men, but has long been dead - or by any plausibility of argument.

I do not know in what class I ought to reckon the man who needs arguments against the charges that Celsus brings against the Christians in his written books, to restore him from the shaking of his faith to standing firm in it.

Nevertheless, since among the multitude of those reckoned to be believers there might be found some of such a kind, who are shaken and overturned by the writings of Celsus, but healed by the defence made against them - provided what is said has some character fitted to demolish Celsus' arguments and to establish the truth - I have resolved to obey your command and to compose a reply to the treatise you sent me;

a treatise which I think no one who has made even a little progress in philosophy would agree to call 'a true doctrine', as Celsus entitled it.

Now Paul, perceiving that there are in Greek philosophy things not to be despised, plausible to the many, which present falsehood as if it were truth, said concerning such things:

Beware lest there be anyone who carries you off as spoil through philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world and not according to Christ. And seeing in the words of the wisdom of the world a certain appearance of grandeur, he said that the arguments of the philosophers were 'according to the elements of the world'.

But no one of sound mind would say that Celsus' writings too were composed 'according to the elements of the world'.

Those philosophical arguments, having something deceptive, he called also 'vain deceit', perhaps by way of contrast with a deceit that is not vain, which Jeremiah, perceiving it, dared to say to God:

You deceived me, O Lord, and I was deceived; you prevailed, and you overcame;

but Celsus' writings seem to me to have no deceit at all, and therefore not even a vain one, such as belongs to those who have constructed sects in philosophy and have grasped, with regard to those matters, an intelligence that is no ordinary one;

such things are called 'vain deceit, according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world'.

This preface, after I had dictated all that comes down to the impersonation by Celsus of the Jew speaking against Jesus, it seemed good to me to set before the beginning;

so that whoever is going to read what I have dictated against Celsus may first encounter it, and may see that this book has been written, not for those who are altogether firm believers, but either for those wholly untasted of faith in Christ, or for those who, as the apostle named them, are 'weak in the faith'.

Receive him who is weak in the faith. And let the preface make this defence, that with one purpose I dictated the beginning of the work against Celsus, and with another the part after the beginning.

For at first I intended to note down the main heads, and to give briefly what was to be said against them, and then after this to give the argument a fuller body;

but afterwards the very facts suggested to me, as I was sparing of time, to be content with what had thus been dictated at the beginning, and in what follows to contend in literary fashion, so far as I was able, against Celsus' charges against us.

Therefore I ask pardon for the beginning of the part that comes after the preface.

But if you are not effectively moved even by what is dictated afterwards, then, asking the same pardon also for these things, I refer you - if you still wish the solutions of Celsus' arguments to be made for you by dictation - to those among us who are more intelligent and able by words and books to overthrow Celsus' charges against us.

Yet better is the man who from the first had no need - even if he came upon Celsus' treatise - of any defence against it, but who despised everything in his book as deserving, with good reason, to be despised even by any chance believer in Christ, because of the Spirit that is in him.

AGAINST THE TREATISE OF CELSUS ENTITLED 'THE TRUE DOCTRINE', BY ORIGEN, BOOK ONE. Celsus' first main point, in his desire to slander Christianity, is that Christians make secret compacts with one another contrary to law; that of compacts, some are open, namely those made according to the laws, while others are hidden, namely those concluded contrary to what is lawful.

And he wishes to slander the so-called love of Christians for one another, as arising from their common danger and as being more binding than oaths.

Since, then, he keeps harping on the common law, alleging that the Christians' compacts are contrary to it, it must be said in reply that, just as if a man living among Scythians who have lawless laws, and having no opportunity to depart, were compelled to live among them, he might reasonably, on account of the law of truth - which is, as it were, lawlessness among the Scythians - make compacts contrary to what is customary among them, with those who share his convictions;

even so, before the judgement of truth, the laws of the nations concerning images and the godless polytheism are laws of Scythians, and of something even more impious than Scythians.

It is therefore not unreasonable to make compacts contrary to what is customary, when they are on behalf of truth.

For just as, if some men were secretly to make compacts in order to destroy a tyrant who had seized control of their city, they would be acting rightly;

so too the Christians, while the one whom they call the devil and falsehood plays the tyrant, make compacts contrary to what is lawful in the devil's eyes, against the devil and on behalf of the salvation of others whom they may be able to persuade to revolt from the law that is, as it were, of Scythians and of a tyrant.

Next he says that the doctrine is barbarian in its origin, meaning evidently Judaism, on which Christianity depends.

