Letter to George, Prefect of Africa 1 part 10/14

the common, in the principle of the essential identity of the extremes in relation to his own parts, according to which he had the difference of the parts in relation to one another preserved even after the union;

but the particular, in the principle of the hypostatic identity of the parts, according to which he was distinguished from the extremes, preserving unconfused his distinction from them.

For the true hypostatic union of each of the parts coming together with one another for the composition of a certain whole — according to their concurrence for the generation of a certain whole — having taken up, together with the common element, the property distinguishing each from the essential commonality, shows that property to be enhypostatic, but not a hypostasis;

because it did not subsist by itself in a determinate manner;

distinguished from things of the same kind, or from that which, by union with it, co-subsists with it for the generation of a certain whole;

which is precisely the property of hypostasis.

For that which subsists by itself in a determinate manner is hypostasis;

since indeed they say hypostasis is essence together with properties, differing numerically from things of the same kind;

but 'enhypostatic' is that which does not subsist by itself at all, but is contemplated in others, as species is contemplated in the individuals under it;

or that which is composed together with another, different according to essence, for the generation of a certain whole;

— differentiated from the essence of things of the same kind by its own properties — to that same degree it is united, being identified with, that which is hypostatically composed with it.

For it is not by those properties by which it is distinguished from things of the same kind that it is also distinguished from that which is composed with it by union and co-subsists with it;

but by those distinguishing properties by which it differs from things consubstantial with it, by these same properties it preserves toward that which is composed with it the identity of hypostasis according to union, an identity maintained in the wholly singular character of the person;

which the true doctrine proclaims concerning the divine economy, that is, the incarnation.

For it was by those properties by which the flesh, being distinguished, differed from us, that it had identity with the Logos according to hypostasis;

and it was by those properties by which the Logos differed from the Father and the Spirit, being distinguished as Son, that he maintained his singular hypostatic union toward the flesh preserved, in no way whatsoever divided.

Therefore the flesh of God the Word did not become a hypostasis.

For never, not even for so brief a moment as bare conception is by nature able to traverse, did it at all subsist by itself, determinately distinguished from things of the same kind by the properties that distinguish it, or distinguished from the Logos with whom it is hypostatically composed, having its particular property separated from the common;

but it was enhypostatic, having received the generation of its being in him and through him;

and having become his flesh by union, and being united to him according to hypostasis, by reason of the property that distinguishes it from the rest of men.

And to put it more clearly: making its own, according to hypostasis, what is proper to the Word Himself;

just as, indeed, also the [property] common according to essence, of which the flesh too has truly become [a partaker] through union;

For Christ, being perfect God, and the same one perfect man, had, of the things which he was, both the common and the proper, by which he effected within himself the union and distinction of the extremes;

on the one hand, by the union of the extremes with himself, confirming that the two natures out of which he was composed are preserved within himself;

and on the other hand, by the distinction of the extremes with himself, presenting the singularity of his own hypostasis.

For if the Word, being God by nature, became man without change through the assumption of flesh that was intellectually ensouled, it is clear that he is one out of both, and, in truth confirming himself through the one [hypostasis] to be both, the same one had, of both, both the common and the proper;

by which he effected the union and distinction with respect to the extremes;

on the one hand, by the natural difference of his own parts in relation to one another, being united according to essence with the extremes;

and on the other hand, by the identity of the same parts, that is, being distinguished according to hypostasis from the extremes.

But if the same one had both difference and identity, it is clear that the same one was both one and two.

One, on the one hand, by reason of his own undivided monad according to hypostasis;

and two, on the other hand, by reason of the otherness, according to essence, of his own parts in relation to one another even after the union.

A brief exposition concerning difference, by which it is shown that the quantity according to essence of the things united is preserved:

of each part in relation to the other, within the whole composed of them, preserving inviolably the boundary and principle of [its] essence.

