On the State of the Soul 1 part 9/11

Therefore you are incorporeal even while in the body, if you could be caught up without the body; since the incorporeal is mingled with the body, with its own substance preserved, for the very purpose of vivifying that body; but that the body should exist without body is not permitted by the appointed law of things. XIII. FROM THE GOSPEL HE USES GOD HIMSELF AS WITNESS FOR THE INCORPOREALITY OF THE SOUL. But now, by my witnesses—namely the heralds of truth—Truth itself shall testify to undoubted faith. The Lord says in the Gospel: 'Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul.' Why, I ask you, can he who can kill the body not kill the soul, unless perhaps because the soul is not body? But you say: it is indeed a body, but more tenuous; it is indeed a body, but lighter.

But I myself bring back this answer: granted it be more tenuous and lighter—yet nevertheless, if it is a body, it can be killed by him by whom a body can be killed. For we are dealing with these two, namely soul and body, of which the visible man is composed. For He who said 'Fear not those' did not say 'who kill the thicker body, the heavier body,' but 'who kill the body'; and likewise He did not say 'they cannot kill the more tenuous and lighter body,' but 'they cannot kill the soul.' For by this name 'body' He plainly included the living body, since nothing can be killed except what is living; and on this account, if the soul is a living body, it can be killed by him by whom the body can be killed. Truth says: 'Those who kill the body cannot kill the soul.'

Therefore the soul, which cannot be killed by those by whom the body can be killed, is not a body. But since the attention of the reader must be relieved of the burden of continuous reading, let this now be the end of this volume. I. CONCERNING THE BODY OF LAZARUS—HOW IT LAY LIFELESS IN A PLACE, WHILE THE SOUL DEPARTED FROM THE BODY WITHOUT BEING IN A PLACE.

Having put forward, for the establishing of the truth, sureties sufficiently suitable (as I judge) both in worth and in number, it now remains for us to examine what survives undiscussed from the little work of this champion of the body—who, decreeing by rash persuasion that the soul is contained by the body, and having taken up for this same purpose an example of evangelical authority, argues as though decisively, saying that the body of Lazarus, when it was dead, was without life, and that the same, when revived, was with life, so that by this the soul is believed to be local, having withdrawn from the body and again drawn near to the body. II. CONCERNING THE SOUL—IN WHAT RESPECT IT BEARS THE LIKENESS OF GOD.

And in order to prescribe in common for the whole class of souls, he pronounces that the soul of our very Redeemer is local—by a syllogism, forsooth, formidable and (as he supposes) insoluble: that the soul, where it is, exists, and where it is not, does not exist—as though we were saying that the same soul is either everywhere or nowhere; whereas, if it were everywhere, it would be God, and if it were nowhere, it would be nothing. The soul indeed is not whole in the whole world, but just as God is everywhere whole in the universe, so this soul is found whole everywhere in the body. And just as God by no means fills a smaller part of the world with a smaller part of Himself, and a greater part with a greater, but is whole in the part and whole in the whole, so too this soul is not present in a part of the body by a part of itself.

Nor does one part of the soul give sensation to the eye and another vivify the finger; but just as in the eye it lives wholly and through the eye sees wholly, so too in the finger it lives wholly and through the finger feels wholly. Or if perchance it feels wholly in the finger in such a way that it is not wholly in the finger, then it feels wholly where it is not wholly, and it exists where it does not exist. Either therefore the soul will be whole in the smallest part of the body, since it is nonetheless whole in the whole, or, since it feels wholly where it is not whole, it then exists wholly where it is not whole. But concerning this I have discoursed at great length in the first book, and have set down not a little at the beginning of the second; into which, if anyone shall have looked attentively, he will plainly come to this very place not unschooled.

