Latin original · 39 verses · some words can be tapped for a gloss · long chapter, split into parts; this part covers 1:2960–1:2998 (3306 verses in all)
And by this, whoever tells us that anyone is made alive by the resurrection of the dead except in Christ is to be detested as a common plague to the faith. Likewise, whoever says that even little children who go out of life without partaking of his sacrament shall be made alive in Christ, this one certainly both goes against the apostle's preaching and condemns the whole Church, where for this very reason there is haste and running when little children are to be baptized, because it is doubtless believed that otherwise they cannot in any way at all be made alive in Christ. But those who are not made alive in Christ, it remains that they abide in that condemnation of which the apostle says: 'Through the offense of one, upon all men unto condemnation.'
That little children are born subject to this offense both the whole Church believes, and you yourself—already disputing against Jovinian and expounding the prophet Jonah, as I mentioned a little before—defined with most truthful faith. I believe you did so in other places of your works too, which I either have not read or... Or must it perhaps be said that in a little child there is only the flesh of sin, but that a ninth... a soul is made for him, by which, living according to God's precepts in the help of Christ's grace, and with the flesh itself tamed and subjugated, the merit of incorruption may be procured even for the flesh? But because in a little child the soul cannot yet do this, if he receive the sacrament of Christ, through this grace there is acquired for his flesh what could not yet be acquired by that soul's conduct;
but if the soul of the little child departs without that sacrament, it indeed will be in eternal life, from which no sin could separate it, yet his flesh will not rise again in Christ, since the sacrament was not received before his death? This opinion I have never heard, never read; but I have plainly heard and believed—for which reason also I have spoken—that 'the hour will come, when all who are in the tombs shall hear his voice and shall come forth: they who have done good, unto the resurrection of life' (it is this of which it is said: 'and through one man the resurrection of the dead'; it is this by which 'in Christ all shall be made alive'), 'but they who have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment.'
What, then, is to be understood here concerning those infants who, before they could act either well or ill, were stripped of the body without baptism? Nothing has been said here about such ones. But if their flesh shall on that account not rise again, because they did neither anything good nor evil, then neither shall the flesh rise of those who, having received the grace of baptism, died at that age at which they could do nothing well or ill. But if the latter shall rise among the saints, that is, among those who did well—among whom shall those former ones also rise, unless among those who did evil—so that we should not believe that any human souls will not receive their bodies, whether unto the resurrection of life or unto the resurrection of judgment?
This opinion, before it is refuted, already displeases by its very novelty. Then, who could bear it, if those who run to baptism with their little ones should believe that they run on account of their flesh, not on account of their souls? The blessed Cyprian, indeed, framing no new decree but preserving the most firm faith of the Church, in order to correct those who thought that a little child ought not to be baptized before the eighth day of birth, said that it was not the flesh but the soul that must not be lost, and judged, together with certain fellow-bishops of his, that one newly born could rightly be baptized. But against some opinion of Cyprian, where perhaps he did not see what ought to have been seen, let each think what he pleases;
only let no one hold an opinion against the most manifest apostolic faith, which preaches that from the offense of one all are led into condemnation, from which condemnation none is freed except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, in whom alone all are made alive, whoever are made alive; let no one hold an opinion against the most firmly founded custom of the Church, where, if people ran to baptism only on account of the bodies of little children, even the dead would be offered to be baptized. Since these things are so, the cause must be sought and rendered why souls should be damned—souls which are created new for each individual as they are born—if little children die apart from the sacrament of Christ. For that they are damned, if they depart from the body thus, both holy Scripture and the holy Church bear witness.
Whence that opinion about the creation of new souls—if it does not attack this most firmly founded faith, let it be mine too; if it attacks it, let it not be yours either. I would not have it said to me, in favor of this opinion, that we ought to accept what is written: 'who fashioned the spirit of man within him,' and 'who fashioned their hearts individually.' Something most strong and most unconquerable must be sought, which does not compel us to believe God the damner of any souls without any fault. For it is either just as valid, or perhaps more, to create than to fashion; and yet it is written: 'Create in me a clean heart, O God.' Nor can it be thought on this account that the soul in this passage wishes itself to be made before it was anything.
