TO QUINTUS AURELIUS SYMMACHUS, MAN OF CLARISSIMAN RANK, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS EX-CONSUL, OF THE ORDINARY RANK AND PATRICIAN, HIS FATHER-IN-LAW. PROOEMIUM. The question which I have investigated for a very long time—insofar as the divine light has deigned to illumine the little spark of my mind—formed by reasonings and committed to writing, I have taken care to offer to you and to share with you, being as desirous of your judgment as I am studious of my own discovery. In which matter, what my disposition is whenever I commit to the pen things thought out, can be understood both from the difficulty of the subject and from the fact that I converse with only a few—that is, with you alone; for we are not stirred by the boasting of fame and the empty clamors of the crowd; but if there is any external fruit, this can hope for no other judgment than one similar to its subject matter.
Wherever, therefore, I have cast my eyes away from you, partly slothful indolence, partly cunning envy meets me; so that he would seem to inflict an insult upon divine treatises who should cast forth such things—to be trodden under foot rather than recognized—before such monsters of men. Therefore I contract my style with brevity, and what I have taken from the inmost disciplines of philosophy I veil with the significations of new words, so that these things may speak only to me and to you, if ever you turn your eyes to them; but the rest we so put away that those who could not grasp them with the intellect seem unworthy even to read them. Yet not so much ought to be sought from us as the gaze of human reason is able to ascend to the heights of divinity.
for in the other arts also there is, as it were, a certain limit set, up to which the way of reason is able to approach. For neither does medicine always bring health to the sick, but there will be no fault in the physician if he has omitted nothing of those things which ought to have been done; and the same is true in the other arts. But by how much this question is more difficult, by so much the readier it ought to be for pardon. Yet this too must be examined by you: whether any fruits coming into us have brought forth seeds of reasonings from the writings of the blessed Augustine; and let us take from this our beginning concerning the proposed question. CHAPTER ONE. The Catholic opinion concerning the Trinity and the unity of God. Many usurp the reverence of the Christian religion;
but that faith is preeminent and unique which, both because of the precepts of universal rules, by which the authority of this same religion is understood, and because its worship has spread through almost all the bounds of the world, is called Catholic or universal: whose opinion concerning the unity of the Trinity is this. The Father, they say, is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; therefore the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one, not three Gods. The ground of this conjunction is the absence of difference. For difference accompanies those who either augment or diminish, like the Arians, who, varying the Trinity by degrees of merits, tear it apart and draw it out into plurality. For the principle of plurality is otherness;
for apart from otherness no plurality can be understood as to what it is. For the diversity of three things, or of however many, consists in genus, in species, and in number: for as often as the same is said, so often also the diverse is predicated. But 'the same' is said in three ways: either in genus, as man is the same as horse, because their genus is the same, namely animal; or in species, as Cato is the same as Cicero, because their species is the same, namely man; or in number, as Tullius and Cicero, because there is one in number. Wherefore the diverse too is said either in genus, or in species, or in number; but in number it is the variety of accidents that makes the difference: for three men differ neither in genus nor in species, but by their accidents.
For even if in mind we should separate from these all the accidents, nevertheless the place of all is diverse, which we can in no way feign to be one: for two bodies will not occupy one place, which is an accident; and therefore they are several in number, because they become several by accidents. CHAPTER TWO. The divine substance is form. Come then, let us enter in and discern each thing as it can be understood and grasped; for, as it seems best said, it belongs to a learned man to try to apprehend each thing as it is. For since there are three speculative parts—the natural, which is in motion and not abstract; the inseparable (anepexairetos, that is, inseparable);
for it considers the forms of bodies together with matter, which cannot in act be separated from bodies, which bodies are in motion, as earth is borne downward, fire upward; and the form joined to matter has motion. Mathematics, without motion, not abstract: for this speculates the forms of bodies without matter, and through this without motion; which forms, since they are in matter, cannot be separated from it. Theology, without motion, abstract and separable: for the substance of God lacks both matter and motion.
In natural things, therefore, one will have to proceed rationally; in mathematical things, by way of discipline; in divine things, intellectually; nor to be drawn down to imaginations, but rather to contemplate that very Form which is truly Form and not image, and which is Being itself, and from which Being is; for all being is from form. For a statue is called the likeness of a living being not according to the bronze, which is matter, but according to the form which is stamped upon it; and the bronze itself is called bronze not according to earth, which is its matter, but according to the figure of bronze. Earth too itself is called earth not according to unformed matter (kata tēn hylēn), but according to dryness and weight, which are forms.
