Greek original · 133 verses · some words can be tapped for a gloss · long chapter, split into parts; this part covers 1:2404–1:2536 (6569 verses in all)
This, then, is his more cutting argument, which he threatened to bring forward against us, as a proof that we say the essence of God to be commingled with things contrary and worse.
But I hold it manifest to those who have within themselves a sound criterion of the truth, that—since the teacher gave the sycophant no handle in what was said—this man, by falsifying what was said to suit his own purpose, has brought to its conclusion this childish sport of sophistry.
Nevertheless, that it may become more evident to all readers, I will once more read out that passage word for word, and set over against it, in opposition, the words of Eunomius.
As, then, the endlessness of His life is called incorruptible, so also its being without beginning is named unbegotten, we contemplating these things by conception. This is the teacher's argument, teaching us through what has been said that the divine life, being one in nature and continuous with itself, neither begins from any beginning nor is circumscribed by any limit, and that it is possible to render manifest, through certain names, the notions contemplated in this life.
For that He is not from any cause we declare through the term 'without beginning' and 'unbegotten'; and that He is circumscribed by no end nor dissolved into corruption—this the word 'incorruptible' and 'unending' makes plain.
And by this it is determined that, in the case of the divine life, one must call the not-having-a-beginning 'being unbegotenly,' and name the being-endlessly 'incorruptible'—since everything that has ceased to be passes altogether into dissolution, and, hearing of the dissolution of that which is, we understood the corruption of what had held together.
What, then, does Eunomius say against these things? "If," he says, "He is incorruptible only in respect of the endlessness of His life, and unbegotten only in respect of His being without beginning, then in that respect in which He is not incorruptible He will be corruptible, and in that respect in which He is not unbegotten He will be begotten."
...that this name should apply to one portion—is one then to say that the other does not also belong to Him? This is the acuteness of your dialectic: to say that the life which exists without beginning is corruptible, and that the state of being without beginning is not contemplated together with the incorruptible;
just as if someone were to say that man is rational, and capable of mind and of knowledge, fitting each of these names to the subject according to a different apprehension and notion; and were then to be mocked by some such person going through the like, saying that if man is capable of mind and of knowledge, he cannot in this respect be rational, but will be only that in respect of which he is capable of knowledge, and his nature will not admit the other; and again, if one define man as rational, it will no longer concede to him the capacity for mind.
For neither, in the illustration concerning man, is the capacity for knowledge hindered by reason, nor reason by the capacity for understanding; nor does the everlastingness of the divine life fail to possess incorruptibility if it be without beginning, nor—if anyone should attest incorruptibility of it—will its being without beginning be taken away.
But he who, by the art of dialectical shrewdness, searches out the truth, having inserted into our argument, from his own store, the things he wished, fights with himself and overturns himself, without touching what is ours at all.
For what came from us was nothing else than to say that the life which exists without beginning is named unbegotten by conception—named, not made to become so—and that the life which proceeds unto the boundless is signified by the appellation of the incorruptible—not making it incorruptible, but signifying it to be such.
So that the fact that the divine life is boundless in each respect is proper to the subject; but that the notions contemplated in the subject are spoken of thus or thus pertains only to the term which is indicative of the signified notion.
So that the subject is what it is, above every name and notion; but that it is neither from a cause nor ever passes round into non-existence—these things are signified through the conception of these names.
"Therefore, in respect of His being without beginning, He will be at once unbegotten and corruptible; and in respect of His endlessness, at once incorruptible and begotten."
But this, even if it be not clearly resolved by us in argument, is manifest to everyone who partakes in any degree of understanding, how ridiculous and senseless it is—or rather, how impious and worthy of condemnation.
For by the same reasoning by which he constructs the conjunction of the corruptible with the beginningless, in that very manner he makes mockery of every devout and God-befitting name.
For not only are these two things contemplated concerning the divine life—the being without beginning and the not admitting corruption—but it is also called immaterial and free from wrath, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and without form, true and just, and there are countless other notions concerning the divine life, each of which is declared, in itself, according to some distinct notion, by the significant terms.
To every name, then—I mean the name significant of a God-befitting conception—it is possible to attach the absurd conjunction that has been devised by Eunomius.
for by the term 'immaterial' we conceived the Divine to be pure of any admixture of matter, while in 'free from wrath' is signified the estrangement of the Divine from the passion that pertains to anger.
"If, in so far as He is separated from any admixture of matter, He is called immaterial, in this respect He will not be free from wrath; and if He is free from wrath because He does not admit anger, it is not possible for immateriality to be confessed of Him—but by every necessity, in being pure of matter He will be shown to be at once immaterial and prone to wrath, while in not admitting anger He will be found, in the very same respect, to be free from wrath and yet material."
