Hence, because after death it is possible for no one either to repent or to sin, the chasm of an unchangeable state is said to be impassable between the saved and the lost. Your own speech therefore is turned against you; for the testimony which you supposed could be scattered apart from us, you perceive, by the progress of disputation, becomes one with us, and you perceive that you are closing, by the door turned against you, those very slenderest pathways of yours that lead to the infinite spaces of non-local regions—because the narrowness of bodily magnitude, not grasping the immensity of incorporeal subtleties, can comprehend neither a distance without place, nor a word without sound, nor a bosom without space. Moreover, those things which are thus are not bodily.
But the souls of Abraham, of Lazarus, and of the rich man are thus; therefore they are not bodily. But the things which afterward follow, similar to these, ought surely to cost less labor in their own refutation than in our council's vigorous effort. For the buffoon rightly judges himself defeated who, by reason of his own weakness, is on a level with the defeated. Hence not without shame I am amazed that, to prove the bodily nature of the soul, you add: «Behold, if the soul thinks of Alexandria or Jerusalem, and if through thought it was present there with its whole self, let it report to us the lay of the places, the faces of men, the movements and acts of peoples.» Is the author of this opinion not ashamed to seize upon a proof drawn from the soul's bodily nature—from which an argument for its incorporeality ought rather to have been seen? XI.
THAT THE SOUL'S VISION IS UNDERSTANDING, AND THAT AS BY MEANS OF A BODY IT SEES BODILY THINGS, SO BY ITSELF IT SEES SPIRITUAL THINGS; AND THAT, IF IT SAW BODIES BY ITSELF, IT WOULD MORE EASILY HAVE SEEN ITS OWN INWARD PARTS. Thus far indeed I have discoursed concerning the mind's incorporeal and non-local vision, and it has plainly appeared that the mind beholds, with no intervening substance, things eternal, ever-abiding, and unchangeable. Therefore, since the rational soul beholds by itself that which is incorporeal and non-local, and discerns the truth, which is God, far from falsehood by an incorporeal vision, and does not see local and bodily things except by means of a body—what reason is there that the soul should be believed similar to those things which it uses the body as interpreter to behold, yet judged dissimilar to those things which it contemplates by itself?
The soul's vision, as has often been said—and it is no weariness to repeat it—is understanding. For bodily things cannot be understood; they can be perceived by the soul by means of the body. But the soul, just as it perceives by means of the body, so it understands by itself; and the substance of the things that are perceived and of those that are understood is far diverse. Whence it comes about that the soul, because it is not a body, cannot perceive bodily things except by means of the body, yet can see by itself the things that are to be understood. But will you, by an exceedingly contrary opinion, wish bodily things to be understood and incorporeal things to be seen?
But lest it seem to you that the human mind, which you believe to be bodily, can by itself see either nothing, or nothing except bodily things, or perhaps incorporeal things alone—as is proper to its nature—let us sift, as briefly as we can, the threefold obscurity of this question. Therefore, first, let us see whether the human mind sees by itself or not. But since almost the chief point of this whole business turns at this very place, I ask for a reader at once wakeful and watchful. The mind's sight by means of the body, which is common to man and beast,
strains and thrusts itself forth through these little points of the pupils, from the heated front ventricle of the brain, by the invisible flames of the inward parts, and flowing on ever further into rays; and if it catches anything of color or form set in its path, it conceives it, and just as in the outgoing course so also in the return it takes it back by the rapid passages of the lines; and so this is that which is called sight, as we discussed in the first book. Through this, then, the human mind too, together with the beast, distinguishes the known from the unknown, the white from the black, by means of the hide. Is the sight of the human mind only thus far? By what, then, does it discern the just from the unjust, the true from the false? Or shall the mad, who have eyes, be thought to outstrip in bodily judgment the blind who are wise?