For it is most difficult to contemplate incorporeal things, because the deceptive sight of the corporeal senses so beclouds with sin the eye of the feeble mind, that when it wishes to contemplate either itself or God, it sees only the veil of corporeal images which is spread before it, since it cannot see beyond that veil. Whoever therefore is hindered by the difficulty of this inquiry, let him spend study and labor—not to go about slandering me, but that he may be able to be purged. Nor yet am I so forgetful of myself as not to feel that there is in me more of sickness than of health. Yet it delights me that I escaped this opinion—by which the soul is believed to be body—together with my boyish years; for then, when I held the opinion, I assuredly did not know.

But to form opinions belongs to one who is ignorant, and ignorance is contrary to knowledge: therefore whoever forms a mere opinion does not know. Hence indeed it came about that I longed for knowledge in preference to opinion, knowing that I did not know, so long as I was forming opinions. But you say, when we inquire concerning the substance of the soul, that what is above us cannot be seen by us, since we ourselves are not above ourselves; and likewise you deny that it can be recognized, as though you judged it already known, and affirm that the soul of the body is a body. But if you say this knowingly—since false things cannot be known—you speak truly; and if you say this truly, then you lie when you say that the substance of the soul cannot be known. Either therefore it is false that the soul is body, or it is false that the substance of the soul cannot be known. You see whither opinion leads its followers?

For since no one but the ignorant forms opinions, and ignorance is opposed to knowledge, you who wish from the uncertainty of opinion to pass a certain sentence, and to pronounce as though knowingly upon these things which you do not know, are convicted of teaching what you do not know. Therefore you teach not knowing; and when you say that it cannot be known, you presume to teach. Grant us, we beg, pardon, since we are unwilling to learn ignorance. III. THAT THE BODY DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOUL LOCALLY, BUT THE SOUL CONTAINS THE BODY NON-LOCALLY; AND THAT EVERYTHING WHICH EXISTS IS EITHER IN ITSELF, OR A SUBJECT, OR IN A SUBJECT. You say, then, that the soul is contained by the body. Should not even that apostolic saying have come into your mind, which was spoken: 'And though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed'?

Everything that exists, to put it briefly, is either in itself, or a subject, or in a subject. In itself is God; among corporeal things the body is a subject, and the color of the body is in a subject; among incorporeal things the mind and learning, which are so bound to each other that neither is body without color nor is the rational mind without learning. Now do you, who believe that the soul is a body and that this same, superimposed in a subject, is contained in the body—do you see whether we are able to prove that what is in a subject remains when the subject itself perishes? For if it is contained by the body, it is itself superimposed in its subject; nor will that be able to remain which is contained, when he who contains it perishes.

But the apostle says that, as the body grows old, the soul is renewed, and as the body is corrupted, the soul is made strong; therefore it is not contained by the body. I fear that here too you may seem to have opined like a new Academic, who both, with the Academics, knows nothing, and yet without hesitation defines concerning those things which he does not know. See lest the body does not contain the soul, but is contained by the soul. For when the body is corrupted, the soul is strengthened, just as the body in turn is dissolved by the loss of the soul. The soul lives better without the body; the body without the soul does not even live worse. And that of these two, of which the human substance is composed, what is in what may flourish not by argument alone but may also grow clear by authority, let us bring forward also the prophetic testimony. For it says: 'The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul.'

And first we must see whether that weighs down which is in something, or that in which each thing is. If that in which something is, then it is each thing that is lightened by the weight that is laid upon it. But if that weighs down which is in something—not that in which something is—then the body, which weighs down the soul, is more in the soul than the soul, which is weighed down by the body, is in the body: the burden, namely, is in the bearer, not the bearer in the burden. Since these things are so, that there is in the soul a great likeness of its Author is shown by this greatest token: that, according to that likeness, just as the world is non-locally in God, so non-locally is the body in the soul. Now to me inquiring I ask that you answer: if the soul is locally within the body, in what way does it contain the body?