As, therefore, a soul already existing is created by the renewal of righteousness, so a soul already existing is fashioned by the conformation of doctrine. Nor does that which is written in Ecclesiastes—'Then the dust shall be turned back into the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to the Lord who gave it'—confirm this opinion which we wish to be ours; for it rather supports those who think all souls are from one. For, they say, just as the dust is turned back into the earth as it was, and yet the flesh, of which this is said, does not return to the man from whom it was propagated, but to the earth from which the first man was made, so also the spirit, propagated from that one man's spirit, nevertheless does not return to him but to the Lord by whom it was given to that man.
But because this testimony sounds in their favor in such a way that it does not seem in every way contrary to this opinion which I wish to defend, I have thought only to admonish your prudence, lest you try to rescue me from these straits by such testimonies. For although no one, by wishing, makes true what is not true, yet, if it could be done, I would wish this opinion to be true, just as I wish that, if it is true, it may be most clearly and most invincibly defended by you. But this difficulty follows also those who think that souls, already existing elsewhere and prepared by God from the beginning of the divine works, are sent into bodies. For of these too the same question is asked:
if innocent souls come obediently whither they are sent, why are they punished in little children, if these end this life unbaptized? The difficulty is altogether the same in either opinion. Those seem to themselves to escape more easily from this question who assert that souls, according to the merits of a prior life, are individually implicated in individual bodies. For they think that this is to 'die in Adam'—namely, to pay penalties in the flesh which was propagated from Adam; from which guilt, they say, the grace of Christ frees the small together with the great. This indeed is rightly, truly, and excellently said, that the grace of Christ frees from the guilt of sins the small together with the great.
But that souls sinned in another, higher life and were thence cast down into the prisons of flesh, I do not believe, I do not acquiesce, I do not consent—first, because I do not know by what circuits these people bring it about that, after who knows how many volumes of ages, one must return again to this burden of corruptible flesh and to penalties to be paid; and I know not what could be conceived more horrible than this opinion. Then, what just man, in the end, has died, about whom, if these people speak the truth, we ought not to be anxious, lest, sinning in Abraham's bosom, he be cast down into the flames of that rich man? For why could not sin be committed even after this body, if it could also before? Finally, it is one thing to have sinned in Adam—whence the apostle says:
'in whom all have sinned'—and it is another thing to have sinned outside Adam, I know not where, and therefore to be thrust into Adam, that is, into the flesh which was propagated from Adam, as into a prison. But that opinion, that all souls are made out of one, I do not wish even to discuss, unless it be necessary; and would that this opinion which we now treat, if it is true, might be so defended by you that this may already not be necessary. But although I desire, ask, with ardent vows long for and await that through you the Lord may take away my ignorance of this matter, yet, if—which God forbid—I should by no means deserve it, I will ask patience for myself from the Lord our God, in whom we so believe that, when some things are not opened to us even though we knock, we ought in no way to murmur against him.
Let us remember that it was said to the very apostles: 'I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.' Among these, as far as it pertains to me, let me reckon this too; nor, when I know this, let me be indignant that I am unworthy, lest by this very thing I be convicted as still more unworthy. For there are many other things which I likewise do not know, which I could recount or number; and this I would tolerably endure not knowing, were I not afraid lest some one of these opinions creep upon incautious minds against that which we hold by most firm faith.
But before I know which of them should rather be chosen, I profess that I hold this—not rashly—that the one which is true does not oppose that most robust and most firmly founded faith by which the Church of Christ believes that not even little human beings most recently born can be freed from damnation except through the grace of the name of Christ, which he commended in his sacraments. CXXXII. AUGUSTINE TO JEROME, CONCERNING A SENTENCE OF JAMES THE APOSTLE.
