but if it lets the body go, to go wherever it wishes, the body hurls it headlong, just as a hard-mouthed horse does its careless rider. And because the seething of the body blazes the more when the enemies are at work to deceive the soul — since it is not the body that desires, but by its heat generates desires in the soul — the protection of our God must be implored for our guard, that he may keep them off — since our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers — and once these are removed, it will be easy to restrain the motion of flesh and blood. For a fire is extinguished if the material by which it lives is wanting. But to those men there befall the things spoken by the astrologers, who believe that what they say will come to pass.
For this is brought about by the subtlety of the demons, that they may effect those things which their priests have foretold as future, lest, being detected as false, they be exposed. But toward those who do not lend credence to their responses, their effect does not prevail, because neither are they themselves so intent as to satisfy those who do not believe them, nor does God permit them to do so — through which those who trust in God and do not believe the devil would be led astray. For God has so established all things that it may befall each one according to his own faith, so that the free choice of the will may remain. And through this, whoever believes in God, fleeing to his help, nothing will be able to prevail against him;
for he is certain that those things which he made are in his power, and that they dare not act against him whom they see to have God, the common Lord, propitious. Certainly God made the world, and created the sun and moon and stars, appointing for them their courses, by which the race of men is governed. Does he not have the power to command them, that at some time they do something other than they have decreed? For he so founded them that they are subject to his will, and then only carry out their decreed courses, if no other thing has been commanded: so that, if he be asked by those to whom they minister, by reason that the rains are either unseasonable or the crops appear barren through excessive drought, he may bid the season be tempered; or, if perchance, as is wont, when angered
the men do not live unto God, but, wandering through luxury and vanity, do not do what pleases God, the rain being long held back — as we read was done under Elijah and Elisha — he may stir up famine over the earth, and, appeased by satisfaction, may grant assent, so that the showers may join the dry land. For in the same manner is the order of the world, as is the secular empire. For just as certain men, oppressed by the governors of provinces, have recourse to the help of the emperors that they may be raised up, so too men, if they see times adverse to themselves, should present themselves as suppliants to God, in whose power are all things. But this does not seem so to the astrologers. For they say that it cannot be brought about otherwise than that the stars fulfill the causes decreed for them;
and that they can neither be recalled nor impelled to anything else, but keep the offices once appointed. This is the assertion of the astrologers, that they say the fates cannot be changed, nor anything obtained by prayers, because they say that God once established the order of the whole world and handed it over to the ministering stars, which can be carried neither backward nor forward. This is the error of the astrologers, by which they even assail God. For by this assertion they deny that anything can be done outside the order of the world, so that all things which are read to have been done in the world by God, if they are at variance with the law of the world, they deny are to be believed, but maintain only those things which are said to have been done according to the appointed laws of the world, so that neither
is a virgin said to have given birth, nor the rod of Aaron to have blossomed and borne fruit, nor Sarah, an old woman, to have given birth. For the order of the world does not contain these things, because they are read to have been done by God outside the order of the world. And what wonder, if the author of the world did what the world cannot do? 'But he seems', they say, 'to have transgressed the order which he established, so that he is said to have done otherwise than he decreed for the world.' Come now: he established a law for the world of acting or of generating — but for himself? It would even be his lowliness, if he were to act just as the world was founded by him. And whence would it be understood to be done by him, if he had done by the law of the world what he did? But that it might be understood to be done by God, not by the world, it was done by another order.
Certainly he decreed for the sun that it should unceasingly fulfill its appointed spaces and have no license to stand still: surely, because he established this law for it, will it not be permitted to him to make it stand? Certainly it is established for judges that they are not allowed to recall a sentence given against an accused: surely the emperor himself will not be under this law? For to him alone it is permitted to revoke a sentence and to pardon one condemned to death: how much more ought it to be permitted to God, which was not permitted to be conceded to the world, because the world is the servant of its own Creator! Finally, the world through the law handed down to it can kill, but it cannot make alive. Through intemperance it can create a blind man, but it cannot restore his eyes;
it can make a man feeble and sick, but it cannot cure him — for this God reserved to himself, whence it might appear that he is the Lord of all. For it pertains to the overthrow of fate that the dead have risen again, that the eyes of one born blind have been restored, that the sick and the paralytic have been made firm, and the other things which were done of such a kind that, to those fleeing to God, if there can be anything of fate, it cannot bring any hindrance. For the apostle John says: 'Greater', he says, 'is he who is in you, than he who is in this world.' For God, when asked, even removes the things he has established. For surely he established that sinners should be punished, and yet to those who entreat him he grants pardon, because to him alone it is permitted to bind and to loose.
