致馬里努斯神學小品 第 1 章 第 10/12 段

...of the union and of its outcome, which above he defined as 'work' and 'act,' having given no opening whatsoever, either to those who wish to confound, or indeed to those who wish to divide;

but having repelled the former, by knowing what properly and according to nature belongs, first of all, to the humanity that is in him;

and what belongs to the supra-essential divinity;

and having thrust away the latter, by [teaching that there is] no operation whatsoever that stands apart from or divides the same and one [Christ]

For the term 'operation,' taken in common both of the simple motion and likewise of the motion considered in relation, or of the very result [produced], does not introduce confusion into the realities, so long as there is a clear clarification of what is meant — according to which we preserve, undividedly, the properties of the one and of the other of the natures that have essentially concurred, and we recognize, without confusion, the properties proper to the one nature as distinct from the other, on account of the union, and [the properties] of both as belonging to the one whole composed of them, on account of [its] existence — neither confounding them in the former respect, nor dividing them in the latter, but rather maintaining the difference as the boundaries of the essences, while binding fast the union by the principle of one and the same hypostasis.

Thus, then, and for these reasons, this [Father], and every other approved and divine Father, if any, — as I already appear to have written — [speaks of] one operation in Christ, and two: the one, having in view the union of the operations according to nature, just as also of the natures;

and the other, [having in view] the essential difference of these [operations, and of the natures]

Concerning the interpretation, for practical use, of the theologian and great herald of the truth of the Church, Gregory — the phrase which asserts that 'the word was shaped by the man,' not [meaning] the man understood with reference to the Savior.

For [as he says], 'his willing — wholly deified — is not even opposed to God': I judge this to proceed from a mind exceedingly devoted to piety, for whose sake and out of which the diligent Father labored over it, though somewhat lacking in precision of wording — against which those who are altogether facile and dull-witted contrive to make what would more truly be called raids than mere incursions, nothing being so much the object of their zeal as to search out and find fault even with things secured most fully on every side and offering them no opening against the argument — not indeed because they have seized upon some bare phrase (one, moreover, proceeding from an unfeigned and pure mind) set forth in order to confirm and establish the essential and natural will of the ensouled flesh taken beforehand from us (that is, of the humanity according to the Savior) — from this saying of the God-inspired Father, namely:

For his willing was wise and well-considered, from which the essential difference of [his willing] with respect to that which is by nature Divine and Paternal in him is shown — a difference which in no way permits confusion to arise in the mystery of Christ.

But to pronounce 'wholly deified' with a paroxytone accent, as found in certain copies, rather than with an oxytone accent — even though it was necessary that the 'one will' not thereby be introduced by the adversaries — gives a handle against us, as though implying [a union that is] relational and merely hypostatic in a loose sense, and, as it were, a union of grace and dignity — comparable to the way the saints too are said to be moved and to operate preeminently from God, on account of their entire inclination and disposition toward God and things divine.

For the oxytone reading of 'deified' neither brings the willing — as of the man according to the Savior — into identity with the essential and natural [divine] will (for who could demonstrate this?), and yet it presents the utmost union and concretion.

For 'the deified,' being among the relative terms — just as also 'the enfired' and 'the illumined,' and all such — necessarily brings in with itself also the reference to that toward which it points, namely the deifying, the enfiring, and the illuminating; it has this by way of relation, such that the principle both of the difference and of the utmost union is confirmed neither more from the one side nor from the other.

For not being opposed is not, in itself, sufficient for union;

for whatever is natural and blameless is indeed not opposed [to God], yet it is not thereby altogether also united to God.

But 'the deified' is wholly and altogether united, and yet in no way does it displace the essential difference, inasmuch as it also remains unconfused in the union.

And if nothing natural is opposed [to God], how is it that, concerning our innate will — if indeed it is this will, and not perhaps some other, that the Father had in mind — he did not say it altogether follows God, but rather that it resists, as happens in many cases, and struggles against him? For either it is not natural, in that it is an adversary, or it is not an adversary, in that it is natural.

