Works 1 part 2/3

if it was for the sake of glory, how great a glory he supposed he would obtain; likewise if for the sake of domination, or of money, or of friendship, or of enmities; and in general whatever there will be that he says benefits the case, this he ought to magnify to the utmost. The defender, on the contrary, will first say either that there was no impulse at all, or, if he grants that there was, he will extenuate it and show that it was something very small, or he will argue that deeds of this kind are not wont to arise from it. As for deliberation, he will weaken its suspicions, if he argues either that there was no advantage, or only a small one, or one greater for others, or none greater for himself than for others:

or he will say that the disadvantage to himself was greater than the advantage, so that the magnitude of that advantage which is said to have been sought could by no means be compared either with the disadvantage that resulted, or with the danger that was incurred. All these same topics will be handled in like manner in the matter of avoiding disadvantage. Charlemagne: Since you have spoken of the persons in cases, tell me, I beg, the places of each of them. Alcuin: I shall tell you, although this pertains not so much to the precepts of the art as to the decorum of office. The judge sits on the tribunal, the case placed in the midst before him for praise or for penalty — as it might be, the defence or the betrayal of one's fatherland; the accuser stands to the left of the case and the defender to the right, the witnesses behind. Charlemagne: Do each of them have their own insignia? Alcuin: They do.

The judge must be armed with the sceptre of equity, the accuser with the dagger of malice, the defender with the shield of piety, the witnesses with the trumpet of truth. Charlemagne: Even when all these circumstances surrounding the case have been found, what then must be sought, master? Alcuin: What else but the several parts of the whole case? Charlemagne: What and how many those are, I desire to hear. Alcuin: For there are six parts by which the orator must arrange the speech of a case: the exordium (introduction), the narration, the partition, the confirmation, the refutation, and the conclusion. Charlemagne: What is the exordium? Alcuin: It is a speech that suitably prepares the hearer's mind for the rest of what is to be said. Charlemagne: How is this accomplished? Alcuin: First, so that you make the hearer well-disposed, attentive, and receptive. Charlemagne:

As it seems to me, this must above all be taken care of, that the hearer be made well-disposed, attentive, and receptive; but in what manner this same thing can be brought about, I should like to know. Alcuin: Good will is procured from four topics: from our own person, from that of our adversaries, from that of the judges, and from the case. From our own, if we speak of our own deeds and offices without arrogance; if we dissolve the charges brought against us and any less honourable suspicions cast upon us; if we set forth any disadvantages that have befallen us or difficulties that press upon us; if we use humble and suppliant prayer and entreaty. From our adversaries', if we bring them into hatred, or envy, or contempt. They will be brought into hatred if some foul, proud, cruel, or malicious deed of theirs is set forth:

into envy, if their force, power, riches, kinship, and moneys are set forth, together with their arrogant and intolerable use of these, so that they seem to trust in these things rather than in their own case; they will be brought into contempt, if their sloth, negligence, cowardice, idle pursuit, and luxurious leisure are set forth. From the person of the hearers good will will be sought, if their deeds, bravely, wisely, and gently performed, are set forth — yet so that no excessive flattery be signified — if it is shown how honourable an esteem they enjoy and how great is the expectation of their judgement and authority; from the matters themselves, if by praising we exalt our own case and by contempt we disparage that of others.

We shall make the hearers attentive, if we show that the things we are about to say are great, novel, and incredible, or that they pertain to all men, or to those who are listening, or to certain illustrious persons, or to the immortal gods, or to the highest interest of the commonwealth; and if we promise that we shall demonstrate our case briefly, and set forth the point for judgement, or the points, if there be several. We shall make the hearers receptive, if we set forth openly and briefly the sum of the case, that is, in what the controversy consists. But whoever wishes to begin well must first carefully recognize the kind of his case. Charlemagne: How many kinds of cases are there? Alcuin: Five: the honourable, the surprising, the lowly, the doubtful, and the obscure.