For, since each of these two names is spoken of the divine life according to its own distinct meaning, in like manner also, in their case, the wisdom of Eunomius will construct the absurdity.
For if that which ever remains in the same state is signified by the term 'immutable,' and the intellectual character of the essence is presented by the appellation 'incorporeal,' Eunomius will assuredly say the same things in their case too: that the notions contemplated in these names are incompatible and alien and incommunicable with one another.
For in ever remaining in the same state, the Divine will be only immutable and not incorporeal; while in the intellectual and formless character of the essence, it has indeed incorporeality, but is separated from immutability;
so that it follows that, whenever unchangeableness is contemplated in the divine life, it is established, together with immutability, to be also a body; and whenever the intellectual character is examined, it is at once determined to be both incorporeal and mutable.
For why need one, going through them all, prolong the discourse in garrulity? For it is possible to behold this same irrationality being constructed alike in the case of all of them.
So that Eunomius, following out the consequence, would say concerning these too that the true is not present to the just, and that the just is lacking to the truth, and that it comes about that, whenever one reckons the alienation from injustice in the case of God, one declares the Divine to be at once just and false; while, if we reckon its estrangement from falsehood, one establishes the Divine to be at once true and unjust.
For by a wisdom of the same kind as that already set forth, it will be possible neither to say that the invisible resides in the formless nor that the formless resides in the invisible; but rather one may attach shape to the invisible, and by the reverse procedure render the formless visible—saying of these the very same things that he elaborated concerning the incorruptible and the unoriginate: namely, that when we reason upon the incomposite character of the divine life, we confess it to be formless, yet not for that reason also invisible; and when we consider that God cannot be seen with bodily eyes, though we grant Him to be invisible, we shall not thereby concede that He is without shape.
But if these things appear to everyone alike ridiculous and senseless, far more will a person of sound mind condemn the absurdity of those propositions from which the argument, once set in motion, led on by logical consequence to this absurdity.
But he lays hold of our teacher's statement, alleging that it is improper to contemplate incorruptibility in that which is unending, and to conceive endlessness in that which is incorruptible.
But if he should say that the meaning of the incorruptible is one thing and that of the endless another, then it is wholly necessary that, in things which stand in a foreign relation to one another, the one should not be the same in force as the other.
For we have played at these things against the jester only out of necessity, in order that by a like sport we might unravel the puerile entanglement of his sophistry.
But if it should not appear burdensome and tiresome to the readers, it would not be untimely to set out once more, word for word, the utterances of Eunomius.
"If," he says, "He is incorruptible only in respect of the endlessness of His life, and unbegotten only in respect of His being without beginning, then in that respect in which He is not incorruptible He will be corruptible, and in that respect in which He is not unbegotten He will be begotten."
And taking up the same point again, he says: "He will therefore be, in respect of His being without beginning, at once unbegotten and corruptible; and in respect of His endlessness, at once incorruptible and begotten."
For I pass over the untimely insertions of superfluous matter set in the midst, since they contribute nothing further to the construction of his argument.
But the meaning of our words, from which this very man drew his citation, is, I think, easy for anyone to perceive—namely, that it has no kinship whatever with the accusation he has framed against us.
"For we call the God of all things incorruptible and unbegotten," says the teacher, "employing these names according to different modes of conception."
"For since He transcends," he says, "the bounds of the ages in every interval of temporal extension—whether we reckon from the beginning or from what follows thereafter—we signify by each conception that the eternal life is unbounded and uncircumscribed: the one by the name of incorruptibility, the other by that of being unbegotten."
But this fellow says that we assert that being-without-beginning is a substance, and that endlessness is again a substance, as though two segments of substances, spoken of by us as mutually opposed, were being combined.
And in this way he constructs the absurdity, laying down his own premises and interweaving them with his own, and thrusting into absurdity the notions composed by himself—in nothing does he touch upon what is ours.
Likewise also the notion that the incorruptible is not without beginning is the invention of the same shrewdness—the shrewdness that ranks what does not belong to a thing among the account of its substance.
But the man who has trumpeted his own nonsense against our doctrines, pilloring himself through the very accusation he brings against us, does not perceive it.
For since the beginning is one thing and the end another when conceived in terms of dimensional extension, if one should grant that the privation of one of these is a substance, he will make God's life subsist only from the half of it, having its subsistence in what is without-beginning alone, but no longer extending by nature toward the endless—if indeed unbegottenness be reckoned to be [His] nature.
