文集（CSEL） 第 12 章

'And God planted a paradise in Eden toward the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed.' A discourse to be undertaken concerning paradise seems to stir up no slight heat in us who desire to investigate and explain what paradise is, and where it is, and of what nature it is — especially since the Apostle, whether in the body or out of the body he knew not, says nevertheless that he was caught up even to the third heaven. And again, 'I know,' he says, 'such a man — whether in the body or out of the body I know not, God knows — that he was caught up into paradise and heard ineffable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. For such a one will I glory; but for myself I will not glory, save in my infirmities. For if I should wish to glory, I shall not be a fool, for I speak the truth.'

Therefore, if paradise is of such a kind that only Paul, or scarcely anyone like Paul, could see it while he dwelt in this life — and yet he, whether he saw it in the body or out of the body, cannot remember, though he did hear words which he was forbidden to make common, namely what he had heard — by what means, pray, shall we be able to settle the situation of paradise, which we could not even see, and which, if we could have seen it, we should yet be forbidden to disclose to others? Since Paul too feared to exalt himself by the sublimity of his revelations, how much more must we strive not to indicate too anxiously that whose very revelation is liable to peril! We ought not, therefore, to esteem this paradise as worthless, and so let us leave it to be Paul's secret.

Yet since we read in Genesis that paradise was planted by God toward the east, and that the man whom God had formed was placed there, we can already discover the author of that paradise. For who is there that could fashion paradise but Almighty God, who spoke and they were made, never in want of those things which he willed to be brought forth? He himself, therefore, planted paradise, of which Wisdom says: 'Every plant which my Father has not planted shall be rooted up.' Good is the planting of the angels, good that of the saints; for the saints are said to be under the fig tree and the vine in that coming time of peace, in whom there is a figure of the angels. Therefore paradise is a place having very many trees, but fruitful trees, trees full of sap and of vigour, of which it is said:

'All the trees of the woods shall exult' — trees ever flowering with the verdure of their merits, like that tree which was planted beside the courses of the waters, whose leaf shall not fall, because all the fruit in it abounds. This, therefore, is paradise. But the place in which it is planted is called pleasure (voluptas). Whence also holy David says: 'Thou shalt give them to drink of the torrent of thy pleasure.' For you have read that a fountain proceeds out of Eden which waters paradise. These trees, therefore, which are planted in paradise, are watered as it were by a certain outpouring of the torrent of the Spirit. Of which he also says elsewhere: 'The rushing of the river makes glad the city of God.' And that city is the Jerusalem which is above, which is free, in which the diverse merits of the saints have sprung up.

In this paradise, therefore, God placed the man whom he had formed. Understand now that he placed there not that man who is according to the image of God, but him who is according to the body; for the incorporeal is not in a place. And he placed him in paradise like the sun in heaven, awaiting the kingdom of heaven, even as the creature awaits the revelation of the sons of God. Therefore, if paradise is that in which shoots had sprung up, paradise appears to be the soul, which multiplies the seed it has received, in which each several virtue is planted, in which was also the tree of life, that is, wisdom — as Solomon said, that wisdom did not spring up from the earth, but from the Father; for it is the splendour of eternal light and the emanation of the glory of the Almighty.

Now there was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in paradise. For thus you have it: that God brought forth a tree fair to look upon and good for food, and the tree of life in paradise, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Afterward we shall see whether this tree also was fair to look upon and good for food like the rest. For it will be more opportunely discussed in that place where we find the man who tasted of it to have been deceived. Meanwhile we have nothing which we ought now to censure, even though we cannot know the reason.

For neither in this creation of the world ought we, by some rash judgment, to condemn anything if certain things seem to us difficult to understand and incomprehensible to our wit — such as the creation of serpents and of some venomous living thing — seeing that we men cannot yet understand and know by what reason each several thing has been made. So then, in the divine Scriptures also, let us not easily censure anything which we cannot understand; for there are very many things which are not to be measured by our wit.

But they are to be estimated from the height of the divine arrangement and word. Suppose, then — yet without prejudging a future assertion — that this tree of the knowledge of good and evil displeases you for this reason, that after men tasted of it they understood that they were naked: nevertheless, toward the consummation of the divine working I will say to you that this tree too sprang up in paradise and was therefore permitted by God, that we might be able to know the surpassing excellence of the good. For how, if there were no knowledge of good and evil, should we learn any distinction between good and evil?

For neither should we declare what was evil to be evil, unless there were a knowledge of good — and there could be no knowledge of good unless there were also a good — nor, again, should we know what was good to be good, unless there were a knowledge of evil. Take an example from the very constitution of the human body. Surely it has also a certain bitterness of gall, which, if you look to the common good, is found useful for man's health. So then, even what we think evil is for the most part not wholly evil, but useful for the common good. For as the gall is in a part of the body and yet profits the advantage of the whole body, so God, knowing the knowledge of good and evil would profit the advantage of all, set it in a part, that it might profit the common good.

Finally, you find the serpent in paradise, assuredly not generated apart from the will of God. But in the figure of the serpent is the devil; for that the devil was in paradise even the prophet Ezekiel teaches, who says concerning the prince of Tyre: 'Thou wast,' he says, 'in the pleasure of paradise'; and the prince of Tyre we take as a figure of the devil. Shall we from this too accuse God, because we cannot grasp the treasures of his height and knowledge that are hidden and concealed in Christ, save those which he himself has deigned to reveal? Yet he has revealed them, that we may know that even the malice of the devil profits men unto salvation — not that the devil wishes to profit, but that the Lord turns his malice, even when it resists, unto our salvation.

