Sermons & Tracts 6 part 2/11

using some things, to be taken up or rejected, for health; some, to be endured, for patience; some, to be ordered, for justice; some, to be considered, for some proof of truth: it uses even those things from which it abstains, for temperance. Thus it uses all things, both those perceived and those not perceived; nor is there any third kind. But it judges concerning all the things it uses: concerning God alone it does not judge, because it judges concerning the rest according to God; nor does it use Him, but enjoys Him. For God is not to be referred to anything else. Since everything that is to be referred to another is inferior to that to which it is to be referred. And there is nothing superior to God, not in place, but in the excellence of His nature.

All things therefore that have been made, have been made for the use of man, because reason—which has been given to man—uses all things by judging. And before the fall it did not indeed use things to be endured, nor after the fall does it use them except when converted; and although before the death of the body, yet already, as far as it can, a friend of God, because willingly His servant. XXXI. The opinion of Cicero, how the virtues of the soul were divided and defined by him (Cicero, book 2 of On Invention). 1. Virtue is a habit of the soul consonant with the manner of nature and with reason. Wherefore, when all its parts are known, the whole force of simple honorableness will have been considered. It has therefore four parts: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance.

Prudence is the knowledge of things good, evil, and neither. Its parts are memory, understanding, foresight. Memory is that by which the soul recalls those things which have been. Understanding, that by which it perceives those things which are. Foresight, that by which something future is seen before it is done. Justice is a habit of the soul which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth. Its beginning proceeded from nature; then certain things came into custom by reason of utility; afterward the fear of laws and religion sanctioned things both proceeding from nature and approved by custom. Natural right is that

which no opinion begot, but a certain innate force implanted, such as religion, piety, gratitude, requital, respect, truth. Religion is that which brings care and ceremony toward a certain higher nature which they call divine. Piety is that by which a benevolent duty and diligent regard is rendered to those joined by blood and to the fatherland. Gratitude is that in which is contained the remembrance of friendships and services on the one part, and the will to requite on the other. Requital is that by which force or injury, and in general everything that will be harmful, is repelled by defending or avenging. Respect is that by which we deem worthy, with a certain regard and honor, men excelling in some dignity.

Truth is that by which the things which are, or have been, or will be, are stated unaltered. By custom, right is that which either, lightly drawn from nature, use has nourished and made greater—as religion; and if we see any of the things we mentioned before, proceeding from nature, made greater on account of custom—or that which antiquity has led into practice by the approbation of the common people. Of this kind are the compact, equity, law, the adjudged. A compact is what has been agreed among certain parties. Equity is that which is equal for all. The adjudged is that concerning which it has already been established by the judgments of someone or of several. By law, right is that which is contained in that writing which is set forth to the people to observe. Fortitude is a considered undertaking of dangers and endurance of labors.

Its parts are magnificence, confidence, patience, perseverance. Magnificence is the handling and administration of great and lofty matters with a certain broad and splendid purpose of soul. Confidence is that by which the soul, in great and honorable matters, has placed in itself much assurance with sure hope. Patience is the voluntary and lasting endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of the honorable or the useful. Perseverance is a stable and perpetual continuance in a well-considered plan. Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over the other wrongful impulses of the soul. Its parts are continence, clemency, modesty.

Continence is that by which desire is ruled by the governance of counsel. Clemency is that by which minds rashly enticed and stirred to hatred of someone are held back by kindness. Modesty is that by which honorable shame procures a clear and stable authority. And all these are to be sought for their own sake alone, so that no gain be added. To demonstrate this neither pertains to our present purpose, and is far removed from the brevity of precept-giving. But for their own sake are to be avoided, not only those things contrary to them—as cowardice to fortitude, and injustice to justice—but also those which seem near and neighboring, yet are very far off. Of this kind, contrary to confidence is diffidence, and by that fact it is a vice;

rashness, on the other hand, is not contrary, but placed alongside and neighboring, and yet a vice. Thus for each virtue a neighboring vice will be found, either already called by a definite name—as rashness, which is neighbor to confidence; obstinacy, which is neighbor to perseverance; superstition, which is near to religion—or without any definite name: all of which likewise, as the contraries of good things, we shall place among the things to be avoided. And concerning that kind of honorableness which is sought for its own sake in every respect, enough has been said. Now it seems that something must be said concerning that in which utility too is joined, which we nevertheless call honorable. 3. There are therefore many things which draw us both by their dignity and also by their own fruit. In which kind are glory, dignity, greatness, friendship.