Hence, although to the sun a standing still has not been conceded, under Joshua, son of Nun, it was commanded to stand, and it obeyed his command, contrary to that which had been prescribed for it in the order of the world. But under Hezekiah something greater is read to have been done, because, so that Hezekiah might not doubt that what had been promised to him was true, he received such a sign as was new and unheard of by human ears. For not, as before, was the sun commanded to stand still, but to turn back, which Hezekiah seeing might hold for certain that he could add fifteen years to his life — the sun which had made the sixth hour out of the ninth. And because it is contrary to the astrologers what was conceded to Hezekiah — for they deny that anything can be added to life — he received again a sign in this matter, which was contrary to the astrologers.
For they assert it is impossible that the stars do anything other than what they have appointed. Certainly they say it is of fate to have or not to have a slave. So be it. From the beginning of the world, where were these fates? For up to the flood, and for a long series of years thereafter, this condition of slavery did not exist. Or did these fates perhaps begin from the times of Ninus, who is said to have been the first to begin to wage wars upon his neighbors and to make captives liable to slavery? You see, therefore, that this was an invention afterward and not of fate, but of the doing of demons; because, if it had been of fate, it would have existed from the beginning of the world. For the stars themselves are the very ones that were made in the beginning, and in this their course remains. And formerly the life of men was rustic, nor was there zeal for riches:
how is it that now the astrologers say that through the stars men become rich and poor? Have the stars been changed, or is it the cunning and sleight-of-hand of Satan, that he may say those things come to pass through the stars which he works through his angels as ministers? For as the time draws near in which destruction approaches him, he devises greater means through which sin may be committed. Behold, we know that Italy and Africa, Sicily and Sardinia, labored under famine: let the astrologers say, whether all these had one fate, when among a hundred the fates of even two are said to be unable to agree with one another. Let them blush and be silent and stretch out suppliant hands to God, in whose power are all things. But perhaps in this case fate was caught off guard: what shall we say of Pannonia, which was so scraped bare that it cannot have a remedy?
O the weakness of those who, with wavering faith, profess themselves Christians! For while they doubt concerning the things promised, they do not even ponder upon the things that have been done. For if they considered those things which were done by the prophets and apostles, they would never admit the fables of the astrologers. For they would know that all things are in the power of God, nor would they be terrified when evils befall the good, because in the future judgment they will be recompensed, mindful of the apostle who says: 'Because through tribulations', he says, 'we must enter into the kingdom of God.' For the man who is content and awaits the judgment of his God, being recompensed, will also be vindicated.
For if he desires to be vindicated in the present, or with all greed to enjoy present resources, he doubts concerning the promised life, and through this, in the future, being reckoned among the faithless, he will be held worthy of punishment. For God made the world for the sake of testing, and adorned it with all resources, setting forth two causes, the present and the future, the heavenly and the earthly, that they might be for the probation of men; so that he who, despising the future life, should choose the present, would be reckoned to the flesh, while he who should set the future before the present would be held worthy of spiritual things; and he who, being unjustly oppressed by the power of the unjust, should lay his complaints before God or reserve them for the future judgment, being relieved, would be honored with spiritual glory.
Hence no one of the saints appeared glorious in the world, nor loved the present delights. Whence the apostle says: 'Having', he says, 'food and clothing, with these let us be content.' But the Christian complains and grieves if anyone seems happy in the world, although the dignity and happiness of Christians is promised not on earth, but in the heavens: how then does he call himself a Christian, who does not wish to glory there, where it is promised, but here, where it is forbidden? For if it were expedient to enjoy present things, then surely heavenly things would not be promised to those who despise these. By what hope, therefore, do Christians lend their ears to the astrologers, when they hear the apostle John crying out and saying: 'Do not love this world, nor the things that are in the world'?
And so, if these are the precepts of our faith or law, that the world be not loved, nor the things that are in the world, how is it that some of us complain, being saddened by the happiness of others which is in the world — a happiness which before God is perhaps unhappiness — when they ought rather to rejoice, because the world does not bestow upon them those things by which, being bound, they would be held liable, subject to human affairs? For that happiness, having received the means of security, lacks the solicitude for divine things. For he must needs be negligent concerning the divine oracles, who, being filled with all necessities, has nothing about which to be anxious. For men of this kind are wont to begin to labor under another anxiety, that they may be enlarged in the world, which cannot be done without sin.
