Having proposed long ago, at the beginning of the Evangelical Preparation, to refute the polytheistic error of all the nations, for the establishment and defense of our withdrawal from them — a withdrawal which we have made with good reason — I investigated first of all, in the first three treatises, not only the myths which the very children of their own theologians and poets have ridiculed concerning their national gods, but also the solemn and secret 'natural' allegories of these myths, transferred up somewhere to heaven and to the parts of the cosmos by the noble philosophy — even though their own theologians have declared that there is nothing at all in these myths that ought to be spoken of solemnly.
One must therefore observe that the most ancient of their theologians, knowing nothing more than the traditional narrative and clinging to myths alone, were nonetheless attested as authorities; whence it naturally came about that in all cities and villages, following the accounts of the ancients, rites and mysteries of the gods have been handed down in agreement with the earlier mythical narratives, so that even now the marriages and begettings of the gods, their lamentations and drunken revels, the wanderings of some, the love-affairs of others, the wraths of others, and the countless other misfortunes and predicaments of others, are received in keeping with what has been recorded by the most ancient writers, both in the rites, in the hymns, and in the odes composed to the gods themselves.
Nevertheless, out of abundance I have also brought into the open the tragic pretensions of these same men in their explanations of nature, and the sophistical ingenuities of the sophists and philosophers; not only this, but in three further treatises following after the first, I have stripped bare with clear refutations the account concerning the much-vaunted oracles, and the false opinion about fate so widely bruited among the many—employing for their refutation not only arguments of my own devising, but especially the very utterances of the philosophers among the Greeks themselves.
Then, passing on from there to the oracles of the Hebrews, I have set forth in an equal number of treatises in turn by what reasonings I presented the dogmatic theology contained in them, together with the whole history concerning them—a history attested even by the Greeks themselves.
Then next, having refuted the Greek way of life, showing how they profited in everything from barbarians and brought forward no venerable learning of their own, and having brought to light the comparison of the times in which the vaunted men of the Greeks and the prophets of the Hebrews lived—again, through the three treatises that follow these, I demonstrated the agreement of the opinions of the celebrated philosophers among the Greeks with those of the Hebrews, once more making the very utterances proper to these men my witnesses.
Moreover, in the treatise before this one I also exposed those among the Greek philosophers who differ from us in opinion—not only standing apart from us, but at variance even with their own kindred, and overturned by their own disciples. Through all these things I have shown to my readers the incorruptible standard of our judgment, offering, so to speak, by deeds and by the very facts themselves, proof that it was not without purpose, but by a considered and sober reasoning, that we chose the ancient and true philosophy and piety of the Hebrews in preference to that of the Greeks—a point which has also been established through the citation of the Greeks' own words.
Since I am still now, up to this point, holding to the last discourse of this work, being the fifteenth of the treatise in hand, I shall render what remains lacking to what has already been traversed, still now dragging into the light the venerable things of the noble philosophy of the Greeks, stripping bare before the eyes of all the useless learning found in it, and establishing before all else that it was not through ignorance of the things admired among them, but through disregard for the unprofitable pastime found in them, that we have given them so little thought, having devoted our own souls to the practice of better things.
Since this, then, has by God's help been sealed for us through the truth, the matter of the Preparation shall here be brought to its close for me; and passing on to the more complete subject of the Evangelical Demonstration, I shall attach the beginning of the second treatise, starting from the remaining point in the accusation made against us.
Now this was the reproach cast at us: that having preferred the oracles of the Hebrews to our ancestral customs, we did not likewise choose to emulate a manner of life similar to that of the Jews. To this, after the completion of the present discourse, with God's cooperation, I shall attempt to respond. For in this way I believe that the second part, bound as it were by a single bond to the first, will bring about one comprehensive understanding of the whole discourse.
As for the present treatise, since it has already appeared in the works before this one that the philosophy of Plato is at times in harmony with the doctrines of the Hebrews, and at other times at variance with them—in which respect it has been shown to be convicted of disagreeing even with what it itself prefers—while the doctrines of the others, those called the natural philosophers, both those of Plato's succession and those of Xenophanes and Parmenides, and further Pyrrho and those who introduced the suspension of judgment, and all the rest in order after them, whose opinions the preceding discourse has refuted, stand opposed both to the doctrines of the Hebrews together with those of Plato and to truth itself, and moreover have brought upon themselves refutation by their own weapons...