And, fair-mindedly, he does not reproach the doctrine for its barbarian origin, but praises the barbarians as competent to discover doctrines;

but he adds to this that the Greeks are better at judging, confirming, and practising toward virtue the things discovered by the barbarians.

Now this serves us as a defence, drawn from what he himself says, on behalf of the things laid down in Christianity, which are true: namely, that one who comes to the word from Greek doctrines and exercises would not only judge them to be true, but, having practised them, would also build them up and supply what seems lacking by the standard of Greek demonstration, thereby establishing the truth of Christianity.

But it must further be said, in answer to this, that there is a proper demonstration of the word, more divine than the Greek one drawn from dialectic.

And this more divine demonstration the apostle calls a 'demonstration of Spirit and of power' - of Spirit because of the prophecies, which are sufficient to bring conviction to the reader, especially in matters concerning Christ; and of power because of the marvellous mighty works, which must be shown to have happened both from many other considerations and from the fact that traces of them are still preserved among those who live according to the will of the word.

After this, having said that the Christians do and teach what pleases them in secret, and that they do not do this in vain, since they are warding off the penalty of death that hangs over them, he likens this danger to the dangers that befell men on account of philosophy, as in the case of Socrates;

he could also have spoken of Pythagoras and other philosophers.

But it must be said in answer to this that, in the case of Socrates, the Athenians at once repented, and nothing bitter remained in them concerning him, nor in the case of Pythagoras;

the Pythagoreans, at any rate, established their schools at length in Italy, in the region called Greater Greece;

but in the case of the Christians, the Roman senate, the emperors of each period, the armies, the peoples, and even the kinsfolk of believers, warring against the word, would have hindered it, conquered as it was by the plotting of so many, had it not, by divine power, risen above and surmounted them, so as to conquer the whole world that was plotting against it.

Let us see also how he thinks to disparage the ethical part, on the ground that it is common to us with the other philosophers also, as being no venerable and novel teaching.

But to this it must be said that, for those who introduce a righteous judgement of God, the penalty for sins would have been shut off, if not all men possessed, according to the common notions, a sound preconception concerning the ethical part.

Therefore it is no wonder that the same God has sown what he taught through the prophets and the Saviour into the souls of all men;

in order that every man may be without excuse in the divine judgement, having the purport of the law written in his own heart;

which the word hinted at in what the Greeks regard as a myth, when it represented God as having written the commandments with his own finger and given them to Moses, commandments which the wickedness of those who made the calf shattered - as if it said, the flood of sin overwhelmed them.

And a second time, when Moses had hewn out stones, God wrote again and gave them, as it were the prophetic word making ready the soul, after the first sin, for a second writing of God.

And as for the matters concerning idolatry, setting them forth as peculiar to those of the word, he further establishes the point, saying that they do not for this reason regard the gods made by hands as gods, since it is not reasonable that things wrought by the basest craftsmen, and men depraved in character, should be gods - things often fashioned by unjust men as well.

In what follows, then, wishing to show this to be common and not first discovered by him, he sets forth a saying of Heraclitus which runs thus:

It is just as if one were to chatter with houses, for those who approach lifeless things as though they were gods to do so. So concerning this too it must be said that, just as in the other ethical realm, notions were sown in men, from which Heraclitus, and any other Greek or barbarian, conceived the establishing of this point.

For he sets forth also that the Persians hold this view, citing Herodotus as having recorded it.

And we too shall add that Zeno of Citium too says in his Republic:

There will be no need to build temples;

for one ought to consider nothing sacred, nor of great worth and holy, that is the work of builders and craftsmen. It is clear, then, that concerning this doctrine too there has been written in the hearts of men, by the writing of God, what ought to be done.

After this, moved I know not whence, Celsus says that the Christians seem to have power by the names of certain demons and by invocations, hinting, as I suppose, at those who charm down the demons and drive them out.

But he clearly seems to misrepresent the word.

For they do not seem to have power by invocations, but by the name of Jesus together with the recital of the histories about him.

...to be separated from men, and especially when those who utter them speak them from a sound disposition and one that has genuinely believed.

So great, indeed, is the power of the name of Jesus against the demons, that sometimes it is effective even when named by base persons;

teaching which Jesus declared when he said:

Many will say to me in that day:

In your name we cast out demons and did mighty works. But this I do not know whether Celsus willingly passed over and is acting maliciously, or whether he does so in ignorance.

In what follows he also accuses the Saviour, alleging that it was by sorcery that he was able to do the wonders he seemed to perform, and that, foreseeing that others too, having learned the same arts, would do the same thing, boasting that they did so by the power of God, he expels such persons from his own commonwealth.