But if it be looked at more closely, the world will be seen to be rather the enemy of those whom it is said to make blessed, for scarcely any of them thinks of heavenly things. Christians, therefore, ought to rejoice when, living rightly, they are oppressed in the world. For he has conquered the world here, who, content with however it has befallen him in the world, gives thanks to his God, from whom, if any temporal things seem here to be denied, he may hope that eternal things will be repaid. For to what end did God appoint a future judgment, except that those who are unjustly cast down for a time may in eternal life be exalted, those being put down who, through power, despising or not believing the future judgment of God, reckoned the impunity of crimes to be theirs? But the assertors of the fates deny a future judgment.
For if those are born who are good, and on the contrary those who are evil, why do you praise or accuse, when neither did the good man toil in the struggle that he might conquer, nor was the evil man negligent that he might lose? These fables indeed they peddle among private men. For sinners brought before the courts have never dared to excuse their crimes by the fates, but, confessing themselves guilty, do not deny that they rightly receive sentence. And so the authority of the law tramples upon the reasoning of the fates in such a way that it cannot even be named, once the law has bestirred itself. But how do they believe they will escape forever, who, having lived wickedly, escape the severity of the law by a certain effort for a time, not considering that the author of the law cannot dissemble in this matter?
For here is the image of the law, there the truth; and he who mocks the image cannot mock the truth. Is there any place without God, or does anyone escape his hand? But they think, flattering themselves, that he who escapes here is now secure. And how do they reckon this just, that, while others are condemned in such cases, these escape? Certainly God established the world and showed by what law it should make use. For, loving his work, he showed it the way by which one goes to life, having appointed certain guides whom it should use, because there is also a way that leads to death.
Ought he not, therefore, to inquire whether those whom he set as ministers of his kingdom governed his people by the right by which he appointed it, or whether the people received his edict, so that the ministers found faithful might be worthy of praise, or the unfaithful subjected to punishments, and likewise the people, keeping the law, might be praised, or, despising it, condemned? This is just, this the case demands. How then does it displease some to believe in a future judgment? But the madness of the astrologers found this out. For how could they accept a future judgment, who fight against the present one, since they contend that judgment is in one's nativity?
And because the truth, when it is thought to be pressed down, rises again, they themselves, who by a certain natural judgment maintain that the good and the evil are not made but born, requite those who sin and do not suffer sins to go unavenged. For with rods, with the mill, with chains they chastise within doors those whom outside they assert are born incorrigible. Does any prudent man chastise one whom he knows cannot be corrected? Which indeed is the act either of a fool or of an unjust man. But lest they say that this very thing comes about by fate — because he who is under fate does not do what he wills — so that they themselves too have it as natural to take vengeance on those whom they know to remain naturally unconvertible, and truly, since it must be so spoken, so that whatever is said to be of fate may be reckoned as folly.
For how foolish it is that, when they say someone was born evil, they do not even approve as good the one whom they assert was born good! For how can he be judged good, who is caught doing an unjust thing? For what is so unjust as that he be cut down who is denied to have been able to do anything other than what he did? And if all things happen by fate, how did the law enter in, which does not permit that to be done which is of fate? For if the law be taken away, things unlawful will everywhere be done publicly, and the powerful will not be able to be borne, nor will there be liberty, because even he who now does not think of evil, the fear being removed, will begin to be evil. Finally, we read that the law was given because of the wicked. But perhaps this very thing too was of fate, that the law should be given.
And by what reasoning do the fates subsist, if they generate that by which they are destroyed, since the law has declared that what is of fate ought to be done contrary to it? They lack reason, therefore, if they generate things contrary to themselves; and they are unjust, because they make men be born unto damnation; and if they are unjust, they ought not to have authority, because everything unjust is liable to punishment. Or do they perhaps say that the law profits nothing, because he who was so born as to be evil cannot be changed by the law? But if this is so, the law was given in vain; and how did the fates make a superfluous thing be born, since 'nothing is without fate'? And so the fates act both for themselves and against themselves. But if it is so, that cannot stand which, through the inconstancy of its reasoning, holds no firmness.
