Against Celsus 1 part 15/42

but, wishing to separate the sons who have been won over to philosophy from their depraved fathers, you will watch for opportune moments, so that the teachings of philosophy may take hold of the young men.

And concerning the teachers we shall say the same things.

For we turn people away from teachers who teach the indecent parts of comedy and the licentious passages of the iambics and all such things, which neither turn the speaker round nor benefit the hearers, and from teachers who do not know how to listen to poetry philosophically and to add to each passage what tends toward the benefit of the young; in doing this we are not ashamed to acknowledge what we are doing.

But if you present to me teachers who provide preliminary training toward philosophy and exercise the young in philosophy, I will not turn the young away from these; rather, after they have been preliminarily exercised, as in the general curriculum and in philosophical studies, I will try to lead them up to the venerable and lofty character of the loud proclamation of the Christians, hidden from the many—a proclamation that deals with the greatest and most necessary matters, demonstrating and establishing that these have been philosophized about by the prophets of God and by the apostles of Jesus.

Then, after this, Celsus, perceiving that he has reviled us rather too bitterly, says, as if by way of apology, the following:

But that I bring no charge more bitter than the truth compels, let anyone judge also from the following.

For those who summon people to the other initiatory rites proclaim beforehand the following:

whoever is pure of hands and intelligible of speech; and again others:

whoever is pure from every pollution, and whose soul is conscious of no evil, and who has lived a good and just life.

And these things they proclaim beforehand who promise purifications from sins.

But let us hear whom these people summon:

whoever, they say, is a sinner, whoever is without understanding, whoever is childish, and, to put it simply, whoever is wretched—him will the kingdom of God receive.

By the sinner, then, do you not mean this one—the unjust man and thief and burglar and poisoner and temple-robber and tomb-robber? What others would a brigand summon by his proclamation? And to these things we say that it is not the same thing to summon those sick in soul to healing and to summon the healthy to the knowledge and understanding of more divine things.

And we too, knowing both of these things, at the outset, in inviting people to be healed, exhort sinners to come to the teachings that teach not to sin, and the unintelligent to those that produce intelligence, and the childish to ascend in mind toward maturity, and the simply wretched to happiness or, what is more proper to say, to blessedness.

But when those of the exhorted who are making progress have demonstrated that they have been purified by the word and, to the extent of their ability, have lived a better life, then it is that we summon them to our initiatory rites.

For we speak wisdom among the perfect. And teaching that wisdom will not enter into a soul that contrives evil, nor dwell in a body enslaved to sin, we say:

whoever is pure of hands and on this account lifts up holy hands to God, and is able, alongside accomplishing things uplifted and heavenly, to say:

Let the lifting up of my hands as an evening sacrifice come before us;

and whoever is intelligible of speech by meditating on the law of the Lord day and night, and by having, through habit, his faculties trained for the discernment of good and evil—let him not hesitate to approach the solid rational nourishment that is fitting for athletes of piety and of all virtue.

And since the grace of God is also with all those who in incorruption love the teacher of the lessons of immortality, whoever is pure not only from every pollution but also from the sins reckoned to be lesser—let him with confidence be initiated into the mysteries of the worship of God according to Jesus, mysteries reasonably handed down to the holy and pure alone.

Now the initiate of Celsus says:

whoever's soul is conscious of no evil, let him come;

but he who initiates into the mysteries of God according to Jesus will say to those who have been purified in soul:

whoever's soul has for a long time been conscious of no evil, and especially since he has come to the healing administered by the word—let this one also hear the things spoken privately by Jesus to his genuine disciples.

[The healing remedies are] for the base, but the more mystical teachings are for those already most pure.

It is not, then, to the mysteries and to the fellowship of the wisdom hidden in a mystery, which God foreordained before the ages unto the glory of his righteous ones, that we summon the unjust man and thief and burglar and poisoner and temple-robber and tomb-robber and as many others as Celsus may name in his exaggeration, but rather to healing.

For in the divinity of the word there are, on the one hand, the remedies that heal those who are sick, concerning which the word said:

Those who are strong have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; and, on the other hand, the things that disclose to those pure in soul and body the revelation of a mystery kept silent through eternal ages but now made manifest both through the prophetic scriptures and through the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ—a revelation that appears to each of the perfect and illuminates the governing faculty unto the unerring knowledge of things.

