For because it is not the time for performing mighty works—since they had to be done at the beginning, so that the seed of faith might through them make its increase—yet even now the demons, at the naming of the cross of Christ, are terrified and, if it is done more earnestly, are put to flight, and the gods of the pagans, through dread and fear of the named cross, cannot give responses. If the death of Christ is a reproach, why is it a terror? For a thing which comes from crime ought not to be feared but despised. For who would fear a man slain for his own crime? And if he was innocent, yet he cannot be feared, but pitied. And so, unless the demons or the gods of the pagans perceived that the cross of Christ is a sacrament, they would not be terrified at its naming; and, to speak more precisely, unless they were guilty, they would not fear.
For all these, who are on the side of the devil, consented to the death of Christ. Whence all demons or the gods of the nations are shaken with terror at the naming of the cross of Christ. For everyone who is guilty in the death of some innocent man, when that man's name has been recalled, fear seizes his heart. For when the memory of the misdeed is had, he sees himself guilty: how much more the demons or the gods of the nations, who are guilty of the slaying of the Lord and Savior of the world! But the pagans contend that they hold the truth by reason of antiquity, because, they say, 'what is earlier cannot be false,' as though antiquity or ancient custom should prejudge the truth.
For murderers, or the effeminate, or adulterers, or the rest of the criminal sort, could by this means defend their unlawful deeds, because they are ancient and have been begun from the very beginning of the world; whereas from this they ought rather to understand their error, because what is reprehensible and base is proved to have been wickedly begun, but what is honorable and holy is worthily reverenced; and the base and reprehensible cannot be prior to the holy and irreproachable. And finally, it cannot be denied that the tradition of the pagans was invented by man; but that our law was given by God is an evident matter.
For on the mountain the majesty of God appeared to give the law to men, and, that this might be believed, he sent beforehand many signs and prodigies, wrought in Egypt, which even today the books attest, books stored away by Ptolemy in the library of Alexandria. Thus therefore he deigned to give the law in such a way that no one might doubt that it was God who delivered it. For openly and manifestly was the majesty of God seen by all in such great splendor and terror, that besides him no other was believed to be God, and that what he commanded was held worthy of all observance. And, that all things may accord with the divine reason, let the law that was delivered be examined, whether there be anything unjust in it, anything dishonorable, anything ridiculous.
Thus it behooved God to make himself known—not so as to appear in a corner through imposture, he who cannot be enclosed, nor in a cave, where there is something other than what is seen, an alluring deception being at work, nor so as to deliver for keeping such things as, because they were dishonorable, would be performed in darkness. For when the knowledge of the one God had been blotted out in the world by the habit of transgressing, because falsehood had furnished a veil for the truth, the clement and merciful God, unwilling that his own work should become subject to perdition, deigned to visit the human race, appearing not as those did who falsely wished to be called gods, but, as is the truth of God, so he manifested himself, that he might take away the error which, by the proclamation of false gods, had corrupted the perception of the world.
In short, above six hundred thousand men who had gone out of Egypt, seeing and knowing that this was the Lord, were afraid to draw near to him beyond all appearance of ineffable glory, but bowing the knee from afar they worshiped; afterward, as other signs followed than those which he had wrought in Egypt amid all the wonders, he was made manifest to be the one God. These things became known to almost all tongues; these things were a terror to the neighboring nations. What such thing was there among the gods of the nations? To what nation, to what people did they show their glory? What signs or mighty works did they perform as testimony of their divinity? Where or when are they proved to have spoken? But the irrational crowd began to worship as gods either appearing shades, or demons, or images of the dead;
and this practice, brought into the custom of antiquity, supposes that it can defend for itself the truth of reason, although the reason of truth is not from custom nor from antiquity, but from God, who is proved God not by antiquity but by eternity. Wherefore faith is not a thing that has begun, but is without beginning. For our believing in God is to begin; but that which is believed is eternal. In what way then do the pagans suppose themselves earlier, since that which they worship is later than God? Is not the work later than the workman? The pagans worship works, we the workman; they the creature, we the creator. Surely God made the world: come now, having made it, did he not show his own knowledge? Or did he make man and not wish to be worshiped by him whom he made? But that is absurd.