Such persons Jesus drives out of his own commonwealth.

And he accuses him, saying that if he justly expels them, then he himself, being guilty of the same things, is base;

but if he is not base in doing these things, then neither are those who act in like manner with him.

But plainly - even if it should seem irrefutable, in the case of Jesus, how he did these things - it is clear that the Christians, in performing them, employ no practice of incantations, but only the name of Jesus together with other words believed in according to the divine Scripture.

Then, since he often calls the doctrine 'secret', in this too he must be refuted, seeing that almost the whole world is better acquainted with the proclamation of the Christians than with the tenets that please the philosophers.

For from whom is the birth of Jesus from a virgin hidden, or the Crucified One, or his resurrection believed by many, or the proclaimed judgement of God, which punishes sinners according to their desert but counts the righteous worthy of reward? Indeed, even the mystery of the resurrection, not being understood, is bandied about and mocked by the unbelievers.

To say, then, in view of these things, that the doctrine is secret, is utterly absurd;

but that there is a certain teaching, as it were beyond the exoteric, which does not reach the many, is not peculiar to the doctrine of the Christians alone, but belongs also to that of the philosophers, among whom some arguments were exoteric and others esoteric;

and some, hearing Pythagoras, would say 'He himself said it', while others were taught in secret the things not worthy to reach profane ears not yet purified.

And all the mysteries everywhere, throughout Greece and the barbarian world, being secret, are not disparaged;

wherefore in vain, without having accurately understood the secret character of Christianity, he slanders it.

He seems, with some cleverness, in a way to plead on behalf of those who bear witness to Christianity unto death, saying:

And I do not say this, that the man who holds fast to a good doctrine, if he is going to incur danger among men on account of it, must abandon the doctrine, or pretend that he has abandoned it, or become a denier.

And he condemns those who, while holding the views of Christianity, pretend not to hold them, or who deny, saying that the man in the doctrine must not pretend that he has abandoned it, or become a denier of it.

Celsus must indeed be refuted as saying things contrary to himself.

For from his other writings he is found to be an Epicurean;

but here, because it seemed more plausible to accuse the word, not confessing the views of Epicurus, he pretends that there is in man something better than the earthly, akin to God, and says that those in whom this is in good condition - that is, the soul - long in every way for what is akin, meaning God, and yearn always to hear something and to be reminded concerning him.

See, then, the bastard quality of his soul: that, having first said that the man who holds fast to a good doctrine, even if he is going to incur danger among men on account of it, must not abandon the doctrine nor pretend that he has abandoned it nor become a denier, he himself falls into all the contrary things.

For he knew that, if he confessed himself to be an Epicurean, he would not have credibility in accusing those who in any way introduce providence and set a God over things that exist.

And we have received the tradition that there were two men named Celsus who were Epicureans, the earlier one in the time of Nero, and this one in the time of Hadrian and later.

After this he exhorts men to follow reason and a rational guide in accepting doctrines, on the ground that deception altogether arises for the man who does not thus give his assent to certain persons -

to begging priests of Cybele and soothsayers, to Mithras and Sabazius, and whatever else one may have met with, to apparitions of Hecate or of some other demon or demons.

For just as among those people base men often, taking advantage of the simplicity of the easily deceived, lead them wherever they wish, so, he says, it happens also among the Christians.

And he says that some, not even wishing to give or to receive a reason for what they believe, use the saying 'Do not examine, but believe', and 'Your faith will save you'. And he says they declare:

Wisdom in the world is an evil thing, but folly is a good thing. But it must be said in answer to this that, if it were possible for all men to leave the affairs of life and to give their leisure to philosophising, no other road should be pursued by anyone than this alone.

For there will be found in Christianity - not to say a greater - no less examination of the things believed, and explanation of the riddles in the prophets, and of the parables in the Gospels, and of countless other things done or legislated symbolically.

But if this is impossible, partly because of the necessities of life and partly because of the weakness of men - very few rushing eagerly to the word - what better method than the one delivered by Jesus to the nations could be found for helping the many? And we inquire indeed concerning the multitude of believers, who have laid aside the great flood of wickedness in which they formerly wallowed;

whether it is better for them, believing without reason, to have their characters somewhat restrained and to be benefited through the faith concerning those who are punished for sins and honoured for good works, or not to admit their conversion with mere faith, until they should give themselves to an examination of arguments? For plainly all, save a very few, would not even gain this much - what they have gained from having simply believed - but would remain in a most wicked life.

If, then, there is anything else that establishes that the love of man shown by the word did not come to dwell in the life of men apart from God, this too must be reckoned among those benefits.

