But the man who believes that gods exist, yet does not think that they care for human affairs, must be gently admonished. 'O best of men,' let us say, 'that you believe in gods, some divine kinship perhaps leads you toward what is akin to you, to honor them and hold that they exist; but the fortunes of wicked and unjust men, both private and public — not truly happy, yet accounted supremely happy by opinion — improperly celebrated both in poetry and in every sort of discourse, lead you toward impiety, though not in an orderly fashion.'
Or perhaps also, seeing impious men reaching the end of life in old age, leaving behind children's children in the highest honors, you are now troubled — whenever, seeing in all these cases, or hearing of them, or even yourself becoming an eyewitness to some of them, you observe that many acts of impiety and terrible deeds have, precisely on account of these very things, brought some men from small beginnings to tyrannies and to the greatest positions. Then, on account of all such things, you are clearly unwilling to blame the gods as being the cause of such things, on account of your kinship with them; yet, being led on both by lack of reasoning and being unable to feel indignation at the gods, you have now come to this condition: to think that they exist, yet that they despise and neglect human affairs.
In order, then, that your present state of mind may not grow into a greater impiety, but that, if somehow we are able, as it were, to exorcise it by argument as it approaches, let us try, by joining together the discourse that follows, to make further use now of that same argument by which we from the beginning thoroughly refuted the man who does not believe in gods at all.
But you, Clinias and Megillus, on behalf of the young man, as in what went before, take up the task of answering in turn; and if any difficulty should arise in the arguments, I, taking it up on your behalf, just as I did a moment ago, will carry you across the river. — You speak rightly; do you act accordingly, and we, for our part, will do as far as possible what you say.
But perhaps it would be no difficult matter to demonstrate this very point, that the gods are no less careful of small things -- indeed more so -- than of those that surpass in greatness. For you were listening, surely, and were present when it was just now said that, being good, they possess as most proper to their own virtue the care of all things in their entirety. And indeed he was listening most attentively.
Next, then, let them jointly examine with us what virtue we mean when we affirm that they are good. Come now, do we say that temperance and the possession of understanding belong to virtue, and their opposites to vice? -- We do say so. -- And what of this: that courage belongs to virtue, and cowardice to vice?
Certainly. And shall we say that of these, some are shameful and some are noble? -- Necessarily. And shall we say that whatever is base belongs, if at all, to us, but that the gods have no part in such things, whether great or small? -- Everyone would agree to this as well.
What then? Shall we set down negligence, idleness, and self-indulgence as belonging to virtue of soul? Or how do you put it? -- How could we? -- Rather, to the opposite? -- Yes. -- Then their opposites belong to the opposite? -- To the opposite. -- What then? Would not everyone among us who is self-indulgent, negligent, and idle -- the sort of man the poet declared to be most like stingless drones -- turn out to be exactly such a one?
You have spoken most rightly. Therefore it must not be said that god has such a character as he himself hates; nor should anyone attempting to utter such a thing be permitted to do so. -- Indeed not; how could he? -- Now, in the case of one whose proper business is to act and to exercise care with special diligence over something, if such a one cares for great matters but neglects the small ones, on what ground could we praise such conduct without altogether erring? Let us examine it thus. Does not one who acts in such a way -- whether god or man -- act according to one of two kinds? -- What two kinds do we mean?
Either supposing that it makes no difference to the whole when the small things are neglected, or, though it does make a difference, neglecting them out of laziness and self-indulgence. Or does negligence arise in some other way? For surely, when it is impossible to care for everything, there will be no negligence in one who fails to care for small or great things of which he, being god or some base creature, falls short and is not able to provide care, being deficient in power. -- How could that be?
Now let the two of you, being two, answer us who are three: you who both agree that gods exist, though one of you holds that they can be won over by entreaty, and the other that they neglect small things. First, you both say that the gods know, and see, and hear all things, and that nothing of whatever falls within the range of sense-perception and knowledge can escape them. Do you maintain that these matters stand thus, or how? -- Thus.
What then? That they are able to do all things that mortal and immortal power can achieve? -- How could they not be granted to hold this as well? -- And moreover, we five have agreed that they are good and best of all. -- Certainly. -- Is it not then impossible to admit that beings such as we say they are should do anything whatsoever out of laziness and self-indulgence? For among us idleness is the offspring of cowardice, and laziness the offspring of idleness and self-indulgence.