It is time to survey from above, as though from a stage, the further conceit of the followers of Aristotle and of the Stoic philosophers, and to examine all the remaining natural philosophy of those who arch their brows in pride, so that we may learn both the things solemnly proclaimed among them, and again the objections raised against them in turn by their own associates.
For thus our judgment concerning our withdrawal from these men would be freed from every reasonable charge, since it would be shown that it was not through ignorance of the venerable things among them, but by a judgment examined and thoroughly tested, that we have preferred the truth and piety found among those reckoned as barbarians to all that belongs to the Greeks.
I shall begin with the doctrines of Aristotle. Now others have indeed slandered the man's life, though they too were philosophers not otherwise obscure. But it is not pleasing to me even to endure with my own ears this man being ill spoken of by his own associates. Therefore I shall rather set forth the defenses made on his behalf by Aristocles the Peripatetic, who in the seventh book of his On Philosophy writes as follows concerning him:
For how is it possible, as Epicurus says in his letter concerning ways of life, that he, while still young, devoured his father's estate, then was pushed into military service, and faring badly in this, turned to selling drugs, and then, when Plato's school had reopened, thrust himself in among everyone there?
Or how could one accept what Timaeus of Tauromenium says in his histories, that he closed the doors of an undistinguished doctor's surgery and its ordinary practice only late in life?
Who could be persuaded by what is said by Aristoxenus the musician in his Life of Plato? For he says that during Plato's wandering and sojourn abroad, certain foreigners rose up against him and built a rival Peripatos [Walk] of their own. Some therefore suppose he is saying this about Aristotle, though Aristoxenus everywhere speaks well of Aristotle.
One might justly say that the memoirs of Alexinus the eristic are likewise ridiculous. For he represents Alexander as a boy conversing with his father Philip, spitting on the arguments of Aristotle, but approving of Nicagoras, who was surnamed Hermes.
And Eubulides too, in his book against him, plainly lies: first bringing forward frigid poems, as though written by others, concerning his marriage and his intimacy with Hermias; then claiming that he offended Philip, did not attend Plato at his death, and destroyed his books.
As for the accusation of Demochares against the philosophers, what need is there to speak of it? For he spoke ill not of Aristotle alone, but of the others as well. Moreover, if one examines the slanders themselves, one would say he is talking nonsense. For he says that letters of Aristotle were seized as being directed against the city of the Athenians, and that he betrayed his native Stagira to the Macedonians; and further, that when Olynthus had been razed, he informed Philip at the slave-market of the wealthiest of the Olynthians.
But everything is surpassed in folly by what was said by Lycon, who claims to be a Pythagorean himself. For he says that Aristotle offered a sacrifice for his deceased wife such as the Athenians offer to Demeter, and that he used to bathe in warm oil and then sell it off; and that when he was departing for Chalcis, the customs officials found in his ship seventy-four bronze pots.
Such, more or less, were those who first slandered Aristotle: some of them lived in the same times as he, others came a little later; but all were sophists, eristics, and rhetoricians, whose names and books are more dead than their bodies. As for those who came after them and merely repeat what those men said, one should altogether bid them farewell, especially those who have not even encountered their books but improvise—such as those who say he had three hundred pots. For no one among those who lived at that time could be found to have said any such thing about him except Lycon; and he, as I said, said that seventy-five little pots were found.
One might conjecture that all these statements are false, not only from the dates and from the slanderers themselves, but also from the fact that they do not all slander him for the same things, but each says something peculiar to himself; whereas if any one of these things were true, it surely ought to have followed—yet he was never once destroyed by the men of that time.
It is evident, then, that just as happened to many others, so it happened also to Aristotle: on account of his friendships with kings and his preeminence in learning, he was envied by the sophists of that time. But those who think rightly ought not to look only at those who slander him, but also at those who praise and emulate him; for these would be found far more numerous and far better.
The other charges, then, have plainly been fabricated; but these two seem to be believed, for which some find fault with him: one, that he married Pythias, sister by nature but adopted daughter of Hermias, thereby flattering him (Theocritus of Chios indeed composed an epigram to this effect: 'This empty tomb was set up by empty-minded Aristotle for Hermias, the eunuch, slave of Eubulus, who, on account of his belly's incontinent nature, chose to dwell by the outflow of a sluggish stream rather than in the Academy'); the other, that he was ungrateful toward Plato.
Concerning Hermias and the friendship of Aristotle toward him, many others have written, and especially Apellicon, whose books, once read, will make anyone cease from reviling them.
