講道與短論 第 6 章 第 3/11 段

how did they not more easily find the Lord of this world? (Wis. XIII, 8, 9) For the human mind, judging concerning visible things, is able to recognize that it is itself better than all visible things. Yet since it confesses that it too, on account of its defect and its progress in wisdom, is mutable, it finds that above itself is the immutable Truth; and thus cleaving after it, as it is said, 'My soul hath cleaved after thee' (Ps. LXII, 9), it is made blessed, finding within itself the Creator and Lord even of all visible things; not seeking outwardly for visible things, though they be heavenly ones—

which either are not found, or with great labor are found in vain, unless from the beauty of those things which are outside there be found the Artificer who is within, who first works in the soul the higher beauties, and then in the body the lower ones. 2. But against those who are now called astrologers, who wish to subject our acts to the heavenly bodies and to sell us to the stars, and to receive from us the very price for which we are sold, nothing truer and briefer can be said than that they give no response except upon receiving the constellations. And in the constellations are noted the parts—of which they say the zodiacal circle has three hundred and sixty—

and that the motion of the heaven is accomplished through one hour in fifteen parts, so that in such a delay as one hour occupies, fifteen parts rise. And these single parts are said to have sixty minutes each. But the minutes of minutes they do not now find in the constellations from which they claim to predict future things; whereas the conception of twins, since it is effected in a single act of intercourse—as the physicians attest, whose discipline is much more certain and manifest—occurs in so small a point of time that it is not stretched into two minutes of minutes. Whence then, in twins, comes such a diversity of actions and of outcomes

and of wills—those who must necessarily have the same constellation of conception, and for whom one and the same constellation is given to the astrologer, as though of one man? But if they should wish to hold to the constellations of birth, they are refuted by the twins themselves, who for the most part are so poured forth from the womb one after the other, that this interval of time turns again to minutes of minutes, which they never accept as things to be treated in the constellations, nor can they treat them. But when it is said that they have predicted many true things, this happens because they do not hold in memory their falsehoods and errors; but, being intent on nothing except those things which have come to pass according to their responses, they forget those things which have not come to pass;

and they call to mind those things which happen not by that art—which is no art at all—but by some obscure lot of things. But if they wish to attribute this to their skill, let them say that even dead written parchments, whatsoever they be, divine artfully, from which for the most part a lot comes forth according to one's will. But if a verse comes forth from the codices without any art, often foretelling the future, what wonder if from the soul of a speaker there comes forth, not by art but by lot, some prediction of things to come? XLVI. On the Ideas. 1. Plato is reported to have been the first to use the name 'Ideas'; yet if this name did not exist before he instituted it, it does not follow either that the things themselves which he called Ideas did not exist, or that they were understood by no one;

but perhaps they were named by other and other men under this or that other name. For it is permitted to anyone to impose any name whatever upon an unknown thing which has no customary name. For it is not likely that there were no wise men before Plato, or that they did not understand those things which Plato, as has been said, calls Ideas—whatever things they are—since so great a power is set in them that unless these be understood no one can be wise. It is also credible that, besides Greece, there were wise men among other nations; which Plato himself sufficiently attested not only by traveling for the sake of perfecting his wisdom, but also records in his books.

These men, therefore, if any such existed, are not to be supposed to have been ignorant of the Ideas, although perhaps they called them by another name. But of the name let this suffice to be said; let us look at the reality, which is above all to be considered and known—the naming being placed within our power, so that each may call by whatever name he wishes the thing he has come to know. 2. The Ideas, then, we can in Latin call either 'forms' or 'species,' so that we may seem to translate word for word. But if we should call them 'reasons,' we depart indeed from the propriety of interpretation—for reasons are called in Greek 'logoi,' not 'ideas'—yet whoever wishes to use this word will not stray from the reality itself.

