Hence it came about that the publishing of the little books transmitted by me—which I arranged with the most subtle discussion of philosophical art—made me cautious and anxious, so that I should not commit the understanding of them to my own judgment, but should refer it to the expertise of one more capable; and not only those things which I have now perceived from the reading of them, but also those which I long ago committed from various sources to be kept in memory, I have transmitted to be approved by your judgment. For your worthiness well knows that we by no means have those by whose conference we may be rendered firm and stable concerning the things about which we are in doubt. Every nature which comes to knowledge from God is addressed by its proper name, and thus the name of the nature of each single thing is shown.
The ancients therefore said that the name is that which makes a thing known, which introduces into the ears the images of the thing itself—as it were through the senses of the body, which memory directs; and just as we understand when people speak, so, when the will is present, we think upon both the absences of things and the images retained by memory. But the nature of things is twofold: corporeal, therefore, and spiritual. For every creature is either spirit or body. Corporeal things, namely, we perceive through the body; intellectual things we apprehend by the intellect. Therefore in two ways, so far as is granted in this life, knowledge of every thing is had. What, then, is that which is said—that there are three kinds of questions: whether a thing is, what it is, of what sort it is?
Why, I ask, is it said "whether it is," when all knowledge, showing the thing, removes ambiguity and does not allow doubting? But I think this ambiguous question is so posited because not all things are of substances, but some are found which show the proofs of them. For example, if it be asked whether the good is a substance or not, we answer that it is not a substance, but a privation of evil. For rightly is it asked in the first question whether a thing is a body or a spirit, and in the following it is asked of what sort it is—whether it is an animate body or a spiritual one, a rational spirit or an irrational one. Rightly therefore has it been defined that there are three kinds of questions, about which we have now, as I think, spoken briefly enough.
Now let us also see how many kinds of bodies there are. Although it has innumerable species under it, there are nevertheless three kinds: that is, a body which lives and feels, a body which lives and does not feel, a body which neither lives nor feels. But this kind of body, which neither lives nor feels, I think to be the four elements—earth, water, air, and fire—which are primary and simple, out of which all compounded bodies are made; that is, the living and feeling bodies of animals, and the living but not feeling bodies of trees, shrubs, and herbs. Wherefore how they differ among themselves is most evidently clear; what their common features are, let us, with God helping, inquire more intently.
For thus we wish, the Lord inspiring and assisting, not only to scrutinize his creature, but also, ascending to the creating substance through the things that have been made, to behold it with the intellect; and, although we do not arrive at this, that we should be able to understand his substance and to know what it is, yet at least let us most evidently hold that which it is not. Therefore every body is subject to quantity and to quality; but in a subject body there is no [other] body. For a body is a subject, not in a subject, because a body is a substance, not an accident. But accidents are in a substance, not substances. Quantity and quality, therefore, befall a body as accidents; for quantity is in measures, quality in colours.
The body itself is not the very thing that 'to be of a certain quantity' is, nor is it the very thing that 'to be of a certain quality' is, because even when the colour is changed the body remains, and in a diminished body the quantity which was first is not present; and through this, that which is great is not greatness, nor that which is long, length, nor that which is broad, breadth, nor that which is coloured, colour itself. There is also to a body measure, number, and weight—whence even Holy Scripture says that God has disposed all things in measure and number and weight; but I see that this is to be referred in another way to the rational spirit, which must be said in what follows. But now let us explain what we have begun concerning the body.
For just as we have said that the great is not the very thing that greatness is, so neither is measure the very thing that the measurable is, nor number the numerable, nor weight the weighable. It is diminished, therefore, since in its whole part it has up and down, has right and left, has before and behind. It is moved through time and place; it neither judges nor is judged, [yet] is divided infinitely into parts. Come now, let us see what that is which is a body vivified and not made sentient. For better matched to life is that which receives than that which gives life; for life, which is not less in a part than in the whole, and is not less to a lesser part, nor offers a greater life to a greater part and a lesser to a lesser, is not a body, but a spirit.
The spirit of a beast, which does not subsist after the body, is to be passed over here, that we may come to the rational spirit. Therefore the spirit has no quantity; for if it were long or broad, it would surely rightly be said to be of a certain magnitude. For it is prudently separated and set apart from the body, because it is not subject to quantity, though it is subject to quality. Disciplines befall the mind; justice and injustice, chastity and lust befall it. For there are four principal virtues: that is, prudence and temperance, fortitude and justice. For the prudent mind is not the very thing that prudence is, nor the just the very thing that justice is, nor the temperate temperance, nor the brave fortitude. It is one thing to be a mind, another to be a just mind.
For when I say "a just mind," I understand two things; this I would say also of prudence and temperance and fortitude, because there can be a mind which is in no way endowed with virtues, but if it has not had them, it follows that it has vice. For it is concluded that the mind is always subject either to vices or to virtues, that it is subject, as we have said, to disciplines, which cannot exist without it. But the reckoning of number is a discipline. For it will never be that four and two make seven, or seven and three eleven. Similarly, the figure of a circle does not admit contrariety. It will never be that the figure of a circle is made from two or three lines, or a quadrilateral from three, or a triangle from four.
For if you add or take away anything, it will then be neither a triangle nor a quadrilateral; for it remains eternal and unchangeable. The principles of these disciplines are both in the mind as their subject and cannot exist without it. It is concluded that that in which they are is eternal, just as that which is in it. Therefore the soul is immortal, and that which lives always knows and discerns. But it does not always think this, because when it knows, secure about itself—since it loses itself amid many thoughts—it stretches itself out as if through time, not through space; yet, [though] moved, it moves the body too through time and space, namely, it judges and is judged. See therefore, O human soul, how great a good you are, while you judge concerning bodies, while you are joined to reason, while you become a partaker of eternal truth.
For the things that are beneath you are not to be loved by you; and although measure is in you, yet you yourself are not measure. Number belongs to your thought and weight to your pleasure, but you yourself are neither number nor weight. Refer the will of your love to that Number without number, of whom the Psalmist says, "and of his wisdom there is no number," to that Measure without measure, to that Weight without weight, by which all things are weighed and measured. This itself is the highest good, by which all good kinds of bodies have been made, this is that by which the great goods of rational beings are made: leave the goods and the great goods, and love the highest good and the simple good—that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, this Trinity one God.
And yet body or spirit is to be loved thus, according to what is to be loved, just as a certain most noble expositor of the Holy Scriptures said: you shall set down four rules of love—what is above us, what is beside us, what is ourselves, what is beneath us. Let us therefore love that highest good which is above us, not by order of place but of nature, because a creature cannot be made equal to the Creator. For the Son alone is made equal to the Father, and likewise the Holy Spirit, because they are not creatures, but among them there is one nature. These things, which we have set forth in brief discourse, the picture placed below demonstrates: 10