As for the marriage to Pythias, he himself has given a sufficient defense in his letters to Antipater. For when Hermias had died, he married her out of goodwill toward him—she being in other respects modest and good, but made unfortunate by the calamities that had befallen her brother.
Then next: 'After the death of Pythias, sister of Hermias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stagira, from whom a son, Nicomachus, was born to him. They say that this son, raised as an orphan under Theophrastus, died in war while still a young lad.'
Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews, having laid down the premise that the end of living blessedly is the knowledge and friendship of the God of the universe, brought to completion through piety, and having taught that true piety consists in pleasing God through the whole of virtue (for this, they said, is the cause of all good things, since all things depend on God alone, and all things are supplied by him to those who love God)—while Plato too defined matters in harmony with these, declaring virtue to be the end of happiness—Aristotle, having traveled a different road, says that no one will be happy otherwise than through bodily well-being as well as an abundance of external goods, without which not even virtue is of profit. How the disciples of Plato opposed him on this point, refuting his mistaken supposition, may be learned from what follows.
For since the whole of philosophy, common to all who philosophize, promises human happiness, and is divided into three parts according to the creative distribution of the universe, the Peripatetic will be seen to fall so far short of teaching anything of Plato's in these matters that, although there are many who differ from Plato, he himself will appear to be the one most opposed of all.
And first, on the point that is common, greatest, and most authoritative of all, he made his departure from Plato: he did not preserve the true measure of happiness, nor did he grant that virtue alone is sufficient for it, but slipped away from the power inherent in virtue, supposing that it stood in need of the gifts of fortune besides, so that together with these it might attain happiness; whereas if virtue were taken by itself, he faulted it as incapable and unable to reach happiness.
To demonstrate the ignoble and mistaken character of his judgment in this and other matters is not the task of the present occasion; but this, I think, is plain: since the goal and happiness are neither equal nor the same according to Plato and according to Aristotle—the one everywhere proclaiming and declaring that the most just man is the happiest, the other not allowing happiness to follow upon virtue unless birth also proves fortunate, and beauty, and moreover gold—'who, though possessing gold, went off to war, like a maiden'—it necessarily follows that, in accordance with the difference of the end, the philosophy that leads to it must also differ.
For one traveling a single road, which by its nature leads to something small and lowly, cannot arrive at things greater and set on high. 'Do you see that lofty peak, rugged and forbidding, on which he sits, making light of your struggle?'
For that keen and cunning beast, the fox, it is impossible to ascend to that lofty peak; and in order that she might come to the same place as the eagle's offspring, either those eagles must, by some evil fortune, fall to the ground when their own wings have been destroyed, or she must grow, what she does not by nature grow, swift, encircling wings, and thus, lifted from the earth, fly up to the lofty peak. But so long as each remains in its own proper order, there is no fellowship between the creatures of earth and the creatures of heaven.
And after other things he adds: 'These things being so, and Plato attempting to draw the souls of the young somewhere on high toward the divine, and in this way making them akin to virtue and to the beautiful, while persuading them to disdain everything else—tell us, O Peripatetic, how will you teach these things? How will you guide the lovers of Plato toward them?'
Where in your school is there such a height of doctrine as would let one acquire the ambition of the Aloadae and seek the road to heaven—which they thought could be achieved by heaping up mountains, but which was in fact achieved, as Plato says, by the stripping away of human pursuits?
What help, then, do you offer the young toward these things? And from where does any argument come as an ally of virtue? From which writings of Aristotle? From which of his followers? From what treatises? I grant you leave even to lie, if you wish, provided it be at least something bold and spirited. But in fact you cannot say, nor would any of the leaders of your school permit you.
At any rate, Aristotle's treatises on these matters—entitled Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Great Ethics—hold an opinion about virtue that is small, lowly, and vulgar, and no greater than what even a layman, an uneducated person, a mere youth, or a woman might hold. For the diadem, so to speak, and the royal scepter that virtue holds, unalienable, having received it from Zeus himself—'since that is not to be revoked which he has once assented to with a nod of his head'—this they dare to strip away from her.
For they do not permit her to make men happy, but they render her equal to wealth, reputation, birth, health, beauty, and whatever other things are common even to vice. For just as any one of these, present apart from virtue, is not sufficient to render its possessor happy, so likewise virtue, in the same way, apart from these, is not sufficient to make its possessor happy.
How then has the dignity of virtue not been cast down and thrown to the ground? 'Yes,' they say, 'but we hold that virtue far surpasses the other goods.' What of it? Health too surpasses wealth; but that neither, apart from the other, suffices for happiness is common to all such goods.