Glory is frequent report about someone accompanied by praise. Dignity is someone's honorable authority, worthy of regard and honor and reverence. Greatness is power, or majesty, or a great abundance of some resources. Friendship is a will toward someone of good things, for the sake of that very person whom one loves, with an equal will on his part. Here, because we are speaking of civil matters, we add fruit to friendship, that it may seem to be sought also for their sake, lest perhaps those who thought we were speaking of friendship in general should reproach us. Although there are those who think friendship is to be sought only for utility, there are those who think it for its own sake alone, and there are those who think it both for its own sake and for utility.

Which of these is to be most truly determined, there will be another place to consider. XXXII. Whether one person understands any thing more than another, and thus the understanding of the same thing goes on to infinity. Whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived; and everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived. Whoever therefore understands any thing otherwise than it is, does not understand it. Therefore nothing can be understood except as it is. But we understand something as not being as it is—for instance, this very fact, that nothing is understood which is not understood as it is. Wherefore it is not to be doubted that there is a perfect understanding, than which nothing more excellent can be;

and therefore the manner in which each thing is understood does not go on to infinity, nor can one person understand it more than another. XXXIII. On fear. It is doubtful to no one that there is no other cause of fearing except lest we either lose what we love once obtained, or fail to obtain what we hoped for. Wherefore, whoever has loved and possessed this very thing—not to fear—what fear is there that he might lose it? For many things which we love and possess, we fear to lose; and so we guard them by fear. But no one can guard "not-to-fear" by fearing. Likewise, whoever loves not-to-fear, and does not yet have it, and hopes he will have it—must he not, as is fitting, fear lest he not obtain it? For by this fear nothing else is feared than that same fear.

Further, all fear flees something, and nothing flees itself. Therefore fear is not feared. But if anyone thinks it is not rightly said that a fear fears something, since it is rather the soul that fears by the fear itself, let him attend to this, which is easy to grasp: that there is no fear except of a future and imminent evil. Now it is necessary that he who fears should flee something. Whoever therefore fears to fear is assuredly most absurd, because by fleeing he possesses the very thing he flees. For since nothing is feared except lest some evil happen, to fear lest fear happen is nothing else than to embrace what you spurn. And if that is contradictory—as it is—then in no way at all does he fear who loves nothing else than not to fear.

And therefore no one can love this alone and not have it. But whether this alone is to be loved is another question. Now him whom fear does not dismay, neither does desire lay waste, nor does sickness of soul wear down, nor does exulting and vain joy toss about. For if he desires—since desire is nothing else than the love of passing things—he must fear lest he either lose them when he has obtained them, or not obtain them. But he does not fear: therefore he does not desire. Likewise, if he is tormented by grief of soul, he must also be agitated by fear; since where there is anxiety over present evils, there is also fear of imminent ones. But he is free of fear: therefore also of anxiety. Likewise, if he rejoices vainly, he rejoices over those things which he can lose:

wherefore he must fear lest he lose them. But he in no way fears: therefore in no way does he rejoice vainly. XXXIV. Whether nothing else is to be loved than to be without fear. If not to fear is a vice, it is not to be loved. But no most-blessed man fears, and no most-blessed man is in vice. Therefore not to fear is not a vice. But rashness is a vice. Therefore not everyone who does not fear is rash—although everyone who is rash does not fear. Likewise, every corpse does not fear. Wherefore, since not-to-fear is common to the most blessed, to the rash, and to the corpse—but the most blessed has it through tranquility of soul, the rash through recklessness, the corpse because it lacks all sensation—not-to-fear is not to be left unloved, since we wish to be blessed;

nor is it to be loved alone, since we do not wish to be rash and lifeless. XXXV. What is to be loved. Since whatever does not live does not fear, and no one would persuade us that life is to be forgone so that we might also be without fear, to live without fear is to be loved. But again, because a life lacking fear, even if it lack understanding, is not to be desired, to live without fear with understanding is to be loved. Is that alone to be loved? or is love itself also to be loved? Yes indeed, since without this those things are not loved. But if love is loved for the sake of other things which are to be loved, it is not rightly said to be loved. For to love is nothing else than to seek some thing for its own sake.