Nothing, therefore, is said to be according to matter, but according to its proper form. But the divine substance is form without matter, and therefore it is one, and that which it is. For the rest are not that which they are: for each thing has its being from those things of which it is, that is, from its parts; and it is this and that, that is, its parts joined together, but not this or that singly: as when earthly man consists of soul and body, he is body and soul, not either body or soul. In the part, therefore, he is not that which he is. But that which is not from this and that, but only this, that truly is that which it is; and it is most beautiful and most strong, because it leans upon nothing.
Wherefore this is truly one, in which it is, and there is nothing else in it besides that which it is, since no number can become a subject in it: for it is form, and forms cannot be made subjects. For whereas the other forms are made subjects to accidents, as humanity, it does not receive accidents in respect of that which itself is, but in respect of the fact that matter is made subject to it. For while the matter subjected to humanity receives any accident whatever, humanity itself seems to receive this. But the Form which is without matter cannot be a subject, nor indeed inhere in matter; for then it would not be form, but image. For from these forms which are apart from matter have come those forms which are in matter and constitute body.
for the other forms which are in bodies we misuse, calling them forms, whereas they are images; for they are likened to those forms which are not constituted in matter. There is therefore no diversity in him, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents, and therefore no number either. CHAPTER THREE. In the divine substance there is no number.
But God differs in no way from God, so as to stand apart either by accidents or by accidental differences placed in a subject. But where there is no difference, there is no plurality at all, and therefore no number; therefore there is unity alone. For the fact that God is thrice repeated, when he is named Father and Son and Holy Spirit, does not make the three unities a plurality of number in respect of that which they themselves are, if we attend to numerable things and not to number itself: for there the repetition of unities makes number. But in that number which consists in numerable things, the repetition of unities and plurality in no way makes a numerous diversity of numerable things. For number is twofold:
one indeed by which we number, the other which consists in numerable things. For 'one' is a thing, the unity by which we say 'one.' 'Two' again are in things, as men or stones; but duality is nothing—rather it is duality by which two men or two stones become two: and in the rest in the same manner. Therefore in the number by which we number, the repetition of unities makes plurality; but in the number of things the repetition of unities does not make plurality: as if I should say of the same thing—'one sword' (gladius), 'one blade' (mucro), 'one brand' (ensis)—for a sword can be recognized by so many names. For this repetition of unities is rather a reiteration, not a numbering; as if we should say thus, 'brand, blade, sword,' it is a certain repetition of the same thing, not a numbering of diverse things.
as if I should say, 'sun, sun, sun,' I would not have made three suns, but should have predicated of one so many times. Not therefore, if God is predicated thrice of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, does threefold predication on that account make number: for this, as has been said, threatens those who make a distinction of merits among them. But for Catholics, who establish no difference, and who posit the Form itself as it is, and who hold that there is nothing other than that which the very 'that which is' is, the repetition of the same rightly seems to be, rather than an enumeration of the diverse, when it is said: God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, and this Trinity one God—just as 'blade and brand, one sword'; as 'sun, sun, sun, one sun.'
But let this be said in the meantime to that signification and demonstration by which it is shown that not every repetition of unities accomplishes number and plurality. Yet it is not so said—'Father and Son and Holy Spirit'—as though it were something multivocal: for blade and brand both are and are the same; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are indeed the same, yet not the very same. In which matter one must consider for a little while. For to those who inquire, 'Is the Father the same one who is the Son?'—'By no means,' they say. Again, 'Is the one the same as the other?'—it is denied. There is not therefore among them an absence of difference in every respect.
Wherefore number creeps in, which is brought about by the diversity of subjects, as was explained above. Concerning which we shall consider briefly, if first we set forth this: in what manner each thing is predicated of God. CHAPTER FOUR. How God is in the categories. Ten categories in all are handed down, which are universally predicated of all things—that is, substance, quality, quantity, relation, where, when, having, being-situated, doing, undergoing. These, then, are such as their subjects permit: for a part of them is, in the predication of the other things, substance, and a part is in the number of accidents.