The honourable kind of case is that which the hearer's mind favours at once, even before our speech; the surprising, that from which the minds of those about to hear are alienated; the lowly, that which is neglected by the hearer and seems not greatly worth attending to; the doubtful, in which either the judgement is uncertain, or the case partakes both of honour and of baseness, so that it begets both good will and offence; the obscure, in which either the hearers are slow, or the case is entangled in matters rather difficult to understand. Charlemagne: Ought the orator always to begin in a clear manner? Alcuin: Sometimes clearly, sometimes by a roundabout way. A clear speech is one which the hearer's mind soon favours, as is the case in the honourable kind:

but that speech which is made by a roundabout way steals secretly into the hearer's mind, as must be done in the lowly, doubtful, or obscure kind of case. But this must be known: that the exordium ought to have very much of weighty sentiments and gravity, and altogether everything that pertains to dignity, but very little of display and elaborate polish — for the reason that from these there arises a certain suspicion of artful contrivance, which most of all robs the speech of credit and the orator of authority. Charlemagne: Behold, I now have how a case ought to begin; now expound the texture of the narration. Alcuin: The narration is the setting forth of things done, or as if done, which ought to have three qualities, that is, to be brief, to be clear, and to be plausible.

It will be brief, if it takes its beginning from where it is necessary, and is not fetched from the very furthest point; and if, where it will be enough to have stated the sum of some matter, its parts are not stated — for often it is enough to say what was done, without narrating how it was done; and if one proceeds in the narration no further than is needful; and if the speech does not pass off into any other matter; and if it is so told that sometimes, from what has been said, what has not been said is understood; and if not only what is harmful, but also what is neither harmful nor helpful, is passed over: and one must forbear no less from a multitude of unnecessary matters than from a multitude of words.

The narration will be able to be clear, if whatever was done first is expounded first, and the order of events and times is preserved, so that things are narrated as they were done, or as they seemed capable of having been done. Here it must be considered that nothing be said confusedly, nothing in a tangled way, and that there be no passing off into any other matter.

The narration will be plausible, if there appear to be in it those things which are wont to appear in truth: if the dignities of the persons are preserved; if the causes of the deeds are evident; if there appear to have been the means of doing them; if it is shown that there was a suitable time, enough space, and an opportune place for that very matter of which the narration is told; if the matter is adapted both to the nature of those who act, and to the rumour of the crowd, and to the opinion of those who will hear. Charlemagne: The order demands that you speak of the partition. Alcuin: I shall. The partition is the division of the matters pertaining to the case itself, which, when rightly made, renders the whole speech clear and luminous. It has two parts:

one part is that which shows what is agreed upon with the adversaries and what is left in controversy, from which something definite is set before the hearer, on which he ought to keep his mind occupied; the other is that in which a brief, distributed exposition of those matters of which we are about to speak is set down, from which it results that the hearer holds certain matters in his mind; for this part too ought to have brevity, completeness, and fewness. Brevity is when no word is taken up except what is necessary; completeness is that whereby we embrace in the partition all the kinds of matters which fall within the case and of which we must speak:

fewness is that which sets down in the partition only those matters which must necessarily be spoken of a second time, and lest we say that we shall demonstrate more than is enough — in this way: 'I shall show that the adversaries, in the matter of which we accuse them, both could have done it, and wished to do it, and did it' — when it is enough to show that they did it. Charlemagne: Now turn, master, to the precepts of confirmation, which I think the most necessary of all, so that each man may know how to confirm his own case; and although he may do this of his own accord, yet it cannot be done worthily enough without precepts and practice. Alcuin: It is so, my lord king, as you say. For all argumentations tend toward the methods of confirmation; but so vast is the forest of arguments that scarcely anything can be opened up within the brevity of this our dialogue.