Finally, his malice made the virtue and patience of holy Job to be more illustrious. His malice exercised Job's righteousness, that he might contend and conquer, and that the crown might follow the victory; for no one is crowned save he who has lawfully contended. The chastity of Joseph, too, would never have come to our memory, had not the woman, his master's wife and housemate, incited by the fiery darts of the devil, tempted his affection — had she not at last sought his destruction, whereby the chastity of the man might be more illustrious, who despised death for the sake of chastity. Do you wish to know the counsel of God? Surely, by the devil's instigation deaths seem to be prepared for righteous men, and the murders of sons are even carried out.

Yet the Lord tempted Abraham also by this very device, in that he required of him that his son should be offered up to him. By which temptation Abraham was proved faithful to the Lord, in that he was not called back from the obedience of devotion even by pity for his beloved son. So then, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in paradise also, which was fair to the sight and good for food, was so in appearance; for it was not good for food in use, since its food is seen to have harmed men. Therefore there is that which may harm individuals, yet profit the common good. As the devil harmed Judas, but, except for him, crowned all the apostles who overcame the temptations of his malice.

And so it is neither to be doubted nor censured that the devil was in paradise, since he could not block the way to the saints, that none should ascend; nor did he, as a possessor, snatch away from the righteous the dwelling of their abode. For grant that he turned away some slothful and vicious ones from the abode of the supernal possession: that is far more august and far more beautiful, that he shall be shut out by the prayers of the saints, when that shall have been fulfilled: 'I beheld Satan falling like lightning from heaven.' Therefore let us not fear him who is so far weak that he too is destined to fall to the earth. He received indeed licence to tempt, but he did not receive power to overthrow, unless a weak affection slip of its own accord — one that has not known how to summon help to itself.

And therefore it is needful to know by what guile he tempted the first man, and what he supposed in man was to be tempted, by what order, by what art, that we may be able to beware. Yet very many, who wish that the devil was not in paradise — although we have read of him standing in heaven among the angels — lest they seem to be offended in this discourse, may receive the interpretation of this reading according to their own will.

For there was one before us who related that the transgression was committed by man through pleasure and sense, taking in the appearance of the serpent the figure of delight, and in the figure of the woman setting the sense of soul and mind, which the Greeks call aisthēsis; and, the sense being deceived, he maintained that, according to the history, the mind was the transgressor, which the Greeks call nous. Rightly, therefore, in the Greek the nous received the figure of the man, the aisthēsis that of the woman. Whence also some have interpreted Adam as the earthly nous. But the Lord, in the Gospel, set those virgins awaiting the bridegroom's coming with their torches kindled or extinguished, in place of the senses, whether sound (of the wise) or corrupt (of the foolish).

For if Eve — that is, the sense of the first woman — had had her torches kindled, she would never have entangled us in the snares of her transgression, nor would she have fallen from that immortality of virtue. Therefore paradise is a certain fertile earth, that is, a fruitful soul, planted in Eden, that is, in a certain pleasure or in cultivated earth, in which there is the delight of the soul. There is also the nous as it were Adam, and there is the sense as it were Eve. And lest you should have something to throw back upon the weakness of nature, or upon a condition liable to perils in enduring them, consider what helps this soul has. There was a fountain to water paradise. And what is that fountain but the Lord Jesus Christ, the fountain of eternal life, as the Father is? Because it is written:

'For with thee is the fountain of life'; and again: 'Out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.' Both a fountain is read of, and a river is read of, which waters the fruitful tree of paradise, that it may bear fruit unto eternal life. This fountain, therefore, as you have read — 'for a fountain,' it says, 'proceeds out of Eden,' that is, in your soul is the fountain, whence also Solomon says: 'Drink water from your own vessels and from the fountains of your own wells' — this is the fountain which proceeds out of that cultivated soul, full of pleasure; this is the fountain which waters paradise, that is, the virtues of the soul that sprout with most eminent merit. 'And the fountain,' it says, 'is divided into four heads. The name of the one is Pishon; this is that which compasses all the land of Havilah, where there is gold.'

'And the gold of that land is good, where there is the carbuncle and the green stone. And the name of the second is Gihon; this is that which compasses all Ethiopia. And the third river is the Tigris; this is that which goes toward the Assyrians. And the fourth river is the Euphrates.' These, then, are the four rivers, that is, Pishon — according to the Hebrews it is called Pishon, but according to the Greeks the Ganges — which flows toward India. Gihon, moreover, is the Nile, which compasses the land of Egypt or Ethiopia. And it is called Mesopotamia because the Tigris and Euphrates have enclosed it, since it is set between these two rivers, which the very name and common opinion have expressed even to those set far away. But in what manner is the wisdom of God called a fountain?

For it is a fountain according to the Gospel which says: 'If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink'; it is a fountain also according to the prophet, who says: 'Come and eat of my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you.' As, therefore, wisdom is the fountain of life, the fountain of spiritual grace, so it is the fountain of the other virtues, which direct us to the course of eternal life. Out of this soul, therefore, which is cultivated — not out of that which is uncultivated — this fountain proceeds, that it may water paradise, that is, certain thickets of the diverse virtues, of which there are four heads, into which this wisdom is divided. And what are the four heads of the virtues but one of prudence, another of temperance, a third of fortitude, a fourth of justice?

These the wise men of this world also, having taken them from ours, transferred into the writings of their own books. And so, as wisdom is the fountain, so also these four rivers are certain streams of the virtues flowing from that fountain. Pishon, therefore, is prudence, and therefore it has good gold, the splendid carbuncle, and the green stone. For we frequently take gold to signify prudent discoveries, whence also the Lord says through the prophet: 'I gave them gold and silver'; and David says of the prudent: 'If you sleep among the midst of the lots, the wings of the dove are silvered, and her hinder parts in the appearance of gold,' because whoever has cleaved to the Old and the New Testament can advance into the very secrets of the wisdom of God with the abundance of his discourse.