And since, in exaggerating the charges against us, he adds, regarding the men he named as most defiled, the words: "What others would a brigand summon by his proclamation?"—to this too we shall say that a brigand calls such people because he makes use of their wickedness against the men whom he wishes to murder and plunder;

but the Christian, even if he summons those whom the brigand summons, summons them with a different summons, in order that he may bind up their wounds with the word, and pour upon the soul inflamed with evils the medicines that come from the word—analogous to wine and oil and a soothing salve and the rest of the remedies of the medicine of the soul.

Then, slandering the things said and written for the sake of exhortation toward those who have lived badly, and which call them to repentance and to the correction of their soul, he says that we declare that God was sent to the sinners.

And in doing this he acts just as if he were to accuse certain persons who say that, on account of those living badly in the city, the physician was sent by a most benevolent king.

God the Word was therefore sent, insofar as he is a physician, to the sinners, but insofar as he is a teacher of divine mysteries, to those who are already pure and no longer sin.

But Celsus, unable to distinguish these things—for he did not wish to be a lover of learning—says:

But why was he not sent to those who are without sin? What evil is it not to have sinned? And to this we say that, if by "those without sin" he means those who no longer sin, then our Savior Jesus was sent to these also, but not as a physician;

but if by "those without sin" he means those who have never at any time sinned—for he did not distinguish in his own wording—we will say that it is impossible for a human being to be thus without sin.

And this we say, excepting the man understood as belonging to Jesus, who committed no sin.

Indeed, Celsus speaks maliciously about us, as though we asserted that God will receive the unjust man if he humbles himself out of his depravity, but the just man, if from the beginning he looks up toward him with virtue, this one he will not receive.

For we say that it is impossible for a human being from the beginning to look up toward God with virtue;

for it is necessary that vice first subsist in human beings, just as Paul also says:

But when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died;

but neither do we teach concerning the unjust man that it is sufficient for him to humble himself on account of his depravity in order to be received by God; rather, if, having condemned himself for his former deeds, he proceeds humble concerning those things and adorned concerning the later ones, this one God will receive.

Then, not understanding how the saying "Everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled" is meant, nor having even learned from Plato that the noble and good man proceeds humble and adorned, and not knowing also, as we say:

Humble yourselves therefore under the mighty hand of God, that he may exalt you in due time—he says that human beings who rightly preside over justice put a stop to the pitiful, plaintive speeches of those bewailing their misdeeds, lest they be judged according to pity rather than according to truth;

but God, then, judges not according to truth but according to flattery.

For what flattery, and what plaintive speech, occurs according to the divine scriptures, when the sinner says in his prayers to God:

I have not hidden my iniquity;

I will confess against myself my iniquity to the Lord, and so forth? But can he show that such a thing is not conducive to the turning round of sinners who humble themselves before God in their prayers? And, confounded by his impulse to accuse, he says things contradictory to himself: in one place he gives the impression of knowing a sinless and just man who from the beginning looks up toward him with virtue, but in another place he accepts what is said by us, that "Who is a man perfectly just, or who is without sin?"—for he says it as one accepting it:

This much is fairly true, that the human race is by nature somehow inclined to sin;

then, as though not all are summoned by the word, he says:

It was necessary, then, to summon all without distinction, if indeed all sin.

And in the foregoing we showed that Jesus said:

Come unto me, all you who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. All human beings, therefore, laboring and heavy laden on account of the nature of sin, are summoned to the rest that is with the word of God;

for God sent forth his word and healed them, and delivered them out of their corruptions.

"What, then, is this preference for sinners?" — and he adds remarks of a like kind. We shall answer that an absolute sinner is by no means preferred to one who is not a sinner;

but there are times when a sinner who has become aware of his own sin, and on that account is proceeding toward repentance, being humbled over his transgressions, is preferred to one who is reckoned the lesser sinner but does not think himself a sinner at all — rather, one who exalts himself over certain things in which he supposes himself to possess some superiority, and who is puffed up because of them.

And this is made clear to those who are willing to read the Gospels with fairness by the parable concerning the tax-collector who said:

"Be merciful to me, the sinner" — and by the parable concerning the Pharisee who boasted with a certain base self-conceit and said:

"I thank you that I am not like the rest of men — robbers, unjust, adulterers — or even like this tax-collector." For Jesus appends to the account of them both the words: "This man went down to his house justified rather than the other;

for everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled, and everyone who humbles himself shall be exalted." Therefore we do not blaspheme God nor speak falsely against Him when we teach that absolutely everyone should become aware of human smallness in comparison with the majesty of God, and should ever ask of Him what is lacking to our nature — He being the only one able to supply what is deficient in us.