You speak most truly. None of the gods, then, neglects anything out of idleness and laziness, for cowardice has no part in him at all. -- You speak most rightly. -- What remains, then, is that if they neglect the small and few matters concerning the whole, they would do so either knowing that there is no need at all to care for such things -- or what else remains except knowing the opposite? -- Nothing else.
Which then, O most excellent and best of men, shall we suppose you to be saying: that they are ignorant, and neglect what they ought to care for out of ignorance; or that, knowing they ought, they nevertheless, as the basest of men are said to do, though knowing that other things would be better to do than what they do, fail to do them because they are overcome by certain pleasures or pains?
How could that be? Now human affairs partake of the nature endowed with soul, and man himself is the most god-fearing of all living creatures. -- So it seems, at any rate. -- Yet we say that all mortal living beings, or beings endowed with mind, are possessions of the gods, as indeed is the whole heaven of which they are part. -- How could it be otherwise?
Now then, let anyone say whether these things are small or great in the gods' estimation; for in neither case would it be fitting for those who possess us to neglect us, being as they are most careful and best. Let us also consider this further point in addition. -- What point? -- With regard to perception and power, are these not so constituted by nature as to stand opposite to each other in respect of ease and difficulty? -- What do you mean?
To see and to hear small things is surely more difficult than great ones, whereas to carry, master, and take care of small and few things is easier for anyone than the opposite. -- Yes, much easier. -- Suppose, then, a physician charged with healing a whole body, who is both willing and able: will it turn out well for the whole if he cares for the great parts but neglects the small parts and members? -- Not at all.
Nor indeed for pilots, or generals, or household managers, or certain statesmen, or anyone else of that sort, can many or great things go well apart from few or small ones; for even masons say that the great stones do not lie well without the small ones. -- How could it be otherwise?
Let us not, then, ever suppose god to be inferior to mortal craftsmen, who, the better they are, produce their proper works, small and great alike, with a single skill all the more exactly and perfectly; nor suppose that god, being most wise, and both willing and able to care for things, should altogether neglect the things that are easier to care for, being small, like some idle or cowardly person shrinking from toil, while caring only for the great ones.
By no means, stranger, let us accept such an opinion about the gods; for in no way would we be thinking a notion that is either pious or true. -- It seems to me that we have now already argued at sufficient length and with due measure against the man who loves to accuse the gods of negligence. -- Yes. -- In that we have compelled him by our arguments to admit that he was not speaking rightly. Yet it seems to me that he still stands in need of certain incantations and some further myths besides. -- Of what sort, my good friend?
Let us persuade the young man by our arguments that for him who takes care of the whole, all things have been ordered with a view to the preservation and virtue of the whole, and that each part, as far as it is able, suffers and does what is proper to it. Over these parts rulers have been appointed, one for each, presiding down to the smallest instance of experience and action, having been perfected to the utmost point of division.
Of these your own portion too, unhappy man, is one, and it ever strains, looking toward the whole, small as it altogether is. But it has escaped you, concerning this very thing, that all becoming comes to be for the sake of that whole, so that there may exist for the life of the universe a blessed being, coming to be not for your sake, but you for its sake. For every physician and every skilled craftsman works all things for the sake of the whole, striving toward what is best in common, and produces the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part.
But you are indignant, not knowing how what is best for you contributes to the whole, and to yourself as well, according to the power belonging to the common process of becoming. And since soul, being ever joined to a body, now to one, now to another, undergoes all manner of changes, either through itself or through another soul, no other task is left to the player of the game but to transfer the character that becomes better to a better place, and the worse to a worse, so that each may receive the portion befitting it.
In what way do you mean this? -- In the very way that would give an account of the ease of the gods' care for all things -- that, I think, is how I mean to explain it. For if someone, always looking to the whole, were to mold and reshape all things by transforming them, as it were making ensouled water out of fire, and not many things out of one, or one out of many -- things that have partaken of a first, second, or even third generation -- the ordering that would have to be transposed would be infinite in multitude. But as it is, there is a wondrous ease for him who takes care of the whole.
How do you mean this in turn? -- In this way. Since our king beheld that all our actions are ensouled, and that in them there is much virtue and much vice, and that soul and body, once brought into being, are indestructible though not eternal -- as are the gods who exist by law; for the generation of living creatures would never have come to be if either of these two perished -- and since he understood that the good of the soul, by nature, always tends to benefit, and the bad to harm; having taken all this into view together, he devised where each of the parts, being situated, might most fully, most easily, and most excellently secure the victory of virtue and the defeat of vice throughout the whole.