What I wrote to you, my brother Jerome, honored by me in Christ, asking about the human soul—whether, as individuals are born, new individual souls come into being even until now, where they contract the bond of sin which we do not doubt is to be loosed, even in newborn infants, through the sacrament of Christ's grace—since it was proceeding into no small volume, I did not wish to burden it with any other question. But what presses more sharply is much less to be neglected. Therefore I ask, and by the Lord I beseech, that you expound to me—what I think will profit many—or, if you already have it expounded either by yourself or by someone else, that you direct to us how it is to be taken, that which is in the epistle of James the apostle:
'For whoever shall have kept the whole law, but offends in one point, is become guilty of all.' This matter is of such a kind and so great that I much repent that I did not write to you about it long ago. For this question turns upon the present life to be led—how we may attain to life eternal—not upon a past life to be investigated, which oblivion has utterly submerged, such as is that which I thought must be inquired about concerning the soul. And it is elegantly told, in a way that fits this matter quite aptly. When a certain man had fallen into a well, where there was so much water that it received him rather (so that he might not die) than choked him (so that he might not speak), another came, and seeing him, taking pity, said: 'How did you fall in here?' But he:
'I beg you,' he said, 'seek how you may free me from here, not how I fell in here.' So, since we confess and hold by the catholic faith that even the soul of a little infant must be freed by the grace of Christ from the guilt of sin as from a well, it is enough for him that we know the manner by which he may be saved, even if we should never know how he came into that evil. But I thought it should be inquired, lest perchance from those opinions about the incarnation of the soul we hold some one too incautiously, which contradicts that a little child's soul is altogether to be freed, denying that it is in this evil.
Therefore, this being most firmly held—that the soul of a little child must be freed from the guilt of sin, and freed in no other way except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord—if we can also know the cause and origin of that very evil, we resist more readily and more equipped those who are not disputants but wranglers, given to empty talk; but if we cannot, we should not on that account grow slothful in the office of mercy because the beginning of the misery lies hidden. But against those who seem to themselves to know what they do not know, we are the safer for this, that we are not ignorant of this our ignorance. For it is one thing which it is evil not to know, another which either cannot be known, or need not be, or is indifferent to the life which we seek.
But this question, which I now raise concerning the epistle of the apostle James, is bound up with the very conduct in which we live and by which we strive to please God, that we may live forever. How then, I beg you, is this to be understood: 'Whoever shall keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, is become guilty of all'? Is it so, that a man who has committed theft — nay rather, one who has said to the rich man, 'Sit here,' but to the poor man, 'Stand there' — is thereby guilty of murder and adultery and sacrilege? And if he is not, how is it that he who offends in one point is become guilty of all? Or does that which I said concerning the rich man and the poor man not pertain to those matters in which, if a man offend in one, he shall become guilty of all?
But we must recall whence this saying has come, what preceding words gave rise to it, and to what it is joined and dependent upon. 'My brethren,' he says, 'do not hold the faith of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons. For if there come into your assembly a man having a gold ring in fine apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile attire, and you have regard to him that wears the splendid raiment, and say to him, 'Sit here in a good place,' but say to the poor man, 'Stand there,' or, 'Sit under my footstool,' have you not judged within yourselves, and become judges of evil thoughts? Hearken, my beloved brethren:'
'Has not God chosen the poor of this world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which God has promised to them that love Him? But you have dishonoured the poor man' — namely, for the sake of that one to whom it was said, 'Stand there,' while to the one having the gold ring it was said, 'Sit here in a good place.' And then he follows on, treating and unfolding the same thought more fully: 'Do not,' he says, 'the rich oppress you by their power, and themselves drag you before the judgment seats? Do they not themselves blaspheme the good name that is invoked over you? If indeed you fulfil the royal law according to the Scriptures, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself,' you do well; but if you have respect of persons, you commit sin, being convicted by the law as transgressors.'
See in what manner he calls those transgressors of the law who say to the rich man, 'Sit here,' and to the poor man, 'Stand there.' Whence, lest they should think it a contemptible sin to transgress the law in this one matter, he went on to add: 'But whoever shall keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, is become guilty of all. For He who said, 'You shall not commit adultery,' said also, 'You shall not kill.' Now if you do not kill, yet commit adultery, you are become a transgressor of the law' — on account of that which he had said, 'convicted by the law as transgressors.' Since these things are so, it seems to follow — unless it be shown that it is to be understood in another way — that he who has said to the rich man, 'Sit here,' and to the poor man,
'Stand there,' thus giving greater honour to the former than to the latter, is to be judged an idolater, a blasphemer, an adulterer, a murderer, and — not to enumerate them all, which would be tedious — guilty of every crime; for by offending in one point he is become guilty of all. But then, 'He who has one virtue has all, and he who lacks one has none.' If this is true, that saying is confirmed. Yet I wish it to be expounded, not confirmed, since in itself it stands among us more firmly than by the authority of all the philosophers. And even if that saying about the virtues and vices is truly spoken, it does not follow that on this account all sins are equal.