Is love then to be sought for its own sake, seeing that whenever what is loved is lacking, there is undoubted misery? Then, since love is a certain motion, and there is no motion except toward something, when we ask what is to be loved, we are asking what that is toward which one ought to be moved. Wherefore, if love is to be loved, certainly not every love is to be loved. For there is also a base love, by which the soul pursues things lower than itself, which is more properly called desire—the root, namely, of all evils. And therefore that is not to be loved which can be taken away from a love that abides and enjoys. The love, then, of what thing is to be loved, except of that which cannot be lacking while it is loved? And that is what it is nothing else to have than to know.

Further, as for gold and every body—to have them is not the same as to know them: therefore they are not to be loved. And since something can be loved and not had—not only among things which are not to be loved, as some beautiful body, but even among those which are to be loved, as the blessed life; and again, something can be had and not loved, as fetters—it is rightly asked whether anyone can, in the case of that which to have is nothing else than to know, not love it when he has it, that is, has come to know it. But since we see some who learn numbers for no other reason than that by that same discipline they may become wealthy, or please men—which, when they have learned it, they refer to the same end which they had set for themselves when learning it; and since to have any discipline is nothing else than to know it:

it can happen that someone has something—which to have is the same as to know—and yet does not love it. Although a good that is not loved, no one can perfectly have or know. For who can know how great a good is, which he does not enjoy? But he does not enjoy it if he does not love it; therefore he who does not love does not have what is to be loved, even if he who does not have it were able to love it. Therefore no one knows the blessed life and is miserable; since, if it is to be loved—as it is—then to know it is the same as to have it. 2. Since these things are so, what else is it to live blessedly than to have something eternal by knowing it? For that is eternal, in which alone one rightly trusts, which cannot be taken from him who loves it; and that itself is what it is nothing else to have than to know.

For the most excellent of all things is that which is eternal; and therefore we cannot have it except by that thing by which we are more excellent, that is, by the mind. But whatever is held by the mind is held by knowing; and no good is perfectly known which is not perfectly loved. Nor, as the mind alone can know, can it thus also love alone. For love is a certain appetite; and we see that appetite is present also in the other parts of the soul, which, if it agrees with the mind and reason, in such peace and tranquility the mind will be free to contemplate what is eternal. Therefore the soul ought to love, with its other parts also, this so great thing which is to be known by the mind. And since that which is loved necessarily affects the lover from itself;

it comes about that the eternal, when thus loved, affects the soul with eternity. Wherefore that alone is the blessed life which is eternal. But what is eternal, which affects the soul with eternity, except God? Now the love of things to be loved is better called charity or dilection. Wherefore, with all the powers of thought, that most wholesome precept is to be pondered: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind" (Matt 22:37); and that which the Lord Jesus says: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent" (John 17:3). XXXVI. On the nourishing of charity. 1. I call charity that by which those things are loved which are not to be despised in comparison with the lover himself:

that is, that which is eternal, and that which is able to love the eternal itself. God, therefore, and the soul by which He is loved, is properly called charity—most purified and consummated—if nothing else is loved: this it pleases us also to call dilection. But when God is loved more than the soul, so that a man prefers to be His rather than his own, then truly and supremely is provision made for the soul, and consequently for the body also—we not caring for it with any busy appetite, but only taking what is ready and offered. Now the poison of charity is the hope of obtaining or retaining temporal things. Its nourishment is the diminution of desire; its perfection, no desire. The sign of its progress is the diminution of fear; the sign of its perfection, no fear:

because "desire is the root of all evils" (1 Tim 6:10); and, "perfect love casts out fear" (1 John 4:18). Whoever therefore wishes to nourish it, let him press on with diminishing his desires. Now desire is the love of acquiring or obtaining temporal things. The beginning of diminishing this is to fear God, who alone cannot be feared without love. For it is directed toward wisdom, and nothing is truer than what is said: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord" (Sir 1:16). For there is no one who does not flee pain more than he seeks pleasure; since we see even the most savage beasts deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pains—which, when it has turned into a habit for them, they are called tamed and gentle.