Whenever, then, someone teaches, on the basis of these doctrines and this school, the man who seeks the whole of human good within the soul itself, he says that the happy man does not mount the wheel of torture, nor could the man bound by the fortunes of Priam be happy and blessed.
Yet it is not unlikely that the man possessing virtue should fall into such circumstances. And from this it follows that happiness neither necessarily attends those who possess virtue in every case, nor, should it come, does it remain forever: 'Some leaves the wind scatters upon the ground, but others the flourishing wood puts forth again; so too the generation of men—one grows, another comes to its end.'
Your example, O poet, is still too small and too timid: 'and after it the season of spring comes on.' Great is the time in between, and for some it never comes at all. If you wish to depict precisely the precariousness and frailty of the human race, compare it instead to Aristotle's happiness. More easily than the leaves does this happiness both spring up and fail, not waiting for the year to run its course, nor even for a whole year, nor even a whole month, but within the very day, within the very hour, it both comes to be and perishes.
Many are the things that destroy it, and all of them arise from fortune. For indeed the ills of the body are countless, and so are poverty and dishonor and all such things; and against none of these is the aid of beloved virtue sufficient—too weak either to ward off wretchedness or to preserve happiness.
One, then, who has been raised on these teachings and takes pleasure in these arguments—in what way will he either himself be in harmony with the doctrines of Plato, or ever strengthen others toward them? For there is no way that one setting out from these premises could accept those Heraclean and divine doctrines, that virtue is a strong and altogether beautiful thing, never at any time lacking for happiness nor ever deprived of it; but even if poverty, even if disease, even if disgrace, even if torments, even if pitch and the cross, even if all the horrors of tragedy should come flooding in together, still the just man is happy and blessed.
At any rate, by his own loudest-voiced herald he proclaims the most just man as though he were some victorious athlete, declaring that this man is most blessed who reaps the fruit of happiness from justice itself. Divide, then, if you wish, and elaborate, distinguishing goods into three, four, or many kinds; none of this is relevant to the matter before us. You will certainly never bring us over to Plato by means of these things.
For what if, as you say, of goods some are honorable, like the gods, others praiseworthy, like the virtues, others are powers, like wealth and strength, and others are useful, like medical treatments? And what if, distinguishing these by a smaller division, you should say that of goods some are ends, others not ends—calling ends those things for the sake of which the other things exist, and not-ends those things which are taken for the sake of the others?
And what if one should learn that some goods are good absolutely, others not for everyone; or that some are goods of the soul, others of the body, and others external; or again that of goods some are powers, others dispositions and states, others activities, others ends, others materials, others instruments; and even if one should learn from you to distribute the good tenfold according to the ten categories—what do these teachings have to do with the opinion of Plato?
For inasmuch as you—whether speaking of goods homonymously or however you wish—while calling the things of virtue 'goods,' also take up certain other things as necessary for happiness, thereby taking away the sufficiency of virtue, whereas Plato, out of abundance, seeks the surplus in regard to other things, having what suffices for happiness from virtue itself, there could be nothing in common between you two on this point. You need different arguments, and the followers of Plato need different ones.
For just as there are no faithful oaths between lions and men, nor do wolves and lambs have like-minded spirit, so there is no friendship between Plato and Aristotle concerning the chief and most authoritative doctrine of happiness. For continually, even if they do not think evil of one another, they plainly say things utterly opposed to each other concerning the points at issue on this matter.
Again, while Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews—and indeed Plato too, in agreement with them—have set forth clearly and in good order the doctrine concerning the providence over all things, Aristotle, having stationed the divine only as far as the moon, excludes the remaining parts of the world from the governance of God. On this account he is also refuted by the aforementioned author, who argues somewhat as follows.
Since, then, the conviction concerning providence is still the greatest and most authoritative of the things contributing to happiness, and is precisely what most sets human life aright—if indeed we are not to remain ignorant whether the race of earthborn men ascends by a lofty wall of justice or by crooked deceits—Plato, for his part, refers all things to God and derives all things from God. For he says that God, having the beginning, middle, and end of all things that are, proceeds in a straight course, journeying round about. And again he says that God is good, and that in one who is good no envy at all arises concerning anything; and that, being outside of envy, he makes all things as good as possible, bringing them into order out of disorder. And that, caring for all things and adorning all things according to his power, he has taken thought also for human beings.