For the Ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and immutable reasons of things, which themselves are not formed, and through this are eternal and ever holding themselves in the same manner, and are contained in the divine Intelligence. And although they themselves neither arise nor pass away, yet everything that can arise and pass away is said to be formed according to them, and everything that arises and passes away. But the soul is denied to be able to behold them, except the rational soul, in that part of itself by which it excels—that is, by its very mind and reason—as though by a certain face or by its interior and intelligible eye. And indeed not every rational soul, of whatever kind, but that which shall have been holy and pure, this is asserted to be fit for that vision:

that is, the soul which shall have kept that very eye by which these things are seen, sound and sincere and serene and like to those things which it strives to see. But what religious man, imbued with true religion, though he cannot yet behold these things, would nevertheless dare to deny—nay, would he not even profess—that all things which are, that is, whatsoever are contained within their own kind by a certain proper nature so that they exist, were brought into being with God as their author; and that by that same author all things which live do live; and that the universal soundness of things, and that very order by which the things which are changed celebrate their temporal courses under a fixed governance, are contained and governed by the laws of the most high God? Which being established and conceded, who would dare to say that God founded all things irrationally?

But if this cannot rightly be said or believed, it remains that all things were founded by reason. Nor was man founded by the same reason as the horse; for it is absurd to suppose this. Individual things, therefore, were created by their proper reasons. But where are we to judge these reasons to be, except in the very mind of the Creator? For he did not behold anything placed outside himself, so as to constitute according to it what he was constituting; for to think this is sacrilegious. But if these reasons of all things to be created and created are contained in the divine mind, and in the divine mind there can be nothing except what is eternal and immutable; and these principal reasons of things Plato calls Ideas:

they are not only Ideas, but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain of such a kind and immutable; by participation in which it comes to pass that whatever exists, exists in whatever manner it exists. But the rational soul, among those things which have been founded by God, surpasses all, and is nearest to God when it is pure; and insofar as it shall have cleaved to him by charity, so far, being suffused as it were and illumined by that intelligible light, it discerns—not through bodily eyes, but through its own principal part by which it excels, that is, through its own intelligence—those reasons, by the vision of which it is made most blessed.

These reasons, as has been said, one may call either Ideas, or forms, or species, or reasons; and it is granted to many to name them what they please, but to very few to see what is true. XLVII. Whether we shall at some time be able to see our own thoughts. It is customarily asked how, after the resurrection and transformation of the body which is promised to the saints, we shall be able to see our own thoughts. A conjecture, therefore, is to be taken from that part of our body which has more of light; since it must be believed that the angelic bodies, such as we hope to have, are most luminous and ethereal:

if therefore many motions of our mind are now recognized in the eyes, it is probable that no motion of the mind will lie hidden when the whole body shall have become ethereal, in comparison with which these eyes are flesh. XLVIII. On things believable. There are three kinds of things believable. Some are those which are always believed and never understood: such as is all history, running through temporal and human deeds. Others are those which, as soon as they are believed, are understood: such as are all human reasonings, whether concerning numbers or concerning any of the disciplines. The third are those which are first believed and afterward understood: such as are those things concerning divine matters which cannot be understood except by those who are pure in heart;

which comes about by keeping the precepts that are received concerning living well. XLIX. Why did the children of Israel sacrifice visible victims of cattle? Because there are also spiritual sacred things, whose images it behooved the carnal people to celebrate, so that the prefiguration of the new people might be made by the servitude of the old. The difference of which two peoples one may also observe in each one of us, since each necessarily plays the old man from his mother's womb, until he come to the age of youth—where now it is not necessary to be carnally wise, but one is able by his will to be turned to spiritual things and to be regenerated within.

What therefore comes about in one man rightly educated, by the order of nature and by discipline, this, in proportion, in the whole human race, is brought about through divine providence; and that it should be so accomplished is most beautiful. L. On the equality of the Son. God, since He could not generate one better than the One whom He generated—for nothing is better than God—ought to have generated one equal. For if He willed and could not, He is weak; if He could and would not, He is envious. From which it is concluded that He generated the Son as equal. LI. On man made to the image and likeness of God. 1.

Since the divine Scripture makes mention of an outer and an inner man, and so distinguishes them that it is said by the Apostle, 'And though our outer man is corrupted, yet the inner is renewed day by day' (II Cor. IV, 16); it may be asked whether one of these was made to the image and likeness of God. For it is foolish to ask, if one, which of them? For who doubts that he would rather say the one who is renewed, than the one who is corrupted? But whether both, is a great question. For if the outer man is Adam, and the inner is Christ, both are rightly understood.