For the godly man will not suppose that even a physician of bodies, who has brought many sick people to a better state, sojourns in cities and nations apart from God;

for nothing good comes to pass among men apart from God.

But if the one who has healed the bodies of many, or brought them to a better state, does not heal apart from God, how much more does the one who has healed and converted and bettered the souls of many, and has attached them to God who is over all, and has taught them to refer every action to his good pleasure and to shun all things displeasing to God, even to the least of things said or done or even coming into thought? Then, since they keep harping on the matter of faith, it must be said that we, receiving it as useful for the many, confess that we teach men to believe even without reasoning, those who are not able to leave all things and follow an examination of argument, while they, though not confessing it, do this very thing in practice.

For who, having been turned toward philosophy, and having cast himself by lot upon some one sect of philosophers, comes to it otherwise than either by chancing upon such a teacher, or by believing that that sect is the better one? For he does not wait to hear the arguments of all the philosophers and of the different sects, and the refutation of these and the establishment of those, and so choose to be a Stoic or a Platonist or a Peripatetic or an Epicurean or of whatever sect of philosophers;

but, by a certain irrational impulse - even if they are unwilling to confess this - they come to practise, let us say, the Stoic doctrine, abandoning the rest, or the Platonic, despising the others as humbler, or the Peripatetic, as most human and as more fair-mindedly than the rest acknowledging human goods.

And some, troubled from the very first onset over the question of providence, on account of what happens on earth to the base and to the earnest, too rashly assented to the view that there is no providence at all, and chose the doctrine of Epicurus and of Celsus.

...teaching that this one alone must be worshipped, while the rest must be disregarded, either as not existing, or as existing indeed and worthy of honour, yet not of adoration and reverence. Concerning these things, the man who not only believes but also contemplates matters by reason will state the demonstrations that occur to him and are found by diligent inquiry.

And how is it not more reasonable, since all human affairs depend on faith, to believe God rather than them? For who sails, or marries, or begets children, or casts his seed upon the ground, without believing that better things will come to pass - though the contrary is possible and sometimes does happen? Yet nevertheless the faith that the better things and the things prayed for will come to pass makes all men dare even upon things uncertain and which might turn out otherwise.

But if hope and the more favourable faith concerning things to come hold together life in every action whose outcome is uncertain, how shall this faith not the more reasonably be embraced by him who believes - beyond the sea that is sailed and the land that is sown and the wife that is married and the rest of human affairs - in the God who created all these things, and in him who, with surpassing greatness of mind and divine magnanimity, dared to set forth this word to men everywhere throughout the inhabited world, amid great dangers and a death reckoned dishonourable, which he endured for men's sake, having also taught those who at the beginning were persuaded to serve his teaching to dare, amid all dangers and ever-expected deaths, to go forth everywhere throughout the inhabited world for the salvation of men? Then, since Celsus says in his very own words:

If indeed they are willing to answer me, not as one making trial of them - for I know all things - but as one caring equally for all, it would be well;

but if they are not willing, but say, as they are accustomed, 'Do not examine', and so forth, then, he says, it is necessary that they teach what sort of things these are which they say, and whence they have flowed, and so forth;

it must be said, in answer to his 'for I know all things' - a most boastful thing dared by him - that, if indeed he had read most carefully the prophets, full as they are confessedly of riddles and of sayings obscure to the many, and if he had encountered the parables of the Gospels and the rest of the Scripture of the law and of Jewish history and the utterances of the apostles, and, having read them fair-mindedly, had wished to enter into the meaning of the words, he would not have been so audacious, nor would he have said:

as not even we, who have spent our time on these things, would say;

for I know all things - for truth is dear to us.

Will he say 'for I know all the doctrines of Epicurus', or will he take courage to say that he knows all the doctrines of Plato, when there are so many disagreements even among those who expound them?

For who is so audacious as to say:

for I know all the Stoic doctrines, or all the Peripatetic? Unless perhaps, having heard the 'for I know all things' from certain insensible laymen who do not perceive their own ignorance, he supposed that, having used such men as teachers, he knew all things.

It seems to me that he has done something like this: as if a man, sojourning in Egypt - where the wise of the Egyptians, according to their ancestral writings, philosophise much about the things they regard as divine, while the laymen, hearing certain myths whose rationale they do not understand, think much of themselves on account of them - supposed that he knew all the things of the Egyptians, having been a pupil of their laymen and having mixed with none of the priests, nor having learned the secrets of the Egyptians from any of them.

And what I have said concerning the wise and the laymen among the Egyptians can be seen also concerning the Persians;