You ask that, out of our Hebdomads, I should set in order and demonstrate a little more clearly the obscurity of that question which contains the manner in which substances, in that they are, are good, although they are not substantial goods; and you say this is to be done because the path of writings of this kind is not known to all. But I myself am your witness, how vigorously you had embraced this beforehand. As for the Hebdomads, I ponder them for myself, and rather store up my speculations for my own memory than share them with anyone, for whose wantonness and petulance suffers nothing to be set apart from jest and laughter.
Therefore be not adverse to the obscurities of brevity, which, since they are the faithful guardian of a secret, have moreover this advantage, that they converse only with those who are worthy. As then is wont to be done in mathematics and in the other disciplines also, I have set forth terms and rules by which I shall accomplish all that follows. A common conception of the mind is a statement which everyone approves when he hears it. Of these there is a twofold kind: for in one it is common, so that it belongs to all men, as if you should propose this: 'If from two equals you take away equals, the things that remain are equal'; no one understanding this would deny it. But the other belongs only to the learned, which nevertheless comes from such common conceptions of the mind, as is:
'Things that are incorporeal are not in a place,' and the rest, which not the common crowd, but the learned approve. To be, and that which is, are different: for being itself is not yet; but that which is, having received the form of being, is and subsists. That which is can participate in something; but being itself participates in no way in anything: for participation comes about when something already is; but a thing is something when it has received being. That which is can have something besides what it itself is; but being itself has nothing else admixed besides itself. To be merely something, and to be something in that which it is, are different: for there an accident is signified, here a substance. Everything that is participates in that which is being, in order that it may be:
but it participates in something else in order that it may be something. And by this, that which is participates in that which is being, in order that it may be; but it is, in order that it may participate in anything else whatsoever. Everything simple has its being and that which it is as one. Everything composite has its being one thing, and itself another. All diversity is discordant, but likeness is to be desired; and that which desires another is naturally shown to be itself such as that very thing which it desires. Sufficient, therefore, are the things we have set forth before; but by the prudent interpreter of reasoning each one will be fitted to its proper arguments. The question, however, is of this kind: The things that are, are good; for the common opinion of the learned holds that everything which is tends toward the good; and everything tends toward its like.
Those things, therefore, which tend toward the good are themselves good; but in what manner they are good must be inquired into, whether by participation or by substance. If by participation, they are in no way good through themselves; for that which is white by participation is not white through itself, in that very thing which it is, and the same holds of the other qualities. If, then, they are good by participation, they are in no way good through themselves; but this was granted. They are not, therefore, good by participation, but by substance; and those things whose substance is good are good in that very thing which they are, and what they are they have from that which is to be. Their very being, therefore, is good; the very being of all things, therefore, is good. But if to be is good, those things which exist are good in that very thing which they exist;
and for them to be is the same as to be good; they are therefore substantially good, since they do not partake of goodness. But if their very being is good in them, there is no doubt that, being substantial and being good, they are first like the prime good, and through this they will be the very good itself; for nothing is like that prime good except itself. From which it would follow that all things which exist are God—which is unlawful to say. They are not, therefore, substantially good, and through this, the good is not in their being; therefore they are not good in that very thing which they are; yet neither do they partake of goodness, for then in no way would they tend toward the good; in no way, therefore, are they good.
To this question the following solution may be applied. There are many things which, although they cannot be separated in act, are nevertheless separated by the mind and in thought; as when no act separates the triangle, or the rest, from the underlying matter, yet the mind, by abstracting, contemplates the triangle itself and its property apart from matter. Let us, therefore, for a little while remove from the mind the presence of the prime good—which is indeed agreed to exist, and that by the verdict of all the learned and unlearned, and may even be known through the religions of the barbarian nations. This, then, being for a little while removed, let us posit that all things which exist are good; and let us consider how they could be good, if they had not in the least flowed down from the prime good.
Hence I perceive that there is one thing in them whereby they are good, and another whereby they exist. For let one and the same substance be supposed to be good, white, heavy, round: then that very substance would be one thing, its roundness another, its colour another, its goodness another; for if these single attributes were the same as the substance itself, heaviness would be the same as colour, and as the good, and the good the same as heaviness—which nature does not permit to happen. There would then, therefore, be in them one thing 'to be' and another 'to be something'; and then indeed they would be good, yet their being would not come from the good; and they would be good, yet would not be the same as good, but for them 'to be' would be one thing, and 'to be good' another;
but if they were nothing else whatsoever except good—neither heavy, nor coloured, nor extended by spatial dimension, nor was there in them any quality save only that they were good—then they would seem to be, not things, but the principle of things; nor rather would they seem so, but it alone would seem so: for one and one only is of such a kind, that it is good alone, and is nothing else; and since these are not simple, they could not exist at all, unless he who alone is good had willed them to exist. Therefore, since their being flowed down from the will of the good, they are said to be good; for the prime good, in that it exists, is good in that very thing which it is; but the second good, since it flowed from that whose very being is good, is itself also good.
But the very being of all things flowed from that which is the prime good, and which is such a good that it is rightly said to be good in that very thing which it is. The very being of these things, therefore, is good; for then, in that they exist, they would not be good, if they had not in the least flowed down from the prime good. By which point the question is resolved: for although they are good in that very thing which they are, they are nevertheless not like the prime good; because it is not in any manner whatsoever that things exist that their very being is good; but because the very being of things cannot exist unless it has flowed down from the prime being, that is, from the good: for this reason their very being is good, and yet is not like that from which it comes. For that prime good is good, in whatever manner it may be, in that very thing which it is; for it is nothing else than good;
but this latter, unless it came from that prime good, could perhaps be good, yet it could not be good in that very thing which it is. For then it would perhaps partake of the good, but the very being which it had not from the good they could not have as good. Therefore, the prime good being removed from these by the mind and in thought, these things, although they were good, could nevertheless not be good in that very thing which they were; and since they could not exist in act, unless that which is truly good had produced them, for this reason both their being is good, and that which flowed from it is not like the substantial good: and unless they had flowed from it, although they were good, they nevertheless could not be good in that very thing which they are;
since they would exist both apart from the good and not from the good, whereas that very prime good is both the very being, and the very good, and the very good being. But ought not white things also to be white in that very thing which they are, since those which are white flowed from the will of God, that they might be white? By no means. For to be is one thing, and to be white another: and this is so because he who brings it about that they should exist is indeed good, but by no means white. They have, therefore, accompanied the will of the good, that they might be good in that very thing which they are; but they have not accompanied the will of one who is not white, in such a way that this should be its property—that it should be white in that very thing which it is; for they did not flow down from the will of the white. And so, because he who was not white willed them to be white, they are only white;
but because he who was good willed them to be good, they are good in that very thing which they are. According to this reasoning, therefore, ought all things to be just, since he himself is just who willed them to exist? Not even this; for to be good regards essence, but to be just regards act; yet in him to be is the same as to act, and therefore for him to be good is the same as to be just. But for us to be is not the same as to act, for we are not simple; for us, therefore, to be good is not the same as to be just; yet for us it is the same to be all good in that very thing which we are. All things, therefore, are good, but not all are also just: moreover, the good is general, but the just is special, nor does the species descend into all things. For this reason some things are just, others are something else: but all things are good.