But if also the identity of the whole with respect to its own parts — or rather, to speak more clearly, the hypostatic identity of the parts with one another according to the composition of the whole out of them — is preserved;

it is clear that the parts, in no way, according to the one hypostasis completed out of them, differ from one another altogether.

And therefore there is no argument at all able to show either that what is different according to essence is confounded, or that what is singular according to hypostasis is divided.

A fuller and more natural-philosophical demonstration concerning difference and quantity, and the number that signifies them.

Therefore, if indeed we speak of difference in Christ after the union, and quantity is by nature necessarily introduced together with every difference altogether — and we recognize that number is what signifies this [quantity] — then, reasonably taking up number solely for the indication of the difference of the things that differ after the union, we do not at all divide by number the things signified, but we indicate the preserved existence of the things united;

because every number is by nature only signifying of quantity, but not divisive.

For that which neither acts nor is acted upon — how could it be master of any relation whatsoever?

since to act belongs to essence alone;

just as also to be acted upon belongs to accident, that is, to quality;

from which [essence and accident] those trained in such arguments say that [relations] have their being, and out of which the relations proceed.

But rather, as it appears to us more precisely, the relations are not even the work of these — I mean of essence and accident — but of the cause and power productive of all things, which has implanted in each of the things that have come to be a principle constitutive of its being, and representative of its natural affinity and alienation with respect to one another.

But if the relations do not properly have essence as their productive cause, then still less would they have number [as their cause];

which, insofar as it is not essence, cannot act at all;

and insofar as it is not accident, that is, quality, it is not by nature able to be acted upon.

But if number is by nature able neither to act nor to be acted upon, then it is a sign signifying quantity, making no indication whatsoever of the relation within the quantity signified;

since it is not a genus able to be predicated of other things;

but, as I said, a sign indicative of the genus that is predicatively borne of other things.

But if number has neither to act nor to be acted upon, it is clear that, insofar as it does not act, it is not signifying of any relation whatsoever, that is, of union or division;

for this, as I said, belongs to another principle;

and insofar as it is not by nature able to be acted upon, it is not divided.

For every number is in itself undivided, not admitting the motion of alteration, which is proper to quality;

nor contraction and expansion, which is proper to essence;

nor indeed increase and decrease, which is proper to quantity.

And if [it is signifying] of quantity, then not of relation;

for number is signifying only of quantity taken simply, but not of quantity spoken of in a certain respect;

it is clear that number by nature effects neither division nor indeed union, but only the indication of quantity, however we may conceive it to exist.

For, as I said, to act belongs to essence, and to be acted upon belongs to accident, that is, to quality;

of which number is neither.

For if it were essence, it would also be self-subsistent, not needing another for its constitution;

and if it were accident, that is, quality, it would either constitute the most special difference, and, being combined with the genus, would draw together the definition of the subject, and would furnish the indication of species, but not of quantity;

or, being conjoined to the species, it would introduce the difference in the common sense;

and it would effect the distinction of one from another among the individuals referred to the same species;

and it would show what is signified through it to be not merely distinct from another, but also demonstrated to be different in kind.

But if no one at all includes number together in the definitions of things, then number is neither essence nor quality.

And if number is none of these, it is clear that it is by nature able neither to act nor to be acted upon;

and if number has neither to act nor to be acted upon, reasonably it neither unites at all, nor divides as one that acts;

nor indeed is it divided at all as one that is acted upon;

but, making the indication only of the quantity of things, it does not touch upon their relation.

And if number is signifying of quantity alone, and not of any relation whatsoever conceived with respect to it, then number is rather, so to speak, a certain utterance and appellation attached to quantity.

Therefore, he who speaks of difference in Christ after the union has certainly also conceived, together with the difference, the quantity of the things that differ.

For that which is altogether simple is also incapable of admitting difference;

since it is in every way identical with itself and singular, and whole and altogether without relation, as not having predicated of it the genus that is within quantity;

and for this reason it is altogether not numbered;

but he who has conceived quantity together with difference —

for it is impossible for a difference that altogether removes quantity to be known;

taking up number for the mere indication, and not the division, of the quantity conceived together with the difference, he does not depart from the truth, signifying through number the quantity necessarily conceived together with the difference;

since, as I said, quantity is altogether conceived together with every difference, said in whatever manner;

of which we have been taught that number is by nature signifying, but not divisive.

