'But also the Fates are named from the fact that something has been divided and apportioned to each of us. And thus also "what must be" is said to mean what falls to and is due to each according to fate. And he suggests that the number of the Fates corresponds to the three time-periods in which all things revolve in a cycle and through which they are accomplished.'
'And Lachesis is so called from the fact that what has been fated falls by lot to each; Atropos, from the unturning and unchangeable character of the apportionment; and Clotho, from the fact that all things have been spun together and interwoven, and that there is one certain ordered course among them. For by babbling these and similar things he thinks he demonstrates the necessity present in all things.'
It occurs to me to marvel whether, in saying such things, he did not perceive his own idle talk. For let it be granted that men, employing these notions, as he himself explains by etymology, established the names now set forth, holding the opinion that fate has seized all things, and that the causes, predetermined from eternity in all things that exist and come to be, are unalterable.
Why then, O Chrysippus, do you follow all the opinions of men, and none seems to you to be mistaken about anything, but all are perceivers of the truth?
How then do you say that there is no man, except the wise man, who does not seem to you to be mad in equal measure with Orestes and Alcmaeon? Yet you also say that only one or two have ever become wise, while all the others, through folly, have been mad to the same degree as those mentioned above.
And how do you overturn their opinions as mistaken - such as those concerning wealth and reputation and tyranny, and pleasure in general, which most men have considered goods? And how do you say that all the established laws and constitutions are in error? Or why did you compose so great a multitude of books, if men held no mistaken opinions about anything?
For in the first place, not even you yourself claim to be wise, still less do we, so that we should make it a criterion for judging that they at some point think rightly, that their opinion should coincide with yours; and secondly, even if this were true, why should it be necessary to say that all are equally mad, and not rather, insofar as they appeared to hold the same opinions as you, to praise them on that account, as having laid hold of something correct, while insofar as they disagreed, to suppose that they were in error?
However, that what seems true to them should be considered a sufficient testimony of the truth was not fitting even in this way by nature - and everyone would agree that they are not mad, as you suppose, but rather stand very far removed from wisdom.
Ridiculously, then, do you too make use of these men as witnesses through the establishment of names - men whom you would say differ in no way from yourself in understanding - unless indeed it should happen that those who originally established these names were wise, which you will in no way be able to demonstrate.
But let it be granted to you that this is so, and that those names were established as having the meanings you wish, and that this did not come about according to false opinions; where then, through them, is it signified that absolutely all things exist according to fate, and not rather, if anything, only those things of which there is a fate?
For the number of the Fates and their names, and Clotho's spindle, and the thread wound upon it, and the spinning of this thread, and whatever other such things are said among them, indicate the inviolable and eternally-leading chain of causes - as many things as have thus been compelled by necessity to come to be, and as many as have been prevented from being otherwise.
There would be many such things; but as for whatever does not come about in this manner, of some of these things men have named the gods as administrators and craftsmen, of others they have supposed us ourselves to be the causes, and of yet others again, nature, and of others, chance.
And wishing to indicate the changeableness and instability of chance, and how it is now thus, now otherwise, they, having made an image of this particular character of events, represented Chance as standing upon a sphere.
Or has this too not been held as an opinion among men? For indeed, even if at times they confuse the causes together - and consider that whatever happens according to fate or according to chance comes about from divine power, and that whatever happens because of us happens according to fate - nevertheless, it is surely clear to everyone that they hold the opinion that all these causes exist among the things that are.
Following these things he adds next: 'In the first book, then, On Fate, he has employed certain such proofs as these, but in the second book he attempts to resolve the absurdities that seem to follow from the doctrine which states that all things have been compelled by necessity - which we ourselves also set forth at the beginning - such as the abolition, by this doctrine, of our own eagerness concerning blame and praise and exhortations, and everything else that appears to come about because of our own causation.'
He says, then, in the second book, that it is clear that many things happen because of us, but that these things too have nonetheless been co-fated together with the administration of the universe no less.
And he uses certain examples such as these: for, he says, that a cloak should not be lost was not fated absolutely, but together with its being guarded; and that a certain man should be saved from the enemy was fated together with his fleeing them; and that children should be born was fated together with his willing to have intercourse with a woman.
For, he says, just as when someone says that the boxer Hegesarchus will certainly come out of the contest unstruck, it would be absurd for one to think that Hegesarchus should therefore fight with his hands down, since it was fated for him to depart unstruck — the one who made the prediction having said this precisely because of the man's exceptional guard against being struck — so it is also in the case of the other examples.
