致非洲總督喬治書 第 1 章 第 6/14 段

and, fearing this fear that does not exist, refuse to say that the two natures which came together in Christ are preserved after the union, lest cutting and division should be surreptitiously introduced into the mystery of the incarnation — I do not perceive what reasoning of understanding they have concerning this

For either they declare themselves to be wiser in this matter than the holy Fathers who used such an expression and suspected no division whatsoever;

...being deceived into thinking that they could somehow enter into divine things more spiritually than others, or that in examining by themselves the principles of beings, puffed up with conceit over their own opinion, they failed to recognize the truth that had escaped their notice.

For who among those who have practiced the divine teachings of the Fathers to any degree is ignorant that every number, according to the great and God-inspired Gregory, is indicative of the quantity of the subjects, but not of the division of the things, as these men suppose?

For how could that which does not subsist according to essence even be able to divide? — I would gladly ask them.

For it belongs to a subsisting essence to be by nature capable of doing something with regard to something else.

But how, again, will that which by its own principle is incapable of being acted upon be divided?

For those skilled in these matters have declared this — namely, being able to be acted upon — to be the property of an accident, or rather of a quality, among the things said to exist in a subject.

But if number, according to its own principle, is able neither to divide nor to be divided...

for it is not by nature capable of acting, since that belongs to essence;

nor of being acted upon, since that belongs to an accident;

nor, of necessity, will it be able to introduce along with itself a division of the things, since these, as they exist prior to number in nature and position and mutual relation, remain firmly fixed, and after being numbered they undergo nothing novel at all on account of the number—

we know that it was not then, on account of number, that they received the property of existing by themselves, and of being distinguished from one another by their hypostases;

but rather that they are this through themselves, and not through number, and that they are so many, not by division;

but we have indicated their quantity by means of number.

And again, when we speak of a stone as two-colored or five-colored, and whatever else pertains to continuous quantity, we do not thereby divide the one stone into two or five stones;

nor do we cut the colors in it apart from one another, but we signify that, around it and in it as subject, they exist as being so many without confusion;

no cutting or division having occurred to the stone, or being able to occur, from the continuous quantity of colors numbered concerning it;

just as the colors likewise suffer no confusion or intermixture from the one subject that underlies the stone.

For indeed the stone, possessing oneness in respect of its subject, and possessing undividedly the numbered quantity of colors around it, is shown to be quantified.

Likewise also the colors of the stone itself, differing from one another in quality, and possessing quantity, yet again contributing toward the one underlying subject in the composition of the stone, possess unity without confusion; and it is one and the same stone, neither divided by the quantity of the colors, nor confused by the oneness of the subject.

but in another respect, it does not admit of this.

Every number, therefore, is not indicative of the relation itself of the things—

I mean, of division and continuity—

but is indicative of the quantity of whatever things it happens to number, introducing the principle of the quantified thing's being quantified, but not the principle of how it exists.

For how could it introduce along with itself the relations of the things, seeing that these exist prior to it, and can be known apart from it, and it bears no manifestation of affinity toward them, being set as a mean that separates them by their quantity?

For when we see a multitude of men, or of horses, or of oxen, and whatever else is of this kind—

as I said before, we know them to be that which they are;

and though we need number for the indication of their quantity, we by no means posit it as the cause of their relation;

for we have not needed it at all, even for knowing that relation itself.

And again, when we behold a stone, or a flower, or a many-colored animal, and whatever else is similar to these—

for knowing that they are variously colored, we take up number not at all;

but for wishing to know the quantity of the colors in them, we do not deny our need of it.

So that number does indeed indicate quantity, but it does not thereby make or introduce division;

rather, it indicates quantity, and introduces difference.

For just as every difference is indicative of some quantity that admits of number, introducing the principle of how a thing exists—

for that which is without quantity is also entirely without difference, being simple in essence and in quality;

so too every number is indicative of the quantity of certain things that differ according to the principle of how they are, or how they subsist, and is introductive of the difference of the subjects, and not of their relation.

And that these things stand thus in very truth, and that every number is indicative of difference and not of division, the most holy Cyril again bears witness to this argument in his letter to Eulogius, writing verbatim as follows:

"Thus also in the case of Nestorius: even though he speaks of two natures, signifying the difference between the flesh and God the Word—"

"—yet he no longer confesses the union together with us."

"For we, having united these, confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord—"

"—and, furthermore, one incarnate nature of the Son." It is as if he were saying: We, contemplating the all-wise economy of the mystery—

whenever we wish to show that the difference of the things that came together is preserved after the union, we speak of the natures as two in this respect, and in this respect alone;

taking up number solely in contemplation, for the indication of the difference;

but whenever we precisely define the ineffable manner of the mystery's union, we speak of one incarnate nature of God the Word.

