Greek original · 103 verses · some words can be tapped for a gloss · long chapter, split into parts; this part covers 1:2663–1:2765 (6569 verses in all)
For just as the sequence of the antithesis shows that what is not incorruptible is corruptible, and that what is not unchangeable is changeable, so too what is not immortal is altogether mortal.
What, then, will this expounder of novel doctrines pronounce authoritatively to us concerning the essence of the Only-begotten? For once again I shall put the same question to this word-monger.
Will he grant that this too is immortality, or will he not agree? If, then, he does not admit that the essence of the Son is immortality, he will of necessity agree to the contrary, establishing—by the removal of the better—that it is death.
But if, avoiding the absurdity, he should also name the essence of the Only-begotten as immortality, then for this very reason he will agree that there is no difference whatsoever in essence.
For if the nature of the Father and of the Son is equally immortality, and immortality is by no principle of difference sundered from itself, then it is confessed even by our very enemies that no principle of difference in essence is to be found in the case of the Father and the Son.
But it would be a fitting moment to set forth the grievous accusation he brought against us, which he made at the end of his discourse, saying that we assert the Father to be from that which in no way exists.
Having dragged this phrase out bare and detached from the rest of the body of the argument, he attempts to gnaw at it, tearing it apart with toothless jaws—or rather slobbering over the statement.
But I will first state the meaning of what our teacher carefully expounded to us concerning this matter, and then likewise I will set the very passage itself before you word for word, so that it may become plain to all how he insinuates himself, to the ruin of the truth, into the earnest labors of the godly.
For in leading us to the meaning of 'ungenerate' through his own arguments, our teacher set before us this kind of approach toward the knowledge of what is sought, showing that the thing signified by 'ungenerate' lies far from the notion of essence.
The Evangelist, he says, having begun the genealogy of the Lord according to the flesh from Joseph, and then proceeding to one ever more ancient in time, and having fixed the end of the genealogy in Adam, and having declared God to be the Father of the first-formed man because there was no bodily father set above him—he says it is ready to hand for each one's understanding to grasp this concerning God: that God, from whom Adam came, does not, after the likeness of those genealogized in human fashion, himself have his subsistence from another.
The Evangelist Luke, he says, in setting out the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Savior Jesus Christ, and going back from the last to the first, began with Joseph, and having said that he was the son of Heli, and Heli of Matthat, and thus leading up the account by ascent to Adam, then coming to those higher up and saying that Seth was of Adam, and Adam of God, at that point ceased his ascent.
As, then, that one said that Adam was of God, let us ask ourselves: and God—of whom? Is it not ready to hand for each one's understanding that he is of no one? And 'of no one' plainly means the unoriginate, and the unoriginate means the ungenerate.
As, then, in the case of men, 'being from someone' was not essence, so neither in the case of the God of the universe can one call 'the ungenerate' essence. With what eyes do you still gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, the herd of those who are perishing.
How do you still incline your ear to one who by his words has set up such a monument of his own shamelessness? Are you not ashamed, if not before, then at least now, to use such a leader-by-the-hand toward the truth? Will you not use this as a sign of his madness concerning his doctrines—that he so shamelessly sets himself against the truth of the Scriptures? Is this how he interprets the divine utterances for you, is this how he champions the truth of the doctrines—so as to convict Basil of genealogizing the God who is over all from that which in no way exists? Shall I quote his statement, shall I set forth the words of his shamelessness? I pass over the insults, I do not reproach the revilings.
I take no account, then, of the revilings, but I will write out plainly, in his very words, that vehement and irresistible interweaving of syllogism by which he brought his accusation against us to bear upon his own aim.
For 'in order,' he says, 'that Basil might not be prevented from saying that the Son is from participation in Him who is, he has unwittingly said that the God who is over all is from that which in no way exists.'
'Since things of equal force are interchangeable without hindrance, he who says that God is from no one says that God is from that which in no way exists.'