But did they perhaps wish, on this account, that the law was fate, so that those whom the fates make to be born evil should be condemned by the law, that fate and law might agree for the punishment of these? To this what will there be to say, except that both laws and fates deserve to be condemned by their own judgment, if with equal injustice they labor at this, that those should be killed who did evils not of their own accord, but with the fates as the agents? Against these things the law speaks to the contrary, because the fates must be condemned by their own profession. For they do not deny that those who are evil are of fate that they are evil. But the law is to such a degree opposed to the fates that it denies that the evil are of fate that they are evil, but of their own will; for which reason it will rightly constitute them guilty. Nothing, therefore, is common to the law and the fates, since what is asserted by the fates is denied by the law.
But by what reasoning will those be said to have been born, who forbade the astrologers from the city of Rome — which observance of the law is not unknown, and they were certainly pagans? How do those things come to pass by fate which are against fate? But if there is fate, it does not act against itself: these men do not have fate, who act against fate; and if these do not have fate, there is no fate. 'But there is', they say, 'a fate apportioned to each one, by what death he shall die.' But if this is so, the murderer is not to be accused. For he will defend himself even by a double argument, because he himself did this with the fates as agents, and the other was killed with the fates as agents. But amid these things the law is assailed, because it punishes the murderer brought before it. In like manner too is born he who is to be an adulterer, and she who is an adulteress, and the one against whom adultery is committed.
But if this too is so, even now the law is touched, which punishes adulterers; for if it were truly of fate, that man too ought to be punished who has such a fate as to suffer adultery. For he too is found to be a partaker, because his fate admitted that adultery should be committed. It would be fair, therefore, that they should either be condemned together or absolved together; amid these things the law seems unjust. And therefore, if the fates are from God, the law will not be of God, because this befits not only God, but not even a prudent man, to condemn what he himself did. But since no one has ever dared to speak against the law or to deny that it is from God, the fates cannot be said to be from God, because God punishes these things through the law.
For when that is condemned which is done with the fates impelling, without doubt the fates are condemned. 'But evil souls', they say, 'are born for this purpose, that they may do evil.' So be it. But the innocent ought not to be born with such a fate, that they could be killed by these. For if those were evil souls, they ought not to be born, but to be punished, lest they kill the innocent. But it is not the souls, which they feign to be evil, that kill the innocent, but the fates, which so make men to be born that they may be killed. And through this it is not the souls, but the fates that are unjust; and if they are unjust, they are not from God: therefore they are from the devil, to be condemned together with him.
And since they are said to decree for individuals how they shall die, whether by sword or by noose or by precipice or by shipwreck or otherwise, they grant the same to many. For no one can alone differ from the fates of all. But if anyone be found to differ, then it is not of fate, but of chance; and if in the death of one there is chance, there will be also in the death of many, and then it will not be of fate. Anaxagoras, cast into a mortar by command of the king, expired pounded, which befell no other man. And a woman fixed a stake into the temples of Sisera, king of the Allophyli, and so he gave up his spirit. In this manner no one has died. And formerly men were fixed to the cross, which afterward remains forbidden by edict. If it was of fate, how did it cease?
For when that which is of fate is forbidden and does not happen, fate is overcome. Or if it was not of fate, then men were fixed to the cross not by fate, but by the judgment of the law. And so it is that men are condemned not by fate, but being convicted by their own evil deeds. Among the Etruscans there is said to have been born a certain man so beautiful of face as never was, and because he was a good man, lest he come into anyone's suspicion — since he enticed even the eyes of honorable women — he wounded his face with seven blows, that he might damage the beauty which is desired by all. Behold, how, if there are fates, they were overcome! But perhaps it may be said: 'It was of nature that he should be born beautiful, but of fate that his appearance should be wounded.'
But if this is so, then fate is not born, but the accident is the cause; and if it is an accidental thing, it will not be of fate, but of deliberation or certainly of chance, as far as concerns the remaining parts. For what else is it to conquer fate, than to change nature? But if it were assuredly from God, it could neither be changed nor conquered. For it is read, recorded in a certain little book of law, that once a woman bore five children: how was fate caught off guard, that to this one alone nature should decree what was not of fate? For if it had been of fate for her, a good many women would have been burdened with this lot.
And when a certain man was setting out for foreign parts, he commended his wife to a friend whom he knew to be faithful — not indeed a boy, but of mature age — who, that he might be a more diligent guardian of her, castrated himself, so that he might sleep cautiously with her without anyone's suspicion. What do we think: was it of fate or of deliberation? But how was it of fate, when it is contrary? For he who conquers what is born in him, this man empties out fate. And in studies too the case of the fates is certainly bandied about, so that someone may know something or be unable to comprehend it. All senators, therefore, have one fate — for no senator is without letters — and the nations which are without letters have one fate, and all slaves are of one fate; for none of the slaves is a senator.