He supposes that we say such things by way of exhortation to sinners because we are unable to bring over to us any man who is truly good and just, and that for this reason we open the gates to the most impious and depraved.

But if anyone were to examine our assembly with fairness, we are able to present more who have turned from a not altogether grievous life than those who have turned from the most abominable sins.

For those who are conscious to themselves of better things, praying that the proclamations concerning the recompense given by God to the better sort may be true, are naturally more ready to assent to what is said than those who have lived very wickedly — the latter being hindered by their very conscience from accepting that they will be punished by the Judge of all with such a punishment as would befit one who has sinned so greatly, and which would be brought upon him by the Judge of all not contrary to right reason.

But there are times when even the utterly depraved, though they may wish to accept the doctrine of punishment because of the hope held out in repentance, are hindered by their habit of sinning, as though dyed fast by wickedness and no longer able easily to depart from it to the settled life lived according to right reason.

And Celsus too, having considered this, somehow says such things as the following in what comes next:

"And surely it is in some way clear to everyone that those who are by nature and by habit prone to sin no one could ever wholly change, not even by punishing them — much less by pitying them;

for to alter one's nature completely is altogether very difficult;

but the sinless are better partners in life."

He seems to be mistaken in not granting to those who are by nature prone to sin and habituated to doing it the possibility of a complete change — he who supposes that they cannot even be cured by punishments.

For it is clearly evident that all men are by nature prone to sin, while some are not only prone by nature but are also habituated to sinning;

but not all men are incapable of a complete change.

For there are, according to every school of philosophy and according to the divine word, those who are recorded to have changed so greatly that they were set forth as an example of the best life.

And some adduce, among the heroes, Heracles and Odysseus; among those of later times, Socrates; and among those born just yesterday or the day before, Musonius.

Therefore Celsus has spoken falsely not only according to our view, in saying that it is in some way clear to everyone that those who are by nature and by habit prone to sin could be led by no one to a change for the better, not even by being punished, but also according to those who have philosophized nobly and have not despaired that the recovery of virtue is possible for men.

But even if he has not established with precision what he intended, none the less, hearing him with fairness, we shall thus refute him as not speaking soundly.

"Those who are by nature prone to sin and habituated to it no one could wholly change, not even by punishing them."

And the meaning gathered from his words we have overturned as far as is possible for us.

It is likely, however, that he wishes to indicate something of this kind: that those who are not only by nature but also by habit disposed toward such sins as are committed by the most depraved, no one could wholly change, not even by punishing them.

And this too is shown to be false from the history of certain men who pursued philosophy.

For what man would not rank among the most depraved one who somehow submitted to yield to a master setting him upon a roof, so that he might offer himself to anyone wishing to put him to shame? Yet such things are recorded concerning Phaedo.

And who would not say that the man who, accompanied by a flute-girl and revellers — his fellow profligates — burst into the school of the most venerable Xenocrates in order to outrage a man whom even his companions admired, was the most defiled of all men? Yet none the less the word prevailed and, turning even these men, brought it about that they advanced so far in philosophy that the one was judged by Plato worthy to expound the discourse of Socrates concerning immortality and to set forth his fortitude in the prison — Socrates not caring for the hemlock, but fearlessly and with all the calm of his soul expounding such great matters as even those who are entirely composed and troubled by no circumstance can scarcely follow;

and the other, Polemon, who from a profligate became most temperate, succeeded to the school of Xenocrates, who was renowned for his gravity.

Therefore Celsus does not speak truly when he says that those who are by nature prone to sin and habituated to it no one could wholly change, not even by punishing them.

Now that the order, composition, and diction of the discourses derived from philosophy should have wrought such effects upon the aforementioned men, and upon others who had lived badly, is not very astonishing.

But when we consider what Celsus calls the unlearned discourses, as though they were incantations filled with power, and when we behold those discourses suddenly turning multitudes from the licentious life to the most steadfast, and from the unjust to the more upright, and from the cowardly or unmanly to so great a fortitude that they even despise death because of the piety that has been made manifest to them —

how shall we not justly marvel at the power that is in it? For the discourse of those who first championed and laboured at these things, in order that they might establish churches of God, and indeed their preaching, came to be in persuasion — yet not in such persuasion as is the persuasion among those who profess the wisdom of Plato or of some other philosopher, men who are nothing other than men and possess nothing beyond human nature;

but the demonstration that was given from God in the apostles of Jesus is one that produces faith, a demonstration from the Spirit and from power.

