History of My Calamities & Works 3 part 5/9

For it does not befit us, who are wholly occupied about the investigation of truth, to wrangle after a childish manner or in the way of importunate declamation; nor, if some things are conceded less providently, should one who intends to be taught or to teach take from this an occasion for inflicting shame, where, even for the sake of argument, it is sometimes permitted to concede things that are false. We therefore grant every liberty either of wholly changing or of correcting an opinion. Philosopher: Remember, I say, what I said, and recall the condition I appended, where, namely, it was said: 'What if it is so?'

For it has seemed to many of the philosophers that in all good men all the virtues are present together, and that no one is to be reckoned good in any degree if he lacks any single virtue; and that, on this account, among all good men there is no difference whatever, either in the merits of their life or in the recompense of their blessedness. And if this is perhaps so, then the same blessedness is rendered to all, and all, having attained the supreme good equally, become blessed alike. How openly Tully professes this opinion in the second book of his work On Duties, in these words: 'Although justice, even without prudence, has authority enough, prudence without justice avails nothing toward winning trust. For the more crafty and cunning a man is, the more is he hated and suspected, once the reputation of uprightness has been taken away.'

'Wherefore justice joined to understanding will have as much power as it wishes for winning trust; justice without prudence will be able to do much, but prudence without justice will avail nothing. But lest anyone wonder why, when it is agreed among all philosophers, and has often been argued by me myself, that whoever has one virtue has them all, I now so separate them, as though anyone could be just who is not likewise prudent: that is one kind of subtlety, when truth itself is refined in disputation, and another, when discourse is adapted to all. Wherefore, as the common crowd does, so in this place we too speak, calling some men brave, others good men, and others prudent.'

'For when we speak, we must use popular and customary words.' He also, in his Paradoxes, not only makes good men equal in their virtues, but likewise makes wicked men equal in their sins, so as to maintain that all sins are equal. Christian: Now for the first time I see you become unseasonably shameless and quarrel rather than philosophize. Indeed, lest you should seem to be forced to confess a manifest truth, you turn aside to the madness of a most patent falsehood, namely so as to reckon all good men equally good, all the guilty equally guilty, and all alike worthy of the same glory or punishment. Philosopher:

Since indeed the matter rests in the reality, not in men's opinion—men who judge and reward the effect of deeds rather than the quality of character, and who, according to what is seen to be done outwardly, judge some more just or braver, or better or worse, than others. From which opinion I think that you yourselves are not far removed, if you consider your own teaching diligently. For all the virtues, as that greatest Philosopher of yours, Augustine, maintains, are comprehended under the single name of charity, which alone, as he himself says, distinguishes between the children of God and the children of the devil. Whence too he rightly recalls in a certain place: 'Where charity indeed is, what could be lacking?'

'For love is the fullness of the law.' Pursuing this fullness, the very Apostle who says this both removes evils from it and comprehends goods in it, saying: Charity is patient, is kind; charity does not envy, does not act perversely, and so forth. Of which it is also said, among other things, that it bears all things or endures all things—even death itself, of course; as Christ too recalls: Greater love than this no one has, than that a man lay down his soul for his friends. Therefore no one abounds more than another in charity, since charity contains all these things in itself and brings them with it. But if no one surpasses another in charity, then certainly not in virtues or merits either, since charity, as you say, embraces every virtue. Christian:

In truth, if virtue be understood properly—that is, as that which obtains merit before God—charity alone is to be called virtue. And inasmuch as it makes a man just, or brave, or temperate, it is rightly called justice, or fortitude, or temperance. But just as all who have charity are not equally kindled by it, nor do all the prudent understand equally, so neither are all the just equally just, nor are all equally brave or temperate.

And although, according to the distinction of species, we grant that all the virtues are present in certain men—since indeed each of them is just and brave and temperate—nevertheless we by no means agree that they are equal in virtues or merits, since it happens that one man is more just, or braver, or more moderate than another. For though we suppose that individuals agree in the aforesaid species of the virtues, there is nevertheless a great difference among the individuals of the species, since the justice or fortitude or temperance of this man is greater than that of that man; but although charity confers all the things you have mentioned, it does not bestow all of them upon each of those in whom it dwells.