And accordingly [it might seem that our will] stands as something else, differing in natural quality, from the willing of the humanity according to the Savior —

but if this indeed were so, [it would] by no means [be admissible].

We say that, insofar as it is natural, it is not opposed [to God];

but insofar as it is moved by us in a manner not natural, it is clearly opposed, and for the most part resistant — upon which sinning also follows.

For it is by the mode of the misuse of the movement, and not by the principle of the natural power, that what is contrary to reason and law comes to subsist;

since, being naturally formed and moved, even if it does not possess that which is united to God, it possesses at least that which is concordant and not resistant.

For as there is in nature no principle for that which is above nature, so too there is none for that which is contrary to nature and rebellious.

Hence the teacher did not declare that it never follows [God] wholly and altogether; rather, he qualified [his statement], saying:

'As not altogether,' and 'for the most part' — to which is also understood [the sense] 'sometimes' and 'rarely,' on account of the difficulty of the many to be led up to virtue.

For the willing of the humanity according to the Savior, even though it was natural, was nevertheless not bare like ours — just as the humanity itself was not, being, as it is above us, wholly deified through the union to the utmost, upon which also his being properly without sin depends.

But ours is manifestly bare, and in no way sinless, on account of the deviation that occurs this way and that —

not that it alters the nature, but that it diverts the movement, or, to speak more truly, changes its mode.

And this is clear from the fact that, though we do many things irrationally, we in no way thereby fall away from our inherent, innate rational essence into an irrational one.

There is not, then, one thing that is ours, and another the humanity according to the Savior;

nor is the willing different, at least according to the principle of nature, even though it is otherwise above us;

for in a divine manner the one came into hypostatic being, while the other was formed, through the utmost union with the divine.

But again, to attach fittingly, each in due order, to the [assumed] nature the things disparaged in us — such as opposition, or contrariety, and whatever else belongs to this list — even by way of distinguishing the natures inseparably in mere conception, so as to include the humanity of Christ among them — this is by no means permitted.

For if these things are not even natural in us, but are seen to be contrary to nature and reason, how is it possible to attach them to that [humanity], even by conception or by a further supposition upon conception, so to speak?

But [Christ took our disparaged infirmities] only by way of appropriation, out of compassion, as befits the head of the whole body — just as the sufferings of the ailing belong also to the physician — until God, who became man for our sake, shall free us from these things.

Yet [he does so] while completely consuming and obliterating what is ours by the power of his own embodiment.

and the one rightly characterizes our nature, while the other utterly falsifies it throughout.

That [natural human will], then, as man, he for our sake essentially embraced by willing, thereby at once both confirming the nature and dissolving the condemnation that lay against us;

but this [insubordinate mode], again, as one who loves mankind, he appropriated economically — a mode recognized in us and in our insubordinate manner — so that, as fire consumes wax, or as the sun consumes earthly vapor, having utterly consumed it away from us, he might effect a communication of what is his own, and might thereby render us free from passion, and, according to the promise, incorruptible.

As for saying 'one will' — I rather advocate for [this statement], and, as is fitting, establish it: the Father said this not with a view to denying the human and natural will of the Savior, but with a view to [affirming] that no will of the flesh, or passionate reasoning, in any way preceded his seedless conception and his incorrupt birth.

For it was the divine and paternal act of willing alone — through the Only-begotten Son himself effecting his own incarnation, and by the concurrence of the Holy Spirit — that wrought this.

And that he indeed holds this understanding is clear from what follows.

For, having said that, on account of the ineffable union of the human and the divine nature, God is even said to have suffered, and humanity is said to have come down from heaven together with the divinity —

and by this to show the extreme interchange — by way of a thoroughgoing transfer — of the properties naturally belonging to each nature of the one Christ and Son, he adds, saying: 'Whence we also confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ.' 'How?' he says —

'Since manifestly our nature was assumed from the divinity, not sin;'

that is, [taken] not from sin;

well-nigh echoing the great Athanasius, who writes thus against the impious Apollinaris: 'He was born of a woman, having raised up for himself the form of man from the first formation, in a manifestation of flesh without fleshly wills and human reasonings, in an image of newness';

for the willing belonged to the divinity alone, since it was also wholly the nature of the divinity [that was at work].

