What need was there, once His own work had been brought forth, also to attend to the business of matter, by likewise bringing forth evil, so that He alone might be known as good out of good, but matter might not be known as evil out of evil? The good would have flourished more without the blast of evil. For Hermogenes too assails the arguments of certain persons who say that evils were necessary for the illumination of goods, which are to be understood from their contraries. Therefore either there was no place for bringing forth evil on that account; or, if some other reason demanded that it be introduced, why could it not have been introduced out of nothing as well—the very reason being about to excuse the Lord, lest He be reckoned the author of evil, which reason now, when He works out of matter, excuses the evils?
If it excuses, then everywhere and from every side the question is driven to that very point to which those men are unwilling it should come—those who, by not examining nor discerning the very rationale of evil, how they may either attribute it to God or separate it from God, cast God down by more and unworthier demolitions. XVI. Therefore, in the fore-structuring of this article—perhaps to be treated again elsewhere—I for my part define that either both good and evil, which He made out of matter, must be ascribed to God; or to matter itself, out of which He made them; or both to both, since both are bound together, He who made and that out of which He made; or the one to the other; for there is no third besides matter and God. Now if both shall be God's, God will seem to be the author of evil too; but God, as good, will not be the author of evil.
If both are matter's, matter will seem to be the mother of good too; but matter, being wholly evil, will not be the mother of good. If both shall be of both, in this too matter will be compared to God, and both will be equals, alike akin to evil and to good; but matter ought not to be made equal to God, lest it produce two gods. If the one belongs to the other—namely, the good to God and the evil to matter—then neither will evil be ascribed to God nor good to matter; and yet God, in making both good and evil things out of matter, makes them together with it. If these things are so, I do not see by what verdict Hermogenes can escape, who thinks that God—in whatever way He founded evil out of matter, whether by will or by necessity or by reason—is not the author of evil.
Further, if the author of evil is the very one who made it, though matter be its associate by the contribution of its substance, you have now excused away the reason for introducing matter. For no less is God shown to be the author of evil even through matter, if matter was assumed for this very purpose—lest God should seem the author of evil. Matter, therefore, being excluded, since its reason is excluded, it remains established that God made all things out of nothing. We shall see whether He made evils too, when it shall have appeared which things are evil, and whether meanwhile those things are evil which you suppose. For He more worthily produced these things also of His own choice by producing them out of nothing, than by another's prejudgment, had He produced them out of matter. Liberty, not necessity, befits God. I would rather He willed to have founded evils of Himself than that He could not have failed to found them. XVII.
The condition of the one God vindicates this rule: that He is not otherwise one save because He is sole, nor otherwise sole save because there is nothing with Him. Thus too He will be first, because all things are after Him; thus all things are after Him, because all things are from Him; thus they are from Him, because out of nothing—so that the reasoning of that Scripture too may hold good: 'Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been His counselor? Or whom did He consult? Or who showed Him the way of understanding and knowledge? Who first gave to Him, and it shall be repaid to him?' No one at all, because no force, no matter, no nature of any other substance was present with Him. But if He wrought out of some substance, of necessity He received from that very thing both counsel and the handling of the arrangement, as the way of understanding and knowledge.
For according to the quality of the thing He would have had to work, and according to the nature of matter, not according to His own choice—so much so that He would have made even the evils according to a nature not His own but that of the substance. XVIII. If matter is necessary to God for the works of the world, as Hermogenes supposed, God had a matter far worthier and more suitable—not to be estimated among the philosophers, but to be understood among the prophets—namely His own Wisdom. This alone, in short, has known the mind of the Lord. For who knows the things that are God's, and the things that are in Him, save the Spirit who is in Him? But Wisdom is the Spirit: she was His counselor, she is herself the way of understanding and knowledge; out of her He made, by making through her, and by making with her.
'When He was preparing the heaven,' she says, 'I was present with Him; and when He was making strong above the winds the clouds that are on high, and how He was setting firm the fountains of that which is under heaven, I was there, framing together with Him. I was He in whom He rejoiced; and daily I took delight in His presence, when He rejoiced, having perfected the world, and He took delight in the sons of men.' Who would not rather commend this as the fountain and origin of all things—the very matter of matters, not subject to an end, not diverse in condition, not restless in motion, not formless in aspect, but inborn and proper and composed and comely—of which God could have had need, His own rather than another's, being needy?
