Greek original · 118 verses · some words can be tapped for a gloss · long chapter, split into parts; this part covers 1:1612–1:1729 (2009 verses in all)
This, then, was what you ought to have said to them and so been rid of the trouble; but you, having refuted the false conclusions drawn from premises no less obscure—rather, plainly false—and then fearing lest they should seem to have drawn (their conclusions) demonstratively from false premises, (p. ...)
) came into the necessity of saying that there is no demonstration at all concerning divine things, and of contradicting us, who immoderately (you say) assert that some divine things are, according to the Fathers' traditions, so manifest that there is even a grasp of them and demonstration and knowledge—yet (a grasp) above the intellect that sees intellectually, and above him who has even transcended the intellectual energies themselves and, by the cessation of all apprehending power, has been supremely united by ineffable grace to the inconceivable things.
It follows, then, from what the philosopher—under compulsion, as he himself says—nevertheless laid down, that all the syllogisms spoken against him by the Latins are irrefutable; for, according to him, the patristic traditions concur with these.
...he dims and mutilates (the truth) by the force of those arguments, so that this stumbling-block too might be got out of the way—(for this reason) I made the argument concerning this.
I do not, then, think that he suffered this under compulsion by the force of the opposing (arguments), even though he himself says so; but rather as one not accurately initiated into divine things, and wishing to seem to hold pre-eminence over all in matters of argument, theologizing from the school of vanity, and displaying the bad artifice of Aristotle's arts in such discourses.
) ...and of heavenly visions and of contemplations simple and indivisible, he himself (decides) about those very things concerning which no other of our (writers) gives a verdict; for 'these things,' he says, 'when I hear them saying, I cannot but say that they too have been enlightened by God'—each of which has been thoroughly refuted in my former discourse to him, 'Against the Hellenic intellectual vision.'
Hence he refutes the Latins in no other way than by saying that their syllogisms are neither dialectical according to Aristotle's traditions nor demonstrative—not knowing, as it seems, that all, or most, syllogisms concerning divine things are neither dialectical nor demonstrative; for how could those be, which are not even syllogisms at all according to Aristotle's traditions, as we showed in the former discourse and shall now again, as the argument proceeds and God grants, show?
Hence he tries by every means to annul our arguments against the Latins, so that he might seem to be not only a theologian, but even the only one at present on earth.
For concerning demonstration he perhaps got hold of some pretext; but concerning the other matters, what reason has he to oppose the arguments that advocate piety?
For this wise man of ours, hearing us say that God did not come to deity (in the Son and Spirit) by a deity intermediate, but that the deity is by nature, while (sonship and procession are) by position and grace; and that, if to the First Cause are referred the things of the Only-begotten, so too are referred the things of the Spirit, then the Spirit is referred immediately to the Father, and if referred immediately, also proceeds immediately; and that, if the Son is begotten from the Father alone, the Spirit too proceeds from the Father alone, for these likewise are from the Father, save in the mode of existence; and besides, those who later theologized in like manner, showing and adducing the things that pre-eternally subsist in like manner with respect to this, those who said that, as the Son is from the Father, so too the Spirit is from (p. ...)
) the Father, save that the one is by way of begetting, the other by way of procession; and again, why the Spirit is not called by those names by which the Son is, save 'begetting'; and that all things which are the Son's are also the Spirit's, save sonship; and all things which the Son is, the Spirit also is, save begetting; and that this is to be observed in all things said concerning him—moreover, those who, by reduction to absurdity, refute those who dogmatize that the Spirit does not proceed from the Father alone, and show that not even the Son would be from the Father alone, unless the Spirit also (were so)—all these things and very many others, though they resound throughout the whole discourse, that man, setting them at naught, says: 'You are begging the question.'
How are we 'begging the question,' when through many (arguments) we have shown many (witnesses) attesting with us that, save in the mode of existence—that is, of procession and begetting—as the Son is from the Father, so too is the Spirit from the Father, and have thus set forth a cause of the conclusion that is plain and irrefutable?
I pass over, then, through how many (proofs) the argument, as it proceeded, demonstrated this; but is not 'not from the Son' the same as 'from the Father alone'?
The Spirit (is) from the Father alone; and if from the Father alone, then not also from the Son; and these are so equally balanced with respect to one another, that in all the arguments by which it is gathered that the Holy Spirit is not also from the Son, if anyone should set the conclusion 'from the Father alone' in place of this, it would make no difference at all.