Charlemagne: Yet compress much into few words; for often by one key many treasure-chambers of treasures are opened. Alcuin: I shall do as I can. Confirmation is the argumentation by which you procure credit and authority for your case, and it is made in two ways, that is, from persons or from circumstances (negotia). And to persons we think these things are assigned: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, condition, affection, pursuits, counsels, deeds, chances, and speeches; for from each one of these arguments can be made, according as the advantage of the case presents itself. Charlemagne: Although you study brevity, yet I desire these matters more fully. Alcuin:

From a name an argument is made in this way, as if we should say that someone is called 'Callidus' (Crafty) because he acts with rash and sudden counsel — and that we may use an example from Sacred Scripture as well. For Esau says of his brother Jacob: 'rightly is his name called Jacob, that is, supplanter: behold, a second time he has supplanted me.' In nature, sex, nation, fatherland, kinship, and age are considered: in sex, whether man or woman; in nation, whether Greek or barbarian; in fatherland, whether Athenian or Roman; in kinship, of what ancestors, of what blood-relations he is; in age, whether boy or youth, more advanced in years or an old man. Likewise an inference is often to be drawn from the advantages or disadvantages of nature, in this way:

whether strong or weak, tall or short, handsome or ugly, swift or slow, sharp or dull, of good memory or forgetful, crafty or simple. And from a man's manner of life many suspicions are drawn, when it is inquired in what way, among whom, and by whom he was reared and educated, and with whom he lives, and by what plan of life and in what domestic custom he lives. And from fortune an argumentation often arises, when it is considered whether he is, or has been, or will be a slave or free, moneyed or poor, noble or ignoble, fortunate or unfortunate, a private man or in a position of power; or finally when something is inquired of those things which are understood to be assigned to fortune.

Condition consists in some perfected and constant completeness of mind or body — in which class are virtue, knowledge, and their contraries; the matter and case as set forth will teach whether this topic too discloses anything of suspicion. For the account of affection is wont to bear an evident inference openly before it, such as love, anger, distress — for the reason that both their force is understood, and the things which follow upon any one of these are easy to recognize. And since pursuit is an assiduous and vehement occupation applied to some object with great pleasure, an argumentation is easily drawn from it, according as the matter itself in the case shall require. Likewise something of suspicion is taken from counsel;

for counsel is a deliberated plan of doing or not doing something. But deeds, chances, and speeches will be considered from three times: what he has done, or what has happened to him, or what he has said; and what he does, what happens to him, what he says; or what he is about to do, what is about to befall him, what speech he is going to use. From which it will be easy to see what they bring toward confirming the inference of suspicion. Charlemagne: Are these topics common to the accuser and the defender? Alcuin: They are employed according to the advantage of each side's case. Charlemagne: In what way? Alcuin:

For the accuser must censure the past life of him whom he accuses, or his insolent nature, or his malicious pursuits, or his wicked morals, or his bloody deeds, and show, if he can, whether he has previously been convicted of a like offence, and how base or covetous or wanton or bloody he was, so that it be no wonder that such a man rushed forth to such a crime. For as much as is detracted from the honour and authority of him who is accused, so much is diminished from the resource of his whole defence. If the accused cannot be defamed by any past offence, the judges are to be exhorted that not the man's old reputation, but his new crime, is to be judged. For previously it was concealed what sort of man he was, but now it is manifest:

wherefore this present matter ought not to be considered from his earlier life, but his earlier life ought to be discredited by this present baseness. Charlemagne: If the accuser heaps all these things upon the accused, what place of defence is left to him? Alcuin: A suitable place of defence is left; for often, with one shield protecting, many darts of the assailant are repelled. The defender first, if he can, must show that the man's life was most honourable and most faithful, whether toward the commonwealth, or toward his parents, kinsmen, and friends; and his deeds, faithfully and bravely accomplished, if there be any, are to be set forth; and that it is a pitiable thing for such conspicuous goods to be obscured by so small a charge.