For that doctrine of the inseparability of the virtues — even if perhaps I am mistaken, yet if I rightly remember, though I scarcely remember — was pleasing to all the philosophers who said that these same virtues are necessary for the conduct of life. But this doctrine of the equality of sins only the Stoics dared to maintain, against the whole common sense of the human race; and that folly of theirs, in that Jovinian who in this opinion was a Stoic, but in hunting after and defending pleasures was an Epicurean, you most lucidly refuted from the holy Scriptures. In that most delightful and most splendid disputation of yours it appeared plainly enough that neither to our authors, nor rather to the Truth itself which spoke through them, did it seem good that all sins are equal.
But how it can come to pass that, even if this be true of the virtues, we are nevertheless not thereby compelled to confess the equality of all sins, I will try, as far as I am able and with the Lord's help, to make clear. And if I succeed, you will approve; where I fall short of the argument, you will supply it. Certainly this is the ground on which they persuade us that he who has one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to him who lacks one: that prudence can be neither cowardly nor unjust nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Further, if it is to be prudence, provided it be also brave and just and temperate, then assuredly, wherever it is present, it has the rest along with it. So too fortitude cannot be imprudent or intemperate or unjust;
so temperance must needs be prudent, brave, and just; so justice is not justice if it be not prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, where any one of them is truly present, the others likewise are present. But where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even though in some manner it may appear to be similar. For there are, as you know, certain vices contrary to the virtues by an open distinction, as imprudence to prudence. But there are certain others which, merely because they are vices, are on that account contrary, and yet by a certain deceptive appearance are similar — as to that same prudence there is opposed not imprudence but craftiness. For now I mean by craftiness that which is more usually understood and called so in malicious men, not as our Scripture is wont to speak, which often puts craftiness in a good sense, whence it is said:
'Be wise as serpents,' and that other saying: 'that He may give shrewdness to the simple.' Although even among those pagans the most eloquent master of the Latin tongue said, 'Nor yet was guile or craft wanting to him for taking heed,' putting craftiness in a good sense; but among them it is very rare, whereas among us it is very frequent. Likewise, among the parts of temperance, prodigality is most plainly contrary to frugality; but that which is even commonly called stinginess is indeed a vice, yet resembles frugality not by nature but by a most deceptive appearance. Again, injustice is contrary to justice by a manifest dissimilarity; but the lust for taking vengeance is wont to imitate justice as it were, yet it is a vice.
Cowardice is clearly contrary to fortitude; but hardness differs from it in nature, and deceives by resemblance. Constancy is a certain part of virtue; from it inconstancy stands far removed and undoubtedly opposes it, but obstinacy affects to be called constancy and is not, because the one is a virtue, the other a vice. Therefore, that it may not be necessary to mention the same things over again, let us set down something by way of example, from which the rest may be understood. Catiline, as those wrote of him who were able to know, could bear cold, thirst, and hunger, and was patient of fasting, of frost, and of watching beyond what anyone could believe; and by this he seemed to his followers and to himself to be endowed with great fortitude.
But this fortitude was not prudent — for it chose evil in place of good; it was not temperate — for it was defiled by the foulest corruptions; it was not just — for he had conspired against his fatherland; and therefore it was not fortitude at all, but a hardness which, in order to deceive fools, imposed upon itself the name of fortitude. For if it had been fortitude, it would have been not a vice but a virtue; and if it had been a virtue, it would never have been forsaken by the other virtues as by inseparable companions.
Wherefore, when it is asked concerning the vices also, whether they too are all present alike wherever one is present, or none present where one is absent, it is a laborious thing to show this, for the reason that two vices are wont to be opposed to one virtue: the one which is openly contrary, and the one which is shadowed forth by an appearance of resemblance. Hence, since that quality in Catiline was not fortitude — as one which did not have the other virtues along with it — this was more easily seen; but that it was cowardice, where there was an exercise of enduring and bearing the heaviest hardships beyond what anyone could believe, can only with difficulty be made credible. Yet perhaps to those who look more keenly, that very hardness appears as cowardice, because he had neglected the labour of good pursuits by which true fortitude is acquired.