If, then, this is so—as indeed it is—we have shown this very thing, that the Holy Spirit is not also from the Son, having shown it to proceed from the Father alone; and if, in the case of the Son, the 'not from another' is at once understood together (with 'from the Father') because of the near-conjunction, as you yourself say, then in the case of the Spirit (p. ...)
And if the proof is found from this very source, one ought rather to have marvelled at the manifestness of the truth and the power of the advocating argument.
But he, having nothing to charge, out of the ill-timed ambition of seeming to be the only (theologian), uses (the arguments) from the school of vanity against us too, as though against the heterodox; for envy is not wont to distinguish the pious from the impious. Wherefore he tries to overshadow the manifestness of the truth and thinks to escape notice, having poured around it the 'black' (ink) of his art—or rather, of his bad art.
Hence he, now the first of all the theologians from the whole age, both invented and declared that there is no demonstration concerning any of the divine things.
But he would have said, had he been present, mocking us first for our ignorance, as is his wont—or rather for our slow-wittedness—that, since the Divine is above knowledge and mind and opinion, and above all sense-perception and discursive thought and grasp and knowledge, and demonstrating this just now, flowing in rivers of words, he would have inundated us who do not think so.
Well said; but bear with being further questioned by us, the slow of wit—and this too is not from philosophy: of that of which there is knowledge and conception and opinion, imagination and sense-perception, of this is there demonstration?
Since these things have thus been previously agreed upon, hear, O philosopher, him who dwells far above your floods—I mean the great Dionysius, the hymnographer of the divine names—who, hymning the Self-Wisdom (Christ), says that God is known both through knowledge (p. ...)
) and through unknowing; and that there belong to him both conception and reason and knowledge and grasp and sense-perception and opinion and imagination and name and all the rest.
Therefore there is also demonstration of him—this both according to what was previously agreed by you, for he has all the (marks) of demonstrables; and also on account of the most all-comprehensive statement later added by the saint; for, he says, all the other things too belong to God, and one of the 'all' is also demonstration—so that there is also demonstration of him.
In addition to these things, the opposite positions of beings, when spoken of God, are not opposed to one another, and the negations do not overturn the affirmations; for the opposites, by one and single cause of identity, at once pre-contain and contain (them). And according to this reasoning, therefore, if there both is not and is demonstration concerning divine things, then to say that there is demonstration of none of the divine things, or of all, is untrue; rather, there is (demonstration) of some, but there is not of others.
Altogether (it is) in a different respect; this, then, is what we say: that some of the divine things are knowable and demonstrable, while others are both unknowable and indemonstrable.
But you, having least of all been initiated into these things, as it seems, say that there is of none of the divine things either knowledge or demonstration, but faith alone; and you do not even listen to the great Paul, who says to the unbelieving Greeks that 'what is knowable of God is manifest,' and that 'having known God, they did not glorify or worship him as God'—nor (do you heed) the true vision of God that arises in the faithful, who also show forth their faith by deed, which the Lord in the (p. ...)
) gospels calls blessed—whether you have suffered (experienced) it or have (only) believed, you who boast greatly in faith, though it (the true vision) is the end of faith, or the prize, or the pledge of the prize, wrought through love. For if there is faith alone concerning divine things, then neither is this vision true.
But if it is true—as indeed it is—and that too is true, that 'no one has ever seen God,' this is what we said: that some of the divine things are contemplable, and others not.
But you, never having read it, did not even recognize that theological saying: 'One God, who is over all and through all and in all'—at one moment being now apprehended, at another being sought, and at some time, as far as is possible, perhaps to be apprehended; for 'he made darkness his hiding-place,' as the psalmist says, yet also 'his lightnings shone upon the world,' and no one is wholly without recognition of God, even if some, willfully doing evil, feign not to know.
For he is a 'Sun of righteousness' shining abundantly upon all, both evil and good; but those who open their eyelids are filled with the life-originating ray, while the evil, closing their eyes, feign not to know in any way at all, and by their utter lack of communion with the light fall into blindness of the understanding—which is wont to happen also in the case of bodily eyes.
He (the Sun of righteousness), however, by the superabundance of his brightness, does not allow anyone to gaze upon him at all—wherefore he is also beyond conception—and again, by this very superabundance, he reaches even to those who see but dimly, and appears to those who seek, even to the very lowest of rational beings; just as the sensible sun too works upon dull eyes, although, on account of the excess of its brightness, it does not at all allow the sense to gaze fixedly (upon it).