And that he committed this very thing not out of any covetousness or malice or faithlessness, but did it by chance and ignorance, or at another's suggestion; and that no one would wish to be zealous for the welfare of his fatherland, or for piety toward parents, or for dignity of morals, if his earlier goods are to be annulled by any small or trivial charge whatsoever. And that this is ruinous to the best of men, that any malicious person should dare to accuse the good. But if there are any baseness in his past life, it must be said that he committed these either through the constraint of imprudence or the persuasion of youth, or that they were feigned through the envy of certain persons, or brought against him by false opinion.

But if in no way can the baseness or infamy of his life be softened by the speech, it will be fitting to refuse to inquire about his life and morals, and to deal only with the one crime of which he is accused — wherefore, leaving aside the past, that which is at hand ought to be dealt with. Charlemagne: You said that some arguments are from persons, others from circumstances; for these which you have just spoken of are from persons; but it remains for you to speak of those from circumstances, and first tell me what you call a 'circumstance' (negotium). Alcuin: A circumstance is the very deed itself, in which there is controversy between the accuser and the defender. But when arguments are to be drawn from circumstances, three things must be considered:

first, what was before the deed, what was in the deed, what was after the deed — as in the case of the innkeeper, before the deed there was the fact that those two travellers went along familiarly on the journey, that they turned aside together into the inn, and dined together; in the deed: night, sleep, the slaying; after the deed: that he went off alone, that he left his companion behind, that he had a bloody sword. There is also a fourth thing pertaining to the circumstance, that is, what is the law concerning that matter, or who are its authors, or by what name that which was done ought to be called. For before the deed the motive of the deed must be considered, that is, whether he killed the man in hope of gain, or for the sake of enmity, or fear, or a friend; for it is incredible that anyone should wish to kill a man for no reason.

Altogether, in the carrying out of the deed, place, time, occasion, manner, and means are wont to be considered, that is, it must be inquired in what place, or at what time, or by what manner, or by what occasion or means he killed the man. After the deed is done, certain signs of the deed done will be considered, as blood is a sign of slaughter, and flight is often wont to be a sign of guilt. Charlemagne: You have recounted the topics of arguments and of confirmations; but the argumentation itself, as I think, can by no means be uniform. Alcuin: It is not uniform; but every argumentation that is composed from those topics which we have recounted ought to be either probable or necessary. Necessary are those things which cannot be otherwise, as: 'if she has given birth, she has lain with a man.'

These are accomplished by way of a dilemma (complexio), or by way of enumeration, or by a simple conclusion. By dilemma, in which whichever side you grant is censured, in this manner: 'if he is wicked, why do you protect him? if he is upright, why do you accuse him?' By enumeration, in which, several things being brought forward, one is of necessity confirmed, in this fashion: 'it is necessary that this man was killed by him either for the sake of enmity, or fear, or hope, or of some friend; and if none of these holds, it remains that he was not killed by him; for a man cannot be killed for no reason.' By a simple conclusion, in this manner: 'if you say that I did that at that time, I at that time was across the sea; therefore that which you say, not only did I not do, but I could not even have done it.' Charlemagne:

These, as I understand, are altogether necessary; but also, as I see, it must be carefully looked to, lest in some way this kind of argumentation can be refuted. Alcuin: It is so, as you understand. Charlemagne: These arguments which you have spoken of are necessary; now tell of the probable ones too. Alcuin: Probable are those things which generally are wont to happen, as: 'if she is a mother, she loves her son; if he is greedy, he disregards an oath.' Charlemagne: Are probable things always true? Alcuin: Some are true in opinion, others in resemblance: in opinion, as 'that there are infernal regions beneath the earth'; resemblance is observed in contraries and in parallels. Charlemagne: How in contraries and in parallels? Alcuin: In contraries in this manner:

'for if it is fitting that those who have done harm imprudently be pardoned, then to those who have necessarily done good no thanks ought to be given.' From a parallel thus: 'for as a place without a harbour cannot be safe for ships, so a mind without faith cannot be steadfast for friends.' Charlemagne: Is every argumentation confirmed, adorned, and considered only from these topics? Alcuin: There are also argumentations which are handled by way of induction or of reasoning (ratiocinatio), but these pertain rather to philosophers. Charlemagne: Yet tell me of those. Alcuin: Induction is a discourse which, through certain established things, proves certain uncertain things and leads the unwilling into assent. Charlemagne: This seems wonderful, if it can bring it about that one unwilling consents. Alcuin: You shall hear, and perhaps by an example you will believe.