And when one turns these into divine predication, all the things that can be predicated are changed. But relation cannot be predicated at all; for in him substance is not truly substance, but beyond substance. Likewise quality and the rest which can occur—of which, that a fuller understanding may be had, examples must be subjoined. For when we say 'God,' we seem indeed to signify substance, but that which is beyond substance; but when we say 'just,' we signify indeed a quality, yet not an accidental one, but one which is substance, and beyond substance;
for in God it is not one thing that he is, and another that he is just, but it is the same thing to be God as to be just. Likewise, when he is called 'great' or 'greatest,' we seem indeed to signify quantity, but that quantity which is the very substance, such as we said is beyond substance: for it is the same thing to be God as to be great. For concerning his Form it has been demonstrated above that he is Form and truly one, and there is no plurality. But these categories are such that, in that wherein they are, they make the very being to be what is said: dividedly indeed in other things, but in God conjointly and copulately, in this manner: for when we say 'substance,' as 'man' or 'God,' this is said as though that of which it is predicated were itself substance, as 'substance is man' or 'substance is God.'
But there is a difference, since man is not entirely man himself, and through this is not substance. For what he is, he owes to other things which are not man; but God is this very thing which he is, God; for there is nothing else except that which is, and through this he is God himself. Again, 'just,' which is quality, is so said as though it were the very thing of which it is predicated; that is, if we should say 'a just man,' or 'a just God,' we propose that the very man or God is just; but it differs, since the man is one thing and the just another; but God is the very same thing which is just. Likewise a man or God is called 'great,' and that as though he himself were a great man or a great God; but the man is only great, while God himself is greatness. But the rest are predicated neither of God nor of the others:
for 'where' can be predicated either of God or of man; of man, as 'in the forum'; of God, as 'everywhere'—but so that it is not as though the very thing which is predicated were the thing of which it is said. For a man is not said to be in the forum in the same way as to be white or long, nor as though circumfused and determined by some property by which he could be designated according to himself, but only that he is something informed by other things—this is shown through such predication. But concerning God it is not so: for the fact that he is everywhere seems to be said not because he is in every place (for he cannot be in place at all), but because every place is present to him for receiving him, while he himself is not received in place; and therefore he is said to be nowhere in place, since he is everywhere, but not in place.
But when something is predicated in the same way, as of a man, 'he came yesterday'; of God, 'he always is.' Here too that very thing of which yesterday's coming is asserted is not said to be something, but rather it is predicated that it came to him according to time. But what is said of God, 'he always is,' signifies one thing, namely that he was in every past, that he is in every present mode likewise, and that he will be in every future. This can be said, according to the philosophers, of the heaven and of the other immortal bodies.
But it is not so with God, for he always is, since the time present to him is always present; and there is as great a difference between the present of our affairs, which is the 'now,' and that of divine things, as that our 'now,' as it were a running time, makes the sempiternal, whereas the divine 'now,' abiding, neither moving itself nor standing still, makes eternity. To this name, if you add 'always,' you make of that which is 'now' a continual, untiring, and thereby perpetual course, which is sempiternity. Again, with 'to have' or 'to do,' it is the same way: for we say of a man, 'he runs clothed'; of God, 'possessing all things he governs.' Again, nothing of that which is 'to be' has been said of either. But all this predication is given according to external things, and all these things are in a certain way referred to something else.
We more easily discern the difference of this predication thus: he who is a man, or God, is referred to the substance by which he is something, that is, man or God; he who is just is referred to the quality by which, namely, he is something, that is, just; he who is great, to the quantity by which he is something, that is, great. For in the other predications there is nothing of this kind. For he who says that someone is in the marketplace, or anywhere, refers indeed to the category which is 'where,' but not to that by which something is, as the just by justice. Likewise, when I say 'he runs,' or 'he governs,' or 'he is now,' or 'he is always,' it is referred either to doing or to time;
if indeed meanwhile that divine 'always' can be called time; but it is not referred to that by which, as by something, a thing is, as the great by greatness; for situation and being acted upon ought not to be sought in God, for they are not in him. Is it now clear what difference there is among predications? That some, as it were, point to the thing itself, while others point to the circumstances of the thing; and that the former are so predicated as to show the thing to be something, but the latter so as to show it not to be, but rather to affix to it in a certain way something from without. Therefore those which designate something to be according to the thing let them be called predications; when these are said of subject things they are called accidents according to the thing; but when they are said of God, who is not a subject, the predication is named according to the substance of the thing.