But if you call whatever is born by birth 'fate,' then whatever is added beyond birth will lie outside fate. Or if what is added comes by fate, why does it come through toil? For it would be called fate only if it befell a man against his will. For what looms over us without forethought is called the work of the fates; but what is devised, long pondered, and acquired through intervening exertions—why should that be called fate? Some man is born a eunuch, others are made so: where will fate be? In the one, I suppose, who was born so; but as for those who are made so, what is to be said of them? For the case is different. Or if these were made eunuchs by fate, that one was born a eunuch contrary to fate. And why is a eunuch born so rarely that it seems past belief?
There was a certain woman in the city of Rome who is known to have had eleven husbands, and another man who had twelve wives: what fates were these, that decreed this for them? For in the time of the emperor Constantius it is well attested that in the region of Campania a girl was changed into a male and brought to Rome: what fates wrought this? Others, I suppose, of which you know nothing. Oh, if only you would keep silent about this word 'fate,' and assign some things to chance and circumstance, you would grant something to providence! For the virtue and industry of the soul has such power that it not only resists nature, but even corrects or fails to correct itself, since it has judgment over itself.
It is related of the women of the Scythians, who were called Amazons, that since their husbands, occupied in a distant war, were long absent, they consorted with their slaves for the sake of offspring and killed every male child that was born, keeping only the females, so that none of them devoted herself to wool-working, but from earliest age they were trained in the wrestling-ground and in arms. So great was their valor and energy in their exploits that, reigning through a long succession of years, they subdued not a few nations and placed all Asia under tribute. What can be said to this? Surely these things were not of fate, which over so many years were so accomplished that they emptied of meaning all that men suppose to be of fate? First, that contrary to nature women should reign, having spurned men; next, that they consorted with their own slaves;
thirdly, that all males born were killed, while the females were kept alive, with such prosperity attending them that, having begun a kingdom without men, they spread it abroad with great resources and over long ages. Surely this thing was never done since the founding of the world, except in Scythia alone—lest perhaps they should say that, since the world is renewed after one thousand four hundred and sixty years, such things come about thus, seeing that the world is now in its sixth thousandth year. And a man does this for as long as he keeps imitating what he set out to imitate. For Marcus Crassus was called Agelastus (the unlaughing), because he is said to have laughed but once in his life; and Gaius Junius was surnamed Brutus, because by shrewd counsel he feigned himself a fool, lest he be killed by the proud king on account of the greatness of his wealth;
and in the times of Constantine a man called Samsucius feigned himself a simpleton for thirty years, that he might, as he himself afterward said, divert the emperor from his weariness. Where is the reckoning of the fates, when each man does what he wishes? It is shut out. But what manner of thing is this, that the asserters of the fates are devoted to supplications, even though these are contrary to the fates? For they both commend their years and inquire about marriages and about a journey, and about purchases and about offices. But if it is of fate, why do you pray, why do you supplicate for what is to come even against your will? 'But I ask,' he says, 'whether I ought to buy.' Then what you say you ought then to do, if you have learned that it is to your advantage, does not consist in fate.
For if it is of fate, you ask in vain, since, whether you will or not, whether you ask or do not ask, you are going to do it. But because this assertion is not fixed even among them, therefore being uncertain they make trial, lest they find any truth other than the one they have been handling. But those who seem the more prudent among them say: 'We do not supplicate on account of the fates, since we know these can in no way be changed, but on account of those things which are alongside the fates, lest they do us any harm.' Come now, if some man has a good fate and beside it is something that seems contrary, what can it be, when a good fate is said to be unchangeable, just as an evil one too? Surely this is it: one supplicates that this thing which is alongside the fate may do no harm—for it will harm unless it be supplicated against—:
how then is that fate said to be unchangeable, when this thing which is near it is feared? For this would not be feared, unless it were believed that the other could be changed. But because the case rather rests on this point, that you may not say fate is changed, without doubt you supplicate without cause. And see whether this too be of fate, that you supplicate, since whatever you assign to fate is wont to be without savor. Surely it is no evil thing to supplicate: why then should it not be said to be of fate? If then it shall be of fate that one supplicates, of what shall it be that he supplicates and does not obtain? For, if it were of fate, he ought to obtain what he supplicates for. But if it is of fate to supplicate and not to obtain, fate is foolish, since it makes a man supplicate whom it knows will not obtain.