This good, then, one may call gold, not coined money, which is corruptible and earthly. It has too, he says, the gleaming carbuncle, in which a certain little fire of our soul lives. It has also the green stone, which by the appearance of its color seems to display something verdant and full of life. For the shrubs that live are green, while whatever dies withers away; the earth is green while it flowers, and the seeds are green while they burst forth. And rightly is this river Phison set in the first place, which according to the Hebrews is called Pheoyson, that is, 'change of countenance,' since it does not flow around one nation only, but flows even through Lydia. For prudence is no narrow thing, but rich in useful benefits, that it may profit many.

Therefore it stands first, so that if anyone has departed from paradise, a certain river of prudence may receive him, lest he should quickly wither, but that through it he may easily return to paradise. This river is frequented by many people and is reported to possess the greatest beauty and fertility. And so prudence is understood under its likeness, prudence which brought forth many fruits at the coming of the Lord our salvation. And it flows into the farthest parts of the earth, because through wisdom all men have been redeemed. Whence also it is said: Their sound went out into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.

The second river is Geon, beside which the law was laid down for the Israelites when they were settled in Egypt, that they should depart from Egypt and, with their loins girded, eat the lamb—which is a mark of temperance; for it is fitting that those who keep the Lord's Passover be chaste and sanctified. And so beside this river the lawful observance was first established, because this name signifies a certain chasm of the earth. Therefore, just as a chasm swallows up the earth and whatever filth or refuse there is in it, so chastity is wont to abolish all the passions of the body; and rightly there is the first establishment of observance, because through the law the sin of the flesh is swallowed up.

Rightly therefore is Geon, in which is the figure of chastity, said to compass about the land of Ethiopia, that it may wash the abject body and quench the burning of the most vile flesh; for Ethiopia in the Latin rendering is marked as 'abject and vile.' But what is more abject than our body, what so like Ethiopia, which is even black with a certain darkness of sins? The third river is the Tigris, which goes toward the Assyrians, to whom Israel the transgressor was led captive. This river is said to be swifter than all, and the Assyrians dwell beside it, that is, 'those who direct'—for this is what the interpretation means. Therefore whoever by the courage of his soul takes captive the transgressing vices of the body, directing them toward things above, that man is reckoned like to this river.

And therefore fortitude too flows forth from that fountain which is in paradise. Now fortitude, with a certain rapid course, breaks through whatever stands in its way, nor does its course cling to any obstacles of hindrance. The fourth river is the Euphrates, which in Latin is called 'fruitfulness and abundance of fruits,' bearing a certain mark of justice, which feeds every soul. For no virtue seems to have more abundant fruits than equity and justice, which profits others more than itself and neglects its own advantages, setting common benefits before its own. Many think that Euphrates is so called from euphrainesthai, that is, from rejoicing, because the human race rejoices in nothing more than in justice and equity.

But as to the reason why the regions through which the other rivers pass are described, while the regions through which the Euphrates passes are not described, we take it to be this: because its water is asserted to be life-giving, water that nourishes and increases. Whence the wise men of the Hebrews and Assyrians called it Auxen ('the increaser'), whereas the water of the other rivers is said to be the contrary. Then, because where there is prudence there is also malice, where there is fortitude there is anger, where there is temperance there is often intemperance and other vices, but where there is justice there is the concord of the other virtues. Therefore it is known not from the places through which it flows, that is, not in part; for justice is not a part, but is, as it were, the mother of all.

In these rivers, therefore, are expressed the four principal virtues, which have, as it were, enclosed the ages of this world. The first age, then, from the beginning of the world up to the flood, was the age of prudence, in which time are reckoned the just: Abel, so called by the Lord, and Enos—that is, 'man made to the image of God'—who hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God; and Enoch, who in Latin is called 'grace of God,' caught up to heaven; and Noah, who himself too was just and a certain right ordering of rest. The second age is that of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and the rest of the number of the patriarchs, in whom shone forth a certain chaste and pure temperance of religion.

For the immaculate Isaac, given as a son to Abraham by promise, presenting not so much a bodily birth as a gift of divine indulgence, in him the figure of the truly immaculate One went before, as the Apostle teaches when he says that to Abraham were the promises made, and to his seed. He says not 'and to seeds,' as in many, but as in one: 'and to thy seed,' which is Christ. The third age is in the law of Moses and the other prophets.

For time would fail me in telling of Gideon, Barak, Samson, David and Samuel and the other prophets, of Ananias, Azariah, Misael, Daniel, Elijah, Elisha, who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the power of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, recovered from infirmity, were made strong in battle, took the camps of foreigners. Not without reason, therefore, is the figure of fortitude in these men. For they were cut asunder, as you have below, were tempted, died in the slaughter of the sword.

They wandered about in goatskins, destitute, afflicted with distress and sorrows, of whom the world was not worthy, wandering in deserts, in mountains and in caves and in the dens of the earth. Rightly therefore do we place in these the figure of fortitude. But according to the Gospel the figure is properly of justice, because it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believes. And finally the Lord himself says: Suffer us to fulfill all justice—justice which indeed is the fruitful parent of the other virtues; although in whomever one of these chief virtues we have spoken of is present, in him also the others are at hand, because the virtues are themselves bound together and grown into one with one another.