But if he who signifies through number, for the constitution of the mystery, the quantity necessarily conceived together with the difference, cares rather for the truth, so that he may not advocate a confusion of the things united;

how is it not right to think, as some hold, that on this account it must be confessed that the essential quantity of the things preserved unconfused in Christ after the union [is affirmed] — since, as the discourse has shown at length, number is by nature apt to make an indication of difference, but not of division?

If, then, the principle according to essence of one of the two things united has remained unaltered after the union, not passing over into the boundary of the essence of the other, then manifestly the divinity of Christ has remained, according to essence, divinity, not having passed over into the essence of the flesh;

and again, the humanity of the same one has remained, according to essence, humanity, not having undergone a change into the nature of divinity.

But if neither the divinity of Christ nor the humanity have passed over into one another on account of the hypostatic union, but the natures have remained unconfused, according to the great Cyril, then clearly there is, after the union, a difference of the natures preserved in Christ, and no argument will contradict this.

And if the difference after the union belongs to the things preserved unconfused in Christ;

but it is impossible for a difference altogether separated from quantity to be known;

let the quantity of the things that differ be spoken for the indication of the difference, lest we be suspected of advocating a difference that is somehow bare and not true.

For reason recognizes that every mere distinction is one that does not have, really subsisting as its substrate, the truth of the things of which it is a distinction.

We, then, since we never properly say that hypostasis and nature are the same — in accordance with the teaching of the Fathers, as the argument has already shown above — piously maintain in the case of Christ both "the same" and "the different."

The "same," by the principle of the one hypostasis, according to which we confess God the Word to be identical with his own flesh;

lest the all-glorious Trinity receive an addition of person, becoming a quaternity.

The "different," by the principle of the essential otherness of the [components] from which he is composed, according to which the parts of Christ in no way change into one another.

For divinity and humanity could never become identical in essence, lest anything created be, by virtue of the union, of the same nature and consubstantial with divinity —

we know [such a claim] to belong to a deranged mind.

For a nature could never by nature be of the same nature and consubstantial [with a nature unlike it in kind].

For "of the same nature" and "consubstantial" are properly said only of individuals that are referred back, according to the same species, to a single essence.

That he who does not say that nature and hypostasis are the same speaks piously, concerning Christ, of both the union and the distinction;

believing the union to be according to hypostasis, and the distinction according to nature.

Holding this confession, we neither deny the difference of the natures after the union, out of which the one Christ was composed, believing that the natures have remained unconfused;

nor do we ignore the union according to hypostasis, confessing Christ to be one of the holy, consubstantial, and worshipful Trinity.

But we also make manifest, by means of number, the difference of the [natures] from which Christ is, which are truly preserved in him without division and without confusion after the union, in refutation of the confusion of Apollinaris and Eutyches;

and since we know the union according to hypostasis, we set forth, with resounding voice, against the division of Nestorius, the one incarnate nature of God the Word, [incarnate] in flesh possessing a rational soul;

while likewise fleeing the confusion of Apollinaris —

who denies the natural difference of the united [components] after the union, and holds the flesh to be, by reason of the union, the same as the Word according to nature;

and [fleeing] the division of Nestorius, who proclaims a hypostatic difference in Christ, and severs the identity of the flesh with the Word according to hypostasis.

That Severus, by saying that nature and hypostasis are the same, turns the union into a confusion, and the distinction into a division;

by which he is shown, on the one hand, to expand the principle of the Trinity into a quaternity of persons;

and, on the other hand, to cut the mystery of the Monad into a duality of divinities;

and blasphemously to expel Christ from all essential existence.

