福音的預備 第 15 章 第 4/5 段

Therefore, when from a single union and a single seed twin offspring come to be — or, as in the case of other animals, very many — the seed being divided into many places, and yet the whole seed-power is present in each part, how does this not teach those willing to learn that, where the part is identical with the whole, this entity transcends being a quantity in its very substance, and is necessarily without quantity? For thus it would remain the same, even though quantity is being subtracted, inasmuch as quantity and mass are of no concern to it, its substance being something other than quantity. Soul, therefore, and the rational principles (logoi) are without quantity.

That, if soul were a body, there would be neither sense-perception, nor thought, nor knowledge, nor virtues, nor anything of what is noble, is clear from the following. If anything is to perceive something, it must itself be one, and must apprehend everything by means of the same single faculty; and this holds even if the things entering through many sense-organs are several, or if there are many qualities concerning one thing, or if the object perceived is varied even though perceived through one sense, as, for example, a face.

For it is not one thing that perceives the nose, and another thing the eye, but the same thing perceives all together. And if one perception comes through the eyes, another through hearing, there must be some single thing to which both belong; otherwise how could one say that these are different, unless the sensations had come together into the same subject? This perceiving subject, then, must be like a center, with lines converging from the circumference of a circle, the perceptions from every direction terminating at it, and that which apprehends must be truly one in this way.

But if this percipient were divided, and the perceptions were to strike, as it were, at both ends of a line, then either they will run together again into one and the same point — say, the middle, or some other point — or else each of the two ends will have perception of one sensation separately, just as if I were to perceive one thing and you another.

And if the sensation is one — say, of a face — it will be contracted into one, which is indeed what appears to happen; for it is contracted even within the very pupils themselves (otherwise how could the largest things be seen through them?) — so that, coming still further into the ruling faculty (hēgemonikon), they become, as it were, partless acts of apprehension. And this ruling faculty will be partless — or else, being of some magnitude, it would be divided along with the sensations, so that one part of us would perceive one part of the object, and no one of us would have apprehension of the whole sensible object.

But in fact the whole is one; for how indeed could it be divided proportionally to the object? For surely the equal will not fit the equal, since the ruling faculty is not equal in magnitude to every sensible object. According to what measures, then, would the division occur? Or will it be divided into as many parts as the number the incoming sensation has in its variety?

And so each of those parts of the soul will, in turn, perceive by means of its own further parts. Or will the parts of the parts be without perception? But that is impossible. And if each and every part will perceive the whole, then, since magnitude is by nature divisible to infinity, it will follow that infinite perceptions occur for each part concerning each sensible object — as, for instance, infinite images of the same thing in our ruling faculty.

Moreover, if the perceiving subject is a body, perception could occur in no other way than as seal-impressions stamped by rings into wax, the sensations being impressed either upon blood or upon air. Now if this happens as in moist bodies — which is indeed the reasonable assumption — then, as in water, it will be blurred together, and there will be no memory —

But if the imprints remain, then either it is impossible for other imprints to be impressed while those earlier ones hold their place, so that there will be no other perceptions; or else, when other imprints come to be, the earlier ones will be destroyed, so that there will be no such thing as remembering. But if there is such a thing as remembering, and perceiving one thing after another without the earlier ones getting in the way, it is impossible for the soul to be a body.

One could see this same point also from the perception of pain. When a person is said to feel pain in a finger, the pain itself, presumably, is around the finger, while the perception of the pain — as they will surely admit — occurs around the ruling faculty. Since, then, the part in pain is one thing, and the ruling faculty of the pneuma is what perceives, the whole soul undergoes the same experience.

How, then, does this happen? By transmission, they will say — the psychic pneuma around the finger being affected first, and passing it on to the next portion, and this to another, until it reaches the ruling faculty.

It is necessary, then, that if the first portion perceived the pain, the perception of the second portion be a different one; and if the perception occurs by transmission, that of the third be different again, and so there will come to be many, indeed infinite, perceptions concerning a single pain, and it is only after all of these that the ruling faculty perceives — and, besides these, has yet another perception of its own.

But the truth is that none of those transmitted perceptions would be a perception of the pain in the finger itself — rather, the one next to the finger would be a perception that the instep hurts, and the third that something else, further up, hurts, so that there would be many pains; and the ruling faculty would not perceive the pain located at the finger, but only the one located next to itself, and would know only this, letting the rest go unheeded — not even knowing that the finger hurts.