Nevertheless, since there are bold men who are not timid, and again timid men who are without boldness, while each is a vice — inasmuch as he who is brave by true virtue neither dares rashly nor fears without deliberation — we are compelled to confess that the vices are more numerous than the virtues. Hence sometimes one vice is removed by another, as the love of money by the love of praise; sometimes one gives way that several may succeed, as when a man who has been a drunkard learns, out of stinginess and ambition, to drink but moderately. And so vices can give place even to succeeding vices, not to virtues, and therefore they are more numerous. But virtue, wherever one has entered, since it brings the rest along with it, will assuredly cause all the vices to give way, whatsoever were present;
for not all were present, but sometimes just as many, sometimes more gave way to fewer, or fewer to more. Whether these things are so must be inquired into more diligently. For this is not a divine sentence, by which it is said, 'He who has one virtue has all, and to him there is none, who lacks one,' but it seemed so to men — men indeed very ingenious, studious, and at leisure, yet men. But I, for my part, do not know in what manner I should speak.
I do not say of the man from whom virtue (virtus) is named, but even of the woman who keeps the fidelity of the marriage-bed to her husband — if she does this on account of God's precept and promise, and is first of all faithful to Him — I cannot say that she does not have chastity, or that it is no virtue at all, or but a small one; and so too of the husband who keeps this same fidelity to his wife. And yet there are very many such, of whom I would not say that any one is without some sin, and assuredly that sin, of whatever kind, comes from some vice. Hence conjugal chastity in religious men and women, since it is beyond doubt a virtue — for it is neither nothing nor a vice — does not nevertheless have all the virtues along with it. For if all were there, there would be no vice; if no vice, then no sin at all;
but who is without some sin? Who, then, is without some vice — that is, some tinder as it were, or as it were a root of sin — since he who reclined on the Lord's breast cries out, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us'? Nor need this be argued at greater length with you, but I say it on account of others who may perhaps read these things. For you indeed, in that same splendid work against Jovinian, have carefully proved this too from the holy Scriptures; where also, out of this very epistle whose words we are now seeking to understand, you cited that which is written: 'For in many things we all offend.'
For he does not say 'you offend,' but he says 'we offend,' though it was the apostle of Christ who was speaking; and whereas in this place he says, 'But whoever shall keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, is become guilty of all,' there he says that not in one but in many, and not certain persons but all, do offend. But far be it that any believer should suppose that so many thousands of Christ's servants, who truly say that they have sin — lest they deceive themselves and the truth be not in them — have no virtue, since wisdom is a great virtue. And He said to man, 'Behold, piety is wisdom.' Far be it, then, that we should say that so many and so great faithful and godly men of God do not have piety, which the Greeks call either eusebeia or, more expressly and fully, theosebeia.
And what is piety but the worship of God? And whence is He worshipped but by love? For love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith is a great and true virtue, since it is itself also the end of the commandment. Rightly is it called strong as death, whether because none conquers it, as none conquers death, or because in this life, even unto death, is the measure of love — as the Lord says, 'Greater love has no one than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends' — or rather because, as death tears away the soul from the senses of the flesh, so love tears it away from carnal desires. To this love, knowledge is subservient when it is useful; for without love it puffs up. But where love has filled all by building up, knowledge will find nothing there empty for it to puff up.
Moreover, he showed by defining it what useful knowledge is, when, after saying, 'Behold, piety is wisdom,' he immediately subjoined, 'and to abstain from evil is knowledge.' Why, then, do we not say that he who has this virtue has all, since love is the fullness of the law? Or the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; but the less it is, the less virtue is present, since love itself is the virtue; and the less virtue is present, the more vice there is? Where, therefore, that love shall be full and perfect, nothing of vice will remain.
Accordingly, the Stoics seem to me to be deceived on this account: because they are unwilling that a man advancing in wisdom should have wisdom at all, but hold that he has it only when he is altogether perfect in it — not because they deny that he is making progress, but because, unless by emerging as it were from some deep he should suddenly flash forth into the free air of wisdom, they hold that he is in no part wise.
For just as it makes no difference for the drowning of a man whether he has water many furlongs deep above him or but a hand's breadth or a finger's breadth, so they say that those who strive toward wisdom do indeed make progress, as though rising from the bottom of a whirlpool into the air; but that unless by advancing — as it were by emerging — they have escaped the whole of folly like the overwhelming water, they have no virtue and are not wise; whereas, once they have escaped, they straightway have the whole of it, and nothing of folly remains from which any sin at all could arise.