In short, as He perceived her to be necessary for the works of the world, He straightway founds and begets her within Himself. 'The Lord,' she says, 'founded me, the beginning of His ways, unto His works: before the ages He established me, before He made the earth, before the mountains were set in place; and before all the hills He begot me; before the abyss too I was brought forth.' Let Hermogenes, then, acknowledge that for this very reason the Wisdom of God too is proclaimed to be born and founded, lest we should believe anything to be unborn and unfounded save God alone.
For if within the Lord that which was out of Him and in Him did not exist without a beginning—namely His own Wisdom, which was born and founded thenceforth, from the moment it began to be stirred in the mind of God for the arranging of the works of the world—much more does it not admit that anything existed without a beginning which was outside the Lord. But if this same Wisdom is the Word of God, without whom nothing was made, just as also nothing was arranged without Wisdom, how is it that to the Son of God, the Word only-begotten and first-begotten, anything should have been more ancient than the Father, and in this way at any rate more nobly born—nay, that the unborn should be stronger than the born, and the unmade mightier than the made, because that which, in order to exist, needed no author, will be far loftier than that which, in order to exist, had some author?
Accordingly, if evil is indeed unborn, whereas the Word of God is begotten -- for 'my heart hath belched forth a good Word,' he says -- I do not know whether evil can be produced by good, the stronger by the weaker, the unborn by the born. 4. So on this ground too Hermogenes sets matter before God, by setting it before the Son -- for the Son is the Word, and God is the Word, and 'I and the Father are one' -- unless indeed the Son will endure with equanimity that she be set before Him who is made equal to the Father. XIX. But I shall also appeal to the original document of Moses, from which the opposing party too tries, whether one will or not, to prop up its own conjectures, lest it should appear not to be instructed from the very source from which it ought to be. And so it has seized on the occasions offered by certain words, as is generally the custom of heretics, twisting whatever is simple.
For they insist that the very 'beginning' in which God made both heaven and earth was something substantival and corporeal, which could be interpreted as matter. But we assign to each word its own proper sense: that 'beginning' means a commencement, and that it was fittingly so used of things beginning to come into being; for nothing that is destined to come into being exists without a commencement, since indeed its very starting to come into being is a commencement to it; thus 'beginning,' or the commencement of an inception, is a term, not the name of any substance. Now then, if the principal works of God are heaven and earth, which God made before all things, being properly the beginning of His works, seeing that they were made first, rightly does Scripture thus preface itself:
'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth' -- just as He would have said, 'In the end God made the heaven and the earth,' had He made them after all other things. Or if 'beginning' is some substance, then 'end' too will be some kind of matter. Plainly it will indeed be permissible for something substantival to be the beginning of another thing which is to come from it, as clay is the beginning of a pot, as seed is the beginning of a plant; but when we use the word 'beginning' in this way, as a name of origin and not of sequence, we also add express mention of the very thing which we wish to be the beginning of another thing. For the rest, if we should put it thus, for example:
'In the beginning the potter made a basin or an urn,' then 'beginning' will no longer signify matter, for I did not name clay as the beginning, but the order of the work, because the potter first, before the rest, made the basin and the urn, being about thereafter to make the remaining things as well; the word 'beginning' will pertain to the ordering of works, not to the origin of substances. I can also interpret 'beginning' in another way, and not indeed out of place; for in Greek too the word for 'beginning,' which is arche, takes on a principate that is not only of order but also of authority, whence they call rulers and magistrates 'archons' too. Therefore according to this signification also 'beginning' will be taken for principate and power: for in His principate and power did God make the heaven and the earth.
XX. But even granting that the Greek word signifies nothing other than 'beginning,' and that 'beginning' means nothing other than 'commencement,' we still have that one who acknowledges herself to be a commencement, she who says: 'The Lord created me at the commencement of His works.' For if all things were made through the Wisdom of God, then God, in making heaven and earth in the beginning -- that is, at the commencement -- made them in His Wisdom. In short, if 'beginning' signified matter, Scripture would not have framed it thus, 'In the beginning God made,' but 'Out of the beginning'; for He would have made not in matter but out of matter. But of Wisdom it could be said: 'In the beginning.'
For in Wisdom He first made, since by thinking and disposing He had already made in her; because -- even if He had been about to make out of matter -- He had beforehand already made in Wisdom by thinking and disposing, seeing that she was 'the beginning of His ways,' inasmuch as thought and disposition are the first operation of Wisdom, establishing by way of forethought a road for the works. This authority also I claim for myself from Scripture, in that, when it shows both the God who made and the things which He made, it does not likewise attest the source from which He made. For since in every operation there are three principals -- he who makes, and that which is made, and that out of which it is made -- three names must be set forth in the lawful account of a work: the person of the maker, the kind of thing made, the form of the matter.