For this, as I think, is what he means to signify by the words: "But we, having united these, confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord—"

"—and, furthermore, one incarnate nature of the Word." That is: we, confessing the union, and precisely articulating its manner with piety, do not employ the term signifying difference for the indication of the union;

but, fittingly taking the one term for difference and the other for union, we preserve the sense of what is signified without confusion.

So that it is evident from this that it is common to him and to Nestorius to speak of two natures, insofar as both acknowledge the difference.

But it was no longer common to both also to confess the union, by saying, "One Christ, one Son, one Lord, and one incarnate nature of the Word"—

which Nestorius did not deign to say.

For to say, "Thus also in the case of Nestorius: even though he speaks of two natures, signifying the difference between the flesh and God the Word—"

"—yet he no longer confesses the union together with us" — this means nothing other than that Nestorius confesses the difference together with us, by saying two natures;

but no longer confesses the union together with us, by not saying "One Christ, one Son, one Lord, and one incarnate nature of the Word." And this has become clear to the lovers of the good, and to those zealous to love the truth, from the fact that the teacher nowhere appears either forbidding one to say two natures after the union—

—but rather forbidding one to divide the natures after the union—

—or teaching that the difference of the things that came together is abolished after the union—

as one may learn from his countless writings.

If, then, the union always stands firm, and the things united always remain unconfused;

and the difference of the things united is also always preserved — on account of which number was employed, according to the Fathers—

how is it not necessary — if indeed the union, and the things united, and their difference, always stand and remain and are preserved — both piously to speak of two natures for the indication of the difference of the things that came together, and again to confess one incarnate nature of God the Word for the demonstration of the union according to hypostasis, neither of these terms — evidently — being abolished by the other, as it seems to some who make unwisdom a pretext of wisdom—

so that neither confusion nor division might be surreptitiously introduced?

For by keeping silent the term that fittingly indicates the difference, we give room for confusion to gain ground;

and again, by not speaking the term signifying the union, we do not know how to put division to flight.

but, as applied to the same Christ, both are always laid down and spoken piously—

yet not in the same respect, since the things signified are not identical with one another either.

For difference and union are not the same;

even though both exist, and are spoken, concerning the same one, and of the same one;

for each of these, when uttered apart from the other, is shown to be both incomplete — as regards the indication of the whole mystery, not carrying along the other as its advocate — and also to be under suspicion;

the one — difference alone — under suspicion of division, because of Nestorius, who denies the union according to hypostasis, and cannot bear to confess that the Uncircumscribed willed for our sake to be contained by flesh;

and the other — union alone — under suspicion of confusion, because of Apollinarius and Eutyches, who deny the difference of the things that came together after the union;

and who are ashamed to confess that the Invisible submitted to fall under our sense-perception, on account of the natural property of his holy flesh taken from us.

and again to speak of two natures, so that the difference of the things that came together and are preserved without confusion after the union might be made manifest;

and to employ number for this purpose alone.

But if anyone, trusting in himself, is also able to devise a more fitting expression for the manifestation of this, let him not begrudge us the benefit, and neither shall we begrudge him the instruction — lest I say, the rebuke of his rashness.

How one must understand the statement set down in the letter of the holy Cyril to Succensus;

and that the expression 'in two' does not conflict with those who say 'one incarnate nature of the Word';

unless it is taken impiously, according to what seemed [right] to Nestorius.

But if they should say that the difficulty of those who speak of two natures united without division after the union nonetheless conflicts with those who say 'one incarnate nature of the Word';

as the holy Cyril supposes in the second memorandum to Succensus;

I maintain that this is plainly [the doing] of those who either are ignorant of, or maliciously misuse, the expressions of the Fathers;

of those who reckon it more advantageous to fight against the truth than to be reconciled with it.

For they ought, knowing that we shall render account even for a bare thought to the righteous Judge of us all, when reading the writings of the Fathers wisely and with the fear of God, to be eager not to make into a pretext for strife and division those words which teach peace and concord.

The blessed Cyril appears to forbid such an expression, but only when it is put forward according to the malicious intent of Nestorius, who asserted that the union had come about relatively — as the blessed Cyril himself is shown testifying concerning himself at the end of the same letter, making his own purpose manifest to those who are excessively contentious, speaking thus:

But the word 'undividedly' added [to this] seems to us, in some way, to be indicative of right belief.

For 'the undivided' is taken by them, according to the empty talk of Nestorius, in a different manner.

