致馬里努斯神學小品 第 1 章 第 8/12 段

Various forms and figures have been skillfully devised by various persons, at once for security and for adornment;

and they seem, in outward appearance, to shine forth by these, having grown numb through folly with respect to what is hidden;

but for you, sanctified Father, who have already transferred your mind to an undivided life, virtue — artless, and surpassing every form and figure — has sufficed for beauty and protection, adorning you as much in what is hidden as in what is seen by all, in the measure that you have preferred the longing for that which endures over that which is dissolved and worldly, [a longing] that never has its fill.

Rather, [that virtue] has shown you, as is fitting, to be so far made akin and like to God, as it has rendered you, in disposition, wholly estranged and unlike, from matter and the things pertaining to it.

From this comes to you also [your] invincibility toward those who act wickedly;

for it is natural that he who has, by disposition [gnome], undergone the good things should be affected by them, and be held wholly fast by them, having received the fulfilment of desire — that is, the complete conquest, effected upon himself, of the thing desired — and the cessation of motion that is the ever-moving rest, according to which death, which of old held sway over nature, is utterly abolished, nature no longer being defeated by it through transgression.

For you no longer undergo any tossing, on account of the prevailing grace of the Spirit, by which, holding fast to being held fast in accordance with your prayers, and skillfully completing its paths, you show by [your] operation how many [paths] are royal and divine, to those wishing to walk straight along the unerring path of piety;

and you mark out the deviations from these on either side;

and, on the one hand, [you point out] the sorrows that are threatened against these [deviations] —

and of these you intimate the promised sacred recompenses,

so that through fear and longing you might lead [them] to divine perfection.

And having greatly admired your labor, I fittingly praise your understanding;

or rather, astounded at the vigor you show in both, I glorify the God who empowers and makes you wise, entreating you to employ the same methods toward those who are deficient in understanding, and not to grow weary;

for virtue knows no weariness, since it accomplishes all good things, until you instill in them the mind of Christ, and train them to search out the depths of the Spirit — whose manifest workings encompass all the wisdom and power of created beings, and who reveals what is spoken in mystery to those who, like you, have devoted themselves to him and have preferred nothing more precious than communion with him.

But since you have acquired the virtue that is alike first of all and last, as a forerunner and radiant seal [of the rest] —

And I consider it correct to hold that this [the natural will] is one thing and the gnomic [will] another, and that this is not discordant with the teaching of the God-approved Fathers — even though it has seemed otherwise to some, who insist that the Fathers define 'will' as 'the act of willing' and 'the object willed' or 'the thing willed.'

And who defines it thus, and which of the Fathers [does so] — I would gladly ask them.

For if it is so, what else does this turn out to be but a circular demonstration, which fails to clarify its own definition on its own terms, but, contrary to what is fitting, posits the same thing of each by means of the other, putting forward — which is exactly the case — the defining of 'will' by 'the act of willing,' and this, in turn, by that?

For the things being defined revert, in circular fashion, to their own proper term.

For it is clear that they also call 'will' by the name 'the act of willing.'

Yet they do not say this as [giving] a definition of 'will.'

For who could demonstrate that they do?

since otherwise, according to those who make this claim, 'volition' would be the definition of 'that which is willed by deliberation,' 'motion,' in turn, the definition of 'that which is moved,' and 'humanity' the definition of 'man.'

But whether they signify the thing signified in this way or that, they in no way impair its existence — whether what is indicated be a motion or an essence.

For indeed, if it were otherwise, the existence of all universals and particulars alike would utterly collapse.

And I say this also: even if they do call 'will' by the name 'the act of willing,' they by no means call it 'the object willed.'

For how could desire and the object of desire be the same?

For if this were so, toward what would it be moved, being itself, properly speaking, that very thing toward which it is moved, and being, in nature, nothing other than that?

For this is a middle relation between the extremes,

uniting these [extremes] through itself, yet not coinciding with them in existence.

And the divine and great Gregory is witness to this, who never at all identifies 'the object willed' and 'the thing begotten' with 'the act of willing' and 'the begetting';

but through these, as natural relations, refers [them] back to the one who begets and wills.