For a certain philosopher entered into a discussion with a certain Xenophon and his wife, and first began a conversation with the wife. 'Tell me, I pray, wife of Xenophon: if your neighbour had better gold than you have, would you prefer hers or your own?' 'Hers,' she said. 'What if she had a garment and the rest of a woman's finery of greater value than you have — would you prefer yours or hers?' She answered, 'Hers, indeed.' 'Come,' he said, 'what if she had a better husband than you have — would you prefer your own husband or hers?' Here the woman blushed. The philosopher then began a conversation with Xenophon. 'I ask you, Xenophon,' he said, 'if your neighbour had a better horse than yours is, would you prefer your horse or his?' 'His,' he said.

'What if he had a better estate than you have — which estate, after all, would you rather have?' 'His,' he said, 'the better one, of course.' 'What if he had a better wife than you have — which would you prefer?' And at this Xenophon too himself fell silent. Afterward the philosopher said: 'Since each of you has failed to answer me only that one thing which alone I wished to hear, I myself will say what each of you is thinking. For you, woman, wish to have the best husband, and you, Xenophon, most of all wish to have the most excellent wife. Wherefore, unless you accomplish this — that there be on earth no better man and no more excellent woman — assuredly you will always most of all seek that which you shall judge to be best: that you, the husband, may be married to the very best woman, and that she may be married to the very best man.'

Here, by means of things not doubtful, he proved doubtful things, on account of the resemblance of the induction. But if anyone were to inquire of each thing separately, perhaps it would not be granted. Charlemagne: That philosopher was not an evangelical one. Alcuin: He was not an evangelical, but a rhetorical one. Charlemagne: Why do we believe him? Alcuin: He followed his own art. Charlemagne: What of it? Shall we too follow our own? Alcuin: Follow what you will; I shall follow you as you follow. Charlemagne: What sort of thing ought that induction to be? Alcuin: Always similar to that matter for the sake of which it is brought forward. Charlemagne: Should it be lucid or obscure? Alcuin: It must be seen to with diligent care, that the adversary does not perceive whither those first inductions are tending and to what end they are going to arrive; for he who sees, either by keeping silent or by denying, does not allow the questioning to go further. Charlemagne: If he denies? Alcuin:

The resemblance of those things which were previously granted must be shown. Charlemagne: If he keeps silent? Alcuin: Then a response must be elicited; or, since silence imitates confession, the argumentation must be concluded, just as in things granted. Charlemagne: How is an argumentation to be confirmed by way of reasoning? Alcuin: For that is made by a proposition, an approbation or assumption, and a conclusion. Charlemagne: Make these things plainer by any example. Alcuin: The proposition is, as: 'those things which are carried on with counsel are better managed than those which are administered without counsel.' The approbation is: 'that household which is governed by reason and counsel is better furnished in all things than that which is administered without reason and counsel.' The assumption is: 'but nothing of all things is better administered than the whole world.'

Here a second proof is brought in: 'for the risings and settings of the constellations, and the yearly changes of crops, of seasons, and of days, are arranged in a sufficiently wonderful order and with a sure alternation — which are signs that the world is governed by great counsel.' Then the considered conclusion must be brought forth in this manner: 'but if those things are better carried on which are administered with counsel than those without counsel, and nothing of all things is better administered than the whole world, therefore the world is administered by counsel.' This argument avails against those who say that the world is driven by chance, not governed by counsel. Charlemagne: What is more foolish than for this to be thought? Alcuin: The fool esteems foolish things, to whom nevertheless, according to Solomon, an answer must be given, lest he seem wise in his own eyes. Charlemagne:

I recall, master, that among the parts of the speech you named refutation; but I have heard so great a series of confirmations, that scarcely does any place seem left to the one refuting, by which he might weaken a case confirmed by these arguments. Alcuin: There is left to him a place for weakening; but we ought not to labour over that: nearly every case has within itself both the topics for confirming and the topics for refuting. Charlemagne: I am in suspense nonetheless as to what you wish to say about it. Alcuin: I shall say it, and I shall say it briefly. Refutation is that whereby, by argument, the adversaries' confirmation is either weakened or overthrown. And this is drawn from the same topics from which confirmation also is, because nearly every matter can be weakened from the very source from which it can be confirmed;

this happens thus: if either it is false, from which the confirmation is composed, in this manner: 'one cannot be wise who has neglected money' — but many wise men have neglected money; or it is common, which can no less be said by the adversaries, in this manner: 'for this reason, judges, because I had a true case, I pleaded briefly'; or it is trivial: 'if it had not come into his mind, he would not have committed it'; or it is remote and begins further back than is enough: 'if Scipio had not given his daughter Cornelia to Tiberius Gracchus, this sedition would not have arisen among the people through their sons; wherefore this evil must be imputed to Scipio.' Or it is offensive, that is, what injures the will of those who hear, as if perchance, before a miser, you should accuse the love of money:

...or the adversary, that is, something that works against your own case, as if, when you ought to be exhorting your soldiers, you should praise the forces and the valor of the enemy. Likewise a dilemma (complexio) is refuted if it can be turned around in this way: 'for if he is afraid, he is not to be accused, because he is honest; but if he is not afraid, he knows himself to be innocent, and therefore he is not to be accused.' Here, whether you say that he fears or does not fear, the speaker supposes it must be granted that you should deny he is to be accused; which is refuted by reversal thus: 'on the contrary, he is to be accused, if he fears, having testified that he is not innocent; but if he does not fear, he is not honest and therefore is to be accused.' Likewise an enumeration is refuted if something is passed over in the enumeration, in this manner:

'since you have this horse, either you bought it, or it came to you by inheritance, or it was given to you as a gift, or, if it is none of these, you must have stolen it.' This is refuted if it can be said to have been captured from the enemy. By these and many other ways arguments can be refuted, which the orator must guard against with the utmost diligence — more so than I need to, given the brevity of my explanation. K. There remains only the conclusion, which you placed as the last of the six parts of a speech, and the order requires that you speak of it. A. The conclusion is the close and the settling of the whole case. K. How many parts does it have? A. Three: the recapitulation, the rousing of indignation, and the appeal for pity. K. What is the recapitulation of the conclusion? A.

The recapitulation of the conclusion is that by which the points scattered through the speech are gathered into one place and, for the sake of refreshing the memory, are set together before the eyes at once, in this manner: 'what more, O judges, do you desire, when I have told you this and this, and made this and this plain to you?' K. What does the rousing of indignation accomplish? A. Hatred toward the adversary, or offense at his case. K. This above all I should like to know — how it can be brought about. A. Its precepts are very many, such as these: if we show that the thing which the adversary defends seems unworthy to the immortal gods, to the wisest of men, to the senate, and to the people; likewise if we show other deeds of the adversary to be cruel, unjust, greedy, dishonorable, defiant; likewise if we condemn his past life and character;

likewise what evil will come about if he is not punished; likewise that pardon ought not to be granted for a deliberate or unusual crime; likewise if we display his pride or arrogance; likewise to make the judge reflect upon himself or upon his dear ones, if some such thing had happened to them; likewise that many are eagerly awaiting what shall be decided in this matter, so that from what is here conceded they too may understand what may be permitted to themselves in a like case. Likewise we feel indignation that a foul, cruel, wicked, tyrannical crime should go unavenged, one remote from all law and equity — that such a deed should go unpunished. Likewise we shall speak of cruel deeds done against those who could neither harm another nor defend themselves, such as against children, women, the aged, the infirm;