For it is well known that nothing corporeal can be contained by a body unless what contains is exterior and what is contained is interior. But the soul, as you yourself affirm to be corporeal, in what way is it within the body for the purpose of vivifying it, and outside the body for the purpose of containing it? Or does it perhaps contain exteriorly in such a way that it is not exterior? Again therefore we are driven back into that difficulty: that the soul is either non-locally outside the body, so that it may contain the body, or, if it contains where it is not, it exists where it is not. But this reasoning perhaps troubles you by its novelty. Wake up a little, and, if you can, gaze; if you cannot, marvel at the power of the incorporeal—that it moves a body while standing still, and not by passing through places approaching whatever places, and while operating non-locally in those same places.

If you could discern this, you would not set before us the soul of Lazarus as though some sort of body, on account of a certain locality of withdrawing and returning; but you would recognize that the same soul gave life to his body by an incorporeal motion, and departed non-locally, and again returned to it non-locally. Now if the genuine truth of this vision becomes clear to you, you will be tossed about by no difficulty of the question, as to how the soul, the body being laid down, can be non-locally in the world; for it will be non-locally in any part of the world just as it was non-locally in the body. But you, to the prejudice of the whole class of souls, pronounce that the soul of Christ also is local and corporeal, and you say that the soul of the Redeemer is a body—whereas the soul even of a beast is not. IIII.

THAT, JUST AS THE BODY, THOUGH IT BE LOCAL, IS NON-LOCALLY IN THE SOUL, SO THE WORLD, THOUGH IT BE LOCAL, IS NON-LOCALLY IN GOD. But perhaps you will contend: in what way is the soul both in a place and yet not local? And I in turn question you by a mutual inquiry: in what way is the corporeal world both local and yet not in a place? But if you reply that the world is in a place, no less actively do I ask: is the place in which the world is outside the world, or of the world? If of the world, then the world is not in it, but it, together with the world, is in another. If outside the world, again I ask whether the place in which the world is, is itself in a place. Either therefore you will confess places—that is, infinite bodies—and so will equate with God, who alone is infinite, a body; or you will grant that the world is not in a place.

Now therefore turn over this reasoning in your mind; and just as you perceive that there are so many places and so many spaces, none of which is in a place, so understand that that which is of no mass, of no space, can be in a place without place; for if that which is local is not in a place, much less is that in a place which is not local. V. THAT, JUST AS THE SOUL DEPARTS NON-LOCALLY FROM THE BODY SO THAT THE BODY DIES, SO THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST DEPARTED NON-LOCALLY SO THAT THE SON OF GOD, CHRIST, MIGHT DIE UPON THE CROSS. But however clearly this may shine forth, whether you understand it or not I should doubt; that which is of so simple a consequence that the recognition of it is not (I will not say) ready at hand, but cannot even easily be avoided—I cannot sufficiently marvel that it has thus slipped away from you.

You say that the body of Christ, when it was lifted up on the gibbet, was animate, but when it was committed to the sepulcher was lifeless; and on account of this—which is not to be denied—by the argument of your acumen the soul will be local, because it alternately vivified the body of Christ. Under the constraint, then, of this opinion, we shall believe by profane daring that God too is local—who both was in Christ when He was crucified, and forsook the same in His passion. The Lord Himself also cried from the cross: 'My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' For if He did not depart, He did not forsake; if He forsook, He assuredly departed. Cast locality, then, now upon God. There is, plainly, a near step, that from the wrong done to the likeness of God you should be carried into God, and that you who defame the image should assail its Author.

As therefore non-locality is not taken away from God because, in departing, He forsook the man Christ, so the soul does not lose the privilege of non-locality when it departs as the body dies. VI. THAT THE VIRGIN DID NOT SEE THE ANGEL GABRIEL IN THAT SUBSTANCE BY WHICH HE IS SPIRIT, BUT IN VIRTUE OF THAT VISIBLE BODY WHICH HE TOOK TEMPORARILY FROM THE AIR. Here now, proud orator, you rush into the question of the angelic state, and you choose Gabriel for yourself as a sort of prelude of your tongue, declaiming thus:

'That most blessed Gabriel, who testifies that he stands before God, when he announced that the Lord of the heavens was to be infused into the womb of Mary, and when he stood before the eyes of the Mother of the Lord, was without doubt absent from heaven; he did not fly above Mary, did not fill the empty and diffused expanse of the vast air, but occupied only that very place in which he was present.' Deferring for a little the discussion of this sentence, I confess that I am astounded at so great a contradiction in your declarations: now you call the air subtle, now you call the same vast; now you call the great place of the world—which the element fills in proportion as it is air—by a certain poetic license 'empty,' nor do you understand that it absolutely cannot be empty, since where there is something there is not nothing.

But the air is not nothing; therefore where the air is, there is no void. But neither can that rightly be called empty which is nothing, since that which is nothing cannot receive anything. Accordingly, that is not empty which is capable of nothing. But as for that other point at which you aim—that you prefer, after the manner of the poets, to call the mother of the Lord 'genetrix,' and that you weave a poetic oratory even without verses—I, however, inquire not in what manner, but what you mean, and I ask that you answer. When the most blessed Gabriel stood before the eyes of the Lord's mother, did Mary see in Gabriel that by which Gabriel sees God? For if that was visible to Mary, then the non-local is contemplable by the local. But if it is, then it is not non-local;

for if anyone is local, he sees locally, and looking he cannot regard except a part. He therefore sees a place who sees locally, since a place is a part, and a place is assuredly a part of places, and places are bodies. And he who sees a part sees by a part of himself, nor can anything but a part be seen by a part; but there is no part of God, since the impartible has no part. Either therefore Gabriel does not see God, or he sees Him whole; nor can a thing be seen whole except by what is whole. But a body can neither be seen whole nor see anything whole; therefore that whereby Gabriel sees God is not a body, since by that whereby Gabriel locally saw Mary and Mary locally saw him, one cannot see non-locally.

But, to engage with you in argument: if the whole Gabriel is nothing but body, then on account of the distance of his parts he is not wholly foot, nor wholly mouth, nor wholly eye. Wherefore, when he was seen by Mary, he neither spoke with his foot, nor saw with his mouth, nor stood with his eye, but each several part of his members performed the office suited to its quality. Therefore, just as he stood locally and sounded locally, so too he saw locally. Here now, as the close of the question, I inquire whether Gabriel the angel—being, as you suppose, only a body, corporeally occupied in the contemplation of Mary—by one and the same sight, at one and the same time, saw the non-local God non-locally, by that whereby he locally saw the local Mary.

And since this is not permitted, on account of the diversity between the corporeal and the incorporeal, it remains that either Gabriel never saw Mary, or he ceased to see God. But against this falsehood stands the sentence of truth, by which it was said: 'Their angels always behold the face of My Father.' If they always behold, they never do not behold. But if, when Gabriel saw Mary, he ceased to behold God, then the angels do not always behold God. Therefore either, when Gabriel saw Mary, he ceased to behold God, or what Truth said will not be true.

Wherefore it is concluded, by reasoning indissoluble (as is plain), that since the angel, by a local sight fixed upon the contemplation of Mary, could not see God—and yet it is not lawful to deny that God was then also seen by Gabriel, lest, after the manner of the devil's fall, the angelic nature of an already immutable blessedness should have sunk into the misery, namely, of never seeing God—there is in him a corporeal and an incorporeal substance: the one by which he is either seen by a body or corporeally sees, the other by which he incorporeally beholds the incorporeal without end. VII. HOW FAR FORMLESS MATTER STANDS APART FROM NOTHING, OR HOW FAR, ONCE FORMED, IT STANDS APART FROM THE FORMLESS.

Come now, by the keenness of your surpassing genius and by your knowledge of causes and things, investigate, distinguish, and pronounce: in what way formless matter differs from nothing; what is inanimate yet formed; what is at once both formed and animate; what place and time are; how local motion is subject also to temporal motion, whereas temporal motion is only not also subject to local motion; what stable motion is, and what eternity is; what it is to be nowhere and nowhere not to be; what it is never to be and never not to be. And concerning all these things seek out the hidden ground of reason, and from those things in which all substance is contained choose out something that you may judge the angels to be. They are certainly not nothing, since whatever is something is not nothing.