Toward which of the things previously said shall we first look—that he supposes the Son to be from participation in God, and spreads the foul odor of his mouth over those who do not accept this—or shall we examine the cold and dreamlike composition of his sophism? But that to attach 'from participation' to the divine nature belongs only to poets and myth-fabricators, no one who has any share of understanding could fail to know.
This argument, then, since it carries within itself, from its own nature, the refutation of both folly and impiety, it is fitting to pass over in silence; but rather to set forth that 'irresistible' syllogism, so that the laymen among us may learn from what great and manifold losses those have suffered who have not been trained in the technical methods.
'For if the nothing,' he says, 'is the same in concept as that which in no way exists, and things of equal force are interchangeable without hindrance, he who says that God is from no one says that God is from that which in no way exists.'
Who granted to this man who brandishes against us his Aristotelian spearpoint, that to say someone has no father is the same as to say that he came into being from that which in no way exists? For he who has counted in order those genealogized by the account clearly conceives the one set above the one mentioned as being his father.
For what was Heli to Joseph? What was Matthat to Heli? What was Adam to Seth? Is it not evident even to the very infants that this catalog of the names here mentioned is an enumeration of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, then Adam is altogether the father of him who was begotten from him.
So tell me likewise: and of the God who is over all, who is the father? Speak to your questioner, break forth in voice, answer, set all your logical art in motion toward this inquiry!
Will you find any argument that escapes the grip of your own sophism? Who is the father of the ungenerate? Can you say who? Then—he is not ungenerate? But, hard pressed, you will altogether say what indeed it is necessary to say: that there is no one.
What then, dearest one? Has this soft entanglement of the sophism not yet been undone for you? Have you understood that you have slobbered into your own bosom? What does the great Basil say? That the ungenerate is from no father.
You made 'from no father' into 'the nothing,' and again, having exchanged 'the nothing' for 'that which in no way exists,' you brought to conclusion that already-dissolved syllogism.
If, then, no one is the father of the ungenerate, and 'no one' was by you exchanged for 'the nothing,' and 'the nothing,' according to your own argument, is the same in concept as that which in no way exists, and, as you say, things of equal force are interchangeable without hindrance—then he who said that no one is the father of the ungenerate says that the God who is over all is from that which in no way exists.
Such, it seems, O Eunomius, is the evil (for I will use your own words)—not that of having honored seeming to be wise before being so (for such a thing is perhaps a small misfortune), but that of being ignorant of oneself and not knowing how great is the difference between the high-soaring Basil and the beast of the dry land.
For our own effort, judged in relation to him, though it would be but the portion of a claw, is yet in relation to you so great as to be sufficient to tear away from you the shell of your deceit and to reveal the ugliness hidden within the shell.
If for one who contends lawfully the limit of the toils in the contests is either that his opponent, having wholly given up before the toils, voluntarily yields the victory to the one who has prevailed, or that he be thrown down by three falls according to the athletic law—by which, through the judgment of the umpires, the glory of the crown accrues to the victor with brilliant proclamation—since, then, Eunomius, already twice thrown down in the preceding discourses, still does not concede that truth holds the prize of victory over falsehood, but from a third round again wrestles against godliness through his treatise, in the accustomed wrestling-school of falsehood, having braced himself for the contests on behalf of deceit, of necessity now too, through us, the word of truth is raised up in opposition to the overthrow of falsehood, having entrusted its hopes to the Giver of victory and the Judge of the contest, and being strengthened together against the crafty malice of the adversary's wrestlings.
For we confess unashamedly that we have neither prepared any discourse sharpened by rhetoric for the contests, nor put forward any cleverness of dialectical shrewdness as an ally against our adversaries—which cleverness often, in the case of the inexperienced, transposes even the truth into a suspicion of falsehood.
But the one power of the reason within us against falsehood is, first, the true Word himself, becoming the strength of our reasoning; and then also the rottenness of our adversaries, which is overturned and collapses of itself, by itself.