If matter is not set forth, in the place where both the works and the worker of the works are set forth, it is evident that He wrought out of nothing; for the source from which would likewise have been set forth, had He wrought out of something. In short, I shall bring in the Gospel as a supplement to the ancient document, in which all the more ought God to have been shown to have made all things out of some matter, in that there is revealed even Him through whom He made all things. 'In the beginning was the Word' -- in which beginning, namely, God made heaven and earth -- 'and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing.'
Since therefore here too there is made manifest both the maker, that is God, and the things made, that is all things, and the one through whom, that is the Word, would not the proper order have required it to be declared out of what all things were made by God through the Word, if they had been made out of something? Thus what did not exist Scripture could not declare, and by not declaring it, it sufficiently proved that it did not exist, for it would have declared it, had it existed. XXI. 'Therefore,' you say, 'if you for this reason prejudge that all things were made out of nothing, because nothing is manifestly reported to have been made out of preexisting matter, take heed lest the opposing party for the same reason contend that all things were made out of matter, because it is likewise not openly signified that anything was made out of nothing.' Plainly some things can easily be turned back, but not therefore at once and on equal terms admitted, where there is a difference in the case.
For I say that, even though Scripture did not openly declare that all things were made out of nothing, just as neither out of matter, there was not so great a necessity of openly signifying that all things were made out of nothing as there would have been, had they been made out of matter; because that which is made out of nothing, by the very fact that it is not shown to have been made out of anything, is manifested to have been made out of nothing, and runs no risk of being supposed to have been made out of something, since it is not demonstrated out of what it was made.
But that which is made out of something -- unless this very thing be openly declared, that it was made out of something, when the source out of which it was made is shown -- will run a risk: first, of seeming to have been made out of nothing, because the source out of which it was made is not set forth; then, even if its condition is such that it cannot but seem to have been made out of something, it will likewise run the risk of seeming to have been made out of a source far other than that out of which it actually was made, so long as the source from which it was made is not stated. Thus, if God could have made all things out of nothing, Scripture could have refrained from adding that He made them out of nothing; but it ought by all means to have declared that He made them out of matter, if indeed He had made them out of matter, because the former would have been understood in its entirety even if it were not signified, whereas the latter would remain in doubt unless it were signified. XXII.
And so much indeed has the Holy Spirit established this rule of His own Scripture, that whenever something is made out of something, it reports both what is made and whence it is made. 'Let the earth,' He says, 'bring forth the herb of grass sowing seed after its kind and after its likeness, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit whose seed is in itself after its likeness. And it was so. And the earth brought forth the herb of grass sowing seed after its kind, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit whose seed is in itself after its likeness.' And again: 'And God said, Let the waters bring forth the creeping things of living souls, and the flying fowl flying above the earth through the firmament of heaven. And it was so.'
'And God made the great sea-monsters and every soul of creeping living creatures, which the waters brought forth after their kind.' Likewise after these things: 'And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living soul after its kind, quadrupeds and creeping things and the beasts of the earth after their kind.' If therefore, when God brings forth other things out of things already made, He shows through the prophet and states both what He brought forth and from what -- although we could reckon whence those things were brought forth, provided only it be not out of nothing;
for certain things had already been made, out of which those could be seen to have been brought forth -- if the Holy Spirit expended so great a care for our instruction, that we might know what came forth from what, would He not likewise have made us informed also concerning heaven and earth, by signifying whence He had wrought them, if their origin consisted out of some matter, lest they should so much the more seem to have been wrought out of nothing, in that as yet nothing had been made out of which they could seem to have been wrought? And so, just as He shows, with regard to those things which were brought forth out of something, whence they were brought forth, so with regard to those things whose source He does not show, He confirms that they were brought forth out of nothing. Therefore, 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth.' I adore the fullness of Scripture, which reveals to me both the maker and the things made.
But in the Gospel I find, moreover, the Word to be also the minister and agent of the maker. But whether all things were made out of some underlying matter, I have nowhere yet read: let Hermogenes' workshop teach that it is written; if it is not written, let it fear that 'woe' appointed for those who add or take away. XXIII. But he argues from what follows, because it is written: 'And the earth was invisible and unformed.' For he reduces the very name of 'earth' to matter, on the ground that earth is that which was made out of it; and he directs the word 'was' to this, as of something that had always existed before, unborn and unmade -- invisible, moreover, and 'raw,' because he wishes matter to have been formless and confused and unarranged.