But since Adam, though made good by God, did not remain good, and by loving carnal things became carnal, it can not absurdly seem that this very thing was for him to fall—to lose the image and likeness of God. And through this he himself is renewed, and he himself is the inner man; how then is he himself also the outer? Is it according to the body—so that he is the inner according to the soul, and the resurrection and renewal is of the inner man, which now takes place according to the death of the former life, that is, of sin, and according to the regeneration of the new life, that is, of righteousness? These same two men he likewise so names, that he calls one the old, whom we ought to put off, the other the new, and that one to be put on (Col. III, 9, 10):

of whom in turn he calls the one the image of the earthly man, because he is borne according to the sin of the first man, who is Adam; the other the image of the heavenly man (I Cor. XV, 49), because he is borne according to the righteousness of the second man, who is Jesus Christ. But the outer man, who now is corrupted, will be renewed in the future resurrection, when he shall have paid off that death which he owes to nature by that law which was given in paradise. 1. But how it is not incongruous that the body too is said to be made to the likeness of God, he easily understands who diligently attends to what has been said, 'And God made all things very good' (Gen. I, 31). For no one doubts that He is Himself primarily good.

For in many ways can things be said to be like God: some made according to virtue and wisdom, because in Him there is virtue and wisdom not made; others insofar as they merely live, because He lives supremely and primarily; others insofar as they merely are, because He is supremely and primarily. And therefore those which merely are, and yet do not live or have understanding, are not perfectly but scantily unto His likeness; for they too are good in their own order, since He is good above all, from whom all good things proceed. But all things which live and do not have understanding participate somewhat more in the likeness. For what lives, also is; but not whatever is, also lives.

Furthermore, those things which have understanding are so near to Him in likeness that among creatures there is nothing nearer. For what participates in wisdom, both lives and is; but what lives, it is necessary that it be, though not necessary that it have understanding. Wherefore, since man is able to be a partaker of wisdom according to the inner man, according to that very man he is so unto the image that he is formed with no nature interposed; and therefore nothing is more joined to God. For he both understands, and lives, and is: than which creature nothing is better. 3. But if the outer man be taken as that life by which we perceive through the body with the five most familiar senses, which we have in common with the beasts—for it too can be corrupted by the sensible troubles which are inflicted by persecutions—

not undeservedly is this man too said to be a partaker of the likeness of God; not only because he lives, which appears even in beasts, but the more because he is turned toward the mind that governs him, which wisdom illumines—a thing which cannot be in beasts, that lack reason. The body of man too, since alone among the bodies of earthly animals it is not prostrated prone upon the belly, though it be visible, but is erect for the beholding of heaven, which is the beginning of visible things—although it is known to live not by its own presence, but by that of the soul—nevertheless, not merely because it is, and insofar as it is, is it altogether good:

but also because it is such that it is more apt for the contemplation of heaven, it can with justice be seen to be made unto the image and likeness of God in this more than the other bodies of animals. Yet because man is not rightly called man without life, the outer man is more rightly understood, perhaps, as neither the body alone, nor the life alone which is in the sense of the body, but both together. 4. Nor is it unlearnedly distinguished that it is one thing to be the image and likeness of God, who is also called the Son; another to be made unto the image and likeness of God, as we understand man to be made. There are also those who not without reason understand that two things were said, 'unto the image and likeness'; asserting that, if it were one thing, one name could have sufficed.

But they hold that the mind was made unto the image, which is formed by Truth itself with no substance interposed—which is also called spirit: not that Holy Spirit which is of the same substance of which the Father and the Son also are, but the spirit of man. For thus the Apostle distinguished these: 'No one knows what takes place in a man, except the spirit of man; and no one knows what takes place in God, except the Spirit of God' (I Cor. II, 11). Likewise concerning the spirit of man he says: 'May He keep sound your spirit, and soul, and body' (I Thess. V, 23). For this too was made by God, as also the rest of creation. For it is written in the Proverbs in this manner: 'Know that the Lord knows the hearts of men;'