For since the coming-forth of the Logos' birth according to the flesh, undertaken for our sake, was above us —

for no passionate will or reasoning of the flesh preceded, as is seen in our own case, on account of the pleasure that prevails from the deception of the race; but the will of the divinity alone [preceded] — through the Son himself effecting, as I said, his own embodiment according to the good pleasure of the Father, and the cooperation of the all-holy Spirit — innovating in himself and through himself the mode introduced anew upon the nature of birth, and making, without seed, his own conception from the holy Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary;

having considered, then, this ineffable principle of his birth, the one [Athanasius] said [that there was] only the willing of the divinity concerning it, while the other [Gregory] said, 'one will of the Lord Jesus Christ,' since, he says, our nature was manifestly assumed from the divinity, and not sin;

'without fleshly wills and human reasonings,' as the divine Athanasius says;

not, however, [meaning] that he — being man, in addition to being God by nature — does not have a human and natural will, just as he also has a divine and paternal one.

He hints at the same thing also in what follows, saying: 'He was conceived without sin, of the Holy Spirit and the holy, immaculate, and Ever-Virgin Theotokos Mary, and was born of her according to the flesh without defilement.'

And he adduces the divine Scripture — which speaks of the flesh both approvingly and reproachfully — not thereby suggesting that we should understand the flesh of the Lord to be different in nature and in essence from ours (God forbid!), he who indeed knew it to have been assumed from our essence, that is, from the all-holy womb of the Ever-Virgin and Theotokos who is of the same nature as we; but [understanding it to be] different with respect to sinfulness, and as having nothing whatsoever set in opposition to it, unlike us, who in our members [have] the law arising from transgression [set] against the law of the Spirit. 'For,' he says, 'the flesh corrupted by sin, which wars against the law of his mind, was not assumed by the Savior.'

For that [flesh] which the law of sin — through the seed of generation — did not first take hold of, in it there does not at all exist [that law], not even in the members; but rather the law of righteousness, made manifest for our instruction, and utterly obliterating the law introduced upon nature through transgression.

'For the Sinless One came,' he says, 'to seek and to save that which was lost' — that is, the nature of the human race that had sinned.

For there was no other law in his members, nor was there a will different from, or opposed to, the Father.

By this he shows, not that he did not have a human and natural will;

for he does not appear to have said this;

but that, as man, he possessed, through his members, neither according to the body any operation whatsoever contrary to nature, nor indeed according to the soul any movement of will that is contrary or irrational, as we do — since he was also born above the law of human nature.

And he shows still more clearly in what follows that his purpose was to exclude only the passionate will in the case of the Savior, but not the natural [will].

And that, even though in the natural and human [will] he was indeed concordant with the paternal and divine [will], having no difference from it arising from opposition, yet, giving himself to us as a pattern, he voluntarily subordinated his own [will];

and he confirmed the paternal [will], so that we too, imitating this example, having set aside our own [will], might with all diligence fulfill the divine [will], speaking as follows:

And indeed it is written: 'For I have not come to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father';

and, 'Not what I will, but whatever you [will], Father' — these are not [expressions] of a different will, that is, of one opposed and counteracting, but of the assumed human economy compassionately appropriating what is ours;

and that each of us might, in all things, prefer not his own will, but rather the will of the Lord.

He therefore effects, as I said, not the abolition of the natural and human will, but of the passionate and unnatural [will];

and, to speak comprehensively, he thereby bears witness that God, who was incarnate for our sake, made what is ours free from all sin.

And to speak concisely, I think he means by 'one will' to signify that the divine act of willing alone preceded his birth according to the flesh;

and by [saying] that there is no difference of will, [he means] that it has nothing opposed or counteracting, but is altogether concordant and united.