Wherefore, since there is in man a reason which, when it serves desire by a miserable perversion so that men are not feared, suggests that things committed can lie hidden, and contrives most cunning deceits to cover up secret sins; from this it comes about that men whom the beauty of virtue does not yet delight—unless they be deterred from sinning by the punishments which are most truly preached through holy and divine men, and unless they consent that what they hide from men cannot be hidden from God—are tamed with more difficulty than wild beasts. But that God may be feared, it must be inculcated that the universe is ruled by divine providence;

not so much by reasonings—for he who can enter upon these can already also perceive the beauty of virtue—as by examples: either recent ones, if any occur, or from history, and especially those which, by the very working of divine providence, whether in the Old or in the New Testament, received the most excellent authority of religion. But at the same time one must treat both of the punishments of sinners and of the rewards of the rightly-done. 2. Now indeed, when some habit of not-sinning has persuaded one that what was thought burdensome is easy, let the sweetness of piety begin to be tasted, and the beauty of virtue to be commended, so that the liberty of charity may stand out above the servitude of fear.

Then, once the sacraments of regeneration have gone before—which must move them greatly—it must be inculcated to the faithful what difference there is between the two men, the old and the new, the outer and the inner, the earthly and the heavenly; that is, between him who pursues carnal and temporal goods, and him who pursues spiritual and eternal ones: and they must be warned not to expect from God perishable and passing benefits, in which even wicked men can abound, but firm and everlasting ones—for the receiving of which all things that in this world are thought good and evil must be utterly despised.

Here that most excellent and unique example of the Lord's manhood is to be set forth—who, though He showed by so many miracles that He held such great power over things, both spurned those things which the ignorant think great goods, and endured those which they think great evils. And lest anyone dare the less to undertake such conduct and discipline, the more highly it is honored, it must be shown—both from His promises and exhortations, and from the multitude of imitators: Apostles, martyrs, and innumerable saints—that those things are not to be despaired of. 3.

But when the enticements of carnal pleasures have been overcome, care must be taken lest there creep in and follow the desire of pleasing men—whether through certain wondrous deeds, or through difficult continence or patience, or through some bounty, or in the name of knowledge or eloquence: in that kind is also the desire of honor. Against all these let there be brought forward the things which are written of the praise of charity, and of the emptiness of boasting; and let it be taught how shameful it is to wish to please those whom you would not wish to imitate. For either they are not good, and it is nothing great to be praised by the bad; or they are good, and one ought to imitate them. But those who are good are good by virtue; and virtue does not seek what is in the power of other men.

He therefore who imitates the good seeks the praise of no man; he who imitates the bad is not worthy of praise. But if you wish to please men for this reason, that you may profit them toward loving God, then it is no longer this, but something else, that you desire. But he who desires to please still has a necessary fear: first, lest by sinning secretly he be reckoned among the hypocrites by the Lord; then, if he seeks to please by good deeds, lest, hunting after this reward, he lose what God is about to give. 4. But when that desire is overcome, pride must be guarded against. For it is difficult that one who no longer desires to please men, and thinks himself full of virtues, should deign to associate with them. And so fear is still necessary, lest even that which he seems to have be taken away from him (Matt 25:29);

and, with hands and feet bound, be cast into the outer darkness (Matt 22:13). Wherefore the fear of God not only begins, but also perfects, the wise man. And he is wise who supremely loves God, and his neighbor as himself. But what dangers and difficulties are to be feared on this journey, and what remedies one ought to use, is another question. XXXVII. On the ever-born. Better is the ever-born than he who is ever being born. For he who is ever being born is not yet born; and he never is born nor will have been born, if he is ever being born. For it is one thing to be born, another to have been born. And through this there is never a son, if never born; but the Son, because born, is always Son: therefore always the born one. XXXVIII.