For surely Abel was just, and Abraham most brave and most patient, and the prophets most prudent, and Moses, learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, esteemed the reproach of Christ a greater honor than the treasures of Egypt. And who was wiser than Daniel? Solomon too asked for wisdom and obtained it. It has been said, then, concerning the four rivers of the virtues, whose draught is profitable. And because Phison was said to have the good gold of the land and the carbuncle and the green stone, let us consider also what this means. For Enos seems to us as it were the good gold, who prudently desired to know the name of God.

But Enoch, who was translated and saw not death, is a certain carbuncle, a stone of good odor, who by his works rendered to God a certain grace, breathing it forth in deeds and conduct, holy Enoch. Noah, however, like the green stone, displayed the living color, since in the time of the flood he alone was preserved in that ark as, so to speak, a living seed for the future constitution. Rightly, then, is paradise, which is watered by many rivers, set toward the East—not against the East, that is, according to that East whose name is Orient, that is, according to Christ, who poured forth a certain radiance of eternal light—and it is in Eden, that is, in delight. And God took the man whom he had made and set him in paradise to till it and to keep it.

You see that he who already existed is taken; and he existed in the land of his fashioning. Therefore the power of God took him, breathing into him the advances and increases of virtue. Finally he placed him in paradise, that you may know that he who was taken was, as it were, breathed upon by the divine power. In which place note this, that the man was made outside paradise and the woman within paradise, so that you may observe that each one procures grace for himself not by nobility of place nor of birth, but by virtue. And so the man, made outside paradise—that is, in a lower place—is found the better, and she who was made in the better place, that is, in paradise, is found the inferior; for the woman was first deceived, and she herself deceived the man.

Whence the apostle Peter recorded that holy women, subject as to the weaker vessel, should obey their husbands as masters. And Paul says that Adam was not seduced, but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression. Then it must be considered that no one ought rashly to presume upon himself. For lo, she who was made as a help for the man stands in need of manly protection, because the man is the head of the woman; but he who believed he was going to have the help of a wife fell through his wife.

Whence no one ought rashly to trust himself to another unless he has proved that other's virtue, nor should he who thinks himself taken on as a helper claim too much for himself; but rather, if he finds a stronger one, to whom he supposed he was a protection, let him borrow grace from that one, just as the apostle Peter commands men also to impart honor to women, saying: Husbands, likewise dwelling with them according to knowledge, giving honor to the woman as to the weaker vessel, as to coheirs of the grace of life, that your prayers be not hindered.

Therefore the man was placed in paradise, the woman was made in paradise; but even then, before the woman was deceived by the serpent, she had the grace of the man, since she was taken from the man—though this is a great mystery, as the apostle said—and so she drew the cause of her life from him. And therefore the Scripture said only of the man that he placed him in paradise to till it and to keep it. To till and to keep are not the same; for in tilling there is a certain advance of virtue, while in keeping there is found a certain consummation of the work, in that one keeps as it were what is already completed. These two things are required of man, that by his works he should seek new things and keep what is acquired, which is a general principle.

But Philo, since he did not grasp spiritual things with the Jewish disposition, kept himself within moral matters, so as to say that these two things are sought: work in the field, the keeping of the house. And although paradise, he says, had no need of rural labors, yet because the first man was to be the law of posterity, therefore even in paradise he took on the appearance of lawful labor, so as to bind us to the working and keeping of our due office and to the gift of hereditary succession. These two things, then, are required of you, whether morally or spiritually. This too the prophetic psalm teaches you, for it is written: Unless the Lord build the house, in vain have they labored who build it; unless the Lord keep the city, in vain have they watched who keep it.

You see those laboring who are in the process of work and building, but those watching who have already received the keeping of the perfected work. Whence the Lord too says to the apostles, as to the more perfect: Watch and pray, lest you enter into temptation, teaching that the gift of a perfect nature and the grace of full virtue must be guarded, and that no one, even the more perfect, ought to be secure of himself unless he has watched. And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying: Of every tree which is in paradise you shall eat for food, but of the tree which is of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. And in the day in which you eat of it, you shall die the death. For what reason, where he commanded that he should eat of every tree, did he say in the singular:

'you shall eat,' but where it concerns the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, said in the plural 'you shall not eat'—this is no idle question. But if you attend carefully, it can be resolved by the authority of the Scriptures. For that which is good is also to be done, and what is good and to be done is consonant and coherent; but what is base is dissonant, disordered and divided. And therefore the Lord, always intending unity, commanded according to unity. In short, he works unity who made both one, and not only both, but he made all one; for he commanded that we all be one body and one spirit. But the Firstborn through all things, since he is in unity with the Father, is always most closely joined to the Father, because the Word was with God. And finally he says:

I and the Father are one—to show that there is for him a unity of majesty and divinity with the Father. But he also commanded us to be one, and poured into us a likeness of his nature and unity by the adoption of grace, saying: Father, as I and thou are one, so let these also be one in us. Therefore where he commands the good, he commands as to one, saying: you shall eat; for unity cannot transgress. But where he says of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil that it is not to be tasted, he says as it were to many: you shall not eat; for what is prohibitory is commanded as if to many. Yet I think otherwise, and what is to come is in him. Now in the word of God I find it.

He commanded that of every tree it should be tasted by Adam alone, whom he knew would keep the command; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil that it should not be tasted he now says not in the singular but in the plural; for he knew that the woman would transgress, and therefore by the plural he showed that they would not keep it, because the judgment of the many is divided. And as far as the rendering of the seventy men is concerned, what was troubling is resolved. But because Symmachus put both in the singular, we understand that this followed, because in the law too, when God addresses the people, he speaks in the singular, as you have: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord, and thou shalt love the Lord thy God.