But let us have as witnesses upon the present uncertainty either Appius from the Roman senate, or Hermophilus from the Greek gymnasium, or Tobias from the number of the prophets: of whom either Appius gave the light of counsel to those who outwardly shone with eyes yet inwardly were blind; or Hermophilus taught Theopompus geometry without a rod; or Tobias, while as a forerunner he opened the way of heaven, gave his son an angel as companion. The mind therefore sees, apart from a body, nothing corpulent or colored or extended through places, but the very truth, which, supremely incorporeal, is God, and it contemplates it with an incorporeal gaze. It is plain, as I judge, that the mind both sees incorporeal things by itself and bodily things by means of a body.
But this still remains to be examined, for the sake of those little men of lukewarm liver: whether the human mind can by itself, without a body, see bodily things. Now therefore be wholly present, and be as present as you can. For, as you assert, the human mind is itself also bodily and enclosed within the barrier of the outer body; if it can by itself see anything bodily, then surely nothing is readier for it to see than the inner parts of the body in which it is shut up.
Come, I pray, turn your attention into your own inward parts and into absolutely all the parts of your body with that bodily sight of the mind which you keep proclaiming, and report concerning your very self to yourself and to us: tell by what arrangements and in what position the threefold form of the brain meets together; how the mass of the liver lies; how the straight edge of the spleen clings; how the balance of the stomach hangs; how the plectrum of the heart strikes; what are the pathways of the veins or what their texture; what are the origins of the nerves or their joinings; what the meeting of the bones or their compacting; what the cavities of the lungs; what the windings and bendings forth and back of the twisted intestines, unfolded by their knotty bindings. See, why do you refuse to render answers to the inquirer concerning these things? Why, then, do you refuse? Because, of course, the mind by itself in no way sees bodily things.
But why is it that it can in no way see bodily things, when it has already been established that it is not without sight? No one sees anything bodily who does not have bodily sight. But the mind, which has sight and yet sees nothing bodily, sees incorporeally; and that which can see incorporeally is an incorporeal sight; and the incorporeal sight none but the incorporeal possesses; and the human mind sees incorporeally: therefore the human mind is incorporeal. Be no longer troubled, then, by these frivolities, so as to think that the mind is not there where it thinks—because by its nature it cannot contemplate the lay of places, the faces of men, the movements and acts of peoples; for these things are bodily.
Moreover, the incorporeal mind cannot see that which is contrary to its own nature; yet it is so far present where it thinks that it does not perceive by bodily vision the places which it thinks of—just as it is present where it gives life, so that it does not see the inward parts of its own body which it makes alive.
And if it is everywhere plain that the mind can neither see bodily things without a body, nor see incorporeal things with a body, let us no longer wander abroad at Alexandria, but, returning from Egypt—the sea of errors crossed over and the desert of ignorance traversed—let us enter the homeland of truth, the land, as it were, of promise: not idle nor sluggish, nor indeed trembling, so that, if anything begotten by the vice of lying vanity should either clamor about us covertly or set itself in our path, it may be struck down with Jesus going before and aiding us. XII. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY: THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL TO ITSELF, BODILY TO GOD. But behold, though we are not halted in our journey by the babbling trifles of certain men who do away with souls, we are nevertheless slowed.
But to spend a tiny bit of time is no loss—nay rather it helps—provided that the same truth either repels or tramples down whatever is opposed to the true or at variance with it. And when I hear certain men say—men who both wish souls to be bodily and yet cannot deny that they are incorporeal—that the souls are one thing to themselves and another to their Creator: «To God,» they say, «souls are bodily, but to themselves incorporeal»—which is just as if they said that souls are both bodily and incorporeal—I call eternity to witness that it is exceedingly laborious for me to answer these empty notions with these very words; for there is nothing here with which I may grapple, nothing which I may dig out from the marrow, nothing with which to have contended in exercise, nothing indeed which, when conquered, would be a victory's worth.
Therefore, if the soul is bodily to its Creator and incorporeal to itself, reason in search of truth demands that these two be skillfully examined: either it is truly so in reality that the soul is incorporeal, if it truly knows this very thing about itself; or likewise it is true that the soul is bodily, if this is established with the soul's author. If they speak truly and it is true that the soul is incorporeal, because it knows this in truth, and it is likewise true that the soul is bodily, because the soul's Creator knows it, then they maintain that two things, contrary to each other in every way, are both true—whereas the true is contrary to nothing but the false. A most illustrious and brilliant disputation indeed, which, while it spurns the one and only truth, finds for itself two truths!