Man therefore, having been made, began to venerate his Creator, because it is both fitting and the cause demands it. And when this had grown obsolete through the slothfulness of men, God restored it in Abraham, so that the knowledge of God which had been in Adam might begin again in Abraham, and that those begotten of him might be brought up under this knowledge, and that through succession there might not fail nor be lacking one to worship God, men even of a foreign nation being summoned to this knowledge of God. He therefore who knows is under a beginning; but he who is known is above a beginning. By what reasoning then do the pagans say that their law was earlier than ours? If the world is before God—which God forbid!—then paganism too can be set before Christianity. Let no one wonder at the name of Christianity.
For it is to worship one God in the mystery of the Trinity, because, even if the name of Christ is thought to be from 'chrism' (anointing), yet the reason of the name is before creation. For among our forefathers, those who were anointed into kings were called 'christs' (anointed ones), bearing the image of the Christ who was to come, who, born of God the Father, is not undeservedly called Christ as king, because what to them was the chrism, to him his birth bestowed. Him the pagans, so long as they are ignorant of him, reject; but when they have come to know him, they reverence him more diligently, rejoicing because they have passed from evil to good. For those who were obstinate in a thing so frivolous and absurd—how much stronger and more vehement will they be when the truth is known! What manner of Christ then is ours, who, when he is unknown, is hated, but when he is known, is loved!
For every wicked man, when he is unknown, is loved, but when known is hated. How many in the past hated Christ, who now love him and who grieve that they hated him, because they had not known him! For it is the mark of the imprudent to hate one whom you do not know, since it must be proved whether the thing is worthy of hatred. Finally, those who today oppose him will tomorrow defend him, doing penance that they have come late to know what is true. But if it were a thing worthy of hatred, or had anything of deceit, daily pagans would be made out of Christians. But on the contrary, since this is the truth, daily, every hour, without intermission, men forsaking Jupiter—among them sophists and nobles of the world, who had falsely fashioned him a god—flee for refuge to Christ, to whom be honor and glory unto the ages of ages. CXV. ON FATE.
Nothing is so contrary to a Christian as to give attention to the art of astrology. For this is recognized as the enemy of God's law. For if those are born who are wicked, and on the contrary those who are good, the law will be said to have been given in vain; and not only this, but the lawgiver too will be held unjust. For he who, by giving a law, compels men to act contrary to that for which they were born, knowing that nature cannot be changed, plainly seems to have given the law for this purpose, that he might have an occasion by which to glut his cruelty in the killing of man. For why does he forbid what he knows cannot be turned aside? Or in what way does he condemn a man for not having done what he could not do?
But if he seems just, as he is—for to think that of God is wicked—then rightly and with a salutary reasoning he gave the law, knowing that man can restrain himself from that which the law forbids. Therefore, because he gave the law justly, he is surely not unjust when he punishes. And so, if faith is to be lent to the law of God, because it is proved to have been given justly, the art of astrology must be shunned and fled. For the cunning and subtlety of the devil invented it. For because he does not dare openly to oppose the author, he accomplishes this by evasion, so that he both does injury to God and, setting man against the law, may punish him with the second death.
He therefore who yields to the authority of God and deems it wicked to call his deed in question, obeys the law given by him, applying himself day and night to its pursuits, nor does he look back to anything contrary, not doubting that man is able to keep his precepts. For those who are eager to sin seek occasions by which they may make their sins foreign to themselves, so that, while sins are as it were to be imputed to nature, the sinner may seem immune from punishment. This is the design of those who, in despair of the promised life, desire to enjoy present pleasure. But those who, relying on the confidence of faith, await the hope of things to come, strive to fulfill what they promised at the outset of their rebirth, namely that they would renounce the pomps and pleasures of Satan.
With how great subtlety then has Satan made use, that he might render man more ready to sin, whereby he might fulfill the wickedness of his envy! For when a man hears that he was so born as to sin, and is not ignorant that God is most just, he believes that he sins with impunity, because he who is a just judge does not condemn one who has sinned at the command of nature, nor indeed is that to be called his sin which another performed through him, if the man was deceived; for, oppressed by sins, he became subject to death. Therefore he takes away every good of man, who takes away also the evil. For if the sinner has no punishment, neither has the just man a crown; and why are the good praised and the wicked blamed? For if it is of this nature that one cannot sin, what do you praise in him which is not his own?
And why do you condemn the offense in the sinner, when you know that what he sins is not his own—unless because he will be unjust who praises the good and accuses the evil? But perhaps it may be said on the contrary: 'I praise the good nature in man and condemn the bad, just as good wine too is praised, since it is good by nature, and bad wine is rejected, since nature equally bestows this.' If it were so, there would be nothing of blame in the matter, so that the just man should be praised in such a way as not to be judged worthy of a crown, nor the unjust be accused in such a way as to be said worthy of punishment.