For they say that the man in whom God the Word dwelt is undivided from God the Word by equality of honor, by identity of will, and by [identity of] authority.

So that they do not utter these words simply, but with a certain deceit and malice. Behold, this admirable teacher clearly supposed that the manner of 'the undivided' is twofold:

the one signifying union according to hypostasis;

which he also embraces, saying it is indicative of right belief;

and the other, indicative of a mere connection according to relation, which he also rejects;

and he exhorts the faithful to do this very thing, since, on account of the similarity of the wording, [this term] is often able, unnoticed, to inject the venom of heretical impiety into the more simple-hearted.

Wherefore, in his own understanding, to say 'two undividedly' he sets down as orthodox;

since he himself said that the union was according to hypostasis;

but when put forward by those of Nestorius's party, he regards the expression 'the undivided' as suspect, since they held the opinion that the union had come about according to a merely relational connection alone.

Union according to hypostasis, then, according to the Fathers, is the coming together of things of different substance into one hypostasis, each of the elements composing it retaining, in relation to the other, its natural property unadulterated, unchanged, and undivided.

But relational union is the equal movement of will, and the unvarying identity of intention, of things that subsist individually, each by itself, in personal unities.

He, then, who confesses union according to hypostasis, even if he says that there are two natures in Christ after the union, united without division — namely by the union according to hypostasis — in no way at all misses the truth.

For he confesses, according to the Fathers, that the things of which Christ is composed have remained unconfused, on account of the difference that is preserved;

while being in no way able to know the things that differ from one another by the principle of nature as being outside of, or separate in any manner from, the one [reality] according to hypostasis.

But he who upholds union according to relation, even if he should say 'the undivided' ten thousand times, possesses what is blameworthy;

in saying that [the two] have been united according to a certain loving joint-disposition, and in saying that the things signified possess 'the undivided';

while being in no way able to say that God the Word is one hypostasis together with his own ensouled and rational flesh taken from us.

For it is impossible for one hypostasis to come to be out of two individual hypostases which are divided by an individual principle in relation to [other] individuals of the same species.

So that our holy Father Cyril does not simply denounce and reject saying 'two natures united without division after the union', but rather the notion signified through such an expression by those who use it wrongly.

If, then, it has been shown — even if moderately, yet, as far as I can say, sufficiently, insofar as it was possible to indicate by letter — from the holy Fathers and from the sequence of common notions, that number can neither produce, nor suffer, nor introduce any division whatsoever, but simply indicates the 'how many';

and does not touch upon the relation [of the things numbered], whatever condition they happen to be in;

what suspicion of cutting, then, or of division, remains for those who rebel against the holy Church of God, and who rashly cut themselves off from the common body;

not so much acting, as suffering — being pitiably mortified and corrupted by the separation;

and, insofar as it depends on them, preparing punishment for themselves through the disfigurement of the body of Christ;

so that, on this very account, they refuse the correct and pious confession of the faith;

out of [pretended] caution, lest they should seem to cut the union, they embrace confusion instead, and, like cunning men, they contrive not to be caught in impious opinion.

That the difference in Christ is a difference of things, that is, of substances, and not of qualities.

And that every difference necessarily introduces along with itself the quantity of the things of which it is said [to be the difference];

and quantity [introduces] the number that signifies it, whether the quantity is continuous or discrete.

For if this were truly not the case, and if they were not uttering 'the difference' with a bare and mere pronouncement alone, as though it applied to nothing, ironically so as to deceive the more simple-minded, they ought not to have refused to say what, and how many, are the things that differ, of which they confess there is a difference.

For if they believe that the things of which the union consists are preserved after the union, they would certainly confess that the things preserved are two.

For so many, indeed, are the things that came together into the indissoluble union, having received from the union no change into one another — whether alteration, confusion, diminution, contraction, or transformation.

But now, since they do not hold this opinion — having denied that the natures are preserved after the union — they have made themselves liable to censure, even unwillingly, by saying that the difference is preserved by quality alone, apart from the things themselves;

which is plainly the mark of men who are jesting;

and who reckon it, as is fitting, a disgrace if they were not laughed at, and who clearly empty out the Gospel — legislating that qualities can exist without underlying substances, and supposing that difference can be recognized apart from quantity.

For these most wise men, as it seems, were ignorant that every quality altogether belongs to an underlying substance, around which it is both contemplated and spoken of, having in no way [the capacity] to exist by itself;

and [were ignorant] that every difference — being indicative of the dissimilarity and otherness of some things in relation to others, according to the principle of how they exist — naturally introduces along with itself the quantity of the differing things, whether of substances, or of qualities, or of properties.