These opinions of his I shall refute one by one; but meanwhile I wish to answer him thus: Let us suppose that by these clauses matter is indicated; yet does Scripture, on the ground that it existed before all things, signify that any such thing was made out of it? On the contrary, it signifies nothing of the kind. Let matter have existed, as far as it is permitted to itself, or rather to Hermogenes: it could both have existed and yet God have made nothing out of it, either because it did not befit God to have had need of anything, or certainly because it is nowhere shown that He made anything out of matter. 'It would then be without cause,' you say. Not altogether so without cause. For even if the world was not made out of it, yet heresy has been made -- and that the more shameless in that heresy was not made out of matter, but rather heresy itself made matter.
XXIV. I now return to the individual clauses through which he supposed matter to be signified, and first I shall press the point concerning the names. For of these we read the one, that of 'earth,' but the other we do not find, that of 'matter.' I ask therefore: since the naming of 'matter' does not occur in Scripture, how is even the appellation 'earthy' fitted to it, when 'earth' is already known in another genus of substance? -- all the more since the naming of 'matter' too ought to have appeared, following upon the appellation of 'earth' as well, so that I might know that 'earth' is a name common to matter, lest I should claim it for that substance alone whose proper name it also is, in which it is the more known; or lest I should be able to share it with any other kind whatsoever -- and certainly not with all matter -- were I so minded.
For when there does not exist a proper name for that thing to which a common name is ascribed, the less it appears to whom it is to be ascribed, the more it can be ascribed to any other thing whatever. Thus Hermogenes, even if he could show matter to be named, ought to prove that the same was also surnamed 'earth,' so as thus to claim both words for it. XXV. He wishes, then, that two 'earths' be set forth in that passage of Scripture: one which in the beginning God made, another the matter out of which He made it, concerning which it is said: 'And the earth was invisible and raw.'
Now if I should ask, of these two, which ought to lend the name 'earth' to which, it will be said that this one, which was made out of that, derived the word from that out of which it was made, because it is more probable that the offspring should be named from the origin than the origin from the offspring. If this is so, another question envelops us: whether it is fitting that this earth, which God made out of that out of which He made it, derived its surname. For I hear from Hermogenes and the rest of the materialist heretics that that earth was indeed formless and invisible and raw, but that this earth of ours accordingly obtained both form and appearance and adornment from God, and thus was made a different thing from what that was out of which it was made. Moreover, being made a different thing, it could not be associated in name with that from whose condition it had departed.
If 'earth' was the proper name of that matter, then this one, which is not matter -- being made, forsooth, a different thing -- does not take on the name of 'earth' which is foreign to it and alien to its own state. 'But the made matter, that is, this earth, had a fellowship of name with its origin, just as also of kind.' Not so at all. For even a potsherd, though made out of clay, I shall no longer call clay but a potsherd; and electrum, though compounded out of gold and silver, I shall nevertheless call neither silver nor gold, but electrum. From whatever's condition a thing diverges, it withdraws equally also from the appellation of that thing, as it does from the property of its state. But how far this earth has passed over from the state of that earth, that is, of matter, is plain even from this, that in Genesis it receives the testimony of being good:
'And God saw that it was good'; whereas that other one, according to Hermogenes, is reckoned as the origin and cause of evils. Finally, if this earth is called earth because that one too is, why is not this matter also called matter because that one is? Nay, even heaven and all things, if they consist of matter, ought to have been called both earths and matters. Enough of this about the name of 'earth,' in which he wished matter to be understood -- a name which everyone knows to belong first to one single element by nature, then by Scripture's teaching, unless indeed we ought also to believe that Silenus who, before King Midas, asserted concerning another world, on the authority of Theopompus; but the same man also reports many gods. XXVI. For us, however, there is one God and one earth, which in the beginning God made.
Beginning to run through its order, Scripture first declares it to have been made, then expounds its quality -- just as, having professed that heaven too was first made: 'In the beginning God made heaven,' it thereafter superadds its arrangement: 'And He separated between the water which was below the firmament and that which was above the firmament, and God called the firmament heaven,' that very thing which He had made in the beginning. Likewise also concerning man: 'And God made man, in the image of God He made him,' and thereafter it renders how He made him: 'And God fashioned man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' And it is indeed fitting thus to enter upon a narration: first to preface, afterwards to proceed; first to name, then to describe.