He has devised, then, with regard to this whole matter, what sort of thing, on becoming such as it is, must always take and be settled in what kind of seat, and in what places; but the causes of the becoming of a thing of such-and-such a kind he has left to the wills of each of us. For according to whatever any of us desires and whatever character his soul happens to have, in that direction, virtually every time, each of us becomes such a person for the most part. -- That, at any rate, is likely.
Now all things that partake of soul undergo change, possessing within themselves the cause of change; and as they change, they are borne along according to the order and law of destiny. Those whose characters change to a lesser degree travel a shorter distance over the level of the region, but those that fall in greater and more unjust measure travel into the depths, into the places called the lower regions, which men, naming them Hades and names akin to these, greatly fear and dream about, both while living and once dissolved from their bodies. But whenever a soul undergoes a greater change toward vice or toward virtue, through its own will and the strong association it has formed -- whenever, mingling with divine virtue, it becomes eminently such -- it likewise changes its place eminently, an entirely holy place, being transported to some other, better place; but when it changes in the opposite direction, it likewise relocates its own life to the opposite region.
This, indeed, is the judgment of the gods who hold Olympus, O boy and young man, who suppose yourself neglected by the gods: that becoming worse, you journey toward souls that are worse, and becoming better, toward souls that are better, both in life and in every kind of death, both suffering and doing what it is fitting for like to do and undergo at the hands of like.
Neither you nor any other unfortunate man will ever pray to escape this judgment of the gods, a judgment which those who ordained it have appointed as pre-eminent above all judgments, and one that must altogether be guarded against with the utmost care. For you will never be neglected by it. You will not be so small as to sink into the depths of the earth and escape, nor, becoming lofty, will you fly up into heaven and escape; but you will pay the fitting penalty, whether remaining here, or passing through Hades, or even being carried off from these places to some still holier region.
The same account holds for you also concerning those whom you have observed becoming great out of small beginnings after committing impious deeds, or doing something of that sort, and whom you supposed to have become happy out of wretched -- and, as though in mirrors, you thought you had beheld in their actions the neglect of all things by the gods, not knowing their final outcome, how it in the end contributes to the whole. To know this, O most courageous of all men, you seem not in the least to consider necessary -- yet without knowing it, no one could ever discern even the general pattern, nor would he be able to form any reasoned account concerning life with a view to happiness and to unhappy fortune.
If these arguments persuade you -- Cleinias here, and this whole council of elders of ours -- that concerning the gods you do not know what you are saying, then god himself would rightly assist you. But if you should still be in need of further argument, listen as we speak to the third man, if you have any understanding at all.
The sense of these things, even if not the very words, has already been set down beforehand, most concisely and in a few words comprehending the thought, in the oracles of the Hebrews. For the statement, 'You will not be so small as to sink into the depths of the earth, nor, becoming lofty, will you fly up into heaven,' would be similar to that saying in David which runs thus: 'Where shall I go from your Spirit, and where shall I flee from your presence? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into Hades, you are present.'
'If I should take wings and dwell at the farthest ends of the sea, even there your hand will guide me.' But also the saying, 'The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands.' And again in Isaiah: 'Lift up your eyes on high, and see who has revealed all these things.' And this too, that the Creator is contemplated proportionately from the greatness and beauty of created things; and also this: 'For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are perceived and clearly seen through the things that are made, both his eternal power and divinity.' But also the saying, 'I was jealous of the lawless, beholding the peace of sinners,' seems to me to have been paraphrased by Plato through the words, 'The same account holds for you also concerning those whom you have observed becoming great out of small beginnings after committing impious deeds, or doing something of that sort, and whom you supposed to have become happy out of wretched.' And all the other things that have been said in a similar way to these had already been anticipated by the interpretation which Plato set forth at length, in the writings of the Hebrews. Indeed, you would find each of these, examined precisely one by one, in agreement with the Hebrew scriptures. And by 'the writings of the Hebrews' I mean not only the oracles found in Moses, but also those of the other men, beloved of God, who came after Moses, whether prophets or also apostles of our Savior, whose harmony of doctrines would rightly entitle them to one and the same designation.