Nor does the interpretation of Symmachus prejudice me, who could not see the unity of Father and Son, even if at times both Aquila and he himself confessed it in their rendering. Nor let anyone, from the fact that God addresses in the singular a people that would transgress the divine commandments, think this to be contrary to our former discourse, because the people of the Jews violated even precepts given in the singular. For the law is spiritual, and therefore God addressed the people in the divine oracle, the one thing in his speech, the other in his predestination. And finally he says: Thou shalt not boil a lamb in its mother's milk.

Henceforth the series of heavenly precepts would seem easy, were it not that very many stir up a question, to which it behooves us to reply, lest by a malicious interpretation they lead astray simple minds. For very many, whose author is Apelles, as you have in his thirty-eighth volume, put forward these questions: How does the tree of life seem to work more toward life than the breathing-in of God? Then: If God did not make man perfect, but each one by his own industry takes to himself the perfection of virtue, does it not seem that man acquires more for himself than God bestowed on him? A third they object: and if man had not tasted death, surely he could not know that which he had not tasted. Therefore if he had not tasted, he did not know:

if he did not know, he could not fear. In vain therefore did God set death before them as a terror, which men did not fear. Let us learn, then, that where there is the tree of life, there too God brought forth the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For you have that he brought forth the tree of life in the midst of paradise. He says... for it is understood that he brought it forth in the midst. Therefore in the midst of paradise was both life and the cause of death. Understand that man did not make life, but by either working or keeping the commandments of God he was able to find it. But there was a life, as the apostle said, hidden with Christ in God.

Man therefore was either in the shadow of life because of the figure—since this our life which now is on earth is a shadow—or he was in a certain pledge of life, because he had the breathing-in of God; he had therefore a pledge of immortality, but, placed in the shadow of life, he could not by any common touch and sight see and grasp the life hidden with Christ in God, even though not yet a sinner, yet not of an uncorrupted and inviolable nature, inasmuch as he afterward fell by sin, but by no means as yet a sinner. In short, he was in the shadow of life; but those who are sinners are in the shadow of death. For the people of sinners, as Isaiah teaches, sat in the shadow of death, upon whom a light arose through the grace of God, not by the merit of their own virtue.

Therefore between the breathing-in of God and the food of the tree of life there is no distinction, nor can man say that he is able to acquire more for himself than was conferred on him by the divine bounty. Would that we could hold fast what we received! For our labor profits to this end, that we may take up again the things that were bestowed. As for that third point which was put forward—that he who had not tasted death could not fear death—it readily finds its resolution from the use of common nature. For it is implanted in nature in all living beings that they dread as harmful even things they have not yet experienced as harming them. For whence comes to doves at their very birth the terror at the sight of the hawk? Whence are wolves dreadful to sheep, kites to chicks?

But if in those living beings which are irrational there is a certain natural terror of some opposing kind of animal, so that even irrational creatures receive a sense of fleeing from death, how much more in the first man—surely most full of reason—ought there to have been a certain natural notion of death to be avoided! Again they raise other questions in this manner: it is not always evil not to obey a precept. For if the precept is good, the obedience is honorable; but if the precept is wicked, not to obey is useful. Therefore it is not always evil not to obey a precept, but not to obey a good precept is wicked. But the tree, productive of the knowledge of good and evil, is good, since God too knows good and evil. And finally he says:

Behold, Adam is become as one of us. If therefore it is good to have the knowledge of good and evil, and it is a good thing which even God has, it seems that he who forbids it to men forbids it not rightly—and this they propose. But if they would understand what it is to know, what force this word has, if they would understand it as they ought—for the Lord knew who are his (he knew, surely, those who out of many are made one, in whom he dwells and in whom he walks)—to know, surely, would consist not in bare and perfunctory knowledge, but in the working of those things which ought to be done. But man ought to have obeyed the commandment; and by not obeying he transgressed.

Therefore he who did not obey erred, because transgression is sin. But even if they wish to lessen the force of 'knowledge,' so as to think that the perfunctory knowledge of good and evil was forbidden, in that case too there is the fault of transgression in not having obeyed the commandment, because the Lord God thought that even a tumultuary knowledge of good and evil should be checked. Another question: he who does not know good and evil differs in nothing from an infant, and there is no fault in infants before a just judge. But the just Maker of the world would never have called an infant into fault, on the ground that he had not known good and evil, because an infant is without any crime of transgression and fault.

But since we have said above that there is a twofold understanding of the knowledge of good and evil, if we take the perfunctory knowledge, it is surely false that he who did not know good and evil differs in nothing from an infant; but if it is false that he differs in nothing from an infant, then Adam is not an infant. If he is not an infant, then surely sin is ascribed to him as to one who is not an infant. If sin is ascribed, punishment follows the sin, because he is found worthy of punishment who could not avoid the sin. It can also happen that even he who does not have the knowledge of good and evil is not an infant, since before the child knew good and evil, he did not believe in malice. And again you have:

For before the child shall know to call father and mother, he shall receive the power of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria. Perfect therefore is he who works good, even if he has not attained the knowledge of good and evil, just as many, before they know the law, are themselves a law to themselves. What of the fact that the apostle, before he learned 'thou shalt not covet,' did not know that concupiscence was evil? Indeed he himself says: I had not known sin but by the law; for I had not known concupiscence, unless the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. In which respect even a child can be perfect by the right of nature, before he knows that concupiscence is a crime or commits the crime of concupiscence.