They are not formless matter, since formless matter lies between something and nothing. See, we have scarcely departed from nothing. And now let us treat of that formed-yet-inanimate thing from which it pleases you to say the angels are. Observe now that, just as formless matter, which is capable of being formed, surpasses nothing, so that which is already formed is better than that which, though it can be formed, is not yet formed. Likewise, just as that which is formed precedes that which is not formed, so whatever is formed yet inanimate yields to that which is at once both formed and animate; for as the formed thing draws near to form, so the animate thing draws near to life. And as there are three things—formless matter, the formed-yet-lifeless, and the form of things—so likewise there are three: the thing made alive, that which gives life, and life itself.

The life of bodies is one thing, the life of lives another. The body is a living thing, the soul is alive, God is life—in such a way, namely, that the soul, which is alive in itself, is life to the body, so that thus the body does not live without it, just as the soul does not live without God. Understand now that to grant the holy angels bodies is to deny them life. And through this, since any animate thing consists of a twofold substance, and you hold the angels to be body alone, then the little worm is better than the angel; for although the angel has the form of a body, it does not have life as even the little worm has it. Moreover, no body is itself life to itself, for the body is one thing and the life of the body another.

Therefore either there is a life-giving spirit in the angel, or the angel is worse than every living thing; or, since it is mightier than every created living thing, the life it has is not just any life, but the most blessed life. VIII. THAT THE ANGELS, WHETHER GOOD OR EVIL, ARE SPIRITS, NOT BODIES; AND THAT NEITHER DOES AN ANGEL SEE GOD BY MEANS OF A BODY, NOR DOES A BODILY MAN SEE AN ANGEL UNLESS THE ANGEL HAS TAKEN ON A VISIBLE BODY. Therefore in Gabriel there is both the incorporeal, by which he immutably sees God, and a body, which either Mary may have seen, or by which Mary might be seen, and which, subjected to the spirit, he bore in a local manner—a thing which the spirit had known, in the very truth, must be borne in a non-local way. It is sufficiently clear, as I judge, that the blessed angels are of both substances.

And that they are incorporeal in that part of themselves by which God is visible to them, and likewise corporeal in that part by which they themselves are visible to men—since neither can God be seen by an angel by means of a body, nor can an angel be seen by a man without a body. Since these things are so, it cannot be denied that the devil too was made of incorporeal and corporeal, inasmuch as he was created together with the holy angels, and is of a twofold substance. After he swelled with the dropsy of pride and wasted away with the fever of envy, having of his own will slipped from holiness in a non-local manner, and having locally been cast down from heaven not of his own will, when he ceased to be good—though not to be an angel—he lost his innocence, not his nature.

Accordingly, just as the multitude of angels who stood firm is beatified in both parts of themselves, so the multitude that fell away will be punished in both parts of themselves. Therefore you will by no means rightly deny two substances in the devil; for, even setting myself aside, it will surely be necessary that you yield to yourself, and stamp out part of your own arguments with another part, and demolish the false by the true. The devil therefore has—himself nevertheless incorporeal—his own body; for he cannot feel bodily torments without a body. And again, that which feels is one thing, and that by which it feels is another. Indeed, if you take heed, you will be taught the truth by your own utterance. For you said: «If the devil drew a body from this condensed air, then he will bear an alien body to its torments»—

—as though I myself had ever, anywhere, said such a thing. But I do not deny what is owed: that by this argument you have unwillingly granted us the victory. For when you say that the devil will not bear an alien body to its torments, you of course confess that he will bear his own. Now it matters not to me whether he has his own body or an alien one; but whether he has a body at all—that does matter to me. You, however, not only confess but even argue that the devil not only has a body but has his own. For this is your very sentence: «If the devil drew a body from this condensed air, then he will bear an alien body to its torments.» Surely he who bears is something, and that which is borne is something.