But on the contrary, both in the present and in the future we know and read that the just are rewarded and the unjust, subjected to punishments, are consumed with fire—which surely would seem unjust, if this man, who had done the deed of his own nature, should suffer punishments by the avenging fire, or another, equally carrying out the deed of his own nature, should be endowed with rewards. But if the good man is to be praised because he did what was of his nature, the bad man too ought to be praised, because he likewise did what was of his nature, so that each one, remaining in that which he was made, should be praised; because, if while remaining in that in which he was made he is held blameworthy, the blame touches the author, who caused such a one to be born as would be displeasing.
But if the just man is to be rewarded by right and the unjust condemned, then the answer is given not to nature but to will, because nature is free, whereas the will is at the root of the matter, the will which admits of approach and withdrawal of the senses, so that the unjust man, seeing the just man crowned and himself condemned, may impute it to himself, who, trusting his senses against the law, did evil when he could have done good. Can the sun be accused because it burns, or water because it chills? Or is water to be rewarded because it refreshes men afflicted with thirst, or will the sun be endowed with rewards because it restores men with its heat after cold? For they do what is of their nature, whence they are neither condemned nor praised; for they know not how to do otherwise.
But since it is not as the star-gazers reckon, the reasoning of men's actions proves it. For no one can be found who always does well, or always ill. For then one would seem so born as to act well, if he remained blameless; and so he would deservedly be reckoned to be bad, if he persisted in doing ill always. But since you sometimes see even that man, whom you think born good, acting badly, and sometimes perceive this man, whom you say born bad, doing good, how do you prove this to be true, that the bad man is bad and the good man good, unless because this is the more certain thing—that wherever a man has set his mind, in that he makes progress? For there are also causes which generate sins, such that one either envies, or quarrels, or becomes an enemy.
But those things which are forbidden by the law they commit not openly nor manifestly, but secretly. Why, unless because they revere the law? But if, as they assert, they were born for this, to do evil, they would not seek hiding-places nor show any reverence for the law, but would do everywhere those things which nature compelled. Yet when you see provision being made for sins, and devices contrived where they may be secretly committed—for they choose both places and persons and times, that they may fulfill the will of their evil purpose—in like manner the good too by a certain judgment determine their good works, so as to dispense their good according to the time and the occasion of someone; which surely is now to be imputed not to nature, but to the will which is in nature.
But if it were natural, judgment would cease. For if we discuss the matter more fully, we shall show that those who are now just were formerly unjust, but by deliberate effort were changed. For Abraham himself is read to have been made just through faith—before, then, he was not just, since he is understood to have worshiped idols with his father as leader—and Zacchaeus too, to whom after a common life the Lord bears testimony, and the vessel of election, who confesses even this, saying: 'We too were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.' Because the will takes the place of nature—for one is judged from his will, not from his nature—without doubt all the martyrs too were justified and are good, because they were not born faithful, but reborn.
And how many do we know to have been of base life, and prodigal devotees of luxury, who are now continent and holy! For when the fear of God draws near, the vices which formerly held sway are overcome. But how much the fear of the law can avail, let us notice from this. Before Julian's edict, women could not put away their husbands; but having received the power, they began to do what before they could not do; for they began daily and licentiously to put away their husbands. Where did fate lie hidden for so many ages? Through fear, I believe, of the law it concealed itself. But that other thing, in what way did it creep in, which Moses handed down? While the fates slept, I believe. For things so great and such as no nation has were handed over to them to be kept as precepts.
And lest anyone should think this is to be referred to a region of the sky, scattered through nearly the whole world they keep the commandments of their law. These precepts are against the fates; for they did not exist, perchance, for three thousand years and more from the foundation of the world, but, once given, they remain even unto the end. That therefore which for so many thousands of years did not exist, in what way did it begin? For the course of the stars is from the foundation of the world. And what is that, that, though there is so great a multitude of Jews throughout the whole world, none is changed from among them so as to become a Gentile, although we see that out of pagans, though rarely, Jews are made? Behold, as far as pertains to the rite of the Jews, fate is excluded, because they have begun to be outside fate and remain in that state.