And after a few words: 'Such, then, is Plato's view. But he who puts this divine nature out of the way, and cuts off the soul's hope for the hereafter, and takes away the reverence in the present life toward the powers that are greater—what fellowship does he have with Plato? Or how could he exhort us toward what Plato wishes, and confirm the things that have been said?'
For, quite on the contrary, this man would rather appear as a fellow-worker and ally of those who wish to do wrong. For any person, being human and held fast by human desires, if he should despise the gods and reckon them to be nothing to himself—inasmuch as he is settled far away from them while living, and, once dead, no longer even exists—would readily come to gratify his lusts.
For it is not impossible to gain confidence about escaping notice while doing wrong, if it is only human beings one must escape; nor is it necessary in every case to seek to escape notice altogether, wherever one is able to overpower those who have detected him. So the denial of providence is a ready resource for injustice.
For that man is indeed most kindly, who, having proposed pleasure to us as the good, and having furnished immunity from the gods, still thinks he can supply a device to prevent injustice—doing something like a physician who neglects to help his patient while he is still alive, but after his death attempts to weave together some devices for the salvation of the dead man.
And the Peripatetic is like this man in a similar way. For it is not so much the zeal for pleasure as the disbelief that the divine cares for us that strengthens injustice. 'What then,' someone might say, 'do you place Aristotle in the same rank as Epicurus?' Yes, indeed, at least with respect to the matter now before us.
For what difference does it make to us whether one banishes the divine from the world altogether and leaves us no fellowship at all with it, or whether, having shut the gods up within the world, one removes them from the affairs of earth? For in either case alike the neglect coming from the gods toward human beings is equal, and equal is the immunity granted to wrongdoers by the gods; and if, while those gods remain in heaven, we still enjoy some benefit from them, this is in any case something common even to irrational and inanimate creatures—and indeed even according to Epicurus, some benefit does come to human beings from the gods in this way.
At any rate, they say that the better emanations of these gods become the auxiliary cause of great goods for those who partake of them. But it is right to reckon neither the one view nor the other within the account of providence. For if, according to Epicurus, providence is done away with—even though, according to him, the gods contribute every care for the preservation of the goods proper to themselves—then likewise, according to Aristotle too, providence would be done away with, even if the things in heaven are governed in a certain order and arrangement.
For we are seeking a providence that concerns us; and of this there can be no share for one who has granted that neither daemons nor heroes exist, nor indeed that souls are able to survive at all.
But that other thing seems to me, as judge, something Epicurus has done even more shamefully: as though despairing that the gods could, if they came near to human beings, refrain from caring for them, he banished them as though into a foreign land, and settled them somewhere outside the world, thereby excusing their inhumanity by their remoteness and their total lack of fellowship with everything.
But this remarkable discoverer of nature and precise examiner of divine matters, having placed human affairs directly under the very gaze of the gods, has nevertheless left them uncared for and unregarded, governed by nature and not by the reasoning of God. Hence he too, quite reasonably, would not escape that very charge which some divine concerning Epicurus—namely, that it was not according to his own real opinion, but on account of fear of men, that he assigned the gods a place in the universe, as one assigns a seat in a theater for a spectacle.
And they take as proof of that man's real opinion the fact that he took away from the gods their activity toward us, which alone would have given the belief that the gods exist its rightful warrant. But Aristotle does this very same thing. For having removed the gods to a distance and handed over the belief to sight alone—a faculty too weak to judge matters at so great a distance by any exercise of reasoning—he would seem, perhaps out of a sense of shame, to say merely that there are gods there.
For since he neither left the gods entirely outside the world, nor yet brought them near to the affairs of earth, he was compelled either to confess himself altogether an atheist, or to preserve some semblance of the opinion that gods exist by settling them somewhere in between. But he who has refused the exactness of the higher powers, by this very lack of intercourse, seems merely to disbelieve in the gods in a more decorous manner. These are the words of Atticus against Aristotle, who bankrupts the doctrine of providence. The same author further adds these words to what has been said, directing them against the same man, who does not wish the world to be generated.
Again, whereas Moses defined the world as having come into being, and set God over all things as maker and craftsman, and Plato likewise philosophizes the same things as Moses—Aristotle, having traveled the opposite road in this matter also, is refuted by the aforementioned author, who writes, word for word, as follows.
First of all, then, examining the question concerning the origin of the world, and holding it necessary to investigate everything relating to this great and highly beneficial doctrine of providence, and having reasoned that for what has not come into being there is no need at all of any maker or any guardian for it to come into being well—Plato, in order not to deprive the world of providence, removed from it the attribute of being ungenerated.