For many things cannot come to pass without our also willing them and bringing to them the most intense eagerness and diligence, since, he says, it was fated that they should come to pass together with this willing.
Again, then, here too one might marvel at the man's want of consideration and reflection, and at the inconsistency both of his reasoning and of his own words. For I think that, just as what is called 'sweet' happens to be most opposite to what is called 'bitter,' and 'black' to 'white,' and 'hot' to 'cold,' so too is 'what depends on us' opposite to 'what is according to fate' — if indeed he has previously taken 'according to fate' to mean whatever comes to pass absolutely, whether we are willing or unwilling, whereas 'what depends on us' comes to completion from our being diligent and active about it, or is not accomplished because of neglect and idleness.
If, then, that cloak is preserved because of my diligence in guarding it, and children come to be because of my willing to have intercourse with my wife, and not dying at the enemy's hands comes from my willing to flee them, and coming away unstruck from the contest comes from my fighting bravely against my opponent and guarding against his hand-blows, how then will 'what is according to fate' be preserved here?
For if these things happen according to fate, they could not be said to happen because of us; and if because of us, then clearly not according to fate — since these two cannot run together with one another.
'But,' he says, 'it will be because of us, yet with what is because of us being encompassed by fate.' And how, I would ask, is it encompassed? — seeing that both guarding the cloak and not guarding it depended on my own authority. For in that case I myself would clearly be master of its being preserved.
And even from the very distinction that Chrysippus himself makes, it becomes clear that the cause which lies with us is released from fate. For, he says, it is fated that the cloak should be preserved, if you should guard it, and that children should come to be, if you also should be willing — but otherwise none of these things would come to pass. But in the case of things predetermined by fate, we would never use qualifications of this sort.
We do not, for instance, say that every man will die if such-and-such should happen, and will not die if it should not happen; rather, we say simply that he will die, even if absolutely anything at all should be done toward not dying; nor do we say that a certain man will not be susceptible to pain if he does such-and-such, but rather that every man is susceptible to pain, whether he wills it or not; and so too for all the other things that are fated to be thus and not otherwise.
So that if the coming to pass of such-and-such a thing is necessary provided we should will it, but not otherwise, it is clear that our willing or not willing was not predetermined by any other cause, but was self-determined.
And if this willing was uncompelled, then it is clear that the coming to pass of such-and-such a thing was not predetermined from eternity — unless indeed the very willing to guard the cloak, or not willing to, came about because of some fate and according to some necessary external cause.
But in this way our authoritative power over ourselves is utterly abolished, and the cloak would no longer be preserved or lost because of my cause; wherefore, even should it be lost, I would by reason be blameless — for some other cause was destroying it — and again, when it is preserved, I would in no way be praised, since not even this was my own doing. But you, as though able to save all things, have not extended your argument consistently in this way.
These, then, are the words of the aforementioned man. Let there be joined to these also the words of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a man exceedingly distinguished in philosophical discourse, who himself too, in his work On Fate, used such expressions as these for the refutation of the doctrine.
The causes of things that come to be are divided into four kinds, as the divine Aristotle has shown: of causes, some are efficient, others hold the role of matter; there is also among them the cause according to form; and besides these three causes there is among them also the final cause, for the sake of which the thing that comes to be comes to be.
Such, then, are the distinctions among the causes; for whatever is a cause of anything will be found to fall under one of these. For even if not all things that come to be require so many causes, yet those which require the most do not exceed the number stated.
The distinction among them would become clearer if it were viewed in the case of some example of things that come to be. Let, then, the division of causes here shown be understood by us in the case of a statue. Of the statue, then, the efficient cause is the craftsman who made it, whom we call a sculptor; and as matter, the underlying bronze, or stone, or whatever it is that is given shape by the craftsman according to his art — for this too is a cause of the statue's having come to be and of its existing.
There is also the form which comes to be in this substrate through the craftsman, and this too is a cause of the statue; hence there is the form of one throwing a discus, or hurling a javelin, or of some other definite figure.
But these are not the only causes of the statue's coming to be; rather, second to none of the causes of its generation is the end for the sake of which it came to be, that is, either the honor of someone, or some piety toward a god. For without such a cause the statue would not have come to be at all in the first place.