and He who fashioned the spirit for all, He Himself knows all things' (Prov. XVI, 1). Therefore this spirit is, with none doubting, understood to have been made unto the image of God, in which is the understanding of truth; for it cleaves to Truth with no creature interposed. The rest of man they wish to be seen as made unto the likeness; because every image is indeed like, but not everything that is like is also an image, properly speaking, but perhaps it may be said so by abuse of language. But in such matters one must beware lest anything be thought to be asserted too much, that thing being soundly guarded, namely, lest—because any body is extended through local spaces—anything of the sort be believed to be the substance of God. For a thing which is less in the part than in the whole neither befits the dignity of the soul;

how much less does it befit the majesty of God? LII. On that which was said, 'It repents me that I made man' (Gen. VI, 6, 7). The divine Scriptures, raising us from an earthly and human sense to the divine and heavenly, descended even to those words which the custom of even the most foolish men uses among themselves. And so the names of even those affections which our soul suffers, which he who is wiser now understands to be very far removed from God, those men through whom the Holy Spirit spoke did not hesitate most opportunely to place in the books. As, for example, since it is most difficult for a man to punish anything without anger, they nevertheless judged that the vengeance of God—which is done altogether without that perturbation—should be called anger.

Likewise, because husbands have been accustomed to guard the chastity of a wife by being jealous, they called that providence of God—by which it is enjoined and brought about that the soul be not corrupted, and, following other and other gods, in a certain manner play the harlot—the jealousy of God. So also the hand of God, the power by which He works; and the feet of God, the power by which He extends to all things to be guarded and governed; and the ears of God or the eyes of God, the power by which He perceives and understands all things; and the face of God, the power by which He manifests Himself and is recognized;

and the rest in this manner—for this reason, namely, because we to whom the discourse is addressed are accustomed both to work with our hands, and to walk with our feet, and to arrive whither the mind bears us, and with ears and eyes and the other senses of the body to perceive bodily things, and to become known by the face; and whatever else pertains to this rule, as it were.

In this manner, therefore, since we are not accustomed easily to change something once begun and to transfer it to another thing, except by repenting—although to those who behold with a serene mind, divine providence appears to administer all things in a most certain order—yet most fittingly, in accommodation to lowly human understanding, those things which begin to be, and do not persevere as long as they were hoped to be about to persevere, are said, as it were, through the repentance of God, to be taken away. LIII. On the gold and silver which the Israelites received from the Egyptians. 1.

Whoever diligently beholds the dispensations of the two Testaments, distributed according to the ages of the human race in keeping with the fitness of the times, understands sufficiently, as I judge, what belongs properly to the earlier estate of the human race, and what to the later. For as divine providence beautifully governs all things, the whole series of generations, from Adam even to the end of the age, is administered as though it were the stretch of time of one man, terminating his ages by their steps from boyhood even to old age. And therefore it behooves him who bends a devout mind upon the divine lessons to distinguish the very grades of virtues in morals, until one comes to the highest and perfect virtue of man:

lest perhaps, when he has found that sometimes small things are commanded to the small, sometimes greater things to the greater, reckoning those things which are lesser to be sins in comparison with the greater, he should not judge that it was fitting for God to command such things to men. But now it is too long to dispute concerning the grades of virtues. Nevertheless, so far as suffices for discussing the present question—as far as pertains to deceiving—the highest and perfect virtue is to deceive no one, and to exhibit that which was said, 'Let it be in your mouth, Yea, yea; Nay, nay' (Matt. V, 37). But because this was commanded to those to whom already the kingdom of heaven has been promised; and it is a great virtue to fulfill these greater things, to which this reward is due;

'For the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and they who do violence seize it' (Matt. XI, 12): it must be inquired by what grades one comes to this summit and perfection; among which grades are surely found those to whom hitherto an earthly kingdom was being promised, by which promise, as little ones, they might make preliminary play, and, having in the meantime obtained from the one God—who is Lord of all—the earthly joys after which they still gaped, thence advancing and growing in spirit, they might dare even to hope for heavenly things. As therefore the highest and well-nigh divine virtue is to deceive no one, so the last vice is to deceive anyone whatsoever.