Nevertheless, that I may hold these men by the bonds of their own profession: in man's regard, by their own admission too, the human mind is incorporeal. Since therefore we are agreed with them upon this part of the question, it remains for them to teach in what way an incorporeal substance is bodily to Him who created that same substance incorporeal. And I do not first say whether it be so or not, but for the present I concede that it is so; yet I ask whence they have come to know that it is so. If the letters of the divine volumes contain this, let them read it; if any reasoning persuades it, let them teach it; if it helps to exercise dialectic, let them prove it.
If there is none of these, let them at least yield to their own opinion: that those who are incorporeal in themselves should not believe themselves to be corporeal outside themselves; for nothing can be outside itself which can be nothing outside itself. Accordingly the mind, which is incorporeal in its very self, can in no way be corporeal outside itself; for neither does its author know it to be other than he made it, nor can it know itself to be other than it was made. And through this, if it knows the truth when it knows itself incorporeal, then God is deceived, if He knows to be corporeal a mind which is truly incorporeal. But God cannot be deceived; therefore He knows the mind to be incorporeal, lest that be false which is true, by which the mind truly knows itself incorporeal. The mind therefore is incorporeal to itself precisely because it is so to its Creator also.
For just as the earth is earth to man precisely because it is earth to God also; and just as water, air, and fire are this very thing to man precisely because they are this to God also; and just as all things which have truly become known to man are, in man's knowledge, that which they are; so, of course, the human mind can in no way be one thing in itself and another as known to God. For the Creator's knowledge does not come from the knowledge of things, but the existence of things comes from the Creator's knowledge. Wherefore the human mind, unless it were incorporeal to God, could not be incorporeal. For whatever is in any way incorporeal can in no way be corporeal. But lest we linger here longer than is fitting, come, let us also inquire into that which we have not examined in any part. XIII.
THAT MAN CONSISTS OF TWO SUBSTANCES—AN IMMORTAL AND NON-LOCAL SOUL, AND A MORTAL AND LOCAL BODY—AND THAT, JUST AS THE SOUL SUFFERS IMMORTALLY, SO IT IS GLORIFIED IMMORTALLY AND NON-LOCALLY. For you say: «When, for example, the mind paints for itself within the secret places of the intellect the likeness of Peter or Paul, has it straightway penetrated the innermost seats of paradise where it knows them to be? Or when, from a reading, it sets before itself in its heart the flames of that rich man, has it now descended to the places of his torments and the depths of hell inaccessible to the living?»
Now indeed, as far as it was fitting to be done, I have rendered you answers concerning the incorporeal places of souls, concerning hell and paradise, and concerning the soul's incorporeal beholding without a body—when we spoke of that rich man and the poor man, or when we treated of the soul's twofold vision. But because now that point remains undiscussed which you said—that hell is inaccessible to the living—I ask in what sense you said it. Namely: we consist of soul and body. And although no one doubts what is immortal in us and what is mortal, I will nevertheless deal with you in such a way that I answer concerning whichever of the two you prefer. If we die by neither of our substances, then nothing of ours descends to hell, since you said the dead below are inaccessible to the living.
If we die by both, then the body too descends to hell, and we need not seek these bodily nether regions far off—since indeed the very sepulcher of the Lord is the place of hell. But sound judgment rejects each of these absurdities; therefore we neither die in both substances nor fail to die in both. And the soul lives even when the body is laid aside—although, if through sins it be deprived of its God, it may rightly be called dead. Yet it will by no means be credible that the sinful soul loses that very thing whereby it is a soul, since not even in a dead body does it perish that the body should be a body. For just as the body dies when it loses, along with all life, the soul, yet the soul does not lose its soul—wherefore the soul is immortal, but the body mortal.