Since, then, the causes are of this number and have a recognizable distinction from one another, we would rightly reckon fate among the efficient causes, since it preserves, with respect to the things that come to be according to it, an analogy with the creative art that produces the statue.
This being so, it would follow that we should turn our discussion to the efficient causes; for thus it will become clear whether one must attribute all things that come to be to fate, or must also grant, besides fate, to certain other things a role as efficient causes of certain events.
Aristotle, in dividing all things that come to be, says that some of them come to be for the sake of something, the one producing them having some purpose and end of the things produced set before him, while others come to be for the sake of nothing — namely, whatever does not come to be according to some intention of the one producing it, nor has reference to any definite end, such as the holding and turning of certain bits of straw, and the touching and stretching out of hairs, and whatever else comes to be in a similar way.
For that these things too come to be is evident; yet they do not have a cause according to an end, or a 'for the sake of which.' Things, then, that come to be in this way, aimlessly and simply, admit of no reasonable further division.
But of those things that have reference to something and come to be for the sake of something, some come to be according to nature, others according to reason. For things having nature as the cause of their generation proceed, according to certain measures and a determined order, toward some end, upon arriving at which they cease from coming to be — unless something should intervene and become an obstacle to their natural path toward what lies before them.
But things that come to be according to reason also have some end. For nothing that comes to be according to reason comes to be at random, but reference to some purpose belongs to all of them.
Things come to be according to reason whenever they come to be by those who produce them reasoning about them and constructing them in whatever manner they are to come to be. In this way come to be all the things that come to be according to the arts, and things according to deliberate choice.
These differ from things that come to be by nature in this: things which come to be by nature have within themselves the origin and the causes of such generation (for such is nature), and come to be according to a certain order, yet without the nature that produces them employing, like the arts, reasoning concerning them.
But things that come to be according to art and deliberate choice have the origin of their motion and the productive cause from outside, not within themselves, and the reasoning of the one producing them concerning them precedes their generation.
Third, among things that come to be for the sake of something, are also those believed to come to be by chance and spontaneously; these differ from things that come to be primarily for the sake of something in this respect: in the case of the latter, the things prior to the end come to be for the sake of that end, whereas in the case of the former, the things that come to be prior to the end come to be for the sake of something else, and there befalls them — while they are coming to be for the sake of that other thing — as an unintended result, what is called coming to be spontaneously and by chance.
These things being so, and all things that come to be being divided into these categories, it is consequent, in addition, to see under which of the efficient causes one must place fate.
Is it, then, among things that come to be for the sake of nothing? Or is this altogether unreasonable? For we always use the term 'fate' with reference to some end, saying that a thing has come to be 'according to fate'; wherefore fate must necessarily be placed among the things that come to be for the sake of something.
Having made this division in these very words, the aforementioned man goes on at greater length to establish that fate is nothing other than the things that come to be according to nature; for the necessity of fate is not to be observed in things accomplished according to our own reasoning and according to art.
He says that it happens that very many things according to nature are impeded, and these are called 'contrary to nature,' just as in the arts things are said to be 'contrary to art.' But if things at all come to be contrary to what is according to nature, they would also come to be contrary to fate — if indeed things according to nature are the same as things according to fate.
We see, at any rate, he says, that the body too, by having such-and-such a nature, comes to be in illnesses and corruptions consistently with its natural constitution, yet not alike in all cases, nor of necessity. For often careful attentions, and changes of manner of life, and the prescriptions of physicians, and the counsels of the gods, are sufficient to drive off such a condition.
In the same way, one might also find, in the case of the soul, that in each person, contrary to their natural constitution, there arise different choices and actions and ways of life, these being improved through training, through learning, and through better reasoning.
When, once, the physiognomist said certain absurd things about the philosopher Socrates, things far removed from Socrates' own choice of life, and was for this laughed at by Socrates' companions, Socrates said that Zopyrus had erred in nothing; for he would indeed have been such a man, as far as nature was concerned, had he not, through the training derived from philosophy, become better than his nature.
Such, then, are things according to nature, which he says do not differ at all from things according to fate. But things by chance are of this sort: when, to something done for the sake of one purpose, there does not befall that for the sake of which it was done, but instead something else, which was not even hoped for at all. For he says a man is said to have found a treasure by chance, when, digging for some other purpose and not for the purpose of finding a treasure, he happens upon a treasure; and they say someone has procured money by chance, when, having gone forth into the marketplace for some other reason, he happens upon a debtor who has money and receives what is owed him; and a horse, too, is said by some to have been saved spontaneously, when, in hope of food, or for some other purpose, it escapes those holding it, and there befalls its flight and running the happy chance of encountering its own masters.