Or rather it is the discourse of God, which through them changed many of those who were by nature and by habit prone to sin;

those whom no man could change even by punishing, but whom the word transformed, fashioning and moulding them according to its own will.

And Celsus, indeed, says, adding what is consistent with himself, that "to alter one's nature completely is altogether very difficult."

But we, knowing that there is one nature of every rational soul, and asserting that none has been created evil by Him who fashioned all things — rather that many have become evil through their upbringings, their perversions, and the influences surrounding them, so that wickedness has even become second nature in some — are persuaded that for the divine word to alter a wickedness that has become second nature is not only not impossible but not even very difficult, provided only that one accepts that one must believe in the God who is over all and do all things with reference to pleasing Him;

with whom it is not that "in one and the same honour are held both the base and the noble";

nor that "alike the man who does nothing and he who has wrought much must die."

But if for some it is indeed very difficult to change, the cause must be said to lie in their assent, which shrinks from accepting that the God who is over all is to each a just judge concerning all that has been done in this life.

For deliberate purpose and discipline have great power even with respect to things that seem most difficult and — to put it hyperbolically — almost impossible.

Or has human nature, when it has willed to walk upon a rope stretched aloft through the midst of the theatre, and to do so while bearing such great and so heavy burdens, been able by discipline and attention to accomplish such a thing;

yet when it has willed to live according to virtue, is it incapable of doing so, even though it had previously become utterly base? But consider whether the one who says such things is not rather blaming the nature that fashioned the rational creature than the creature itself, if it has made the nature of man capable of things so difficult and in no way useful, but incapable of his own blessedness.

But indeed these remarks suffice as against the claim that "to alter one's nature completely is altogether very difficult."

Next he says that "the sinless are better partners in life," without making clear whom he means by the sinless — whether those who are so from the beginning, or those who are so as a result of a change.

Now those who are sinless from the beginning are impossible, while those who are so as a result of a change are rarely found — namely, those who become such from having drawn near to the word that saves.

And it is not as being already such that they come to the word;

for apart from the word — and that a perfect word — it is impossible for a man to become sinless.

Then he raises an objection, as though it were said by us, that "God will be able to do all things," not even seeing how this is said, and what is comprehended under "all things" here, and in what sense He is able.

Concerning these matters it is not necessary to speak now; for he himself, although able to take a plausible stand against it, did not take it;

perhaps not even following the plausibility that might be urged against this point, or following it but also seeing the rejoinder to what is said.

But according to us, God is able to do all things — all, that is, which He can do without stepping out of being God, and out of being good, and out of being wise.

But Celsus, as though not understanding in what sense God is said to be able to do all things, says that "He will not will anything unjust," granting that He is able to do even what is unjust, but does not will it.

But we say that, just as that which is by nature sweet cannot, by reason of its being sweet alone, become bitter, nor that which by nature gives light, being light, become dark, so neither can God do injustice;

for the power of doing injustice is contrary to His divinity and to all the power that accords with it.

But if any of existing things is able to do injustice by reason of being constituted with a tendency toward injustice, it is able to do injustice precisely because it does not possess in its nature the impossibility of ever doing injustice.

After this he takes for granted what is not conceded by those who believe more rationally — though perhaps it is supposed by certain foolish persons — namely, that God, like those who are slaves to pity, being a slave to pity for those who are pitied, lightens the burden of the wicked and casts off the good who do nothing of the kind, which is most unjust.

[We deny that] God shows mercy [in such a fashion]; rather, those who have vehemently condemned themselves over their sins, so as on this account, as it were, to mourn and lament over themselves as ruined so far as their former deeds are concerned, and who display a noteworthy change — these God receives for the sake of repentance, even those whose change is from a most wicked life.

For virtue grants an amnesty to such persons, when it has taken up residence in their souls and has cast out the wickedness that previously held possession.

And even if not virtue itself, yet a noteworthy progress should arise in the soul, this too is sufficient, in proportion to the degree of the progress, to expel and make to vanish the flood of wickedness, so that it no longer exists, as it were, anywhere near within the soul.

Then, as though speaking in the character of one who teaches our doctrine, he makes statements such as these:

For the wise turn away from what we say, being led astray and hindered by their wisdom.