But if the body does not enter hell, inasmuch as it is committed to the sepulcher and torn apart into the diverse parts of the world according to the diversity of the elements which had combined together into it, and the mind does not approach hell, because your opinion shuts the nether regions to the living—then either there are no nether regions at all, or no man descends to them; and thus the very ground of our faith will be imperiled, if not even the Redeemer's soul, by going to the nether regions and returning, unlocked them. It is enough that it could be said that whatever those nether regions are, they are inaccessible to the living—since it is established that they cannot be entered except by the living.
Recall now that you placed yourself in this position of your treatise: that if you could prove the soul to be subject to quantity or locality, the opposing party too would agree with you concerning its corporeality. But if you well recollect your own writings, you can at the same time perceive that you proposed rather what was to be disputed than that you disputed about what was proposed; and that you, in the manner of the elder Academics, did not know your own ignorance, but rather, after the manner of the younger of that very sect, were ignorant whether you knew anything. But who, having rashly laid down two things, in which the whole body of an entire work must necessarily consist, would not strive to make—if not provable, at least credible—either both first, or one or the other if he cannot make both?
These two things assuredly concur unto victory: that the cause's uprightness should be matched to an upright advocate. If one of these be lacking, the force of the action is weakened; if both be absent, it is annulled. So now indeed deceit, having found you a defender at once forgetful and ignorant, has not only brought it about, in the eyes of those vigorous in understanding, that it should be plain you ought not be believed concerning these matters, but also that truth—to which belief is always due—should appear the clearer and more illustrious under the necessity of conflict and by comparison with falsehood. XIV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT HELD ENCLOSED WITHIN THE BODY, NOR MOVED FROM PLACE TO PLACE, ALTHOUGH IT IS MOVED TEMPORALLY THROUGH AFFECTION. Therefore you spontaneously professed that you would assign quality, quantity, and locality to the soul, and presently you add:
«How is it not local, which—inserted into the members and bound to the inward parts—is held enclosed by the wandering condition of substance, by its motions alone?» Hardly indeed could error make pardonable some single thing—namely, that you should perchance perceive something wrongly and contend that this very thing should seem like the truth; one error being pardonable, another the ignorance of the error. But now I am amazed in wondrous ways that you have, in almost one and the same instant and in nearly the same word, said things so discordant and so diverse: namely, «bound to the members, it is wandering by its motions,» and again, «by its motions it is, by the wandering condition of substance, held enclosed.» If within the barrier of the body, as you say, the soul is moved, then of course it is moved while standing still—which reason does not permit to be said.
But if it is carried apart outside the body by motions, then it is not held enclosed by the condition of substance. But why does he say «wandering by its motions alone»?—as though anything could wander unmoved, or as though it were not easier to be moved and not wander (which the mind does through affection, since it is at any rate subject to motion, but not according to place) than for something to wander and not be moved (which is at any rate proper to body, since it is subject also to motion through place). You, however, say that it both stands still while wandering, and wanders while enclosed—although, as has already been established above, it can both remain at rest when the body is moved, and be moved when the body is unmoved. Behold to what extent you have disputed concerning the locality of the soul; in this, however, I do not accuse you of sloth.
That indeed you could not do—namely, what in this place especially not even the most powerful orator could have done; for, however great a copiousness of speech he be endowed with, an upholder of the false against manifest truth can lie, but cannot deceive. But why you should have pledged that you would dispute concerning quantity, and yet have discoursed nothing about it, I cannot say to have been forgetfulness, since it is sufficiently established that not even its name could have been brought forth except from memory. This therefore is rather to be believed: that you neither were unwilling, nor said you had forgotten, but found nothing that you might say. What likewise is fitting—either to summon into disputation things that ought to be passed over in silence, or to pass over in silence the things proposed?
There will now be no controversy about quality, to which I have not refused that the soul is subject; for clearly, if the soul were as free of quality as it is of quantity, it would indeed then be God; and likewise, if it were to yield to quantity as it does to quality, it would be a body. But as it is, having obtained a kind of middle position of incorporeal yet created nature, it is neither God, since it possesses quality, nor a body, since it does not possess quantity.