And, simply, to speak concisely: whatever else it may be, of the things which they suppose to differ from one another and so say there is a difference — in every case they have contemplated the differing things altogether in terms of quantity, whether they recognized the difference by sense-perception or by intellection.

For it is impossible to be able confidently to demonstrate a difference apart from quantity.

Since the things that are not altogether identical with one another can in no way admit one and the same principle of being.

For — to take substance, that is to say nature, in relation to substance, for example, or quality in relation to quality, or property in relation to property, or indeed anything else among those things which are not altogether identical —

for of things that are altogether identical with one another, and incapable of admitting difference, we can never speak of [their having] one and the same principle of how they exist.

But the fact that one and the same principle cannot be contemplated, in the same respect, over all [the things in question] — this, having produced the difference — reasonably demonstrates that those things, whose principle of being is different and not the same, cannot possibly exist as one and identical with one another.

But when we say that one thing differs from another, or that some things differ from other things, we signify many things, or at the very least, two, and not one;

even though, in another respect, and according to a different manner and principle, we also say that they belong to one, and can be [called] one;

as, for example, the qualities and properties surrounding one fire [belong to that one fire], and, of one Christ, the natures out of which, and in which, he is known to be constituted;

and, of one man, the things out of which he was composed, and in which he is known to exist.

But [they are] one in hypostasis, both in the case of Christ, and of man as we know him;

that is, in the whole composed of these as parts — a whole which properly admits, in the fullest sense, both of the differing principles of being of the parts;

but not one in nature and in substance, since the parts do not admit one another's principle of being, nor are we able to know, in the case of both, the same principle of being.

For the principle of divinity and of humanity is not the same;

just as neither is that of soul and body, as is evident to all.

For the name 'Christ' is not indicative of substance, that is, of nature, as a species predicated of many individuals differing in hypostasis, as the blessed Cyril says in the Scholia: 'For the name Christ neither has the force of a definition, nor indeed does it signify the substance of anything';

but is understood [to signify] the hypostasis of the Word in the assumption — namely, of flesh possessing a rational soul. But neither is man [predicated as] one nature composed of soul and body;

as though the body were of the same substance as the soul;

but rather, in relation to the other species, [man is] a species divided [from them] by a constitutive difference;

...but is predicated equally of the individuals that are under it as a species and are contained by it.

And it is not on account of this that soul and body are two according to the principle of substance, as soul and body;

and are one substance and another according to the principle of being;

The things out of which, and in which, and as which man exists — these he forbade.

That it is impious to say that Christ is one composite nature, and that this contradicts the truth.

For every composite nature, having its own parts coeval with itself and with one another in respect of the very coming-into-being for existence, and having been brought from non-being into being — for the completion of the ordering of the universe — by the power that constituted the universe and sustains it in being, fittingly possesses, of necessity, its own parts as mutually contained in one another;

as is the case with man, and with all other things that have been allotted a composite nature.

The soul involuntarily holding sway over the body, and being held by it in turn, and providing it life without deliberate choice, merely by virtue of its being within it, and naturally partaking of affection and pain because of the receptive power for these implanted in it;

even if some, having strayed most especially from the true doctrines of the Church concerning the soul, monstrously fancy that the soul pre-exists its body in the Greek manner, or comes to exist after it in the Jewish manner, and suppose that a beginning neither good nor pleasing to God precedes the creation of visible things — they are disposed with hostility toward such a teaching;

judging that to refute their rotten and specious problems on this matter does not belong to the present occasion and discourse, I shall return to the subject before us.

Thus, then, as has been set forth, since every composite thing has such a nature, none of those who have learned to think piously about divine matters would ever dare to say that Christ is one composite nature, lest, by choosing to say such things, he be led of necessity by a certain natural chain and consequence to say that he is wholly created and out of non-being, circumscribed and passible, and not consubstantial with the Father;

and supposing either that the flesh is co-eternal with the Word, or that the Word is coeval with the flesh.

for such is the principle of every composite nature;

he will render himself liable to terrible accusations.

For that which exists as of composite nature is, evidently, also composite according to nature;

But that which is composite according to nature could never be of the same nature and consubstantial with that which is simple according to nature.

It is not lawful, therefore, for the pious to say that Christ is one composite nature — not only because of the absurdity drawn from such an expression,

but also because none of the God-approved Fathers has ever been shown to have said this;

...that the same one might be recognized also in respect of flesh;

and that he may be believed to be one and the same in relation both to the Father and to us, existing as the mediator of God and men.

But if it is also shown that every composite hypostasis has its own parts coeval with itself and with one another;

and we do not deny saying that Christ is a composite hypostasis — our opponents might say to us that we too cannot shake off the reproach on this score, as having been caught by our own arguments.