If, then, since the perceiving subject is a mass, the perception occurs by transmission, one part being affected and another having the knowledge of it — this is absurd. For, since in every magnitude one part is other than another part, one must posit the percipient to be such that it is everywhere the same to itself. But this befits something else among beings, rather than a body, to accomplish.

That thinking, too, would be impossible, if the soul were any kind of body, must be shown from the following. For if sense-perception is the soul's apprehending sensible things by making use of a body, then thinking either would not be an apprehending through the body, or else it would be identical with sense-perception.

If, then, thinking is apprehending without body, it is much more necessary that the thinking subject not be a body, since sense-perception is of sensibles, but thought is of intelligibles. And even if they are unwilling to grant this, there will nonetheless be, at any rate, acts of thinking concerning certain intelligible things, and apprehensions of things without magnitude.

How, then, will something possessing magnitude think what has no magnitude, and how will something divisible think what is indivisible? Perhaps by some partless portion of itself? But if so, then that which thinks will not be a body. For surely there is no need of the whole in order to touch the object of thought; a single point suffices.

If, then, they will grant that the primary objects of thought — which is indeed true — are the purest realities, utterly free of body, the very essence of each thing, then the thinking subject too must, of necessity, know them by being pure of body, or by becoming so. But if they say that the objects of thought are the forms in matter, still, thinking of these occurs only when the bodies are separated in thought, the intellect itself doing the separating.

For surely the separation of circle, triangle, line, and point does not occur along with flesh, or with matter at all. Therefore, in this act of separation, the soul must also separate itself from body. Therefore it must not itself be a body. And I suppose that the beautiful and the just are also without magnitude, and therefore so too is the thinking of them. So that these, as they come to the soul, will be received by its partless part, and will lie stored within it as partless things.

And how, if the soul is a body, could its virtues — temperance and justice, courage and the others — be what they are? For temperance, or justice, or courage would then be some kind of pneuma, or some kind of blood — unless, that is, courage should be the resistance-to-suffering of the pneuma, and temperance its good mixture (eukrasia), and beauty some good form in bodily shapes, in respect of which we say, upon seeing them, that bodies are comely and beautiful.

It might, then, be fitting for pneuma to be strong and comely in shape; but what need has pneuma of being temperate? Rather, on the contrary, it would seem fitting for it to fare well in embraces and touches, where it will be warmed, or will crave a moderate degree of coolness, or will draw near to certain things that are soft and simple and smooth. But what concern would it have for distributing to each according to merit?

Does the soul, then, lay hold of the contemplative principles of virtue and of the other intelligibles as being eternal, or does virtue come to be in someone, and benefit him, and again perish? But who then would be its maker, and whence would it come? For in that case it would again have to remain as an eternal principle. It must, therefore, be something eternal and abiding, like the objects of geometry. But if it is eternal and abiding, it is not made of bodies. And therefore that in which it is to reside must be of the same kind — and hence must not be a body. For the whole nature of body does not abide, but flows.

But if, seeing the operations of bodies — heating and cooling and pushing and weighing down — they place the soul here among bodies, as though establishing it in a place of activity, they fail to notice, first, that these very bodies accomplish these effects by means of incorporeal powers within them; and second, that we do not claim that these physical powers are what pertain to soul, but rather thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, and taking thoughtful and good care of all things — and this activity requires another kind of substance than body.

So then, by transferring the powers of incorporeal things over to bodies, they leave nothing of these powers for the incorporeals themselves. That bodies, too, are able to do what they do by incorporeal powers, is clear from the following. They will admit that quality is different from quantity, and that every body is a quantity — and further, that not every body is a quantity in the same primary sense, as, for instance, matter. In admitting these things, they will thereby admit that quality, being different from quantity, is also different from body.

For how could quality, not being a quantity, be a body, if indeed every body is a quantity? Moreover — as was said somewhere above — if every body, when divided, in every case loses something of what it was, and yet, when a body is broken into small pieces, the same whole quality remains in each part — as, for instance, the sweetness of honey is no less sweetness in each part — then sweetness cannot be a body. And likewise for the other qualities.