For if he did not even consent to make the reference of the object willed or the thing begotten to the act of willing and to the begetting — although this [relation] is by nature a middle term — 'for it does not at all follow,' as he says, how then could he have brought these into identity and declared them to be one?

if they say that 'the object willed' is 'will,' and we ourselves are, by nature, [the] object willed and [the] thing willed —

for since we are creatures of God, then God would have, by nature, nothing else as his will except us alone — a will that comes to be and ceases to be, just as we do;

and before we existed, [God] would have been utterly devoid of will.

The same conclusion will follow with regard to us as well: nothing proper and natural would belong to us [as our will], but only what is willed from outside, whether it exists or does not exist;

good or not such, would be fictitiously ascribed [to us].

But how, indeed, can that which is willed also be among things external [to the one willing]?

So that, if the one who possesses the natural act of willing wills nothing among existing things, then nothing would be for him [the] object willed or [the] thing willed.

What reason, then, is there for those who insist that 'the object willed' is 'the will,' or who declare that it is so called by the holy Fathers?

But let it even be said so, according to them — for our concern is not with a difference of terminology, but our argument concerns pious concepts;

but let them fittingly answer us this, when we ask: whether the divine will is, by nature, other than the human will;

and whether this [human will] is other than that [divine will], even though it be called and named in a thousand ways.

let them teach us this, and steady our understanding, which is shaken by [this] uncertainty;

and we will not be greatly troubled by their choice of terms, but rather [consider] whatever we too, for our part, may contribute in these matters.

For if [the divine will and the human will] are not other and other in essence, it is clear that they are one in nature and identical.

And if this is so, then the nature too is necessarily one and without variation.

For where there is no natural difference of wills, there is likewise no difference at all of essence and nature.

But if they are, by nature, other and other, they are certainly different;

and if they are different, how is it not necessary to acknowledge their number as a quantity?

For the denial of this produces the utter abolition both of difference itself and of the things that differ, as though they did not exist.

For how is it possible both to exist and yet not be counted, and for what reason?

Or how could the wills, though real according to nature, escape being counted in the same way, if indeed the natures themselves could not reasonably escape being counted either?

For what is valid in the case of the natures — which are innate and constitutive of the things — must also hold true in the case of the things themselves; and let them either likewise abolish number from the natures, as being, on their reasoning, injurious, or, if it does no harm at all, let it also be admitted in the case of the wills.

for the manifestation of the innate difference present within them, on account of which we employ [number] even with respect to essences;

or let them show how, through their rejection of number, they do not produce the utter abolition or confusion of the Savior's natural will according to his humanity.

And how is the incarnate Logos a perfect man, apart from a natural will?

For to be deified by union with God does not remove even the very nature of the flesh — rationally and intellectually ensouled — from its essential reality;

just as neither does the utter and thoroughgoing commingling and union with fire remove the iron from its own [nature].

but it does undergo the effects proper to fire, since through the union it has become fire;

yet it is still heavy by nature, and it cuts, because it has suffered no injury to its own nature, nor has it in any way departed from its natural operation;

although it exists together with fire in one and the same hypostasis, and acts without division, both the things proper to its own nature

and also, in turn, the things belonging to the union, namely burning.

For [burning] belongs to it, just as, in turn, cutting belongs to the fire, on account of the extreme mutual interpenetration and exchange between them;

and we are in no way prevented from naming or numbering its nature — I mean the nature of the iron — even though it is seen together with fire, nor [are we prevented from naming or numbering] its natural operation, even though it is observed together with the burning and has no separation whatsoever from it, but rather appears and is recognized in a unified manner together with it and within it.

to him who, by an undivided union, has shared in the things belonging to the nature — just as he has also shared completely in the nature itself, except for sin alone; for sin was not even of nature, but of gnome — a deviation and a lapse of nature moved contrary to the principle and the law.

And it seems to me that, precisely for this reason above all, the aforementioned monk fittingly gave careful attention [to the matter], distinguishing the gnomic will from the natural will.

For everything that exists, and especially every rational being, naturally desires that which exists according to nature, and, having received this from God, possesses the power for it according to essence, for the constituting of itself.