And indeed, if it were possible to demonstrate only affirmatively, there might perhaps be some reason in (saying) that there is demonstration of none of the divine things (p. ...)
Moreover, if none of the created things were 'beyond demonstration,' you, having said well that all divine things are 'beyond demonstration,' might pride yourself as magnifying God above all others; but since many even of the things on earth and attainable by us appear to be 'beyond demonstration,' how, from this, will there be a manifestation of the divine transcendence?
For we know experience to be by nature more certain than demonstration, so that this too is 'beyond demonstration,' although every art and science takes its principles from it: art being collected from things in generation and corruption, and science from things ever said to be the same. Since, then, so many of the beings are 'beyond demonstration,' how, do you think, did you magnify—above all others and as 'beyond demonstration'—a Being that is beyond all, in declaring this (of God)?
For we too, the in-worldly, (are) by nature above them (the things beyond demonstration), and yet fall so far short of those angels; so neither, then, would anyone show the majesty of God by showing him to be 'beyond demonstration.'
Wherefore we, through the guidance of the Fathers, having found a demonstration of 'that which is beyond demonstration' superior to it, and thereby hunting—not all things simply, but some of the divine things—and glorifying the rest above this (demonstration), set the Divine many times higher than that which, by your wisdom, is said, according to Aristotle, to be 'beyond demonstration.' (p. ...)
...glorifying (the rest), we set the Divine many times higher than that which, by your wisdom, is according to Aristotle said to be 'beyond demonstration.'
And if anyone should grant that knowledge is gathered through intelligible apprehensions, yet the divine things are even above the intellect; how, then, could there be a dialectical syllogism concerning things above the intellect?
'But to the dialectical syllogism,' he says, 'all things indeterminately are subject, since it deals with all things': this is why he deems us worthy to be set up as 'dialecticians' instead of 'believers'—though for this reason he has again become a fugitive from the name of 'demonstration.'
For Aristotle says that this (dialectic) has a way toward all the methods; but how (can there be) a method of the incomprehensible, if indeed method is a system made up of comprehensions?
And not only does it (dialectic) have the subject indeterminate, but also the thing sought in each problem, and the very premises—the dialectic, that is, properly so called, as you yourself would say; whereas the true theologian (has) almost all things determinate: the thing sought always and wholly, and most, if not all, of the premises—and both from things God-inspired or God-handed-down, concerning which he also takes his stand, on account of which he holds his own supposition most firm and unalterable.
Again, if through the dialectical syllogism we hunt even the knowledge of divine things, but through the demonstrative only (the knowledge) of the world, as you say, then the dialectical would be superior to the demonstrative (p. ...)
) —but this your Aristotle would never concede; for that whose subject is superior is itself also superior. And if this (the divine subject) also has the addition (of being superior), and that so great and beyond the great, then the addition of betterment (is) as great (as the subject itself).
And what kind of 'genus' is that of which there is no species—and especially since He, being truly existent and alone, needs no essential difference in order to be?
For all these things belong to those needing a distinction of multiplicity; but (the demonstration) will show the Divine as being none of these—yet not as 'above being,' but as in no way whatsoever being; for it (Aristotelian dialectic) neither knows nor hands down anything transcending this 'tetrad' (the predicables). And if anyone should grant it at all, he will grant it to demonstration; for through it alone, it is said, an unalterable supposition comes to be—the very (supposition) which we have concerning divine things.
That there was, then, no necessity at all, and that the (assertion) 'there can in no way be demonstration concerning any of the divine things' lies there utterly in vain, we have shown before; but even if some necessity were upon him, he ought rather to have kept silent and to have inquired even from the unlearned among us—if not the knowledge, yet at least (this): not to heal evils rashly with evils, nor to set out from the crooked but lead back again to the broken, and to straighten distorted things with distortions, now saying 'two principles,' now doing away with the knowledge of God that is possible, now—but let it go no further than this.
...under the pretense (of opposing) the heterodox, you advance against those of the same mind, and the patristic voices set forth by us you undertake—I know not how—to do away with, and you would cause many to fear lest, feigning (to argue) against the Latins, you set them forth against us.
Of the divine things, some are known, some are sought; there are also (some) that are demonstrated; while others are wholly unsearchable and untraceable, no trace at all being manifest of those things that have passed over into that hidden realm.