To this we shall reply that, if indeed wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and of their causes, or, as the divine word defines it, 'a breath of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty, and a reflection of eternal light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness'—then no one who is truly wise would turn away from what is said by a Christian who has knowledge of Christianity, nor would he be led astray or hindered by it.

For true wisdom does not lead astray, but ignorance does; and knowledge alone is the one secure thing among existing realities, together with truth—both of which come from wisdom.

But if, contrary to the definition of wisdom, you call 'wise' the man who dogmatizes about anything whatever by means of certain sophistries, then we shall say that, in truth, the person of such a character as your so-called wisdom describes does turn away from the words of God, being led astray by plausibilities and sophistries, and hindered by them.

And since, according to our doctrine, there is no such thing as a wisdom that is the knowledge of wickedness—though there is, if I may so call it, a 'knowledge' of wickedness among those who hold false opinions and are deceived by petty sophistries—for this reason I would call what exists in such people ignorance rather than wisdom.

After this he again reviles the one who advocates Christianity, and declares concerning him that he expounds ridiculous things; yet he neither proves nor clearly demonstrates the things he says are ridiculous.

And in his abuse he says that no sensible person believes the doctrine, being distracted by the multitude of those who come to it.

He does the same thing here as one who, because of the multitude of common people who are governed by the laws, should say that no sensible person obeys, let us say, Solon or Lycurgus or Zaleucus or any of the rest—especially if he takes 'sensible' to mean the man who is of virtuous character.

For just as in these cases the lawgivers, according to what seemed useful to them, contrived to embrace the people in such a discipline and in laws, so God, legislating through Jesus for men everywhere, leads even those who are not sensible, in so far as it is possible for such people to be led toward something better.

Knowing this very thing—as we have also said in what precedes—the God who speaks in Moses says this:

'They have made me jealous with what is no god; they have provoked me to anger with their idols;'

'and I will make them jealous with those who are no nation; with a foolish nation I will provoke them to anger.' And Paul too, knowing this, said:

'God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame the wise,' calling 'wise' in the more general sense all those who seem to have advanced in learning but have fallen away into godless polytheism;

since, 'professing to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds and four-footed animals and reptiles.'

He also brings a charge against the teacher for seeking out senseless people:

'Whom do you mean by the senseless? For, strictly speaking, every base man is senseless.'

'If, then, you call base men senseless, do you, in bringing people to philosophy, seek to bring base men or virtuous ones? But it cannot be virtuous men, for they have already pursued philosophy;'

'and yet you seek to bring many such people to philosophy;'

'so you too, then, are seeking the senseless.'

But I, even if I do seek out those so called senseless, am doing the same as a humane physician would do if he sought out the sick, in order to bring to them his remedies and restore them to health.

But if by 'senseless' you mean those who are not quick-witted but are more monstrous than ordinary men, I will answer you that I do try to make even these better as far as is possible; yet I do not wish to compose the assembly of Christians out of such people.

For I rather seek the quicker-witted and sharper, since they are able to follow the explanation of the enigmas and of the things said in concealment in the Law and the Prophets and the Gospels—which you, supposing they contain nothing worthy of consideration, have despised, without having tested the meaning in them, nor having attempted to enter into the intention of those who wrote them.

And since after this he says that the teacher of Christianity does much the same as one who promises to make bodies healthy but turns people away from attending to skilled physicians, lest his own amateurishness be exposed by them—to this also we shall reply:

Whom do you mean by 'physicians,' from whom we turn away the unlearned? For surely you do not suppose that we direct our exhortation toward the doctrine to those who pursue philosophy, so that you should think those to be the 'physicians' from whom we turn away the ones whom we call to the divine word.

Either, then, he gives no answer, having no one to name as the physicians, or he is forced to take refuge in the unlearned—who themselves also babble in slavish fashion about many gods and whatever else uneducated people might say.

In either case, then, he will be shown to have introduced into his argument, to no purpose, the figure of one who turns people away from skilled physicians.

But that we may also turn away from the philosophy of Epicurus, and from the so-called Epicurean 'physicians' reckoned according to Epicurus, those who are deceived by such men—how shall we not be acting most reasonably in removing them from a grievous disease, which the physicians of Celsus have produced, namely, that of abolishing providence and introducing pleasure as the good? But suppose it be granted that we are removing these whom we exhort toward our doctrine from other physicians, the philosophers—those of the Peripatetic school, who do away with providence over us and with the divine's relation to men;