For if it did not have desire for that which exists according to nature, how then, and from where, [could it have desire] for that which does not exist at all — since that has no existence or motion whatsoever?

For only non-being is powerless and without essence;

and no power of it whatsoever exists among beings, nor any motion.

But this [gnomic will] constitutes a self-determined impulse, producing deviations toward either extreme;

and it is not determinative of nature, but properly of person and hypostasis.

And having perceived this, Nestorius — the divider [of Christ] and man-worshiper — impiously taught a union of gnomic inclinations;

so that he might confirm each [nature's] hypostasis by means of the other, and that for him the 'mere man' might be preserved, having effected the union by a certain gnome and self-determined movement toward God the Word — as he himself says — from which he also constructs a 'unity of will,' or, to put it more fittingly, a 'multiplicity of wills';

inasmuch as, with each movement of the gnomic will, [the union], according to him, advances part by part from imperfect [stages] toward perfect ones, being carried along and progressing;

and not from the ineffable conception itself, in which our whole nature, entirely, together with all that pertains to it, was united to the whole deity of the Word and all that pertains to it, in one and the same hypostasis.

So that the aforementioned monk might, then, precisely determine that which is complete in the nature of the incarnate God, and cast aside the contrary [opinion]:

The natural [will], on the one hand, he determined in its own case;

but the gnomic will he excluded, giving no room in this either for division through faction, or for entry to imagination, since that [gnomic will] does not exist [in him].

But if someone should perhaps insist that it is not possible for the two wills to be spoken of by him in any other way than as in opposition,

then if [he means] as differing according to essence, I too accept it; but if as opposed, the statement is false.

For not everything that differs is therefore also opposed.

For that which is opposed is clearly [the work] of a gnome moving irrationally;

whereas that which differs is the work of a nature held fast by [its own] principle;

and the one [i.e. opposition] is factious toward nature, while the other [i.e. difference] is manifestly constitutive [of it].

For nature does not possess that which is contrary to nature;

nor is there any principle for that which is at strife.

Moreover, if the two wills are altogether contrary and opposed, how is it that among rational beings divided both by nature and by hypostasis this does not happen wholly and in every case?

For we sometimes concur with these — even though they are gnomic — both with God, and with angels, and with one another; yet on this account we have not thereby already fallen away from gnome, and from the will that accords with it.

For if [this holds true] of these, then manifestly also of the concurrence toward others — provided that, so long as we retain this [concurrence], we also cling fast to the other gnomic [wills] as well.

If then this is so here, and no opposition at all is observed, even though the gnomic wills are preserved both in existence and in number, together with the friendly disposition in [their] relation;

how, in the case of the same and one incarnate God the Word, who became fully man for our sake, will there be opposition among the wills that naturally belong to him according to essence?

But how do they say these are contrary — is it on account of their very number, or on account of their very existing?

But if for this reason [i.e. their existing], let them also do away with the nature of the flesh, as opposed to the Word on account of [its] existence.

for [thus] the substrate would come to stand opposed to that which is in the substrate.

But if on account of number alone, let them strip the natures of this too, and let them not even number a single one of them.

And let them again, for the same reason, reject it also in the case of the three hypostases of the one and unoriginate Godhead, lest that [Godhead] too should be at strife with itself — but it is absurd to allot such power to that which is altogether nothing at all — neither essence, nor quality, nor anything else among beings;

and more absurd still, to blame the very existence of the natural will, and from this to contrive its abolition.

And this, though it is, before all the other natural properties and movements in nature, the foremost innate power;

for it is by this alone that we naturally desire to be and to live, and to move, and to think, and to speak, and to perceive, and to partake of food, of sleep and of rest, and not to suffer pain, nor to die, and, simply, to possess perfectly the states of all the things that constitute nature, and the privations of the things that harm it.

And it seems to me that in this too the devout monk acted fittingly, in his own definition, when he added:

'and [it is] cohesive of all the properties that belong essentially to nature.'