But that it may become most evident to all that the very labor of Eunomius becomes for those who wrestle against him the material of his own overthrow, I will set before those who encounter this discourse the very idol itself (for so, I think, ought a discourse outside the truth to be named).
And may you all become just umpires of the lawful athletic contest of arguments—you who encounter our labors and behold the interweaving now taking place between our discourse and its adversary—so that through your just verdict there may be proclaimed to the whole theater of the Church the discourse of godliness, having received from all an unrivaled might against impiety, adorned through the three falls of the enemy with the ever-blooming crown of those who are saved.
'Preserving,' he says, 'the natural order and abiding by what has been known from above, we do not decline to call the Son generated and offspring, since the generated essence and the appellation of "Son" appropriate to themselves such a relation of the names.'
To this let the hearer diligently attend, that in naming the Only-begotten God both 'generated' and 'Son,' he refers the cause of these names to the natural order and calls to witness the knowledge from above for such a notion.
So that if in what follows he should be found contradicting what has been previously set forth, it may become plain to all that he is overturned by himself, being refuted through his own words before ours.
He confesses that the name of 'Son' could in no way be properly applied to the Only-begotten God unless, as he says, the natural order confirmed the appellation for the one generated.
Therefore if one should take away the natural order in the case of the appellation of 'Son,' he will be babbling the name over him in vain, it being severed from its proper and natural connotation.
But also the fact that he says he affirms these things while abiding by what has been known from above confirms far more the godly notion concerning the appellation of the Son, inasmuch as the God-inspired teaching of the Scriptures, which has come to us from above, confirms the account concerning these matters.
It holds thus, and this is the unfalsified definition of the truth: that these two things run together with one another—the natural order, as he says, and the testimony of the knowledge from above, confirming the judgment of nature; it is plain that to say anything contrary to these is nothing else than to fight openly against the truth itself.
This man, then, who makes nature the teacher of this name and says that he abides by what has been known to us from above through the teaching of the saints—let us hear again what sort of things he goes through a little further on, after what has been said.
'For the present I will pass over the continuous sequence of the things composed in the discourse in accordance with what follows upon these, lest the contradiction of what has been written escape notice, being overshadowed by the reading of the things interposed in between.'
'The same argument,' he says, 'will fit also concerning the work and the creature, since the natural judgment and the relation of the things to one another, and moreover the usage of the saints, furnishes us without hindrance the authority for the type.'
Concerning what creature and work does he speak, as having a natural relation in the name toward the one who made and created? If concerning the visible and invisible things contemplated in creation, as Paul goes through them, saying that in Him all things were created, visible and invisible—so that this relative conjunction of names is properly fitted to itself, the work being ordered with the maker and the creature with the creator—if he says this, then we too agree.
For truly, since the Lord is the maker of angels, the angel is altogether the work of Him who made it; and since the Lord is the creator of the world, the world itself and all that is in it is plainly named the creature of Him who created it.
If, then, looking to these things he distinguishes the order of nature, treating technically, in the significance of names, the appropriation of the relation to one another of names spoken relatively, then even so it was superfluous—since no one is ignorant of these things—for us to make some technical treatise of grammatical pedantry, forsaking the doctrines.
But if he fits such expressions to the Only-begotten God, so as to say that He is the work of the maker and the creature of the creator, and refers the authority of this name-coining to the usage of the saints, let him first demonstrate this by his discourse: which saints he says there are who declared the Maker of the universe to be a work and a creature, following whom he grows bold with this expression.
If anyone among these, through his God-inspired words, dogmatizes that the God who is over all is created and a work—He who bears all things by the word of His power and holds all that exists in His grasp and by His will alone brought the universe into being through Himself—then Eunomius will be pardonable in his use of the saints, following, as he says, toward such a formation of dogma.