What is to be thought concerning Sodom and Gomorrah, the kind of end of which lies before the eyes of vengeance? It was so, that all, sprinkled with the infamy of filthiness, deserved to be consumed by divine fire. In the deluge all were of one fate, so that by one death and at the same time all perished, except the house of Noah. And shall the whole army of Pharaoh be said to have been born by one decree—so that the inept error of astrology may be punished—because they were drowned in the Red Sea together with their king? And how many other examples there are, which we pass over, because two examples suffice for satisfaction, how much more three! For all nations too have diverse institutions, and what is permitted elsewhere is not permitted here, and again what is permitted here is not permitted elsewhere.
For here in the city of Rome and its borders, which is called most sacred, it is permitted to women to put away their husbands, although it is provided in the divine law that not even men should use this power, except for the cause of fornication. Behold, in this matter the barbarians are better! And that this can be observed even here is not impossible, because it is shown to have been observed before. Fate therefore has been changed, because that began to be permitted which before was forbidden. And to make eunuchs is not permitted in the Roman kingdom, but among others it is permitted; but that this too could be done here is settled, for the deed, though done secretly, is proved. But if fear should cease, it would be done publicly. Dread therefore forbids fate; for fate is overcome, if it does not do what it wishes to do.
And the Persians, after the manner of women, wear earrings, which here is dishonorable and unlawful; but that this too can be done here, the priests of the Mother, who is called the Great, attest—and in truth she was great, but a harlot; yet in this there is a difference, that those men are catamites, these are men—and what shall we say? In the whole world are these alone born under this fate, that, castrated, they are transformed into women, so that in the whole world these few only are found, who, it is agreed, are miserably circumvented and, by promised rewards, are compelled to this pain and disgrace? But if they were born to this, they would not be compelled. The Persians hold it lawful to consort with their own daughters, which is shown to be able to be done here too, by the fact that it is proved to have been done by certain men.
But because vengeance intervenes, they are seized with fear lest they should do what can be done, but is not lawful. For everything which is forbidden is forbidden for this reason, lest, because it can be done, it should be done; but if it were of fate, it could not be done nor would it be forbidden. For if it is not of fate and is forbidden, it is signified that what is not of fate can be done. And what prudence is there in forbidding what cannot be done? Let someone forbid a person to fly across from the city of Rome into Spain, or to carry a mountain on his shoulders! But those things which can be done, though they ought not to be, are forbidden. It is the custom of the Moors that the women wear earrings even in their noses. Is this of fate?
If it were of fate, those women transferred hither would so remain, because, if it is fate, each one carries his own fate with him; but because it is not of fate, all who come from there are here changed, seeing that to be base here which there is thought becoming. Surely among all nations number is number, and earth is earth, and water is water, and air is air, and fire is fire. Can earth be found anywhere which is not dry, or air which is palpable, or water which is not fluid or cold, or fire which is cold? So everywhere Jupiter is Jupiter, and Saturn is Saturn, and Venus is Venus; in the same way also the other signs. For this art is everywhere treated by one and the same reasoning.
But since among all peoples customs persist not by reason of the fates, which (as they argue) is everywhere one and the same, but by human contrivance — for whatever seemed to someone, who was reckoned the first among his own people, to be worthy by reason and fitting for decorum, he established for those over whom he was set —, hence each single region or nation has its own usages to keep, just as Solon and Lycurgus had established many things to be kept by the Greeks after the manner of law, which little by little, as their kingdom declined, were blotted out. For to the kings of the Jews mules were pleasing for riding; but to the Romans not mules, but horses; while to the kings of the Garamantes, who are beyond Tripolis of the Africans, bulls are pleasing for riding;
but the kings of the Persians are carried on couches — for the ancient kings of the Persians were not even seen by the peoples —; and the kings of Media take delight in mules for riding, so that they adorn their necks with golden collars; and throughout Africa they prefer to sit upon asses rather than horses. Although all things exist everywhere, yet not all things are pleasing to all, because each one chooses what has more favor in his own eyes. For even among ourselves the will is various, both in garments and in foods and in the rest of usage and in opinion itself. And lest this be called fate — because they maintain that the fates of many are diverse — this very fact forbids it, because the will is frequently changed within us. For what we long love, we afterwards despise, and begin to love
what before we did not gladly possess; and once a habit is formed, we remain changed. But they say that the order of the fates is such that there is something which they bring about at certain times by recurring intervals back to the former state, so that, for example, what they do today, they do again after a span of time. For they are not said to remain fixed in one thing; for they are overcome by discipline and habit. For instance, among the women of the Romans for many ages the use of wine was unknown. For discipline, once it had become a habit, confirmed its own perception, so that it retained what it had learned to be profitable. Were these fates in those times and afterwards died, so that a well-found practice ceased? But not fate had found this out, but discipline. And once there was a departure from the habit, the discipline perished.