For the essential and innate will in us always holds all things together, and desires to hold them together, and to suffer the privation of none of them;

or rather, [it is] we [who do this], through it and in accordance with it;

and I think that whoever takes account, even in some small measure, of what actually is and not of what merely seems, will altogether agree that the incarnate God, as man, has a natural and human will;

and that he wills, by nature, in accordance with it, each of the things enumerated, as confirmation of his flesh ensouled with an intellectual and rational soul — if indeed he became a perfect man, lacking none of what is ours, except sin alone;

but possessing all things, as many as we do, without omission — the things that according to nature constitute our essence — just as also those of the unoriginate and divine [essence], through which he made known that he was, properly, at once man and God, and preserved perfectly, after the union, the natural kinship both toward us and toward the Father.

For indeed to say that it was only at the time of the saving passion, when he was actually representing what is ours in himself, and as man was declining death, that he was shown to have two wills — this seems to me a mere assertion, not a demonstration.

For how [could this be] only at this time, and not before it, and for what cause?

For if he had it then, he had it also from the beginning, from the moment he became man, and did not improvise it later;

but if he did not have it from the beginning, then not even at the time of the passion [did he have it], but he only feigned the refusal, and along with it the rest of the things by which we have been saved — such as the tear, the prayer, the grief, the agony, the cross, the death, the burial;

for if one of the natural things in him that are preserved in accordance with us is invalidated, neither will the rest stand.

For how [could it be that] not that one, but these others [stand]?

And what kind of opposition is it, to pray, and [to do so] voluntarily, of a natural [will] —

I mean [the will] according to the flesh — to make a display of weakness through shrinking back, yet not to resist at all, but to say:

'Not what I will, but what you [will].'

and to join to this shrinking back the strong and eager movement against death?

For on the one hand he was actually representing in himself what is ours, through the natural agony that lasted a short while, so that he might both free us from this too, and confirm the nature of his own flesh, and render the dispensation, for all, pure of any semblance [of illusion];

but on the other hand he immediately again exhibited the greatest impulse against death, and the utmost congruence and union of the human [will] belonging to him with his own and Paternal will, by ratifying this and declaring:

'Not mine, but let yours be done.'

by the one repelling division, and by the other again [repelling] confusion.

But if they say this on the ground that he appears to have made a display of willing at some other time than at the time of the passion, let them say the same also concerning the innate faculty of thought, and thereby make him out to be devoid of intellect.

For he does not appear to have said, 'I have understood.'

And likewise concerning [the sense of] smell, and the rest of the things natural to us, which he is not recorded as having mentioned.

Or even concerning the soul itself — as though it did not exist actually from the moment he became man, but only when he mentioned it.

For it is recorded that he did this not long before the passion.

Let them, then, either say that it [the soul] was improvised on the spot, on the ground that he did not mention it often and from the beginning;

or, not saying this, but rather [confessing]: 'at once flesh, at once the flesh of God the Word, ensouled, rational,'

let them, dogmatizing according to the great Athanasius, say that the natural will of the Savior as man was not [present] only at the time of the passion, even if he made mention of it precisely then;

but that from the beginning it was co-essential with the Savior, as man, in accordance with our nature, naturally.

And let them henceforth cease raising and gathering such matters out of season.

For the present time is a time of bloodshed on account of our sins, but it is not a time of doctrines;

and [a time] of strong lamentations, for the entreating of God, but not of sophistical counter-arguments, unto greater indignation against us.

It occurs to me also to marvel concerning operation — how they teach as dogma that this is one in the case of Christ, by [its] reference and relation, as they themselves say, to the individual.

And to pass over saying that none of the natural things has its reference primarily to the individual, but rather its reference belongs to its nature and essence,

for who could operate anything at all apart from the powers naturally belonging to nature?

or whence would his operating or his capacity [to operate] come, apart from nature?

But I wish to ask this:

did they, then, put forward this [teaching] for the abolition of the natural operations, or for what [purpose]?

For if for abolition, how, when, and what sort of operation at all could there be, once those [natural operations] have ceased?

for just as, if the natures do not exist, that which is [composed] from them is altogether abolished too — I mean the composite hypostasis —

so also, if the natural operations do not exist, there will not be any other operation at all.

And I do not say this as though some other operation were constituted out of the natural ones.