Furthermore, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary that the strong powers have large masses, and those capable of doing little have small masses. But if, in fact, some bodies with large masses have weak powers, while a few with the smallest masses have the greatest powers, then the capacity to act must be attributed to something other than magnitude; therefore, to something without magnitude.

As for the fact that matter, being itself the same body, as they say, produces different effects by acquiring different qualities — how does this not make it clear that the things thus acquired are themselves rational principles (logoi) and incorporeal? Nor let them say that living beings die when pneuma or blood departs. For it is not possible to exist without these, nor without many other things, of which soul would certainly not consist. And indeed, neither pneuma nor blood is present throughout the whole of the living being, whereas soul is.

Moreover, if soul, being a body, passed through the whole of the body it ensouls, it would necessarily be mixed with it, in the manner in which mixture occurs among other bodies. But if the mixture of bodies allows none of the things mixed to remain in actuality what it was, then soul, too, would no longer be present in bodies in actuality, but only potentially, having lost its very being as soul — just as, when sweet and bitter are mixed, the sweet no longer exists as such. But that would mean we would not have a soul at all.

But if, being a body, it is mixed with body throughout its whole extent, in such a way that wherever the one is, the other is also, and both occupy an equal bulk and together fill the whole, and no increase occurs when the second is added into it, then it will leave nothing uncut. For the mixture does not take place by alternation of large parts (for they say that would produce mere juxtaposition), but the ingredient passes completely through into ever smaller portions — which is impossible, namely that the lesser should become equal to the greater. In any case, having passed all the way through, it cuts through everything in every part.

It is therefore necessary that, if it is cut at every single point, and there is no body left between the cuts that has not been cut, the division of the body will have been made into mere points — which is impossible. And since the cutting is carried to infinity (for whatever body you take is divisible), the infinities will exist not merely in potency but in actuality. It is not possible, then, for a body to pass wholly through a whole other body; but the soul does pass through the whole body; therefore it is incorporeal.

As for saying that the same pneuma is first 'nature,' and that, becoming chilled and tempered by cold, it becomes 'soul,' having become finer in the cold — this too is absurd. For many living creatures come to be in heat, and possess a soul that has not been chilled. Yet they say that 'nature' is prior to soul, coming about by external chance occurrences.

It follows for them, then, that they make the inferior thing first, and before this again another, lesser thing still, which they call 'habit' (hexis). And 'mind' (nous) comes last, evidently arising from the soul — or, if mind is before all things, they ought in due order to have made soul next, and then nature; and the later is always inferior, if indeed things proceed according to nature.

If, then, according to them, God too is posterior in respect of mind, and generated, and possesses thinking as something acquired from outside, it might well turn out that there is neither soul nor mind nor God at all. For if that which exists potentially comes to be without something existing beforehand in actuality — even mind itself — it will never arrive at actuality. For what will be the thing that leads it forth, if there is no other thing prior to it, beside it? And if it is to lead itself into actuality, that is absurd; rather, it will lead itself by looking toward something — something that will not exist potentially, but in actuality.

And yet that which always remains the same — if indeed it will possess what is potential — will of itself come to actuality; and this will be superior to that which is merely potential, as being the object of desire for it. The superior thing, then, is prior, having a nature other than body, and always existing in actuality; mind and soul, then, are prior to nature. Soul, therefore, is not to be understood in the way pneuma is, nor as body. But that it is not body has been stated by us, and other things have been said by others too; and what has been said here is sufficient.

But since it is also of another nature, we must inquire what this nature is. Is it, then, something other than body, yet still belonging to body — such as a 'harmony'? For those around Pythagoras, speaking of harmony in a different sense, supposed it, the soul, to be something of the sort that the harmony of strings also is.

For just as, when the strings there are stretched taut, something like an affection supervenes upon them, which is called harmony, in the same way also, in the case of our body, when unlike elements are mixed together, the particular mixture produces both life and soul, soul being the affection consequent upon the mixture. But that this is impossible has already been argued at length against this opinion.