And the ancients of the Romans were of such great self-restraint that they even refused gifts offered to them, accounting a good reputation their riches, and setting virtue before pleasures. And whether these fates succeeded or perished — but it was not of fate, but of discipline, which is even the tutor of fate itself. For how could that be of fate which neither possessed it before its time nor possesses it now? And what it is, I do not know, that they cast such great odium upon fate, so that in all deeds they call it the author, although it both is and is not? For where there is discipline, fate is not; and where there is habit, it is not; and where there is chance, it is not. And where it seems to be, it is overcome by the fear of the law; for lust too is restrained by fear, and gain of money is rejected for the sake of meriting God.
In this respect, therefore, it cannot be denied that what is overcome cannot not be; and yet it can rightly be said that in that very thing it is not, because what is overcome lacks authority. And so, whoever follows the law of God and holds to the habit of a good life, to him yield all those things that are called fates. For habit has such power that it even tames wild beasts. For those who wish to live evilly set up fates for themselves. For through luxury and pleasure there comes intemperance and unrest, which gives birth to incontinence and wrath. And knowing this to be worthy of punishment, so as to make themselves immovable, having suffered shame, they ascribe this to the fates, while the demons render aid to those who ponder upon this matter:
these stand ready for this purpose, that they may grant effect to those who think evil; and men call them fates, not understanding that they are the enemies of man. For if sins did not enter into the soul through the senses, but were born from within, then rightly everything that is transgressed would be said to be of... them. But since they see that the lust for sins is born through sight and hearing and the rest of the senses, with the enemies aiding, who suggest what is to be done — which is contrary, and is not thought to be so as long as it is being done (for it seems sweet while it is being done, or before it is done; but once completed it is shown to be bitter) —, why do they impute it to the fates? But that it can be overcome, from this we perceive it: for when we are thinking and anxious about some matter, the enemies are silent and lust grows still;
for they cannot make suggestions to us when we are occupied. Does anyone suggest something different to a person devoted to some task? He does not, knowing either that he is not heard, or that he will be at a loss as one suggesting at an inopportune time. So too the enemies, who are agreed to be demons; for these are the gods of the pagans, who, if they see us occupied with divine matters, do not thrust themselves forward to suggest contrary things, but lie in ambush, seeking an occasion by which to plunge in. The fortifications, therefore, of our minds are the constant meditation of the law of God and its practice, because, if they see us idle from divine things, they are roused to solicit us. For it is they who sow concupiscences through flesh and blood.
For although the flesh has its own motion from its origin, since carnal birth is not idle, yet in this matter there is added to the destruction of men the aid of the demons. For the demons are diverse and have differing wills. There are some which, when they disturb the minds, dash down the bodies; others, mingling themselves with the blood, generate desires in the souls; others again, coupling themselves to the heart of man, suggest contrary things with flatteries; and there are some which bind the bodies alone with infirmities, as also that daughter of Abraham whom the Lord healed.
All these things, being ignorant of them, the pagans call fate, although the causes are diverse and these things are procured by the enemies, so that by whatever cause a man, being ensnared, may be subjected to passions. But they call it good fate when bodies are well-tempered, or are commended by affability, having a certain grace; and that it is bad fate, if one has more of heat or of moisture, or if he is not sprinkled with grace, but rather disposed to detriments — such men they call unfortunate. Grant that it is true. For we see these things even in animals, that they have more heat; but animals are not rational like man, so as to be able, with care applied, to temper their own body. For this reason the soul is the commander of the body, that it may govern it with the reins of the divine law.
For those things which are suggested either by the impulse of the flesh or by the enemy, the divine law shows to be not profitable — the law which God therefore gave as a help, so that, when the enemy dictates evils as though they were goods, we, looking to the precepts of the law, may understand that he is a seducer, because he persuades something other than what the law teaches. Thus, then, the body is bridled, so that, because it seethes, less is given to it and it is held back from delights. For just as a feverish body, if it takes food or drink, the heat increases in it, so too bodies of this kind, which are burned by the seething of the blood, will blaze the more vehemently, unless they have been governed. For if you do not give food to fire, it is quenched. It belongs to the soul to lead the body;