But Severus, holding essence and hypostasis, nature and person, to be properly identical with respect to the divine incarnation, knows the union to be neither unconfused — even though he pretends to say so —

nor the distinction to be undivided, even though he also boasts of asserting this;

but rather he renders the union a confusion, after the manner of Apollinaris;

and the distinction an estrangement, after the manner of Nestorius.

For if hypostasis and nature are the same, then according to him the flesh will in no way be either the same as, or other than, the Word.

For by asserting that, in Christ, there is a distinction as of natural quality after the union, he too will be found dividing the union together with Nestorius, introducing, after the union, a distinction between the flesh and the Word according to hypostasis;

inasmuch as, according to him, a distinction as of natural quality can be understood in no other way than as a distinction in hypostatic quality, if indeed nature and hypostasis are the same.

For, in speaking of a distinction as of natural quality, he is under necessity to introduce in addition a distinction as of hypostatic quality as well;

in order to show that hypostasis is the same as nature.

But if, fearing division, he speaks instead of a distinction according to hypostasis after the union;

then let him not speak of a natural distinction after the union either, if indeed he has resolved to be consistent with himself, and is intent on keeping the rules he himself has laid down for himself;

since he holds nature and hypostasis to be identical with one another, both in definition and in principle.

I mean: [if] nature and hypostasis [are the same], then, as Severus supposes, the flesh has no difference from the Word — let it plainly be, according to the folly of Apollinaris, the very same thing, consubstantial and co-hypostatic with him.

And if the flesh is consubstantial with the Word, it will also be consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, and the Trinity will be shown to have become a quaternity;

since things that are consubstantial do not admit of coalescing with one another into a single hypostasis.

But if the flesh is co-hypostatic with the Word, it will be of a different essence in relation to him.

For things that are co-hypostatic have, in every way and altogether, a differing principle of essence in relation to one another.

But if, being co-hypostatic with the Word after the union, the flesh is of a different essence, then Christ will be found, according to Severus, divided into two natures after the union;

if indeed, according to him, number altogether carries the force of division.

Thus everything that contends against the truth is easily overturned by itself and easily falls into ruin.

But if, by asserting that after the union there is one composite nature of Christ, he appears to attach to it a distinction as of natural quality;

then, first, insofar as he is a composite nature, Christ will be altogether consubstantial with none of the things that exist;

since, according to essence and nature, Christ is one and unique.

For, as has been said, a nature could never be altogether consubstantial with [a different] nature.

And being consubstantial with none of the things that exist, he will be altogether neither God nor indeed man;

or, if he is God, then he who maintains this will be shown to be a polytheist, inasmuch as he calls the Father and the Holy Spirit "God" as being of a simple, non-composite nature;

while calling Christ "God" as being of a composite, non-simple nature — and thus he will be shown to be proclaiming two divinities;

one simple, and one composite.

Furthermore, in speaking of a distinction as of natural quality, if he holds that the natures to which the qualities belong underlie the differing qualities, then he too will be shown to be declaring two natures after the union;

thereby becoming, even unwillingly, an advocate for the very doctrines he had fought against.

But if he says that the distinction pertains to bare qualities apart from the realities [themselves], then let him also say that the union pertains to these same [bare qualities].

For whatever things possess the distinction after the union, of these same things the union manifestly also holds;

and thereby, in but a few syllables, he has introduced the spontaneity of Epicurus and the deceptive fantasy of Mani, since for him Christ does not truly exist in reality, but [only] in empty qualities;

and Christ will be God only in quality, and not in reality.

For immortality and mortality — of which he says there exists a distinction after the union — belong to natures, but are not themselves natures.

For where is mortality, if there is no one who dies? Or where is immortality, if there is no nature that death does not touch?

But indeed wickedness is truly irrational, and the mere appearance of wisdom is by nature apt to become the artificer of great folly.

And it is more profitable for the discerning to embrace silence toward such men, than, by refuting them, to be thought themselves also to be trifling with the mystery.

Severus, then, holding such views concerning Christ, has died along with his own dogmas.