Otherwise it would be idle, if of a thing of which He had premised no mention -- that is, matter, not even its very name -- Scripture had suddenly promulgated the form and appearance, narrating beforehand what sort it was before it had shown whether it was, deforming its shape while hiding its name. But how much more credibly, according to us, has Scripture subjoined the arrangement of that thing whose institution and at the same time naming it had premised! How coherent, in fine, is the sense: 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth, and the earth was invisible and raw' -- which earth God had of course made, and concerning which Scripture had just now most emphatically declared! For the very word 'but' (autem) is placed, like a clasp of a conjoining particle, to link up the narration: 'but the earth';
for by this word it reverts to that earth of which it had spoken above, and binds the sense together. Remove the 'but' from here, and the joint is loosened, so that it might then seem to have been said of another earth: 'The earth was invisible and raw.' XXVII. But you, raising your eyebrow higher with a nod of the head, a finger applied, and as it were casting it back, say 'was,' as though it had always been -- unborn, forsooth, and unmade, and therefore to be believed matter. But I, without any allurement of pronouncement, will simply reply that 'was' can be said of any thing whatever, even of that which has been made, which has been born, which at some time was not, and which is not matter. For everything that has being, from whatever source it has it, whether through a beginning or without a beginning, by this very fact that it is, will also be said to have 'been.'
To whatever the first positing of the verb belongs, in a definition, of that same thing the inflection of the verb will also run on into a relation of past time; 'is' makes the head of a definition, 'was' makes that of a relation. These are the subtleties and quibbles of the heretics, twisting the simplicity of common words into a controverted question: a great question, forsooth, whether the earth, which was made, 'was'! To be sure, it is to be discussed whether it fits her that she was invisible and raw who was made, or her out of whom she was made, so that the 'was' may belong to the same one as that which was. XXVIII. And yet we shall prove not only that this state was fitting to this earth, but also that it was not fitting to the other.
For if bare matter thus lay subject to God, with no element, of course, obstructing -- seeing that as yet there was nothing besides itself and God -- it certainly could not be invisible; for even though he should wish darkness to have existed in the substance of matter -- to which point we shall have to reply in its own place -- even to man darkness is visible, for this very fact that they are darkness is seen; much more to God. And certainly, if it were invisible, its quality could in no way be known. Whence then did Hermogenes ascertain that it was formless and confused and unquiet, that which lay hidden as invisible? Or, if this was revealed by God, he ought to prove it. Likewise I also demand whether it could be called 'raw.' For surely that is raw which is imperfect.
Certainly the imperfect cannot exist except in that which has been made; for that which has been less made is imperfect. 'Certainly,' you say. Therefore matter, which had not been made at all, could not have been imperfect; that which was not imperfect was also not raw. Having no beginning, because it had not been made, it lacked also its rudimentary stage; for the rudimentary stage is an accident of a beginning. But the earth, which was made, deserved also to be called raw; for as soon as it was made, it had the place of the imperfect before perfection. XXIX. Inasmuch as God consummated all His works in order, first marking out the world, as it were, with uncultivated elements, then dedicating it as it were with them adorned.
For He did not at once fill the light with the splendor of the sun, nor at once temper the darkness with the solace of the moon, nor at once mark the heaven with constellations and stars, nor at once throng the sea with monsters, nor at once endow the earth itself with its varied fecundity; but first He conferred existence upon it, then supplied that it should not be in vain. For thus also Isaiah says: 'He made it not in vain, but to be inhabited.'
Therefore, after it had been made, and was to be perfect as well, in the meantime it was invisible and raw -- raw indeed by this very fact too that it was invisible, so as not to be perfected even for sight, and likewise so as not yet to be furnished as regards the rest; but invisible, inasmuch as it was still covered over by the waters, as if by a protective wall of generative moisture, in which shape our own flesh, akin to it, is also brought forth. For David too sings thus: 'The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof, the world, and all who dwell in it; He hath founded it upon the seas, and prepared it upon the rivers.' For when the waters were separated off into the hollow of the gulfs, the dry land, which before this was covered by the waters, was made more prominent. Thenceforth, accordingly, it is also made visible, when God says:
'Let the water be gathered together into one gathering, and let the dry land appear.' 'Let it appear,' He says, not 'let it be made,' for it had already been made, but until then, though invisible, it was enduring to be seen; and 'dry,' because it was to be so as a result of the parting off of the moisture, yet still earth: 'and God called the dry land earth,' not matter. Thus also, having afterwards attained perfection, it ceases to be held raw, when God pronounces: 'Let the earth bring forth the herb of grass sowing seed after its kind and after its likeness, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit whose seed is in itself after its likeness'; likewise: 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul after its kind, both quadrupeds and creeping things and the beasts of the earth after their kind.'