For it has been shown that soul is prior, and harmony posterior; and that soul rules and governs the body and struggles with it in many ways, whereas harmony, being what it is, could not do this; and that soul is a substance, whereas harmony is not a substance; and that the mixture of the bodies of which we are composed, when it is in due proportion, would be what we call health; and that, on this view, a different mixture in each part would produce a different soul, so that there would be many souls; and this is the greatest objection of all — that there must necessarily be, prior to this soul, another soul that produces this harmony, just as in the case of instruments there is the musician who imparts the harmony to the strings, possessing within himself the principle according to which he will tune them.

For neither there can the strings, of themselves, nor here can the bodies, of themselves, bring themselves into harmony. In general, these people make ensouled things out of the unsouled, and things ordered by chance out of things disordered, and claim that order does not come from soul, but that soul itself has received its existence from a spontaneous order. But this is impossible, whether in particular cases or in others generally. Soul, therefore, is not harmony.

These, then, are the arguments drawn from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who assert that it is corporeal. But since I have set forth sufficiently, in summary, both the arguments against Aristotle's matter and the Peripatos, and those against the Stoic school, it is time to turn back again and examine together the marvelous accounts of nature given by all the noble philosophers together, from that time when the Greeks in general, one and all, considered and revered as visible gods the sun and moon and the rest of the stars, and the other parts of the cosmos, and have transposed their mythical and nonsensical narratives concerning the error of polytheism into more dignified and 'physical' explanations, applied to the elements and to the parts of the whole universe.

For this reason it seems to me necessary to collect together the opinions concerning these matters as well, and to observe carefully both their disagreements and the vanity of their conceit. I shall set these forth too, from the writing of Plutarch, in which, having gathered together the opinions of both the older and the more recent philosophers on all these matters at once, he writes in the following manner. On the Sun.

Anaximander says the sun is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the earth, having a rim similar to a chariot-wheel, hollow, full of fire, which at a certain point reveals the fire through an opening, as through the nozzle of a bellows-pipe; and this is the sun.

Xenophanes says the sun is composed of tiny fires that appear, gathered together from moist exhalation, these tiny fires gathering together to form the sun out of fiery clouds.

The Stoics say the sun is an intelligent kindling of fire from the sea.

Plato says: from a very great mass of fire.

Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus say: a red-hot mass of metal, or a fiery rock.

Aristotle says: a sphere composed of the fifth body, that is, the ether.

Philolaus the Pythagorean says the sun is a disk of glass-like material, which receives the reflected radiance of the fire that is in the cosmos, and filters the light through to us; so that the fiery thing in heaven which we call the sun resembles the light dispersed toward us by reflection from a mirror — for we also call this reflected light 'sun,' as it were an image of an image.

Empedocles says there are two suns: the one, the archetypal fire in one hemisphere of the cosmos, filling that hemisphere, always situated directly opposite its own reflected radiance; the other being the visible reflected radiance in the other hemisphere — the one filled with heat-mingled air — arising by reflection from the round earth into the crystalline sun-disk, and being carried around together with the motion of the fiery archetype. To state it briefly and in summary, the sun is the reflected radiance of the fire that surrounds the earth.

Epicurus says: an earthy compaction, pumice-like, and spongy in its perforations, kindled by fire.

On the size of the sun. Anaximander says that the sun itself is equal to the earth, but that the circle from which it has its outlet of fire, and by which it is carried, is twenty-seven times the size of the earth.

Anaxagoras says the sun is many times larger than the Peloponnese.

Heraclitus says the sun is the breadth of a human foot.

Epicurus, again, says that all the aforementioned possibilities are admissible: either it is exactly as large as it appears, or a little larger, or a little smaller.

On the shape of the sun. Anaximenes says it is flat, like a leaf.

Heraclitus says it is boat-shaped, slightly curved.

The Stoics say it is spherical, like the cosmos and the stars.

Epicurus says all the aforementioned are admissible. Such, then, for them, is the great god of the heavenly phenomena, the sun. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews busy themselves with none of these things.

On the moon. Anaximander says the moon is a circle nineteen times the size of the earth, as in the case of the sun, full of fire, and that it undergoes eclipse according to the turnings of the wheel. It resembles a chariot-wheel, having a hollow rim, and full of fire, having a single outlet.

Xenophanes says it is a compressed cloud.

The Stoics say it is a mixture of fire and air.

Plato says it is composed chiefly of the earthy element.

Anaxagoras and Democritus say it is a fiery solid mass, having within itself plains and mountains and ravines.