But if the knowledge of the divine Scriptures lies open by right to all, and nothing is unspeakable or hidden from any who wish to partake of the divine teaching, how does he attempt to deceive his hearers through his slander against the Scriptures, referring the term 'creature' to the Only-begotten under the guise of the usage of the saints? For that all things came to be through Him one may hear from almost every holy utterance—from Moses and the prophets and apostles in succession—of whom it would be a lengthy matter now to cite each one.
But it suffices, together with the others and before the others, that the sublime John, in the very preamble of his theology concerning the Only-begotten, proclaimed this: that there is nothing among the things that have come to be which did not come to be through Him. And this is an incontestable and indubitable demonstration that He is the Lord of creation, not one to be reckoned in the catalogue of created things.
When John testifies that among the things which exist through creation nothing came to be apart from Him, who is so blind in mind as not even to see the truth in the evangelist's proclamation—namely, that He who made the whole creation is assuredly something wholly other than the creation? For if everything that is numbered among the things that have come to be exists through Him, while He Himself is in the beginning and is with God, being God and Word and Life and Light and Impress and Radiance, and yet none of the things that came to be through creation is named by these same names—not Word, not God, not Life, not Light, not Truth, not Impress, not Radiance, nor is any other of the names befitting God to be found belonging to the creation—then it is plain that He who is these things is by nature something other than the creation, which neither is nor is called any of these.
For if there were in such appellations any community of name between the creation and its Maker, it might perhaps have been pardonable, on account of the commonality of the remaining names, to make the name of 'creation' common also to what is created and to the Maker.
But if the distinguishing marks contemplated in the created and the uncreated nature are, through their names, in every respect incompatible and incommunicable, how is not the calumny manifest to all—the calumny of him who dares to apply the name of servitude to the One who rules, as the prophet says, 'in His dominion over the age'—and dares, by a name and a notion drawn from creation, to bring the One who is preeminent in all things, as the Apostle says, into a rank of equal honour with the servile nature? For the great Paul declared that the whole creation is in bondage—he who was instructed in the higher schools of the heavens in ineffable knowledge, learning these things there where every articulate utterance brought forth by speech falls idle, and where the unspeakable conception becomes a word of teaching, imparting to the purified heart, through the unutterable illumination of concepts, the things that surpass reason.
If then Paul cries aloud that the creation is in bondage, while the Only-begotten God is truly Lord and God over all, and John testifies that the whole creation of the things that have come to be exists through Him, how can anyone who is reckoned in any way whatever among Christians endure to behold, through this incoherent and inconsistent technical jargon, Eunomius dragging down into the lowliness of the creation that Power which is exalted above all rule and authority and dominion—dragging it down by means of a name shared with the servile? But if he says that he has certain of the saints who have called Him a servant, or created, or made, or applied to Him any of the lowly and servile names, behold, the Scriptures are at hand!
But if there is no such expression, nor could there ever be found in the Scriptures believed to be God-inspired any such notion that becomes an advocate of this impiety, what need is there to contend further concerning things acknowledged, against one who not only slanders the utterances of the saints but even wrestles against his own definitions? For if the order of nature, as this very man confesses, attests the name to the Son on account of His being begotten, and thus the conjunction of the name arises through the relation of the begotten to the begetter, how, having wrenched away the signification of 'Son' from its natural kinship, does he transfer the relation to the thing made and its maker? Which one may say to be true not only in the case of the elements of the world, but even if one should say it of a gnat or an ant—inasmuch as each of these is a thing made, the relation of the name to the maker holds equally.
Perhaps that part of the proverb might be brought forward to us by them, which the champions of the heresy are accustomed to adduce as testimony that the Lord was created: the text 'The Lord created me as the beginning of His ways for His works.'
But I consider that to the more attentive and industrious the pious meaning of this saying is manifest, so that no harm arises against the doctrine of the faith for those who have been trained in the enigmas of the proverb.
Nevertheless, I think it necessary to treat the discussion concerning this in a few words, so that, once the meaning of this saying has been more clearly uncovered, the argument of the heresy may nowhere have any warrant, as though it held its testimony from God-inspired Scripture.