These things being so, not even these could be according to fate. And there are also certain causes obscure to human reasoning, which are believed to come about according to certain occult antipathies, the cause for which they occur being unknown. Such are certain amulets which are supposed to produce effects, having no reasonable and plausible cause for producing them; and also incantations, and certain like sorceries. For concerning these it is agreed by all that the cause is obscure; wherefore they call them also 'inexplicable.'
Things are said to come to be contingently in those cases where not coming to be also has room, as the very expression 'whichever way it chances' makes clear; such as moving one of one's own limbs, an ordinary turning of the neck, the stretching out of a finger, the raising of the eyelids, a seated person standing up, a moving person coming to rest, a speaking person falling silent — and in countless such cases one would find a certain capacity present, receptive of opposites, which could not come to be from fate. For the things that come from fate do not admit, in that in which they are, of the opposite.
Moreover, the fact that man deliberates does not belong to him in vain; for he would be capable of deliberation in vain, if he did the things he does of necessity. But it plainly appears that man alone, beyond the other animals, has this advantage from nature: that he does not, like them, simply follow impressions, but has reason as judge of what presents itself to him. Employing this, if, upon examination, the things imagined prove to be as they at first appeared and indeed are, he assents to the impression, and thus pursues them; but if they appear to be otherwise, he no longer abides by his initial impression, reason having refuted it, on account of taking counsel concerning them.
At any rate, we deliberate only about things which we are able to do; and if ever we act without having deliberated, we often repent and blame ourselves for our thoughtlessness. And if we see others acting thoughtlessly, we reproach them as doing wrong, and we think it right that they should make use of advisers — on the ground that such matters are within our power.
That their doctrine concerning fate was false is sufficiently proven by the fact that not even its own advocates are able to abide by what they themselves assert. For indeed they profess to exhort and to teach, and they advise people to learn and be instructed, and they censure and rebuke those who do not do what is fitting, as though such persons were sinning by their own deliberate choice.
Moreover, they also leave behind very many treatises, by means of which they think the young ought to be instructed. Yet they would have ceased from this zeal for literary composition, had they taken note that they also think those who err involuntarily deserve pardon, while those who transgress voluntarily deserve punishment — clearly on the ground that whether to sin or not to sin lies within one's own power.
So that even by their own reasoning, the necessity arising from fate is abolished, and it is established that free will belongs to us according to nature; together with the fact that there are also very many things not in our power — such as things according to nature, and things from chance — which are themselves also distinct from the account of fate, as has been shown above.
We have abridged these matters from a great many sources, since the discussion concerning free will is extensive in our own doctrines — a discussion with which the cited sayings of the philosophers also concur, bearing witness to our own divine Scriptures, and refuting as false the opinions concerning fate held not only by the common run of men, but even by the marvelous oracle-giving gods; and since some have been refuted with rather Cynic bluntness in dealing with those noble oracles, while others have been contradicted, with regard to the admired philosophers, by their own disciples — it is now time also to examine the arguments deriving from astrology, directed against those who Chaldaize, who profess this mischievous sorcery as though it were a branch of learning. And I shall set before you the demonstrations of these men too, drawn from a man Syrian by race, but one who had advanced to the very summit of Chaldean science. Bardesanes is the man's name, who in his dialogues with his companions is recorded to have said something like the following.
According to nature man is born, comes to his prime, begets, eats, drinks, sleeps, grows old, and dies — and this holds true of every man, and of every irrational animal.
And the other animals, being merely ensouled and having come to be entirely through mating, are borne along almost entirely according to nature. The lion eats flesh and defends itself when wronged, and for this reason all lions eat flesh and defend themselves; and ewes eat grass and do not touch meat, and when wronged do not defend themselves; and the same manner holds for every ewe.
The scorpion eats earth, and wrongs even those who have not wronged it, striking with its venomous sting; and the same malice belongs to all scorpions. The ant, by nature, knows of the coming of winter, and, laboring throughout the whole summer, lays up provisions for itself; and likewise all ants labor in this way.
The bee cultivates honey, from which it also feeds; and the same cultivation belongs to all bees. And we could set forth many kinds of animals which, being unable to depart from their nature, could afford you much cause for wonder.