From this last vice, toward that highest virtue, for those who are tending, there is a grade: to deceive at some time not indeed a friend, nor a stranger, but nevertheless an enemy. Whence also that saying of the poet has almost obtained the currency of a proverb: 'Deceit or valor, who would ask in an enemy?' (Aeneid, bk. 2, v. 390). But since the enemy himself can for the most part be unjustly deceived—as when some pact is made concerning a temporal peace, which they call a truce, and faith is not kept, and other such things—much purer and nearer to that highest virtue is he who, although he may wish to deceive an enemy, nevertheless does not deceive him except by divine authority.

For God knows—either alone, or at least far more excellently than men and more sincerely—by what punishment or reward each one is worthy. 1. Wherefore God indeed through Himself deceives no one; for He is the Father of Truth, and Truth, and the Spirit of Truth. Yet distributing worthy things to the worthy—since this too pertains to justice and truth—He uses souls according to their merits and dignities, which are in the grades of them, so that if anyone is worthy to be deceived, He deceives him not only not through Himself, but also not through such a man as already fittingly loves and persists in guarding, 'Let it be in your mouth, Yea, yea; Nay, nay'; nor through an angel, to whom the person of falsehood does not befit:

but either through such a man as has not yet stripped himself of desires of this kind; or through such an angel as, on account of the perversity of his own will, has been ordered in the lowest grades of nature, either for the punishment of sins, or for the exercise and purgation of those who are reborn according to God. For we read of a king deceived by the false prophecy of the pseudo-prophets; and we so read it that we find it not done without divine judgment, since that man was worthy to be thus deceived; nor through that angel whom it would not befit to undertake the office of deception; but through an angel of error, who of his own accord demanded with gladness that such parts be imposed upon him (III Kings XXII, 6-36).

For in certain passages of the Scriptures something is more openly expounded, so that the diligent and pious reader may understand it also in other passages in which it is less open. For our God has so, for the salvation of souls, governed the divine books by the Holy Spirit, that He willed not only to feed us with what is manifest, but also to exercise us with what is obscure. From this ineffable and sublime administration of things, therefore, which takes place through divine providence, a natural law has, as it were, been transcribed into the rational soul, so that in the very conduct of this life and in earthly morals, men may keep the images of such distributions. Hence it is that a judge judges it unworthy of his person and heinous to strike the condemned:

yet at his command the executioner does this, who, according to his own desire, is so ordered in that office that he may strike the condemned with the moderation of the law—he who could even strike an innocent man by his own cruelty. For neither through himself does the judge do this, nor through a magistrate or advocate, or anyone in his office to whom such a ministry is not fittingly imposed. Hence it is also that we use irrational animals for those things which it is heinous to have done by men. For surely a thief is worthy to be torn by the mouth; yet a man does not do this through himself, nor through his son, nor through a household member, nor even through his servant, but through a dog, which beast it befits to do such things according to the grades of its nature.

Since, therefore, it is fitting for some to suffer something which it is not fitting for others to do, there are certain intermediate ministries by which fitting duties are enjoined; so that Justice itself, using them, not only commands that each suffer such things as it is fitting for him to suffer, but also does so through those who do them, whom it is no less fitting to do such things. Wherefore, since the Egyptians were worthy of deception, and the people of Israel, on account of that age of the human race, were still established in such a degree of morals that they might not unworthily deceive an enemy;

it came about that God commanded, or rather permitted on account of their desire, that they should ask from the Egyptians the gold and silver vessels—for which the seekers of an earthly kingdom still gaped—with no intention of returning them, and receive them as though they would return them (Exod. 3:22). And God willed that this should be a wage of such long labor and toil, not unjust for the degree of such souls, and a penalty for those Egyptians whom he deservedly made to lose what they ought to have repaid. God, therefore, is not a deceiver—which whoever should believe, who does not understand it to be wicked and impious?—but the most just distributor of merits and of persons, doing certain things through himself which are worthy of him alone and befit him alone;

such as it is to illuminate souls, and, by offering himself to them for their enjoyment, to make them wise and blessed; while he does other things through the creature that serves him, ordered by the most perfect laws according to merits, commanding some of these things and permitting others, even down to the governance of the sparrows, as the Lord says in the Gospel, and even to the beauty of the grass, even to the number of our very hairs, the divine providence reaching and coming (Matt. 10:29–30; Luke 12:27–28). Of which it is also said: It reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly (Wis. 8:1).