And when it is said «he bears his own,» it is signified that the bearer is one thing and that which he bears is another. The devil therefore is of a twofold and diverse substance, since, when he bears his own body, he himself is not that which he bears. For the burden is one thing and the bearer another. Wherefore you will struggle against us no longer, if you believe yourself; for the body and that which has the body are substantially two, and these two are diverse, and, in order that they be diverse, the one will be incorporeal and the other corporeal. Therefore the devil, being of a twofold and diverse substance, is both corporeal and incorporeal. IX. THAT IT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD SPIRITUALLY, NOT BODILY, WHEN LAZARUS IN ABRAHAM'S BOSOM AND THE RICH MAN IN HELL CONVERSED WITH ONE ANOTHER, A CHASM SET BETWEEN THEM.

But if concerning these matters we have rendered an account, even if only in part, let us now examine, by the discussion of your own chapter, that chasm which—as you argue—set between the places separates the guilty souls from the innocent according to their deserts. For thus you discourse: «If souls are not local, how does that empty chasm, by its grievous interposition, sunder sinners from the gatherings and fellowships of the just, so that they can neither approach thither from here nor pass over hither from there?» This example from the Gospel reading you have set forth, having stripped it of the simplicity of the Lord's discourse, in order, namely, to establish the locality of souls. But the divine oracle, brought forth pure in its own truth, will plainly show what your discourse has there altered, corrupted, and concealed.

The Lord says in the Gospel: «The poor man died and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom; the rich man also died and was buried in hell. And while he was in torments, he saw Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom, and said: Father Abraham, send Lazarus that he may dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. And Abraham answered: Remember, son, that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus likewise evil things; and therefore now he is comforted here, but you are tormented. And in all these things, between us and you a great chasm is fixed, so that neither can anyone go from here to you, nor pass over from there to here.»

Now expound this to me according to places and times, or bodies: there, without the alternation of breath drawn in and out, without the organ of the chest, the flute of the throat, the hollow of the mouth, and the plectrum of the tongue, make words by means of vocal sounds through any soul which, as you assert, is bodily. Here show me the hand of a soul, with whose finger's tip, scorched, Lazarus is to plunge into water in order to cool the rich man's tongue. Here teach me something bodily about that supposedly bodily bosom of Abraham—such that it is both narrow, to the measure of a human body, and yet capacious enough to be able to hold many; and that chasm, either so small that those whom it divides can mingle their words mutually, or so immense that it cannot be crossed.

But this above all I ask: how could that rich man, who among those below seethes in the fires of Gehenna, have been able to meet Abraham in speech, if he did not approach the places of blessedness? And again, how does Abraham converse with the rich man, if he did not go down to the regions below? For you say, by a not-improbable opinion, that the souls of the saints dwell in the innermost seats of paradise.

Accordingly, since Abraham in paradise and the rich man in hell are thus separated from one another by a certain immense, impassable distance, and yet likewise mutually—as though nothing lay between—they not only behold but even converse with each other, then, if these things are to be estimated locally, you are compelled to confess one of two things: either that Abraham and the rich man neither conversed with one another nor were seen by one another; or else that there is hell in paradise, or paradise in hell. X. IN WHAT WAY THIS QUESTION CAN BE TAKEN SPIRITUALLY.

But since neither can the divine authority be obstinately resisted, nor can blessedness be mingled with the wretched, then, because with the blear eye of bodily imaginings we cannot look inward upon the perplexity of this utterance, let us, having for a little while set places and bodies aside, see—and where it is said that between certain persons separated by judgment there is so immense a space, and yet that there can also be an exchange of speech, let us mark not a distance of places, but a difference of deserts. For with respect to the body the unjust man can be locally together with the just; but the unjust man cannot, so long as he is unjust, be within the innocence of the just.