But I have considered it sufficient to make my demonstration from the examples set forth, that the other animals, in accordance with the commonality and the difference given by nature to each of necessity, are borne along gladly, while men alone, possessing that special faculty of mind and the reason proceeding from it, follow nature as regards the common element, as I said before, but as regards that special faculty do not conduct their lives according to nature.
For there is not one single diet common to all men: some feed like lions, others like ewes; they have not one style of dress, not one custom, not one law of conduct among them, not one single impulse of desire for things; but each man, according to his own will, chooses for himself a way of life, not imitating his neighbor, except in what he wishes.
For man's freedom is not subject to slavery; and even if he should ever willingly become a slave, this too belongs to his freedom — namely, being able to serve of his own will.
How many men, and especially of the Alani, like wild beasts, devour raw flesh, tasting no bread — and this not because they lack it, but because they do not wish it? Others, again, taste no meat, like tame animals; others eat fish only; still others taste no fish, not even if they should be starving. Some drink water, others drink wine, others drink strong drink.
And, simply put, there is much diversity of foods and drinks among mankind, differing even in the eating of vegetables and fruits. Moreover, some men, like scorpions and asps, do wrong even when not wronged; others, like irrational animals, defend themselves when wronged; others again, like wolves, seize by force, and like weasels, steal; others, like ewes and bleating sheep, are driven about by those of like nature and do no wrong to those who wrong them; and some are called good, others bad, others just.
Whence one may understand that man is not led entirely according to nature — for what single nature of his shall we name? — but in one respect he is borne along according to nature, and in another according to deliberate choice. Hence praise and blame and condemnation apply to what is according to choice, whereas in what is according to nature he has immunity from accusation, not out of mercy, but by reason.
And next he says: Men have established different laws in each land, some written, some unwritten; of these I shall relate what I know and what I remember, beginning from the beginning of the world.
There is a law among the Seres that no one should murder, nor commit fornication, nor steal, nor worship carved idols; and in that vast country one cannot see a temple, nor a prostitute woman, nor one called an adulteress, nor a thief being dragged to trial, nor a murderer, nor a murdered man.
For the star of fiery-shining Ares, culminating at mid-heaven, has compelled no man's free will to slay another with iron, nor has Cypris, in conjunction with Ares, compelled anyone among them to unite with another's wife — even though Ares is at mid-heaven every day, and the Seres are born at every hour and every day.
Among the Indians and Bactrians there are many thousands of the so-called Brahmans, who, according to the tradition of their ancestors and laws, neither murder nor worship carved idols, nor eat anything with a soul in it, nor ever become drunk, tasting neither wine nor strong drink, nor take part in any wickedness, but attend to God — while the other Indians murder, and consort with courtesans, and become drunk, and worship idols, and almost all of them are borne along according to fate.
But there is, in that same clime of India, a certain tribe of Indians, who hunt down and sacrifice, and eat, the strangers who fall into their hands; and neither have the beneficent stars prevented these people from committing bloody murder and unlawful marriage, nor have the maleficent stars compelled the Brahmans to do evil.
Among the Persians it was the law to marry one's daughters, sisters, and mothers; and not only in that land and in that clime did the Persians practice these unholy marriages, but also as many of them as emigrated from Persia — those who are called Magusaeans — commit the same lawlessness, handing down the same laws and customs to their children by succession.
Of these there are, even to this day, many in Media, and in Egypt, and in Phrygia, and in Galatia. And surely it cannot be that Aphrodite was found, in the boundaries and houses of Saturn, with Mars accompanying Saturn, in the horoscopes of all of them at their birth.
Among the Gelae there is a law that women should farm, and build, and do all manual labor, and consort with whomever they wish, and not be accused by their husbands, nor be called adulteresses by anyone — since all of them are laborers, and consort with all men, especially with strangers.
And the Gelian women neither anoint themselves with perfume nor wear dyed garments, and all of them go barefoot — even though the Gelian men adorn themselves with soft garments and in various colors, and wear gold and anoint themselves with perfume, and this not out of any effeminacy, for they are courageous, and most warlike, and most devoted to hunting.
And not all the Gelian women have Venus, at their birth, in an unfortunate position in Capricorn or Aquarius, nor do all their men have the Paphian goddess in Aries together with Mars — the position in which those who Chaldaize say the brave and the wanton are placed.