Therefore according to the perfunctory knowledge God willed that man should know what is evil, lest, as if imperfect, he should be unable to avoid it. But by not obeying the commandment we incur fault; therefore we confess the fault. But again, if we speak of the high and deep knowledge of good and evil, which deep knowledge indeed makes one perfect, the infant is not at once perfect; yet he who could not attain to the high and deep knowledge is not rightly condemned as one who is not an infant. Again they sow questions. He who does not know, he says, good and evil, knows not even this, that it is evil not to keep the commandment, nor does he know that very good which is to obey the commandment. And therefore, because he did not know, he says, he who did not obey was worthy of pardon, not of condemnation.

This question indeed finds its resolution from the things we mentioned before. For man was able to consider, from those things which God had previously conferred on him—that he received the breathing-in of God, that he was placed in the paradise of delight—that the highest obedience was to be rendered to his Author. And therefore, even if he did not know the force of good and evil, yet because the Author of such great things had said that of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil it was not to be tasted, he ought to have kept faith with his Instructor; for it was not expertise that was required of him, but faith. He understood, surely, that God surpasses all; therefore he ought to have regarded the person of him who commanded. Even if he did not understand the force and quality of the commands, yet he knew that reverence was to be rendered to the Instructor.

He had in his nature this notion, even though he did not have judgment of good and evil. And finally the woman too says to the serpent: Of every tree of paradise we shall eat, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise God said: You shall not eat of it. So therefore she knew that the commandment was to be obeyed, so that she said: Of every fruit we shall eat, which the Lord had commanded, but of the tree which is in the midst of paradise she says it was commanded by God that it should not be tasted, lest they should die the death. Therefore she who knew that obedience was to be rendered to the commandment surely knew that to transgress was evil, and therefore, having justly transgressed, she is condemned. Receive another point:

If the taking from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was so productive that both good and evil were recognized—which the Scripture seems to show, when it says that when both had eaten, their eyes were opened and they knew that they were naked, that is, the eyes of the heart were opened and they knew that it was shameful to go about naked—then without doubt, when the woman tasted of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, she sinned and knew that she had sinned. She therefore who had known that she had sinned ought not even to have invited the man into fellowship of sin. But by enticing the man and giving him what she herself had tasted, she did not avoid sin, but repeated it.

For surely, if you truly look at reason, she ought not to have drawn him whom she loved into a partnership of punishment, but rather to have recalled him, even though unknowing, from that which she herself had known to be sin; although this woman seems, knowing that after her fault she could not remain in paradise, to have feared lest she alone be cast out of paradise. In short, after the fault they both hid themselves. Knowing therefore that she must be excluded, she did not wish to be deprived of the partnership of the man whom she loved. Receive again: it is not the knowledge of evil that is evil, but when the act fulfills the malice. For not at once does he who knows evil do that which is evil, but he who works what he knows to be evil. But the incitement to working what is evil is wont to be either anger or desire.

Nor is it at once necessary that one having knowledge of evil should do what he knows to be wicked, unless he is overcome by either anger or desire. Whence what we have said: the incitement to sinning is either wrath or desire, or very often fear—though from fear arises desire, while each one wishes to avoid what he dreads. And therefore we have rightly set anger and desire as the two incitements of the remaining vices. Let us consider, then, whether Eve was incited to vice by these goads. But she was neither angry with her husband nor overcome by desire; at least in the second instance she errs, in giving the man to eat what she had already tasted. First desire had been the author of error, that she herself should eat, and was the cause of the subsequent sin.

For what she had already tasted she could not desire, and by tasting she had attained the knowledge of evil. Therefore she ought not to have passed on to the man the evil which she had perceived, nor to have made her own spouse a transgressor of the divine commandment. Knowingly therefore and wittingly she sinned, and knowingly she drew the man into her error; otherwise the word concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil will be found false, if even after she had eaten of that tree she could not have the knowledge of evil. But if the word is true, she surely could not have had the cause of desire, although very many think she is to be excused on this ground, that loving her husband she feared to be separated from him, and they put forward this as the cause of desire, that she wished to be with her husband.

Again another question creeps in: whence came death to Adam, whether from the nature of such a tree or rather from God. If we ascribe this to the nature of the tree, the fruit of this tree seems to prevail over the life-giving breathing-in of God, since the one whom the breathing-in had given life, the fruit of this tree drew to death. Or if we record that God is the worker of death, they say that we accuse him on a twofold opinion: either that he is so harsh that he was unwilling to pardon when he could pardon, or, if he could not pardon, that he seems weak. Let us see, then, how this is to be dissolved. Unless I am mistaken, the cause of death was disobedience, and therefore man himself is the cause of death to himself, not having God as the author of his death.

For if a physician prescribes for a sick man the things which seem to him to be guarded against, and that man does not think he ought to abstain from what is forbidden, the physician is not the cause of death to him, but surely he himself is the author of his own death. And so God, like a good physician, forbade lest Adam should taste harmful things. Again receive: to know the good is better than not to know, and for him who knows the good it is fitting to know what is evil, that he may know to beware of what is evil, and that, being prudent, he may undertake the caution of keeping. But again it is not enough to know this alone, what is evil, lest, when you know the evil, you begin to be defrauded of the knowledge of the good.

It is therefore more excellent that we should know both, so that, because we know the good, we may flee what is evil, and from our knowledge of evil may set the grace of the good before it. But you ought to know both in such a way that you know it deeply and put into practice what you know, and that the deed agrees with your knowledge. Otherwise Scripture declares more tolerable the man who is ignorant of both than the one who knows both only superficially. For it is a burden to know what you can neither carry out nor avoid; it is a burden to have knowledge without the use and work of deep understanding. It harms a physician's reputation to know what helps and what harms a sick man, unless he uses that knowledge as he ought; and therefore knowledge is not good unless you use it as you should. Now consider further:

Not in vain was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil brought forth in the midst of paradise; for had it been brought forth for any and every man, the prohibition would have been superfluous. But it was made neither in vain nor for any other than the man who received the commandment, that he might use it not alone, but together with the rest. For if you examine many things, you will find very many, indeed countless ones, which can harm the man who knows not how to use them. You will not find even riches themselves fruitful, if a rich man, possessing the means of generosity, refuses nourishment to the poor and shuts out the needy person bereft of help; if he extorts what belongs to others because he prevails in power. Beauty itself and a more pleasing form of body often draws one into vice more than ugliness does.