For just as all the advantages of the body are bestowed by nature, yet not all upon all, so too it happens with the goods of the soul, that is, the virtues, that not all are equally enriched with all. Whence I would have you attend to how feeble that reasoning is—nay rather, how vile a sophism—which the aforesaid Philosopher introduces in his Paradoxes from the opinion of others, in order to prove that the virtues, like the vices, are equal in all, when, namely, he has said that 'no one is better than a good man, nor more temperate than a temperate man, nor braver than a brave man, nor wiser than a wise man.' For even if no one is better than a good man, yet someone is better than some good man.

For what else is it to say of someone that he is better than a good man, except that he is better than any good man, whoever he may be? For when we say that God is better than man, we understand it in no other way than that He surpasses all men. So too, when nevertheless we call some good man better than a good man—that is, than any good man is, or than some man is good—it seems it must be taken in no other way than that he is set above all good men generally. Which is altogether false, since he himself too is one of the good men. For if he is better than a good man, or than any good man is, the consequence seems to be that neither a good man nor any good man is so good; but if anyone is good, he is the less good by so much.

It therefore seems to make a great difference whether one is said to be better than some good man, or better than any good man is. And here indeed this snare of sophistry can fall into every comparison, so that just as they try to prove that all good men are equally good, so too they prove all beautiful men equally beautiful—since, namely, no beautiful man is more beautiful than the beautiful simply and generally speaking, although he be more beautiful than another beautiful man. Finally, who is there who does not understand how utterly insane it is to say that all sins are equal? For whether you place sin in the will or in the act, it is clear that among evil men one has a more wicked will than another, and harms more or acts worse.

For the will leads on to the act, and when the power of harming is given, this man harms more than that man, or persecutes some just man more, because he hates him more and desires to afflict him more. Likewise, not all good men are equally profitable, or equally willing to be profitable. From which it is plain that good men are not equal to one another, nor wicked men, nor ought their merits to be made equal, so that their recompense too should be understood to be equal.

Moreover, if, setting aside the opinion of fools, you consider the doctrines concerning the virtues handed down by the excellence of approved philosophers, and diligently attend to the fourfold distinction of the virtues made by that most eloquent man Plotinus—who says that some are political, some purgative, some of the purified soul, and some exemplary—you are at once compelled, from the very names and their descriptions, to confess that men differ very greatly in the virtues. This difference too the Apostle himself, whom you cast in my teeth, did not pass over, but when he spoke of continence and the indulgence of marriage, he said: I wish all men to be as myself. But each one has his own gift from God, one indeed thus, another thus, and so forth.

He too, distinguishing the rewards of the future life according to the quality of virtues or merits, says: Star differs from star in brightness; so also shall be the resurrection of the dead. And elsewhere: He who sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly. But as for his saying that charity is the fullness of the law—that is, that the law is fulfilled through charity—this does not prove that all are equal in charity, since charity extends itself above the commandment. Whence too is that exhortation of Truth: When you have done all things that are commanded, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done what we ought to do.

That is, count it as little if you fulfill only this which you owe by commandment, unless, namely, you add something of grace over and above what is owed by the commandment; and this is what he says: We have done what we ought to do. As if, namely, he were to say: Because in the fulfillment of the commandments we pay only what is owed, and work as it were what is necessary, not what is gratuitous. But when someone passes over to the eminence of virginity, he certainly transcends in that the commandment, to which he is not constrained by commandment. Whence the same Apostle recalls: Concerning virgins, however, I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel.

But even in those who have fulfilled the law and not transcended it, charity can be unequal, since indeed in the same work the affection of charity in this man may be greater than in that man. As for the objection raised from that saying of Augustine—'Where charity is, what is it that could be lacking?' and so forth—there is no one who thinks he meant it so as to wish to unite all men to all in virtues and merits; which, following both the Lord and the Apostle, he almost everywhere contradicts. What he says is surely this: What is it that could be lacking unto salvation—but not unto the perfection of the virtues? For no one perishes who has charity, but not all are made equal in it. Philosopher:

Let it not burden you, I pray, that we bring forward many opinions or views, so that out of them all we may be able to choose the truth of the reasonings. For those who are tracking out a place still unknown to them are compelled to explore many ways, in order to choose the straighter one; just as now I am compelled to do in inquiring after the supreme good, while, namely, at your invitation, I set forth the opinions of our elders, or my own. Christian: It would not burden me, if something were brought forward as an opinion which, even if it were not true, would at least have some probability. For there is no need to refute by any reasoning that which is patently false. Philosopher:

What if we should call the supreme good of man that state of the future life only in comparison with the goods of the present life? For even when you say that two ends are set before us by God—namely the supreme good in heaven, or the supreme evil in hell—you understand this in no other way than with respect to the good or evil state of the present life. For reason suggests to us six states of men: three, namely, in this life, and corresponding to these, three others likewise in the life to come. For the first state of man is that in which he is born, while as yet, reason not being awakened in him, he has not attained free choice, such that, according to what he should choose, he should be called a good man or an evil one—although he himself is a good thing, or a good substance or creature.

From this prior state of man indeed, when he himself, having been brought to the age of discretion, has knowingly inclined himself to good or to evil, then, being made a good man or an evil one, he has entered the good or evil state of man. The first state in man, as it were indifferent, is to be called properly neither good nor evil; the second, if he has ascended to virtues, good; if he has descended to vices, evil. So too the future life has three states:

One indeed as it were indifferent, properly neither blessed nor wretched, which belongs, namely, to those whose state even in this life, as we have said, was indifferent—that is, destitute of all virtues and merits, man's reason not yet being awakened; another, however, the best according to merits, and another the worst. These two latter, in comparison with the two others of the present life which earn them, I judge are called the supreme good and the supreme evil, in that nothing adverse or prosperous is mingled with them; whereas it is agreed that the other two are intermixed with such things, so that neither the purity of good nor of evil is present in them. Christian:

Behold, according to you the supreme good is to be understood as that rest of the heavenly life, just as on the contrary the supreme evil is that future damnation of the wicked. Both of which, as you have recalled, we ourselves acquire by our merits, by which, namely, as by certain ways, one arrives thither. Philosopher: So I judge, and it is plain. For among those who embrace the natural law, no opinion is held more firmly than that virtue suffices for blessedness, and that the virtues alone make one blessed, nor does anyone attain this name by any other way. So, on the contrary, it is established that no one becomes truly wretched except from vices. Whence, just as the former are the ways to the supreme good, so it is established that the latter are the ways to the supreme evil. Christian:

Since you now seem to have come somewhat near to the supreme good of man, as also to his supreme evil, and have moreover touched upon the ways to them, I am pleased for a little while to slacken the reins of our objections to your course, so that you may more easily arrive at the goal of your purpose, and that there may be a truer and more perfect judgment concerning the completion of the work. Having shown, therefore, what you call the supreme good of man, or his supreme evil, it remains for you also to define and distinguish diligently those ways to them which you have mentioned—namely the virtues and the vices—so that they may be the more either sought after or shunned, the better they are known. Philosopher: 'Virtue,' they say, 'is the best habit of the mind'; so on the contrary I judge that vice is the worst habit of the mind;

and by 'habit' we mean that which Aristotle distinguished in the Categories, when, under habit and disposition, he comprehended the first species of quality. A habit, therefore, is a quality of a thing not naturally implanted, but acquired by zeal and deliberation, and difficult to change. Whence that which in some men they call natural chastity—arising, namely, from coldness of body or from some complexion of nature, which never sustains any battle of concupiscence over which it might triumph, and which obtains no merit—we by no means number among the virtues; nor any qualities of mind that are easily changeable. For where there is no struggle of resistance, there is no crown of conquering virtue, according also to that saying of your great philosopher:

He shall not be crowned who has not striven lawfully. Hence too that saying of Philosophy herself to Boethius, in the fourth book of his Consolation: 'From this also it is called virtue (virtus), because, relying on its own strength (vires), it is not overcome by adversities.' He too, asserting that every virtue is difficult to change, when in the aforesaid treatise on quality he was expounding Aristotle, who places the sciences and virtues among the habits, says: 'For virtue, unless it be difficult to change, is no virtue.'

'For neither is he who judges justly once a just man, nor is he who commits adultery once an adulterer, but only when that will and intention has remained.' But the best habit of the mind is that which forms us unto the merit of true blessedness; such are the several species of virtue, of which some have established more, others fewer. Socrates indeed, through whom first and chiefly the study of moral discipline grew strong, distinguishes four species of virtue: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. Some, however, name the discernment of prudence rather the mother or origin of the virtues than a virtue.