And since, as we have shown in the arguments set forth above, in questions of this kind an immense field lies open all too widely, the origins of the principal causes, embraced together, cannot by any means be examined inwardly to their depths unless—so far as it is permitted to a man to be able—you distinguish, by applying the balance of judgment, the creature of a twofold substance; either we must cease altogether, or we must proceed thither by these lines: first you separate body from the incorporeal; then, just as within the whole genus of bodies you set the shining before the dark, the lofty before the low, the precious before the cheap, so too among incorporeal things that have been created you set human souls before brute ones, and likewise among those that are human you set the prudent before the dull, and again among those that flourish by nature you set learned souls before unlearned.
XV. THAT THE SUN AND MOON AND STARS ARE BODIES ONLY, AND HAVE NO SPIRITS; AND THAT JUST AS A BETTER BODY IS SET BEFORE AN INFERIOR BODY, SO A SPIRIT ENDOWED WITH MEMORY IS SET BEFORE AN INFERIOR SPIRIT. For just as the sun is a body, and any stone whatever, though far unlike it, is nonetheless likewise a body, so indeed every nature among the kinds of living things is, namely, wholly incorporeal. But just as one body surpasses another, while yet each is a body, so one mind is preferred to another, while yet each is a mind. And again, a rich subject and abundant matters entice one to speak, and almost flatteringly, presenting themselves of their own appearance, they beg, and even compel, to be described.
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sedhasceexcellentiasetpraeeminentiasacsupremitatesillipotissimumilliadeant, siquiillisuntquosardenseuexitinaetherauirtus. uerumenimueromihiinpraesentiarumhuicdestatuanimaequaestioni, proutilleproposuit, quocumcongressisumus, etaliquantoforsanplusculumresponderemihiprouinciafuit: quodrecteneansecusfecerim, aequusetdoctusarbiteriudicabit. XVI. SVPERORVMINBREVIRECAPITVLATIOLIBRORVM.
But let those above all approach these excellences and pre-eminences and supremacies—those, if there be any such, whom burning virtue has carried up into the heights of heaven. Yet in truth, for the present, it was my province to answer this question concerning the state of the soul, just as he proposed it with whom I have engaged, and perhaps even somewhat more fully; whether I have done this rightly or otherwise, a fair and learned arbiter will judge. XVI. A BRIEF RECAPITULATION OF THE FOREGOING IN THE BOOKS.
But since the reader can by no means easily grasp in memory the many things which, in the discussion of this question, we have argued here and there, those things which were set forth scattered, and which, as I think, have been proven, I have reduced collectively, succinctly, and as it were point by point under the eye of the mind, and gathered them together to be reviewed and re-examined at once. 1. On the incorporeal. God is incorporeal, and the human mind is the image of God, since man was made according to the likeness and image of God. But the image of an incorporeal thing cannot be a body; therefore, because the human mind is the image of God, the human mind is incorporeal. 2. On life.
Everything non-spatial is also incorporeal; further, the life of a body is the soul, and in a living body the smallest part of the body lives as much as the whole body. Therefore there is as much of life in a part of the body as in the whole body, and this life is the soul; nor is that spatial which is as great in the whole as in some part, and as great in the small as in the great. Therefore the mind is not spatial, and whatever is non-spatial is not corporeal: therefore the soul is not a body. 3. On reason. Likewise the rational soul reasons, and to reason is present in the soul substantially, and reason is incorporeal and non-spatial: therefore the soul is incorporeal. 4. On the will.