For there is no composition at all of the things that are in a substrate;

since [such a composition] exhibits no existence at all of its own, but only presents what is arbitrary.

So that if they say that the [operations] properly existing according to nature do not exist, how will that which in no way exists come to exist?

For who is it that speaks of a 'hypostatic operation,' and whence [does he get] this, and from whom did they take it, that they should put it forward?

But if perhaps they declare this, and confess that the hypostasis to which it is referred is composite, and receptive of contraries and opposites—

for it will be, in all likelihood, mortal and immortal, visible and invisible, circumscribed and uncircumscribed, without beginning and under a beginning—and the operation will be this too.

And how else, than manifestly according to possession and privation?

And it will undergo the one set of these as existing, while the other, as not existing, it will merely have a derivative subsistence.

And how will the one who has such an operation undergo like affections according to the same operation, and not according to one-and-another, seeing that operation itself is not one-and-another either?

For it is wholly necessary that the one who operates be naturally conjoined to his own operation, and it to him.

And how is he God by possession, and not God by nature?

And how is he man by privation, and not properly existing as this by essence?

And what nature is without operation, or apart from natural operation?

For as it is by no means bereft of existence, so neither is it bereft of natural power.

But if it lacks this power, it would also lack existence.

For the powerless, being wholly inert, is only that which is not.

For everything that exists has a constitutive difference—the innate movement comprised together with the genus—which produces the definition of the subject, whereby it is properly known both that it is and what it is, possessing what is invariable in relation to things of like kind, and again what is distinct in relation to things of unlike kind;

and if this is so, how is it possible for the Logos who became man, if he lacked natural power according to the flesh, to be called a perfect man, or a man at all?

For man does not exist apart from natural operation, just as no other nature exists apart from its own essential operation.

The lack of this operation either causes the nature not even to be a nature, or causes all natures to be identical with one another, and one instead of many, when, through the failure of that which constitutes them, they are commingled and wholly confounded.

For if they say that the Logos, as regards what pertains to us, is not without operation, it is clear that they are thereby saying that he has an innate and human operation.

For it is not possible to operate apart from natural operation;

just as it is not possible to exist apart from essence and nature.

But it is also wholly necessary that he who operates, if indeed he is twofold in nature, does not have the innate operation as only one;

since otherwise the one who subsists would altogether be of one nature, even though he is composite in hypostasis.

For if the former [one operation] is due to the relation [of union], then the latter [one nature] is altogether due to the very same relation as well.

For we see this relation borne singularly upon both.

For the operation is referred to the one who operates, just as, again, the nature is referred to the one who subsists.

It is necessary, then, that if—on account of the union and the oneness of the person—they say the operation of the one who operates is one, they must, for this same reason, also declare the nature of the one who subsists to be one; lest, in declaring the union to be merely relational, they be caught saying it is a union of operations but not likewise of natures.

For it is not possible for them to unite these into a hypostasis, but rather into essence and nature—since, so far as concerns the natural operations, these are united to it into nothing other than operation.

For just as, according to them, the natural difference of these operations produces two agents who operate, so too, quite certainly, the innate difference of the essences will conjoin two subsisting subjects.

Either, then, let them also commingle these essences into one nature;

or let them by no means introduce division into those operations, which are naturally essential realities and are numbered [as two].

For what does not occur in the former case could never happen in the latter either.

But the natural difference is indicated by the number pertaining to them;

while the division is set aside through the extreme union.

For it is not possible to know that the divine or human nature even exists, much less that it differs from another, apart from essential operation.

For the definition of a thing is, properly, the principle of its essential power;

and when this is removed, the subject too is altogether removed along with it.

And for this reason we confess that these [essential operations] are naturally preserved in the incarnate Logos:

the one, shown in the flesh's contact with things divine;

the other, again, shown authoritatively in the experience of human things;

so that we may also, together with these operations, confess the natures of which they are the essential operations.

And to whom is it not clear that, in the case of one and the same essence and nature, no difference of existence or of natural operation is to be seen?