For it is acknowledged by all that, in the scriptural usage, the name 'proverb' is not applied to a plain notion, but is used of some hidden meaning—just as the Gospel names the enigmatic and obscure sayings 'proverbs'—so that a proverb, if one should grasp the interpretation of this name by a definition, is a discourse which, through other things understood at the surface level, indicates something else in what is hidden; or a discourse which does not directly display the aim of its meaning, but frames its teaching obliquely, by an indirect intimation.
And to this book in particular such a name is inscribed, and the intimations of this designation are at once distinguished in the preamble by the wise Solomon.
For he named the words in this book not maxims, nor counsels, nor plain teaching, but 'proverbs,' subjoining the interpretation of what the signification of this name intends.
'To know wisdom and instruction,' he says—not, according to the common practice with other studies, placing instruction before wisdom, but bidding one first to become wise through prior instruction, and then in this way to make room for the instruction that comes from the proverb.
For that which is not understood directly needs a certain turning in order to grasp what is hidden; and just as Paul announced that he would change his own voice, being about to transpose the historical narrative into a figurative contemplation, so here the manifestation of hidden things is named by Solomon 'a turning of speech,' inasmuch as the beauty of the meanings cannot be perceived unless one, having turned back to the opposite the surface appearance of the discourse, should behold the hidden radiance of the meaning—
For in this case, the one who has looked at the back of the feather, on account of its being unlovely and shapeless, altogether despises it as a trivial spectacle;
but if someone, turning it round, should display its other face, he beholds the varied painting of nature—the half-completed circle shining forth in the midst with a purple dye, and the gold-like sheen around the circle, girded at the extremity with many-coloured rainbows and gleaming.
Since, then, no beauty attaches to the surface of the wording (for 'all the glory of the King's daughter,' he says, 'is within,' shining forth in golden thoughts by a hidden adornment), Solomon necessarily lays down for those who encounter this book the turning of the discourse, in order that through it they may understand a parable and a dark saying, the sayings of the wise and their riddles.
Since, therefore, this proverbial teaching contains these things, no one of sound mind will accept without examination and without contemplation the things brought forward from this book, even if they happen to be exceedingly clear and familiar from their surface sense.
But if the surface matters of this Scripture necessarily require the more minute examination, how much more do those things in which there is much that is obscure and hard to contemplate from their immediate apprehension? Let us therefore examine, from the connexion of the words concerning that place, whether the reading of the adjacent passages contains anything clear.
Now the lover of learning assuredly knows the things said in that place, where Wisdom encamps counsel, and calls upon knowledge and understanding, and says she has as her possession strength and prudence, and that she herself is named discernment, and that she walks in the ways of righteousness and turns about in the midst of the paths of judgment, and says that through herself kings reign, and rulers write righteousness, and tyrants take possession of their own land.
For if kings are advanced to dominion through her, and tyranny holds its strength from her, it is altogether necessary that wisdom appear to us as a maker of tyrants, and that she transfer to herself the blame for those who wield power wickedly in their kingdoms.
But we know that the kings who are truly advanced by wisdom to the unending kingdom are the poor in spirit, whose possession is the kingdom of heaven, as the Lord, who is Wisdom, promises through the Gospel;
and such also do we recognise to be the rulers—those who wield power over the passions, who are not enslaved to the dominion of sin, who inscribe righteousness upon their own life as upon some tablet.
Thus also the praiseworthy tyranny, by the alliance of wisdom, having transformed the democracy of the passions into the monarchy of the mind, brings into bondage the things that wickedly rebel against it toward license—I mean all the bodily and earthly imaginations.
As, therefore, it is acknowledged by all who are of sound mind that these things are to be read rather with such a meaning than with the one that appears to the sayings at the surface level, so it is likely, by consequence, that that utterance which is written closely following upon these should not be received simply and without examination by those of sound mind.