We say this would truly be so, if indeed we had supposed the hypostasis to be composite in the manner of having a species predicated of it.

But now, since we do not say this, we shall in no way incur any such form of accusation, knowing clearly that not every composite hypostasis — that is, one falling under a species — is composite on its own account;

but rather on account of the nature that contains it, whenever that nature is composite, and on account of the predicated species under which it is naturally referred.

as the particular — that is, the individual — has wholly within itself the universal, that is, the common and generic, most completely;

whereas the particular, as a whole, imparts nothing of its own proper principle to the generic.

which no one at all among the teachers of the doctrine of piety, from of old down to our own time, has ever been declared to have held in respect of Christ;

in whose case one can find neither genus nor species predicated of him as Christ.

For it was not by reason of nature that the Word who rules over the Godhead sojourned among us through flesh;

but by the mode of the economy, having united it to himself hypostatically without any deficiency, he renewed our nature.

So then — to take up again the sequence of the matters examined a little before — they gained nothing from their much cunning, since their clever device has been overturned for them, bringing them back again to the very quantity which they had fled, being unable even to say that difference in quality itself exists without quantity.

For it is altogether necessary that they be many;

or at the very least two, as has been said before — namely the qualities, whose difference they suppose to exist.

For no one with sense would ever say that a single quality, standing entirely unmixed in relation to any other, differs from itself.

Therefore, for the rest, let them either cease speaking even of this bare 'difference,' having learned that it is altogether indicative of a certain quantity of differing things;

or let them accept together with us the confession of the truth — we who piously receive number, according to the Fathers, by the principle of difference alone, for the purpose of knowing that the things that have come together have remained unconfused.

For indeed, wishing to ask them amicably, let them tell us — if they have any worthy account of wisdom — how, while saying that the things that have run together into union are two, and yet not denying that these same things have remained unconfused even after the union,

so that neither one has departed from its natural definition and principle;

even though both together constitute the one person and one hypostasis of the Son;

they do not confess the 'two' that, according to them as well, are preserved — as they claim, if indeed they speak truly?

And what, for them, is the reason for the diminishment, and for what cause, and how have both natures become one?

Or, if the union remained free of diminishment, what is the reason that the things preserved without diminishment are not called two?

and we complacently acquiesce in the privation of the 'one'—

and we marvel at the vigor of their fine learning, as though they alone had been shown to us to be capable of the knowledge of ineffable things.

But they will never be able to produce an argument that persuades of this.

And even if we should, in the end, take refuge above all in that device — the rotten and empty invention of Severus, which is carried about and celebrated everywhere by him as though it were something wise — declaring it ridiculous to say that, out of two natures, two natures are again shown forth from the union,

as though drawing the plausible consequences from a premise granted by us,

for from which of those instructed in the divine doctrines of the Church did they ever hear that the union produced two natures out of two natures?

But they will by no means be able to claim to have heard such a thing, if they care at all for the truth.

But we say that the union has come to be out of two natures;

but that the one hypostasis of Christ, composite, is formed out of them, preserving and safeguarding unchangeably, as a whole preserves its own parts without deficiency, those very natures themselves out of which it was composed, together with their natural properties;

and is itself preserved and safeguarded in them, as a whole is preserved in its parts.

Out of two natures, therefore, we say Christ is not two natures, but one composite hypostasis;

this hypostasis being inclusive of the natures as its own parts, and containing them as its proper and complementary parts;

and existing and being known in them as in its parts.

For as long as it is believed that the things that have come together have remained unconfused — and they always remain unconfused — it is impossible for them not to be two in respect of what each is naturally constituted to be according to essence;

just as, likewise, it is impossible for these not to be one according to the principle of hypostasis, as long as the union exists;

and it always exists, according to the pious confession of the faithful — so this is impossible otherwise.

For example: according to the principle of nature, there is the 'two' of the things out of which the union is composed;

for we do not know God the Word to be the same according to nature as his own flesh;

but according to the principle of hypostasis, there is the 'one';

for we know God the Word to be the same as his own flesh according to hypostasis.

Therefore we do not foolishly blend the natures into one nature, by saying that the natural difference in Christ has been abolished, lest we introduce a mutation of the Word and the flesh;

nor again do we madly divide him into two self-subsistent beings, by positing a difference also according to the principle of hypostasis, lest we deny our own salvation;

as did those who divided impiety between themselves at diametrically opposite extremes — Apollinaris together with Eutyches, and Nestorius;

the former not acknowledging natural difference in Christ;

while the latter, adding to this also a difference of person, both fell away from the truth.