Does anyone, then, desire to have children uglier rather than more beautiful, and wish his own offspring to be poor rather than rich? There are many things of this sort which are to be referred not to the imprudence of the giver, but to the error of the one who uses them ill; and therefore the user is rather to be accused than the giver. Again a question: did God know that Adam would transgress His commands, or did He not know? If He did not know, that is no proof of divine power; but if He did know, and nevertheless, knowing it, commanded things that would be neglected, still there is nothing superfluous in God's commanding. Yet, they say, He commanded in vain to the first-formed Adam what He knew he would by no means keep. But God does nothing in vain; therefore the Scripture is not from God.

For this is the objection raised by those who do not receive the Old Testament and insert these questions. But these men must be conquered by their own opinion and judgment. For since they do not reject the faith of the New Testament, they are to be refuted by its example, so that they may believe the Old; since, when the divine precepts and deeds agree with one another, it is clear that both Testaments, being of one Author, are to be believed. Let them learn, then, that the command was not superfluously, nor unjustly, prescribed even to one who would transgress. For the Lord Jesus Himself also chose Judas, whom He knew to be a traitor. And if they think he was chosen through imprudence, they detract from the divine power. But they cannot suppose this, since Scripture says that Jesus knew who it was that would betray Him.

Let these opponents of the Old Testament therefore fall silent. But since it seems we must also answer the Gentiles, in case they should perchance raise this objection—for they do not accept an example but demand a reason—let them too receive an account of why the Son of God either gave a command to one who would transgress, or chose one who would betray. The Lord Jesus had come to save all sinners; He had also to show His will toward the impious. And therefore He ought not to pass over even the one who would betray, so that all might perceive that, in the choosing even of His betrayer, He held forth a token of saving all; and in this neither Adam was wronged, in that he received a commandment, nor Judas, in that he was chosen.

For God imposed on neither of them any necessity—on the one of transgression, on the other of betrayal—since each, had he kept what he had received, could have abstained from sin. Indeed, He knew that not all the Jews would believe, and yet He said: I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel. Therefore the fault lies not in Him who commands, but the sin is in him who transgresses; and that which was in God showed to all that He willed to free all. Nor yet do I say that He did not know the transgression would come; rather I affirm that He did know it; but He ought not on that account to draw upon Himself the odium of the perishing betrayer, so that it should be ascribed to God that each one fell.

But now each is refuted and convicted afresh, since the one received a commandment lest he should fall, and the other was even admitted into the office of the apostolate, that he might be called back from the disposition to betray by this kindness, and at the same time that, while others are convicted, he might profit all. For sin would not subsist had there been no prohibition; and, sin not subsisting, not only would malice not exist, but perhaps neither would virtue, which, unless there had been some seeds of malice, could neither subsist nor stand out conspicuously. For what is sin but the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?

For we do not judge of the heavenly commands by the ears of the body, but, since it was the Word of God, certain notions of good and evil sprang up within us, while we naturally understand that what is evil is to be avoided, and naturally understand that what is good has been enjoined upon us. In this, then, we seem to hear the voice of the Lord, in that He forbids some things and commands others. If anyone does not obey those things which we believe to have been once for all commanded by God, he is reckoned liable to punishment. Yet we read God's precept inscribed not, as it were, in ink upon tablets of stone, but we hold it impressed upon our hearts by the Spirit of the living God. Therefore our own understanding makes a law for itself.

For if the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts. Human understanding, therefore, is to itself as a law of God. Again, from this they raise another question: that, corresponding to His commandment—which we said consists in man's own understanding—they accuse this very understanding, impressed upon us by God, as though it were the prescription of a divine law. He knew, they say, that the man would sin, who created him and impressed upon him these notions of good and evil—or did He not know? So that, if you say He did not know, you hold something foreign to the majesty of God;

but if you say that God, though knowing the man would sin, nevertheless impressed upon him the common notions of good and evil, so that through the admixture of evils he could not preserve perpetuity of life—then, as in the former case you would seem to signify Him not foreknowing the future, so in this case you would seem to signify Him not a good God. And from this they argue that the creature, man, was not made by God. For as we showed above that they say there is no commandment of God, so here too they say: man, then, is not the creature of God, since God did not make evil, while man received the notion of evil, in that he is commanded to abstain from evils. By this kind of reasoning they attempt to assert that one God is good, and another is the fashioner of man. To these we must reply at once according to their own opinion.

For if they will not have man made by God, because man is a sinner—and they shrink from this, lest the good God should seem to have made a sinner, since they do not think Him good who made a sinner—let them say whether they think the fashioner of man was made by God. For if that fashioner of man was made by God, as they say, how did the good God make the fashioner of evil? Surely not good. For if He who made a sinner is not good, we must beware lest it be still graver to have made the fashioner of a sinner; for the good God ought to have prohibited the birth of him who would introduce the substance of sin. But if they say the fashioner was not begotten, we must inquire whether the good God was able in any way to restrain the malice as it began, or was not able. For if He was not able, He is weak;

if He was able and did not, He is not good. Therefore, since these things do not agree among themselves, nor do the opinions of the heretics agree with one another, let us inquire whether perhaps there was some reason for which God allowed the malice of that fashioner—whether begotten or unbegotten—to enter into this world, when He could have restrained it. And so, keeping one and the same God who is both good and Maker, let us, if we can, establish that which agrees with the grace of both, and not shun the odium of their accusation who speak thus: How is God good, who not only suffered malice to enter into this world, but also permitted it to come to such great confusion? But this accusation would then have place, if it so infected the power of the soul and the secret depths of the inmost mind, that

it could by no means be done away, and the poison of incurable wounds lodged in our mind and soul. For then there would be a more fitting place for this complaint—that, though God can do all things, He yet suffered man to perish.