Hence, when he says that our nature was assumed from the divinity, he speaks of one will;

but when he sets forth in his discourse the words, 'I have not come to do my own will,' leaving aside the number [of wills], [he says], 'These are not [the words] of a different will' — that is, of one opposed and contrary — from which it is manifestly gathered that there exist, according to nature, two wills in the Savior.

For if it was not opposed, then he had it as natural, as man.

For that which is not opposed is altogether natural, and no one will gainsay this;

for nothing in nature, or among things according to nature, is at all opposed [to it].

For it has the argument as its advocate, repelling every onslaught of the slanderer.

And thus, indeed, I for my part suppose the sense to stand, being pure of all suspicion.

This judgment the most holy presbyter, lord abba Anastasius — a man adorned, as much as any other, with divine virtue and prudence — has made more certain for me, having returned from elder Rome;

and having said that much discussion had arisen for him with the most sacred men there of the great Church, on account of the letter written by them to Sergius, inquiring for what reason and how the phrase ‘one will’ had been inserted into it; and he found them vexed at this and making their defense, and besides them the one who, at his command, had dictated it in Latin — lord abba John, the most holy fellow-laborer — affirming that they had by no means made mention in it, by number, of one will at all, even though this has now been fabricated by those who translated it into the Greek tongue,

the tradition of the most sacred oracles and of the patristic teachings.

And through such words they appear, in a way, to agree with what has just been explained by my nothingness, and as it were to set their seal upon the defense that was made on behalf of Honorius.

Having learned, then, that they had made this defense, I marveled greatly at their precision, just as I was also astonished at the cunning of those who dare everything for the sake of the one [will], impiously and in vain, and who wish — as has been their custom of old and still is now — by certain deceptions and misinterpretations to draw to their own side, contrary to what is reasonable, those who contend against them with fervor, and to appropriate for themselves a sense that by no means follows [their view].

Having, then, of necessity learned this too, I have made it known to you, O God-honored Father, so that you might stand fortified on every side, in order to beat back the ranks of the adversaries, striking vigorously with argument and mightily prevailing by faith, having thereby, for your proclamation, the glory of the Only-Begotten, and as your diadem, communion and union with him by grace.

But, O most sacred and honored head to me, make these things known to him who presides hierarchically over our blameless and orthodox faith, under whose wings all of us, both those near and those far off, shall piously rest, having as the sole foundation of the more sacred doctrines his own blessed illumination, and that which comes through him — by which, in the Holy Spirit, we are led by the hand and brought up to the shadowless and paternal light;

looking toward him as the leader of our salvation, after him who is by nature and first [leader], and directing our paths piously, hastening toward the life that is not dissolved by corruption but established in incorruption — of which, just as here we partake in hope through his God-inspired prayers and God-wise teachings, so also there may we be deemed worthy to partake by experience through his divinely-wrought mediation and intercession, according to the sole perfection that is in the Word himself and God, our Lord Jesus Christ.

On Quality, Property, and Difference, to Theodore, Presbyter in Mazarium.

I do not think that you, most sacred ones, have need of anything else at all for the knowledge [of this matter] — needing only to call, through simple virtue, upon this very One who makes wise according to the mind, the Holy Spirit, from whom you also pour forth divine things to others, according to the boundlessly-giving outpouring of wisdom, making an effusion of your thoughts through the utterance of speech — so as, out of loving-kindness, to extend this abundantly even to such lowly ones as myself, who share in no discourse at all, unto divine knowledge and learning; even though I know that you employ condescension by way of questioning, in order to advance us, and still more, through extreme self-lowering, to raise up to your own height of knowledge us who lie somewhere below and are oppressed by ignorance — so that, having purified by your descent our sluggishness, and by your inspiration the mindlessness of my understanding, you might bring us into a knowing disposition and a vigorous, practical eagerness, from which salvation, by grace, accrues to those being saved, through men such as yourselves, who have been deemed worthy to save the worthy.

I speak, then, concerning the things which, in instructing [me], you urged me to examine further — I mean quality, and property, and difference:

The signification of these terms among those outside [the Church] is manifold, and it would be a lengthy matter to unfold their divisions on these points and to extend the discourse, since these things belong not so much to the proportion fitting a letter as to the labor of a [longer] written treatise.