But we do not think thus, we do not believe thus; "nor is this the portion of Jacob," as he who said it declares;

but, confessing that the one Christ — that is, his one hypostasis — was composed of two natures existing perfectly according to their own proper principle of being, namely divinity and humanity, we believe that the natures have remained unconfused, and without any division whatsoever, after the union.

For, believing him to be Christ, we have confessed that the natures out of which he was composed are preserved after the union,

since divinity and humanity are not the same according to essence;

while [confessing] a hypostatic identity;

for the flesh is evidently identical with the Word according to hypostasis.

Knowing, then, the real distinction of the natures out of which Christ was composed, after the union, we are not ignorant of the identity according to hypostasis;

inasmuch as the parts of Christ, while differing from one another naturally, do not differ from one another with respect to the hypostasis of the whole composed of them;

since it is not in the nature of things for the constitutive parts of a whole to differ altogether from one another with respect to the principle of the whole.

Confessing, then, that the same one is two natures, we have known him to be at once both God and man;

since indeed we do not put forth the appellations concerning him as bare words applying to nothing.

And believing him to exist in two natures, without division and without confusion after the union, we have proclaimed the same one to be perfect in divinity and the same one perfect in humanity, as a whole existing in parts.

For from the parts of which he was composed, he is known in them, as a whole, after the union;

because Christ has no other manifestation of existing, and being preserved, and being properly so named, than the natural persistence—after the union—of the parts of which he was composed, in respect to being;

For Christ is not only from these, but in these, and, to speak more properly, he is these things;

and after the union we number the things of which Christ [consists], not dividing the natures—far be it!—but making manifest only the difference between them that is preserved after the union.

And we confess a concurrence according to natural union—that is, a true and real one—following holy Cyril, and we proclaim the all-holy Virgin properly and truly to be Theotokos [God-bearer];

not simply so, but as one who truly conceived him who was ineffably begotten from God the Father before all the ages, God the Word, and who bore him who was made flesh from her ineffably.

And we say that the miracles and the sufferings belong to the same one, since Christ is evidently one, who works both the divine things and the human things;

the divine things in a fleshly manner, because through the flesh—which was not devoid of its own natural operation—he put forth the power of the miracles;

and the human things in a divine manner, because, apart from any natural compulsion, by his own authority, willingly he accepted the experience of the human passions.

We confess the cross and the death and the burial and the resurrection of the same one, and the ascension into the heavens;

from whence, having descended without flesh, he did not change place by passing through places—he who is by no means contained by the things that exist;

For he exists free from all circumscription;

but he was manifested through the flesh, inasmuch as he is by nature loving toward mankind, becoming, according to a true birth from a woman, capable of being contained, as he willed, having become one of our own kind.

If, then, with both soul and mouth we say that the holy Virgin is properly Theotokos, and confess the hypostatic union, and say that a concurrence according to natural union has come about, and profess one Lord and Christ and Son, and one incarnate nature of God the Word himself;

and believe that Christ is one of the Holy Trinity, co-worshiped and co-numbered with the Father and the Spirit, how is it that we are reviled by the fearless ones—who dare to say all things falsely—as though dividing him, merely on account of the bare term of number, which is put forth by us, as has often been said, solely to indicate the difference of the natures that is preserved after the union?

If, then, number necessarily and altogether effects a division in the quantity of things, let someone demonstrate this, and we shall accept the slander as true.

But if they merely do harm by slandering those who proclaim the true faith of the mystery—on account of the love of vainglory from which they suffer—they themselves will give an account to God on the day of judgment, says the divine Apostle, for those whom they have swept away into error, once they themselves have completed the long course of the present life.

For it is fitting to speak thus, on account of the commandment that bids us pray for those who curse us.

I, then, have set forth these things to you in summary concerning what you asked, servant of God, for the sake of your full assurance;

not that I hold otherwise in my soul, as some of those who delight in Severus noisily allege;

while speaking otherwise to those whom I happen to meet;

do not think this, but I speak as I was taught, and as I think and believe, and as I received from the Fathers.

and, to speak more properly, I put forth my very own understanding, embodied in these words.