Heraclitus says it is earth surrounded by mist.

Pythagoras says it is of a fire-like body.

On the size of the moon. The Stoics declare it to be larger than the earth, as also the sun.

Parmenides says it is equal to the sun; for indeed it is illuminated by it.

On the shape of the moon. The Stoics say it is spherical, like the sun. Heraclitus says it is boat-shaped. Empedocles says it is disk-shaped. Others say it is cylinder-shaped.

On the illumination of the moon. Anaximander says that it has its own light, but somewhat rarefied and dimmer.

Antiphon says that the moon shines with its own light, but that the light concealed around it is dimmed by the impact of the sun's light, since it is the nature of the stronger fire to dim the weaker — which indeed happens also in the case of the other stars.

Thales and his followers say that the moon is illuminated by the sun.

Heraclitus says that the sun and the moon are affected in the same way; for the heavenly bodies, being boat-shaped in form, receive emanations from the moist exhalation, and are illuminated in accordance with what is presented to view — the sun being brighter because it moves through purer air, while the moon moves through murkier air, and for this reason appears dimmer.

What is the substance of the wandering and fixed stars. Thales says the stars are earthy, but fiery, that is, containing fire.

Empedocles says the stars are fiery, formed out of the fiery element which the air, containing it within itself, squeezed out at the first separation of the elements.

Anaxagoras says that the surrounding air is fiery in its substance, and that, by the vigor of its whirling motion, it snatched up rocks from the earth and set them ablaze, and thus turned them into stars.

Diogenes says the stars are pumice-like, and considers them to be the breathing-vents of the cosmos. And the same Diogenes says again that they are invisible stones, which often, when they fall to earth, are extinguished — just like the stony star that fell fiery at Aegospotami.

Empedocles says that the fixed stars are bound fast to the crystalline sphere, while the planets are set free.

Plato says the stars are for the most part fiery, but sharing also in the other elements, after the manner of glue binding them together.

Xenophanes says the stars are formed out of ignited clouds, and that, being extinguished each day, they are rekindled at night, just like coals; for their risings and settings are kindlings and extinguishings.

Heraclides and the Pythagoreans say that each of the stars is a cosmos, containing earth and air and ether, existing within the infinite. These doctrines are found also in the Orphic writings; for they too make each of the stars into a cosmos of its own.

Epicurus rejects none of these views, holding fast to what is possible.

On the shape of the stars. The Stoics say the stars are spherical, just like the cosmos, and the sun, and the moon.

Cleanthes says they are cone-shaped.

Anaximenes says they are like nails fixed fast in the crystalline sphere. But some say they are fiery leaves, as if set into a crystalline vault. Such, then, are the discoveries of these marvelous philosophers concerning the gods they claim appear in the sky. As for what they have determined concerning the universe as a whole, learn it likewise from the very voice of Plutarch.

How the cosmos was constituted. The cosmos, then, was shaped into a curved form in the following manner. The atomic bodies, having a motion that is unplanned and random, moving continuously and with the greatest speed, many bodies were gathered together into the same place, and, because of this, having a variety of shapes and sizes.

As these were gathered together in the same place, those that were larger and heaviest of all sank down beneath, while those that were small and round and smooth and slippery were squeezed out during the coming-together of the bodies, and were carried upward into the region above.

So then, when the striking force that raised them aloft failed, and the impact no longer carried them upward, while at the same time they were prevented from being borne downward, they were compressed toward the places able to receive them. And these were the surrounding, outer regions.

And toward these surrounding regions the multitude of bodies was bent around; and, becoming entangled with one another in this curving-around, they generated the heaven. And the atoms, holding fast to this same nature, being various in shape, as has been said, being pushed out toward the region above, produced the nature of the stars.

The multitude of bodies rising as exhalation struck against the air and squeezed it out. This air, being turned into wind by the motion, and enclosing the stars, carried them around together with itself, and preserved their present circular motion aloft. And then, from the bodies that had settled down, the earth came into being; and from those raised aloft, there came into being heaven, fire, and air.

And since much matter was still contained within the earth, and this was being compressed by the blows from the winds and the breezes from the stars, the whole fine-particled configuration of it was squeezed together further, and generated the moist nature, that is, water.