But among the divine Fathers, the account of these terms is coherent and concise, not taken with reference to some underlying subject — that is, essence and nature — but of the things that are contemplated in essence, and indeed also of those contemplated in hypostasis.

They say, then, that quality is: essential, as in the case of man, the rational [faculty], or of the horse, the capacity for neighing;

and hypostatic, as of a particular man, being hook-nosed or snub-nosed;

or, of a particular horse, being dapple-grey or chestnut.

And so it is also with all the other created essences and hypostases: [quality] is contemplated in beings both commonly and particularly — that is, universally and partially — according to which the difference of species and of individuals in relation to one another is made known, distinctly clarifying the truth of things.

But in the case of the unbegotten and monarchical nature, quality could not be said at all, or in the proper sense.

For the Divine does not [consist] of some essence and accidents, since then it would certainly also be created, as being composite and compounded out of these.

But in an improper sense, and only insofar as one might, from things pertaining to us, conjecture the things that are above us:

inasmuch as we are able, in no other way than thus, and only with difficulty, to receive dimly some knowledge of those things, and to articulate it in speech, even if only to some small degree, though not perfectly:

Natural quality is: the all-holy, the all-powerful, the all-perfect, the super-perfect, the self-perfect, the self-sovereign, the all-surveying, and whatever else of this kind is called natural and divine, and befitting God alone as supra-essential.

Hypostatic quality is: of the Father, unbegottenness; of the Son, begottenness; and of the Holy Spirit, procession — that is, ingeneracy, generation, and procession — which they also call properties, because these belong, naturally or hypostatically, to him alone and to no other (speaking of each concerning God).

From which the essential and hypostatic differences are constituted — in an improper sense, as I said, in the case of God, but properly, according to nature, in the case of all created things.

Whence they say that these — I mean quality, property, and difference — are the same as one another, and that they hold the rank of accidents, but not that of some subject, that is, of essence.

But property is said to be particular, as compared with that [difference], and not of all instances, but simply and in this-or-that way (however many, and simply, but in this-or-that way), and said of this [particular] essence, and not of another;

but difference [is said to be] constitutive of beings and definitive.

Whence they also name it thus, calling it constitutive difference, which distinguishes clearly, as I said, beings according to essence and nature, and according to person and hypostasis, and which drives away every alteration and confusion of all [beings].

This, then, standing thus, according to the teaching of the Fathers, is the distinction and clarification concerning quality, property, and difference, to speak in summary.

But it is impossible for any of these ever to exist, or to be able to be conceived, apart from the underlying essence, of which each of these both is and is said [to be];

for quality, and property, and difference, are said [to belong] to essence, but not to themselves;

and he who does not say this has spoken irrationally, having departed contrary to reason from the principle of nature.

Of this [error], alone above all others, is Severus the deranged sophist — as one who conceives for himself, and fabricates, things that are nowhere and in no way [real], speaking of a difference of essence-less qualities in the case of Christ, so that he might declare him non-existent, by the removal of the natures out of which and in which he consists, and, in turn, by the concomitant removal of the qualities themselves as well.

For, once the natures are removed, [the qualities] could not [enable] Christ still to subsist in these, or at all out of these — I mean the qualities — even though the wretch monstrously fables that he is composite, and thereby renders his denial of him complete.

For the composite is not God, nor is it God's nature;

since indeed [on that reasoning] every composite nature would be God by nature.

But if every composite nature is God by nature, then, according to him, the Father, who is non-composite, is not God;

for if the composite is God by nature, the non-composite is not God by nature.

He has been born man from men, through man, above men, by the assumption of flesh possessing an intellective soul;

yet the inhuman one does not even confess the God who became man to be man, inasmuch as he denies the human nature in him, just as he also denies the divine [nature].

For he does not suppose him to be of two natures, that is, twofold in nature, as the Fathers [teach], but posits some composite and spurious nature, having emulated the abomination of Apollinarius.