But if this word is false, may I not attain to the blessedness that comes from thence;

but may I instead carry away, as the fruit of falsehood, alienation from the promised goods.

But you, on account of my compliance, deign to repay me with your prayers;

so that Christ our God, the salvation of those who fear him, may heal the wounds of my soul by the power of the mystery of his life-giving sufferings on our behalf;

he who alone, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is glorified unto the ages.

[Note:] In the definition, he says, the commonality of things identical in essence is beheld.

[Note:] That the properties characterizing the composite hypostasis, he says, are common to its parts.

[Note:] Definition, that is, the description of the enhypostatic.

[Note:] That quantity of which number is indicative is called 'genus/kind.'

[Note:] He said 'properly' because their own definitions do not change into one another.

[Note:] For of things whose definition is not one, the rational principle is not one;

[Note:] and of things whose rational principle is not one, the mode of being is different;

[Note:] and of things whose mode of being is different, there is no identity throughout all respects between them.

[Note:] Therefore nature and hypostasis are not the same;

[Note:] because the mode of being, and the rational principle, and the definition of these are not properly one.

[Note:] Therefore it will be said 'hypostasis' by an extension of the term, and with reference to some incidental thing, but not properly.

By the same [author], to the same [addressee].

While I was being scourged with many stripes of grief because of what had befallen me from the slander of those who do not fear the Lord, your sacred letter, O holy Father, arriving in good time, brought consolation—to the noble guardian of the virtues, lord George;

this, on the one hand, bringing good tidings of your health, which is longed for by all;

and this, on the other hand, announcing the steadfastness of your right confession toward the Lord Jesus Christ, our true God.

This [confession], having been confirmed by the trial of sufferings, was transformed into unchangeableness for you—you who counted the misfortune of the present life as nothing, you who long ago held its good fortune to be of little worth, having transferred the whole longing of your soul toward the things hoped for alone;

whom faith and a good conscience are naturally disposed to characterize;

the one, faith, guarding the pious doctrine, unstained in any way by false opinion;

the other, conscience, fashioning a life pleasing to God, set right by the observance of the commandments.

For both are needed—I mean doctrine and life—by the one who has been eager to prefer, above all things, a life shared with wisdom;

so that we may also piously proclaim the mystery of the unchangeable self-emptying, through the flesh, of the God of all, on our behalf;

confessing that Christ, in truth, is at once both God and man;

the latter state, that is, man, having come to be afterward, for our sake.

neither putting off what he was on account of what he became;

nor denying what he became on account of what he was;

for to him alone, who properly exists in a superabundance of power, was it possible to become, without change and without confusion, what he was not, while remaining, properly, both what he was and what he became;

his hypostasis not admitting division in the oneness that stands at the very summit of its own hypostatic unity, on account of the difference—naturally preserved in him after the union—between the parts of which he was composed;

since, having been united according to hypostasis with flesh that was rationally ensouled, in the miracles he was shown to remain, unchangeably, what he was;

while in the sufferings he appeared to preserve, unalterably, what he had become;

and through both—I mean the miracles and the sufferings—he granted to us both the abolition of sin and the grace of deification.

And let us honor the calling of grace by a manner of life adorned with the commandments, being shaken by no pleasure, nor by any pain whatsoever, in any respect;

and let us show, through what we do or suffer, that we are held fast by God alone, who gave himself as ransom and exchange for us, having entrusted to him our whole life, both the present and the future;

as being from him, by the principle of our coming-into-being, and existing through him, by the manner of our guidance;

and as destined to come to rest in him, by the mystery, according to grace, of the deification that is hoped for;

and may we receive back the ever-abiding well-being, through what now, alas, seems merely to be suffering, having shown, through what we suffer, our disposition hidden toward God, unaltered in any way by the pains that befall us.