But since God, in mercy toward us, has reserved remedies for casting off error, and has not abolished the possibility of doing away all contagion, how is it unreasonable or unjust if He permitted our material part to be tempted by a certain trembling of human frailty, so that afterwards grace, increased as if with interest, might return through repentance of sins into the disposition of man—and that man, conscious of his own frailty, in that he had so easily trembled by straying from the order of the divine commands, should fear, as if it were the anchor of a wavering soul, to lose the heavenly commands; and, ascribing more to the divine mercy because he had recovered what was lost, should claim for himself something of grace because it returned?

Now let us consider what that reason is—what this means, that when God gave man a commandment, prescribing concerning that admirable and blessed life, lest by acting against it he should die the death, He thought fit to command concerning eating and not eating. For there are those who think that this commandment in no way befits the Creator of heaven and earth and of all things, and is in no way worthy of the dwellers in paradise, since that life is like that of the angels. And therefore we can judge that this food was not earthly and corruptible to be eaten, since they who neither drink nor eat shall be as the angels in heaven.

Since, then, there is neither reward in food—for meat does not commend us to God—nor any great danger—for it is not what enters into the mouth that defiles a man, but what comes forth out of the mouth—the precept would seem, without doubt, given by so great an Author . . . unless you refer this food to that prophetic one, since for a great reward the Lord promises concerning His holy ones: Behold, they that serve Me shall eat, but ye shall be hungry. For this is the food in which eternal life is determined, of which whoever is defrauded shall die the death; inasmuch as the living and heavenly bread is the Lord Himself, who gives life to this world. Whence He Himself also says: Unless ye eat My flesh and drink My blood, ye shall not have eternal life.

There was, then, some bread of which He had prescribed to the dwellers of paradise that it should be eaten. What was it? Receive whom He names it. Man, He says, ate the bread of angels; for it is good bread, if you do the will of God. Would you know how good a bread? The Son Himself eats this bread, of which He says: My food is to do the will of My Father, who is in heaven. Again let us see for what reason the Lord God said to Adam, Ye shall die the death—what difference it makes whether someone says Ye shall die, or adds Ye shall die the death; for we ought to show that there is nothing superfluous in God's commandment. And so I judge thus: since two things, death and life, are contrary to each other, according to plain speech we say from life to live, from death to die.

But if you wish to double each, since life produces life, it is said 'life lives,' as you have in the Law; and since death produces death, it is said 'he shall die the death.' Yet this doubling is not superfluous; for there is a life unto death, and there is a death unto life, since whoever lives, while he lives, dies, and while he dies, lives. There arise, then, four distinctions: to live by life, to die by death, to die by life, to live by death. Since, then, these things are so, we ought to set aside the prejudgment of use and custom, because usage holds this: that it is commonly said 'to live' both of him who lives by life and of him who lives by death, and commonly said 'to die' both of him who dies by death and of him who dies by life.

And so, out of those four, it signifies two, so that it speaks of the living as living, distinguishing nothing better or worse, and speaks of the dying as dying, with no discrimination apparent between an evil and a good death. For a certain undistinguished life is signified, such as that of irrational creatures or even of little children, and an undistinguished death likewise. Setting aside, then, the common usage, let us consider what it is to live by life, what it is to die by death, what it is to live by death, and to die by life. For I think, according to the Scriptures, that 'to live by life' signifies that admirable and blessed life, and seems to show this use of living and gift of breathing as joined, as it were, with the grace of the blessed life and mingled by a certain participation.

For this is 'to live by life': to live by virtue, to have the acts of the blessed life in the life of this body. On the other hand, what is 'to die by death' but to signify, together with the death of the body, the deformity of one who is dying, whose flesh is both defrauded of the common gift of living, and whose soul cannot have the use of eternal life? There is also one who dies by life, namely one who lives in body but dies by his own deed—such are those who, as the prophet says, go down alive into hell; and that woman of whom the apostle says that, while living, she is dead. The fourth remains: that there are those who even live by death, like the holy martyrs, who indeed die that they may live. The flesh dies, but the grace of the dead lives.

Therefore far be it from us that we should live as partakers of death; rather let us die as partakers of life. For the holy man does not even wish to be a partaker of this present life, as he says: To be dissolved and to be with Christ. For it is much better; and another also says: Woe is me, that my sojourning is prolonged—grieving, of course, that, while he hopes for the fellowship of eternal life, he is held back by the frailty of this life. And therefore, on the contrary, I can say that, although to live by life is good, yet to live for this life is doubtful.

For one can be said 'to live for life,' that is, to be a soldier of eternal life by means of this life of the body; one can also be said 'to live for life' in the sense of having any desire whatever—whether ordinary or holy—of this bodily life: as, for example, if someone thinks he ought to live honourably for the purpose of attaining length of life by good deeds, such as are most of the weaker sort whom this life delights. Therefore, just as we have received what it is 'to live for life,' let us receive what it is 'to die for death,' or 'to live for death.' For there can be those who die for death and those who live for life. For he who does not so live as to live according to the death of his own soul—he dies for death.