Likewise the will of the soul is its substance, and, if the whole soul wills, the will is whole, and the will is not a body: therefore the soul is not a body. 5. On memory. Likewise memory is a certain non-spatial capacity, which is neither stretched out by the multitude of things to be remembered nor thinned by their fewness, and it incorporeally remembers even corporeal things. And when the mind remembers, it remembers wholly and is wholly memory; he who remembers wholly is also wholly memory, and memory is not a body: therefore the mind is not a body. 6. On touch. Likewise a body feels in a part of itself a touch where it is touched, but the mind feels through not the whole body, that is, through a part of the body it feels wholly; and a sense of this kind is non-spatial, and everything non-spatial is incorporeal:
therefore every soul is incorporeal. 7. On approach and withdrawal. Likewise a body neither approaches God nor withdraws from God, but the mind both draws near and goes far off in a non-spatial manner: therefore the mind is not a body. 8. On motion. Likewise a body is moved through space, but the mind is not moved through the same: therefore the mind is not a body. 9. On measure. Likewise length, breadth, and height are in a body, and whatever lacks these is not a body; but the mind lacks these: therefore it is not a body. 10. On right and left. Right and left, up and down, before and behind are in every body, but in no soul: therefore every soul is incorporeal.
See now to what extent we have, from every part of our arguments, drawn together whatever we have laboured at throughout the whole work, since what we have here recapitulated as briefly as possible could not have been made plausible save by the foregoing arguments—although, had so great a matter found a fit champion, he would not, as I myself have done, have dishonoured the dignity of the cause with all-too-unequal speech. Nor indeed could I myself have pursued this same question somewhat more widely and at greater length. But it was fitting, indeed, to do battle so long as the adversary was able to resist, that far, or, when he turned to flight, to present my back, and, having taken him captive, to disarm him with leaden daggers.
To proceed further still, and to hurl weapons into the air, and to fight without an enemy, is an empty contention and a frustration of strength, which will be as inglorious as it is toilless. XVII. AGAINST THE DISDAINFUL CRITIC AND SLANDERER OF THESE BOOKS: HOW HE MAY BE OVERCOME, HE PUT FORWARD A COMPARISON CONCERNING THE WORLD. "What then," someone says, "have you ranged through these three volumes against a brief page, if word answers to word?" But the task is not to construct a falsehood, but to demolish it. Let someone deny that the world is a sphere: by this one word indeed he will have denied it, but not even by one word will a Timaeus have established it. Accordingly, whatever we have discoursed somewhat more amply, not only the refutation of the false, but also the establishing of the true compelled it.
For it is one thing to unteach harmful things and another to teach useful ones, nor is it the same to pluck a thorn from the soil as to sow grain; therefore to root out vice is not the very same thing as to plant virtue. Much more labour, then, must be expended on both of these than on either one alone. Moreover, since it was my province to deal with both, in so encumbered a task especially, brevity is more to be wondered at than prolixity. For when matters, growing clear and displaying themselves on every side, kept coming forth and giving birth in manifold ways to others, I prescribed a number for the cause to be more widely pleaded, set a measure, fixed a limit, lest I should either bring more than necessary into the battle line, or contend longer than was reckoned, or proceed further than was just. XVIII.
AT THE END OF THIS BOOK HE ASKS PARDON OF HIS OPPONENT, AND BETWEEN THEM HE CHOOSES THE CONTEST ITSELF AS JUDGE. You now—whoever you are, against whose writings the wrong done by your own writings has compelled me to speak—I beg and beseech that you not be angry with me, for I have neither brought a reproach nor repaid an insult. I have only rendered back to you truth in place of falsehood, and that with no equal exchange; toward those things which, the more they are yours, the more harmful they are to you, I am, and shall be, an adversary; and I urge that you too, for your own sake, oppose those same things. These few and slender replies, as the narrowness of time allowed, I have rendered back; weigh both with yourself, and between me and you assume the person of a judge and apply the scale of justice.
If our scale tips lower and is truly heavier, let it not vex nor shame you to make a refuge out of a desertion, and to yield from falsehood to truth. But if—what I would not wish, nor would you do it at this persuasion—if there be obstinacy, publish something for public reading in support of your opinion, and do not conceal your name: only let God and life keep us in our right mind; since we have made the venture of the ways carried on from the other side, you shall indeed experience how great is the force of truth in the destruction of falsehood. If I were not transmitting to you, venerable man, these things which I write to you, to be examined and corrected, it might rightly seem superfluous and presumptuous to wish to teach one whom I know to be knowledgeable, and out of the want of poverty to give a drachma to one who abounds in many talents of the sciences.