For prudence is this very knowledge of morals, which, as the ethical treatise teaches, is called the knowledge of things good and evil—that is, the discernment itself of goods or evils which are properly to be called good or evil in themselves. For certain things are called good or evil properly and as it were substantially of themselves—as the virtues themselves or the vices; but certain things are so called by accident and through another. As are the actions of our works, which, since in themselves they are indifferent, are nevertheless called good or evil from the intention from which they proceed. Whence too often, when the same thing is done by different men, or by the same man at different times, yet according to the diversity of intentions the same work is called good and evil.

But those things which are called good or evil substantially and from their own nature remain so perpetually unmixed, that what is once good can never become evil, or vice versa. The discernment, therefore, of these—of goods, that is, as well as of evils—is called prudence. Which discernment indeed, because it can be present equally in perverse as in good men, and has no merit, is by no means rightly called a virtue or the best habit of the mind. Whence Aristotle, distinguishing the sciences from the virtues, when in the aforesaid treatise on quality he subjoined examples concerning habit, says: 'Such are the sciences or virtues.' Expounding which place, Boethius says:

'For Aristotle does not consider the virtues to be sciences, as Socrates does.' So too that man—as I have already recalled above—first ours and afterwards yours, Augustine, at times extends the name of virtue even unto faith and hope, at times contracts it to charity alone, which is, namely, the proper and special possession of the good, since the other two are common both to the reprobate and to the elect. For it is written: Faith without works is idle; and: the hope of the impious shall perish. But just as faith or hope without works are rendered useless to us, or rather harmful, so too is prudence.

For we are the more guilty either when we knowingly avoid what ought to be done, or do what ought not to be done, than if this happened through ignorance, which could indeed offer some excuse. Whence too is that saying which you know: The servant who knows the will of his master and does it not shall be beaten with many stripes. And elsewhere: 'It were better not to have known the way of truth, than after knowing it to turn back.' Prudence therefore, like faith or hope—which befit evil men as well as good ones—is not so much to be called a virtue as to afford a certain guidance or incitement toward the virtues. Christian: This for the present concerning prudence I think is enough. Now it remains for you to proceed to the remaining virtues, as it pleases Socrates. Philosopher:

Justice, then, is the virtue which, the common good being preserved, renders to each his own dignity. This is that virtue by which we will that each should have that of which he is worthy, if this brings no harm to the common good. For it often happens that, while we render to someone his own according to his merits, that which is done singly in one man brings harm to the community. Lest, therefore, the part should prejudice the whole, or the individual the community, there is added 'the common good being preserved.' For to this end it is fitting that all things which we do be rightly referred, namely that in all things each should regard not so much his own good as the common one, and should provide not so much for his household concerns as for the public ones, and should live not so much for himself as for his country.

Whence too that first and greatest teacher of moral philosophy, Socrates, judged that all things should be reduced to common ownership and applied to the common advantage—so much so that he ordained that wives too should be common, in such a way, namely, that no one should recognize his own children; that is, that men should believe them begotten not so much for themselves as for the country, so that this community of wives might be understood not as in the use of the flesh, but in the fruit of offspring. This, by word as well as by deed, Aulus left as an example for the memory of posterity, by killing his own son, saying that he had begotten him not for Catiline against his country, but for his country against Catiline.

This man indeed, kindled with zeal for justice, regarding in his son not his son but an enemy of the country, exhibited the aforesaid definition of justice not so much by mouth as by hand. Whoever, therefore, is constant in this will of which we have spoken, so that he cannot easily be moved from it, is strong in the virtue of justice, even if he is not yet perfected in fortitude and temperance. But because that which is hard to lose is nevertheless sometimes compelled to depart when some great cause intervenes—just as this very good will, which is called justice, vanishes through some fear or desire—against fear, fortitude, and against desire, temperance, is necessary.