On the conformation of the soul. Since nature is one thing, discipline another, use another, and these are understood in one soul with no diversity of substance; likewise since natural talent is one thing, virtue another, tranquility another, similarly of one and the same substance; and since the soul is of another substance than God, although made by Him—but God Himself is that most sacred Trinity, known in word to many, in reality to few: it must be most diligently investigated what the Lord Jesus says, "No one comes to me unless the Father draw him" (John 6:44); and, "No one comes to the Father except through me" (John 14:6); and, "He will lead you into all truth" (John 16:13). XXXIX. On nourishment.

What is it that receives that thing which it transforms? as an animal food. What is it that is received and transformed? as the same food. What is it that is received and not transformed? as light for the eyes, and sound for the ears. But these the soul receives through the body: what is it, however, that it receives by itself, and transforms into itself? as another soul, which by receiving into friendship it makes like itself. And what is it that it receives by itself, and does not transform? as the truth. Wherefore one must understand both what was said to Peter, "Kill and eat" (Acts 10:13); and what is said in the Gospel, "And the life was the light of men" (John 1:4). XL. Since the nature of souls is one, whence come the diverse wills of men?

From diverse things seen there is a diverse appetite of souls; from diverse appetite, a diverse success in acquiring; from diverse success, a diverse habit; from diverse habit, the will is diverse. But it is the order of things that makes the things seen diverse—hidden indeed, yet certain under divine providence. It is not therefore to be thought that the natures of souls are diverse because the wills are diverse; since even the will of one soul is varied according to the diversity of times. For at one time it desires to be rich, at another time, despising riches, it desires to be wise; and in the very appetite for temporal things, at one time trade pleases one man, and at another time military service. XLI.

Since God made all things, why did he not make them equal? Because they would not be 'all things' if they were equal; for there would not be those many kinds of things by which the universe is completed, having its creatures ordered as first and second and so on down to the last. And this is what is meant by 'all things.' XLII. How Christ was both in his mother's womb and in the heavens. Just as a man's word, which even if many hear it, each hears it whole. XLIII. Why did the Son of God appear in a man, and the Holy Spirit in a dove? Because the former came to demonstrate to men an example of how to live; the latter appeared in order to signify that very gift by which, through living well, one arrives at the goal.

Both, moreover, were done visibly for the sake of carnal men, so that they might be led by the steps of the sacraments from those things which are perceived by bodily eyes to those which are understood by the mind. For words too sound and pass away; yet the things signified by the words, when something divine and eternal is being expounded in speech, do not likewise pass away. XLIV. Why did the Lord Jesus Christ come so long afterward, and not at the beginning of man's sin? Because all that is beautiful is from the highest Beauty, which is God; but temporal beauty is accomplished by things departing and succeeding one another. And each single age, from infancy to old age, has its own proper comeliness in each single man.

Just as, therefore, he is absurd who would wish only the age of youth to exist in a man subject to time—for he would begrudge the other beauties which, in the other ages, perform their alternations and order—so he is absurd who desires one single age in the whole human race itself; for it too, as though it were one man, passes through its ages. Nor was it fitting that a Teacher should come from on high, by whose imitation one might be formed unto the best morals, except in the time of youth. To this pertains what the Apostle says: that little ones were kept under the Law as under a schoolmaster (Gal. III, 23, 24), until He should come for whom it was reserved, who had been promised through the Prophets.

For it is one thing that divine providence deals as it were privately with individuals, and another that it takes counsel for the whole race as it were publicly. For whoever as individuals have arrived at any certain wisdom, have been illumined by no other than that same Truth, according to the opportunity of their several ages; and it was by that very Truth that, so that the people might become wise, man was taken up at the opportune age of the human race itself. XLV. Against the astrologers. 1. The ancients did not call 'mathematici' those who are now so called, but those who investigated the numbers of the seasons by the motion of heaven and the stars; concerning whom it is most rightly said in the holy Scriptures: 'Yet again, neither are these to be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much as to be able to estimate the world,'