Being disposed in a fluid state, this moisture flowed down toward the hollow places able to contain and hold it fast; or else the water itself, having settled by itself, hollowed out the places lying beneath it.

Such, then, is also their marvelous cosmogony. Bound up with these matters is yet another very extensive war of words, in which they have raised all sorts of puzzling questions and propositions: whether one must hold the universe to be one or many; whether the cosmos is one or several; whether it is ensouled and happens to be governed by the providence of God, or the contrary; whether it is imperishable or perishable; whence it is nourished; and from what point God began to fashion the cosmos; concerning the order of the cosmos, and what is the cause of its being tilted; concerning what lies outside the circumference of the cosmos; and which are the right-hand and left-hand parts of the cosmos; concerning heaven; and, in addition to all these, concerning daemons and heroes; concerning matter and concerning the Forms; concerning the order of the universe as a whole; further still, concerning the motion and movement of the stars; and, besides these, whence the stars derive their light; and concerning the so-called Dioscuri; concerning the eclipse of the sun and of the moon; and concerning the moon's phases; and why it appears earthy; and concerning its distances; and further, concerning years.

Since Plutarch, having cut all this material short — material that had been elaborated at immense length by those concerned with these matters — condensed it into a few statements, gathering together at the same time their conclusions and their disagreements, I think that it will not be useless for us also to set these forth, for the reasonable rejection of them. For since these men themselves have taken up positions diametrically opposed to one another, and have kindled nothing more against each other than battles and wars, each one refuting his neighbor's views out of a rivalry in argument, how could anyone whosoever not fairly agree that it has become safe for us to maintain suspension of judgment concerning these matters?

I shall add, next, to what has been said, all the questions they have raised concerning things closer to the earth as well: concerning the shape of the earth, and concerning its position and inclination; and further, concerning the sea — so that you may know that these noble men did not disagree only about the celestial and lofty matters, but that they have also been at variance concerning things around the earth. And so that you may marvel yet more at the wisdom of these wise men, I shall add also all that they contended about concerning the soul and the ruling faculty within it, they who were not even able to recognize what sort of nature they themselves possessed. But let us go back up to the first of the things stated.

Whether the universe is one. The philosophers of the Stoa, then, declared that there is one cosmos, which they also said is the universe, the All, and consists of corporeal things.

Empedocles says there is one cosmos, yet the cosmos is not the whole universe, the All, but only a small part of the All, while the rest is inert matter.

Plato establishes his view — that the cosmos is one and the All is one — by three arguments: from the fact that it would not be perfect unless it encompassed all things; from the fact that it would not be like its paradigm unless it were unique, only-begotten; from the fact that it would not be imperishable if there were something outside it.

But against Plato it must be said that the cosmos is not perfect, for it does not encompass all things; for indeed a human being is complete, yet does not encompass all things; and there are many paradigms, as in the case of statues and houses and paintings. And how is it perfect, if some part of it can revolve independently? Nor is it imperishable, nor can it be, since it is generated.

Metrodorus says it is absurd that a single ear of grain should be produced in a great plain, and absurd likewise that a single cosmos should exist in the infinite. That the number of cosmoi is infinite is clear from the fact that the causes are infinite. For if the cosmos is finite, but all the causes from which the cosmos came to be are infinite, then the cosmoi must necessarily be infinite in number. For wherever all the causes have come to be, there also are the effects. And the causes are either the atoms or the elements.

Whether the world is animate and governed by providence. [All the others hold it to be animate and governed.]

But Democritus and Epicurus, who introduce atoms and the void, hold that it is neither animate nor governed by providence, but by a certain irrational nature.

Aristotle holds that the world is not animate as a whole throughout, nor indeed sentient, nor rational, nor intellective, nor governed by providence. For the heavenly bodies partake of all these—since they comprise spheres that are animate and full of life—but the terrestrial regions partake of none of them; and they share in the world's good order only incidentally, not primarily.

Whether the world is imperishable. Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics hold that the world was brought into being by God; and that, so far as its own nature goes, it is perishable—for it is perceptible, because it is corporeal—yet that it will not actually perish, being preserved by the providence and cohesive power of God.

Epicurus holds that the world is perishable, because it was generated, like an animal or like a plant.

Xenophanes holds that the world is ungenerated, eternal, and imperishable.