For the fear of a thing which we do not want, or the desire of that which we want, if they are so great as to prevail over reason, easily draw the mind back from a good purpose and lead it into the contrary. Whence against fear fortitude takes up a shield, against desire temperance takes up a bridle, so that what we already will through the virtue of justice we may, being strengthened also by these, be able to fulfill, as far as is in us. Whence we call each of these a certain firmness and constancy of mind, by which we are made able to discharge that which we will through justice.

Whereof certain contraries are rightly named infirmities of mind and impotencies of resisting the vices—as cowardice or pusillanimity, which render a man slack, and intemperance, which dissolves us into obscene pleasures or base desires. Fortitude indeed is a considered—that is, a reasonable—endurance of toils and undertaking of dangers. This is that virtue which makes us ready to undertake dangers or to bear toils, as is opportune; which depends chiefly on the love of justice, which we call a good zeal, namely in repelling or avenging evils. Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over the other unright impulses of the mind.

For often, exceeding the measure, while we seem to ourselves to be temperate, we transgress the bounds of temperance; so that, while we are zealous for sobriety, we afflict ourselves with immoderate fastings, and, desiring harshly to subdue a vice, we extinguish nature itself, and thus, by exceeding in many things, we set up, in place of virtues, the vices that border upon them. Whence rightly, after it was said 'firm,' there was subjoined 'moderate.' Over which reason it is necessary that the very reason of prudence should preside, which they name, as we have said, the mother of the virtues—that is, their origin and nurse.

For unless through this we foreknow the virtues, and are able diligently to discern them not only from their contraries and manifest opposites, but also from the vices that border upon them, we by no means give heed to acquiring or preserving those which we do not know. Whence whoever is perfected in these virtues, it is necessary that prudence be present in him—through which, namely, justice too, which dispenses merits, may know what is owed to each; that fortitude may have discernment in undertaking dangers or enduring toils; that temperance, as has been said, may have moderation in restraining concupiscences. It is established, therefore, that in these three virtues which we have named, from which prudence cannot be absent, a man is perfected and made complete in goods.

Now indeed it remains to distinguish their species or parts, so that we may more diligently recognize them and, by pursuing their doctrine one by one, may judge more truly. Christian: Nay rather, since it so pleases and ought to please, we desire that this be done. Philosopher: To justice, then, which preserves to each what is his own, there pertain—to speak briefly—reverence, beneficence, truthfulness, and retribution. What reverence is. We call reverence that part of justice through which we are of our own accord ready to show due veneration to all: namely both to God, which is called religion, and to men worthy by power or by some merit, which is called observance.

Here, therefore, it is established that the virtue of obedience is included, by which, namely, by complying with the precepts of our superiors, we hereby also defer honor to them, in that we by no means despise their reasonable ordinances. What beneficence is. Beneficence indeed is that through which we are ready to bring due aid to the needs of men—either, namely, by giving the necessary things to those in want, which is called liberality (whereas in superfluous things prodigality consists), or by setting free those violently oppressed, which is called clemency. But mercy—so named from the wretched (miseri)—our elders called rather a vice and a certain infirmity of mind than a virtue: that, namely, through which we desire to succor others by naturally suffering-with them only in this, that they are afflicted.

Clemency, however, is moved to succor certain persons only by a reasonable affection, and attends not so much to the fact that they are afflicted as to the fact that they are unjustly afflicted, so that, by opposing injustice, it may comply with justice. Otherwise they are not works of justice, when we succor others, unless in this we render to each his own. But since virtue is a habit of mind, which—as is clear from what has been said above—is established to be had by application or zeal rather than by nature, by no means is such natural compassion to be referred to the virtues, through which, namely, we busy ourselves to succor even the guilty themselves when set in affliction, by a certain human or carnal, not reasonable, affection—in this rather opposing justice, lest the due penalties be rendered to them.

Finally, to submit the mind to grief whatever may happen, is a matter rather of infirmity than of virtue, and of misery rather than of blessedness, and of a disturbed, not a quiet, mind. For since nothing happens without cause, God disposing all things in the best way, what happens whereby it should behoove the just man to be saddened or to grieve, and thus, as far as in him lies, to go against the best disposition of God, as though he judged it ought to be corrected? What truthfulness is. Truthfulness is that through which we are zealous to keep those things of which we make ourselves debtors by promising. For if we promise what we ought not, we are not made guilty by not fulfilling that of which an evil promise by no means made us debtors.