By this [device], the villain, setting aside the great mystery of the economy concerning us, has cunningly made use of the naming of terms, like a clever rhetorician, making the theft/subversion of the realities hard to detect, and as it were tickling the perception, toward the acceptance of impiety.

For he calls him, ostensibly, both God and man;

but he strips away the proper truth of one or the other appellation, inasmuch as he does not confess the natures, of which the appellations manifestly are [the names].

And he speaks of difference, while recognizing no difference, since, according to him, the things that differ do not subsist as natures, in order that he might also smuggle in confusion through the one composite nature, and might legislate non-existence by the denial of the natures;

and so that he might seem, by the names, to cover over the negation, while by [speaking of] difference, to cast away [the charge of] confusion;

so great is the truly ill-minded device and contrivance of the ill-minded one, covered by the darkness of ignorance, and darkening those who are captured [by it].

Against these it is necessary to turn the argument — those, namely, who contend on his behalf — and to say this as well: that if, according to you, Severus, following the celebrated Cyril, confesses the difference, while avoiding [the charge of] a contraction [of the natures], how is it that he does not also confess with him the natures as well, and, like him, recognize the essential difference in these [natures], rejecting only their division — but instead posits the difference solely in bare qualities, contrary to Cyril's own rule and definition?

That the blessed Cyril confesses the natures, of which he also teaches the difference as dogma, is clear from the fact that he did not disdain to share communion even with Nestorius — who is divided — precisely in respect of the confession of the natures itself, even though not at all in respect of the whole intent [behind it].

For ‘what,’ says the teacher, ‘is common between me and Nestorius?’

[Only] this: to speak of the two natures as two, to the extent of recognizing the difference between the flesh and God the Word;

for this [flesh] is other according to natural quality, and is not of the same kind of essence as that [the Word].

and this amounts to saying the same of essence and operation, with respect to the difference from God the Word;

how is it that the deranged Severus does not even deign to commune with Cyril himself, whom he feignedly honors, and to speak together of the natures to the point of recognizing the difference according to his teaching — not only in respect of natural quality, but also of the non-sameness-of-kind of essence — so that he might recognize together the difference both of the natures and of the natural qualities, that is, of essences and of operations; but instead, denying also the non-sameness-of-kind of essence of the flesh in relation to the Word, which is precisely the natural difference, he introduces in its place a difference [located] in non-subsistent qualities (for every quality whatsoever is non-subsistent apart from the underlying essence)?

But he, acting maliciously, and rising up against the true teaching of the wise Cyril — which is the same as saying, of all the God-approved Fathers — shows himself to be alien [to it], and a partner and advocate of falsehood.

Now, when he speaks of a difference of qualities in the case of Christ, does he speak of the difference after the union, or before the union?

For if [he speaks of it] before the union, he certainly holds a division, not a difference, and he teaches the union as being out of divided things, such as things pre-existing on their own; or [in speaking so] he has dissolved this [union] through the difference and confession of qualities, or he declares that these [qualities] were not united at all from the beginning —

this he really holds, even though he pretends to say [otherwise].

for it is not possible that some should ever be united, while others are divided;

but, together with one another, they must undergo the same thing as one another, whether union or division.

If, then, rejecting division, he declares that, together with the natures, their qualities also have been united, it is altogether necessary that he, being consistent with himself throughout, either say that there is one composite quality, just as also one composite nature, on account of the union — and thus be convicted of not recognizing the difference even in quality, but rather of teaching the confusion of both, essences and qualities, I mean; or else, granting that the qualities are different and not fearing [the charge of] division, he would then have to call the natures different as well — neither being frightened off, nor indeed pretending [to fear] the utter severance, as a pretext for the evasion and refusal of confessing them.

For if, according to him, the qualities — which are, so it seems, confessed by him on account of [their] difference — have not undergone division, how will the natures be cut apart for the sake of [their] confession and difference?

But if he does not confess these [natures], but only, so it seems, confesses the qualities, he is clearly making the natures vanish, and teaching that Christ is an aggregate of qualities — just as, indeed, we recognize the natures of material things to exist,