These things the philosopher bore heavily, and gathering himself together as best he could, he uses against us the force of his arguments, declaring nothing of the divine things to be knowable or demonstrable; but that what was said by us also seems good to the Fathers, the things already said are sufficient to show; and that some of those very theologies (of the Fathers) bear 'demonstration' as a heading, this I do not think any of those who cherish them is ignorant of—so that he who says there is no demonstration concerning any of the divine things undertakes to contradict the Fathers rather than us.
For this word 'demonstration,' lying in between, can signify another sort of proof; but how could it be (used as) a heading, unless what is subscribed (under it) were demonstration in the proper sense?
And if 'demonstration' signifies the perfect and certain proof, after which there is no more perfect discovery of truth—just as, in courts of law, the verdict—what is more perfect and more certain to us than the patristic demonstrations? So that this is for us demonstration in the proper sense; wherefore also the sacred and divine, fittingly-named Hierotheus is attested above the many of the sacred (p. ...)
) teachers, not only in purity of mind and the other sacred utterances, but also in the precision of his demonstrations. And he who attests these things of him, and who loftily unfolded the concentrated and lofty quality of that man's theology, plainly teaches that theology is twofold: the one mystical, perfective, ineffable, unspeakable, which acts and establishes (one) in God by the untaught mystagogies; the other manifest and philosophical and demonstrative, which persuades and binds fast the truth of what is said.
How, then, did he name this not 'dialectical' but 'demonstrative,' O philosopher—although it is not (directed) simply toward believers, for these have no need of persuasion?
Nevertheless, even if it were not so plainly written down and inscribed (as a heading) by them, at any rate the matters of the refutation are even thus plainly referred to those (Fathers).
For just as, if someone should undertake to contradict those who pioiusly call God 'the same' and 'other' and 'great' and 'small,' and in like manner compose the divine names from opposites—saying, 'He who in all becomes all things for the salvation of each, and gives himself in many ways and correspondingly to those who turn to him, and is likened in manifold forms in the hands of the prophets, how could he be the same? and again, the ageless one, he who contains all things in all, who has gone beyond all bulk, how (is he) great?'—just as, then, he who says these things does not simply contend against the one who called God 'the same' or 'great,' but sets the sacred Scripture itself against itself (for 'other' too, and 'small,' said of God by it, will again be overturned in the same way); for the very (Scripture) that surpasses all and is stretched beyond all (?). So too with the one who says that some of the divine things are demonstrable and others not—and (against) the one saying that nothing (p. ...)
) of the divine things is demonstrable—'for there is no grasp of him, nor knowledge'—he uses the divine Scripture against itself, having shown the things in it that are set at war with one another (to be reconciled) through one another; for if, because there is no grasp and knowledge of God, there is also no demonstration, then, because these things also are (of God), there will be demonstration too.
So that it both is and is not (demonstrable), in different respects each; and this is what we have said: that some of the divine things are both known and demonstrated, while others are inconceivable and untraceable. It is therefore faulty to say that there is no demonstration concerning any of the divine things; for there is (demonstration) of some, and there is in a certain way.
For just as the Lord's becoming man is both above nature and according to nature, and being spoken of remains ineffable and being conceived remains unknown—since some things are above nature, as the Virgin's conceiving, and some according to nature, as the swelling of the womb after conception—so too the Divine is both demonstrable and not demonstrable; yet indivisibly divided by the difference of the modes, since it is known both through knowledge and through unknowing; for that he is, and that he is one, is both known and demonstrated, but what he is, and what kind of 'one,' is wholly inconceivable.
But the philosopher, hearing the great Dionysius say that 'the Deity, hymned as both Monad and Triad, is neither Monad nor Triad as known by any of beings,' conceived it, as it seems, somehow thus: as though it had been known by no one that it is a Monad; but that great man does not say this, but that it is known and hymned as being a Monad, yet not of those Monads numbered and co-known among beings, which would not even properly be Monads, if indeed the Monad is not number—so that for this reason it is rather known to be a Monad, and Monad alone (p. ...)
) in that it is not made known through number nor among numbers; for that which is properly (a Monad) is not number. The Deity, then, is a Monad, but not one of those co-known among beings; just as Gregory the Theologian also, having said that the nature of God is 'incomprehensible and uncircumscribable,' at once adds, becoming the interpreter of the meaning of the saying: 'I say, not that he is, but what he is.'