But if one should force both to be a substance, then it is wholly necessary, according to the argument rendered by Eunomius, that each of the names, according to the impression contained in it, should have its being also in the account of substance—existing only to such an extent as the signification of the appellation indicates.
And thus the argument of Eunomius will turn out to be forceful: since the without-beginning does not possess endlessness, nor does the endless possess being-without-beginning, seeing that according to his own argument each of the aforesaid is also a substance, and the two stand unmingled with one another in their conceptions, and neither does the beginning bear the same account as the end, nor do the names that annul these agree with one another in their significations.
For, contending against our positions, he says that God is unbegotten in respect of His endlessness and endless in respect of His unbegottenness, as though there were one and the same impression in both of the names.
If, then, He is unbegotten also in respect of His endlessness, and if the endless and the unbegotten are the same in signification, and yet he agrees that the Son too is endless, then by this same logical consequence he will be constrained to agree that the Son too is unbegotten—if indeed the endless is the same as the without-beginning, as he has said.
But who is it that contends about this—that God is not by nature everything that He is also called? For indeed, when we call God just and powerful and Father and incorruptible, we do so neither by juxtaposition with the ages nor by reference to any other of the things that exist; rather, concerning the subject itself, whatever it may be according to its nature, we hold every reverent supposition.
So that even if, by hypothesis, neither age nor any other of the things conceived within creation had been fashioned, God would nonetheless have been that which He is now believed to be, needing none of the ages in order to become what He is.
These things we have learned concerning the Only-begotten as well, and there is none who contradicts them—unless perhaps someone should openly do battle against the sayings of John.
For neither was life introduced into the Son from without (for He says, "I am the life"), nor is His life composite, nor differentiated; but He is immortal according to that very life (for in what else could one contemplate immortality except in life?), and incorruptible according to that very immortality.
For what does he say? "Being incorruptible without-beginning, He is unbegotten endlessly, being spoken of neither in respect of another, nor through another, nor in relation to another."
For he whose hearing has been purified and whose understanding is keen-sighted knows, even before my words, that apart from the clatter of the names which he has rattled off in their outlandish combination, not a trace of scientific understanding is to be found in what has been said.
For with what meaning do you say this, tell me—that He is without-beginning endlessly and endless without-beginning? Do you think that the beginning is the same as the end, and that the two words are laid upon a single notion, just as the appellations of Peter and Simon indicate through themselves one and the same subject? And on this account, just as you suppose the beginning to be the same as the end, so, having joined into one signification the two words that annul each of these—I mean the end and the beginning—and having conceived by conversion that the endless is the same as the without-beginning, you have made the two words merge into one another; and is this what the mixture of the names means for you, in your saying that He is unbegotten endlessly and endless unbegottenly? And how did you not see the impiety together with the ridiculousness in the things said? For if, by this novel mixture, the interchange of the names comes about on equal terms—so that the unbegotten is endlessly unbegotten and the endless is unbegottenly endless—then it is wholly necessary that everything endless be endless in no other way than by being unbegotten.
And thus there is found for you, dear friend, that much-vaunted unbegottenness—which according to you alone characterizes the substance of the Father—being made common to everything immortal, and rendering all things consubstantial with the Father, because it is manifested alike in all those to whom, through immortality, life proceeds toward the infinite: to archangels, to angels, to human souls, and perhaps even to the apostate power itself, to the devil and to the demons.
And if it is altogether incorruptible unbegottenly, according to your argument, then one must altogether contemplate unbegottenness together with everything that is endless and incorruptible.
Into such difficulties do they fall who, before learning what it is fitting to learn, attempt through those very things to teach, thereby publishing abroad their own ignorance.
For if he had any discriminating knowledge, he would not have been ignorant of the distinct meaning that lies in the without-beginning and in the endless, and of the fact that the endless is common to all things that are believed to endure in life unto the infinite, whereas the without-beginning belongs to Him alone who exists without cause.
How, then, is it possible to suppose that what is common to all is of equal force with that which is believed by all to belong to God alone as His special prerogative—so that through this one must either make unbegottenness common to all things that partake of immortality, or else concede that nothing is immortal, if indeed to be endless belongs to the unbegotten alone, and conversely, if to be unbegotten belongs to the endless alone?
But let these things too be dismissed, and let his customary abuse, which he has poured out upon what has been said, be passed over in silence along with them; and let us come to what follows in the reading.
For in all of it he is the same—not grappling with what comes from us, but supplying himself, as though from what is ours, with the starting-points for his rebuttal.