For nothing differs from itself;

but [difference is seen] in an individual and a person, in every way and altogether, if indeed it is composite;

for indeed we discern both the different natures out of which it is constituted, and the natural movements by which, operating according to nature, each is known, thereby confirming its own proper existence; and it actually demonstrates, through the natural operation occurring in one way and another, that the things of which it consists are one thing and another. Hence, for the one who fixes his gaze on the individual as such and willingly passes over the natures, in order to abolish the natural operations, we find that this assault weighs upon him rather than helping his cause.

For if the individual is not altogether enclosed within one natural operation, just as it is not enclosed within one nature either—

for who is there who says this, or is able to demonstrate it?—

it is clear that it has essential movements equal in number to the natures—that is, the essences—belonging to it, and no one will contradict this.

And I pass over saying that the composite person which is Christ is not, properly speaking, even called an individual.

For it does not stand in relation to the division that proceeds from the most general genus, through the subordinate genera, down to the most specific species, and that circumscribes its own progression within it.

Whence, for this reason, according to the most wise Cyril, the name 'Christ' has neither the force of a definition;

for it is not an individual term predicated of a species comprising many things differing in number, nor indeed does it signify the essence of anything.

For neither is it an individual referred to a species or genus, nor circumscribed by these according to essence;

utterly identifying within itself the division of the extremes, and bringing them into one through the union of its own parts.

But if perhaps, against those who confess his innate and human operation on the ground that the Lord is not without operation according to the flesh, they infer that he must not be without hypostasis either, this is to do violence to the hypostasis.

For the fact that the nature is not without hypostasis does not make it a hypostasis.

Just as the fact that every body has some shape does not mean that a body's not being without shape makes the body itself a shape;

nor does the fact that what is begotten or visible is not unbegotten or invisible make begetting or sight [identical with the thing itself].

And simply put, whatever else, when denied to be that which it is not, this makes for [only] a relation—

namely, that which is affirmed concerning that about which it is naturally contemplated.

Besides, even if this were perhaps the case—though it is not—it would have no bearing on the natural operations, which the holy Fathers likewise do not reject on account of the hypostases;

nor do the natural operations divide the one into two, as the hypostases do.

For who could be able to show that it is not good, for the demonstration of the essential difference, to maintain the natural operations in the case of one and the same subject?

And for what reason and how, and what argument or approved Father determines this—rather than that they merely assert it without proof?

For if it is not good to confess the natural operations, then neither is it good to confess the natures themselves.

Or how can it be good to confess these [natures] but not those [operations]?

But if confessing both is good, for what reason do they insert [a false inference] into this good confession, and construct the hypostasis out of the nature's not being without hypostasis?

For if they knew that, just as the hypostases, so also the operations were disparaged by the Fathers, it would not be unreasonable for them to reject these.

But if we know that the Fathers, proclaiming these [operations], confessing both a divine and a human operation, just as also a [divine and human] nature, even urged that this be confessed—while none of them, in any way whatsoever, ever confessed a divine or human hypostasis, except only the divisive man-worshipper Nestorius—why then, if the teaching of the saints is not rejected by them, do they contrive such sophistries against it, unto the abolition of the natural operations?

And whose doing is it to draw such conclusions, and in this manner, other than Severus the sophist and madman, who zealously undermines even his own positions, and in no way prevails over the pious, on account of the manifest clarity of the truth—even though he contrives it by the shameless manner of sophistical trifles?

For if the nature's not being without hypostasis makes it a hypostasis, then surely, by the same logical consequence, the hypostasis's not being without essence would likewise constitute it as an essence.

And those who say this—how do they not divide the doctrine of theology, by [attributing] natures equal in number to the hypostases?

since, according to them, the hypostases that are not without essence are altogether essence,

and they do not confound that of the economy with the singularity of nature on account of the one hypostasis —

being consistent with themselves, then, they will thereby lay down such doctrines against themselves.

But for those who confess the natural operations, that they thus gather these together as well is a matter of grace: in all things they gather the truth for themselves according to the tradition of the saints, according to which to say that something is not without hypostasis does not make the nature to be a hypostasis, but rather enhypostatic;

so that it may not be taken merely in conception as an accident, but may really be beheld as a species.