But this philosopher posits 'both the what it is and the that it is' as equally incomprehensible and indemonstrable, and his solemn pretext is to demonstrate, through demonstration, that all divine things are 'beyond demonstration.'
If, then, 'that which is beyond demonstration' has been demonstrated by you, it is not divine; but if the appellation befits God, it would not admit demonstration. But you—I know not how—say now one thing, now another, and things contrary to one another, not only concerning the 'demonstrated Divine,' as you say, that is 'beyond demonstration,' but also when you make mention of the ascent that comes from the creatures to the Creator.
Will you not accept even the divine Paul, who testifies that 'the invisible things of God, since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made'—but will you call all the divine things 'beyond all grasp and knowledge'?
'Yes,' he says, 'but my discourse is about the syllogisms which we each compose concerning each thing according to the uttered word (logos prophorikos); such things each man reasons within himself (by the inner word).'
What then? The things which each man thinks within himself—can he not also bring them forth through tongue or hand, making conversation or composing writings by means of the uttered word, just as happens also in the case of immediate and universal premises?
(p. ...) knowledge, gathered together discursively by induction, is wont to come to be in the soul, yet it is also borne to the uttered word, being made known again by induction.
You, however, might reveal even this to us—you who, with all license, say whatever you wish—and you will furnish us a wondrous witness on your behalf, saying: 'To conceive God is difficult, but to express him is impossible.'
But if this seems so to you, what then of that which—I know not whether about yourself or against yourself—you write by way of preface to the Latins: that 'you say more than you conceive'?
'For I see all things needing one and the same will and wisdom and power to come to be out of nothing; but one will and at the same time wisdom and power are of one nature; therefore the Creator God of ours is one in nature.'
Take up again your weapons of defense, put forward the rules of your Aristotle, ask your questions full of precipices on either side; but wait a little while, and we will set these too before you for examination.
Now participation and subsistence I think I will pass over; for the one—no one has been ignorant that God is not anything by participation; and the other—no one has sought what God is 'by subsistence.'
But how it is 'not reasonable' to say that God is one 'by causation,' I cannot make out—not only how it is unreasonable, but not even how he dared to say it, the saints plainly declaring this.
But if it is not reasonable to call God 'one' by causation, then neither will he be the cause of the One; for from those things of which he is the cause, he has his appellations; but if God is not the cause of the One, he is the cause of none of the beings; for by the being of the (p. ...)
) One, all beings are; and each of the beings is one—either in genus, or in species, or in number; and again, none of these could each be 'many' by the difference among them, unless the One were; for the One is the elementary, the cohesive, and the constitutive (principle) of all things.
I pass over, then, saying that the One is not contracted together with the many, but the many with the One; and that God, abiding in the One, both brings forth the many—and not only brings forth, but also knows—the One-like (principle) not being multiplied by the differences among the multitudes; but if God is no more 'one' than 'many,' why do we say 'one God' but do not say 'many'?
But not in abolition of the One, my good sir; for it is a precept of his not to think that the negations are opposed to the affirmations in the case of God.
But you bring forward 'not-one' in abolition of the One, adding that incongruous 'cause,' (saying) that if he is one by causation, he will not be one by subsistence—so that, you say, he is no more 'one' than 'not-one.'
For by his very 'being' God is established as 'one' above the 'one' among beings, and as the cause of the 'one' among beings—giving himself, so to speak, undeviatingly, and imparting of his own unity by his goodness, and being partaken yet imparticipable.
) and that for this reason it is unreasonable to call God 'one'—then neither, henceforth, is the sun 'one,' since the one is not its essence; and if the sun is one by participation in the Self-One, then it is no more 'one' than 'not-one,' since by subsistence it is not one.
For if the Self-One is, according to your wisdom, 'no more one than not-one,' much more so are all things which are one by partaking of it; and not only in the case of 'one,' but also in the case of 'two' or 'three' and every numerable thing; for since quantity is never an essence, the two are 'no more two than not-two'; for even if they are two in number, by subsistence they are by all means not two.
And this is—to speak according to his own science—a paralogism, the one (that arises) from ignorance of the refutation (ignoratio elenchi), which this fine fellow uses even in his theologizing, and by which, having played the sophist, he abolished every number (for 'one and not-one are not in the same respect'); and one might thus easily refute also each of the beings as 'no more being than not-being.'