To go through such things with precision, one of those accustomed to judging would call vain labor, since each reader who peruses his treatise with understanding grasps the calumny from the very things said.
For the dignity of God—whatever one ought to suppose this also to be—takes precedence not only over the generation of our day, but is exalted also above the whole creation and above the ages themselves.
What, then, accrues to his argument from these things, if the dignity of God is confessed to be higher not only than Basil but than all existing things? "Yes," he says, "but the name is the dignity."
And who has demonstrated that the appellation is the same as the dignity, that we too might agree with what is said? "The ordinance of nature teaches us," he says, "that the dignity of names lies in the things named, not in the authority of those who name."
What is this law of nature, and how is it not ratified over all? For if nature had legislated such a thing, it would have had to hold sway over all who share in nature, just as with all the other things that are proper to nature.
If, then, the law of nature made appellations sprout up for us out of the things themselves, as sprouts from seeds or from roots, and did not entrust the significative names of the underlying subjects to the choice of those who designate the things, then all we human beings would be of one tongue toward one another.
How, then, were the prophets ignorant of what is holy and untaught in the law of providence—they who nowhere, according to your argument, deified unbegottenness? And how does God Himself too fail to know such a form of holiness—He who does not impose the appellations upon the living creatures fashioned by Him from above, but rather bestows upon Adam the authority of name-giving? For if, as Eunomius says, it is akin to the law of providence and holy that the words be imposed upon things from above, then it is altogether unholy and unfitting that the designations should be fitted to existing things by those below.
he insists that the name 'unbegottenness' was thus given to designate the essence of the Father. For Adam too would have said this, and all who came after him from him, if indeed such a notion had been sown into our nature by God.
For just as the things that now grow from the earth persist perpetually through the succession of seed from the first creation, and no new kind of seed is now devised by nature, so too this notion, if indeed it were, as you say, sown into our nature from God, would have sprouted forth together with the first utterance of the first-formed human beings and would have passed on through the succession of those who came after.
But since this was not so from the beginning (for none of the first human beings down to the present, before you, ever uttered such a thing), it is clear that something spurious and contrived has sprung up from the seed of tares, not from those good seeds which God, to speak in the language of the Gospel, cast into the field of nature.
For whatever belongs altogether to our common nature does not now take its beginning of existence, but appeared together with nature at the first constitution—such as the activity of the sense organs, and the disposition of human beings toward some things by desire or aversion, and whatever else is acknowledged to be common to the nature. Of these, life in later generations has innovated nothing, but in the very same properties, from the first human beings to the last, humanity is preserved throughout, nature neither casting off any of the things belonging to it from the beginning nor taking on any of the things that do not belong to it.
And just as seeing is acknowledged to be common to the nature, while seeing skillfully comes by practice to those who have devoted themselves to the sciences (for not everyone possesses scientific comprehension through the lens, nor the demonstrative contemplation of geometrical lines, nor anything else of this sort, in which not the seeing itself but a certain applied use of seeing has been devised by art), so also one might say that being rational is common to human essence and is proper to it, having been co-substantiated with the nature from above; but that the devising of certain significant appellations for existing things belongs to human beings who possess the rational faculty within themselves from God, who ever, according to what pleases them, devise certain expressions descriptive of things for the clarity of what is being indicated.
But if these views prevail, he says, one of two things must be established: either the conception of those who conceive is more ancient, or the appellations that naturally befit God and pre-exist all things are later than the coming-to-be of human beings.
Must one, then, contend against such things and grapple through argument with folly so manifest? And who is so paltry as to be harmed by such reasoning and to suppose that, if words are believed to belong to the rational faculty, one must either confess that the sounds of words are more ancient than those who speak, or think it an offense against the divine that human beings—insofar as they are able, after having become human—should name the divine? For that the transcendent nature has no need of words shaped by voice and tongue has already been said, and it would be superfluous to burden the discourse with the same matters over again.
For that which is by nature in need of nothing, and perfect, and without superfluity, neither lacks any of the things it ought to have, nor has any of the things it ought not to have.
Since, then, that He has no need of a nominal designation has been demonstrated from the foregoing arguments and is confessed by the common assent of those who have understanding, no one could deny that it is the utmost impiety to attribute to God things that do not befit Him.
for to those who are more attentive, the very discourse labored over by our adversary will sufficiently show itself an advocate of the doctrines of true religion.
But whether these belong to the divine nature, or whether these very things, according to what is signified, are the essence, I think there is no need to contend against him;
If it be liable to corruption—[which it is not]—then there belongs to it altogether also the not-being-through-begetting; and thus the notion of unbegottenness would be thrust outside the signification of the essence.