CHAPTER V. How God is in relation. Come now, let us examine relatives, for the sake of which we have taken up all that has been said for discussion. For these especially do not seem to make a predication according to themselves, since they are clearly seen to consist of the arrival of something foreign. For come, since master and servant are relatives, let us see whether it is so that the predication is according to itself, or by no means. And yet if you take away the servant, you have taken away also the master; but it is not the case that, if you take away whiteness, you have also taken away the white. But the difference is that whiteness is an accident of the white, and once it is removed the white assuredly perishes. But in the master, if you take away the servant, the very term by which the master was called perishes.
But the servant is not an accident of the master, as whiteness is of the white, but a certain power by which the servant is held in check; and since this power perishes when the servant is removed, it is evident that it does not accrue to the master through himself, but in some manner from without, through the access of servants. Therefore a relative predication cannot be said to add anything, or to diminish, or to change anything in the thing of which it is said according to itself. For it consists wholly not in that which is 'to be,' but in being in some way disposed in comparison; nor always to another, but sometimes to the same. For come, let someone stand; if then I approach him on the right, he will be left in comparison to me, not because he himself is left, but because I have approached on the right.
Again, I approach on the left; likewise he becomes the one on the right, not because he is thus on the right of himself, as white and tall, but because, as I approach, he becomes the one on the right; and what he is, is from me and out of me, but in no way from himself. Wherefore those things which, according to the property of some thing, in that which it itself is, do not make a predication, can in no way alter or change anything, and can vary no essence whatsoever.
Wherefore, if Father and Son are said in relation to something, and differ in nothing else, as has been said, except by relation alone, and relation is not predicated of that of which it is predicated as though it were itself and according to the thing of which it is said, it will not produce an otherness of the things of which it is said; but, if it may be said, in that very manner in which what could scarcely be understood was interpreted of persons. For altogether great is the truth of the rule, that in incorporeal things distances are effected by differences, not by places. Nor can anything be said to have accrued to God, that he might become Father;
for he never began to be Father, inasmuch as the production of the Son is indeed substantial to him, but the predication 'Father' is relative. And if we remember all the sentences set forth before concerning God, let us thus think: that the Son, who is God, proceeded from God the Father, and from both the Holy Spirit; that these, since they are incorporeal, are by no means distant by places; and since the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and God has no differences by which he might differ from God, he differs from none of them. But where differences are absent, plurality is absent; where plurality is absent, unity is present; and nothing else could be begotten from God except God; and in numerable things the repetition of unities does not in every respect make plurality.
Therefore the unity of the Three is fittingly established. CHAPTER VI. How unity and trinity are in God. But since no relation can be referred to itself, therefore, because that predication which lacks relation is according to itself, the numerousness of the Trinity has indeed been made in that which is the predication of relation; while the unity has been preserved in that which is the indifference either of substance, or of operation, or altogether of that predication which is said according to itself. Thus therefore substance contains unity, while relation multiplies trinity;
and therefore those things which belong to relation are alone brought forth singly and separately. For the same who is Father is not the Son, nor is either the same who is the Holy Spirit. Yet the same is God: Father and Son and Holy Spirit; the same just, the same good, the same great, the same all things which can be predicated according to themselves. Indeed it must be known that relative predication is not always such that it is always predicated in relation to something different, as the servant is to the master, for they differ. For everything equal is equal to an equal, and like is like to like, and the same is the same to that which is the same; and in the Trinity there is a like relation, of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit;
as that which is the same in relation to that which is the same. But if this cannot be found in all other things, the otherness akin to perishable things brings this about. But we ought not to be drawn apart by any imagination, but to be raised up by simple understanding, and, as each thing can be understood, so we ought to approach it also by the understanding. But concerning the question proposed enough has been said. Now the subtlety of the question awaits the standard of your judgment; and whether it has been rightly traversed, or by no means, the authority of your pronouncement shall determine. But if, with divine grace aiding, we have furnished suitable supports of arguments to the sentences which are of their own accord most firm upon the foundations of faith, then the joy of the completed work will return thither whence its accomplishment came.