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have been noted. [2] Hence it was fitting to insert here only those which in poetry either never occur or occur with difficulty, but in prose freely. [3] [Anadiplosis is the doubling of words, as (Cic. Catil. 1,2): 'yet this man lives, he lives, nay he even comes into the senate.' [4] Climax is a gradation, when from that at which the higher meaning ends, the lower begins, and thereafter, as it were through

steps, the order of speaking is preserved, as is that saying of Africanus: 'from innocence is born worth, from worth honor, from honor authority, from authority liberty.' Some call this figure a 'chain,' because one thing is bound to another as it were by a name, and thus several matters are drawn along in the doubling of words. This figure occurs not only in single words, but

also in the connection of words, as in Gracchus: 'your boyhood was a dishonoring of your youth, your youth a disgracing of your old age, your old age a scandal to the commonwealth.' So too in Scipio: 'compelled by force and against my will I made that formal agreement with him; the agreement made, I brought him before the judge; brought forward, at the first assembly I condemned him; condemned, of my own will I let him go.' [5]

Antitheta, which in Latin are called 'contraposita' (things set opposite): which, when they are set over against one another, produce a beauty of thought, and stand out as most fitting in the adornment of expression, as Cicero (Catil. 2,25): 'on this side modesty fights, on that wantonness; here chastity, there defilement; here good faith, there fraud; here piety, there crime; here steadfastness,'

there frenzy; here honor, there baseness; here self-control, there lust; here in short equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence—all the virtues contend with iniquity, luxury, cowardice, rashness, with all the vices; finally abundance with want; sound reason with lost reason; a sound mind with madness; good hope in short with the

despair of all things does battle.' In this kind of contest and battle, of this kind of ornament of expression the book of Ecclesiasticus made use, saying (33,15): 'against evil good, and against death life: so against the godly the sinner; and so behold all the works of the Most High, two and two, one against one.' [6] Synonymia is whenever in connected discourse we signify one

thing by several words, as Cicero says (Catil. 1,8): 'you do nothing, you attempt nothing, you plan nothing.' And likewise (Catil. 1,10): 'I will not bear it, I will not endure it, I will not allow it.' [7] Epanodos, which our writers call regressio (return) (Cic. Ligar. 19): 'in origin their rank was almost equal; not equal perhaps in the things that followed.' [8] Antapodosis, whenever the middle terms agree with the first and the last

[as it is] (Cic. c. cont. Metell. frag. 5): 'this deed of yours I now blame, conscript fathers, not my own—and indeed a most noble deed: yet, as I said, not mine, but yours.' [9] Paradiastole is whenever we distinguish by interpretation that which we say (cf. Rutil. Lup. 1,4): 'when you call yourself wise instead of cunning, brave instead of reckless,

diligent instead of stingy.' [10] Antanaclasis is that which expresses a contrary sense by the same word. A certain man was complaining of his son, when the latter, while awaiting his death, answered: 'I am not awaiting it,' said he, 'nay I beg that you may await.' [11] Antimetabole is a reversal of words which, with the order changed, produces a contrary sense: 'I do not live in order to eat, but I eat in order to live.' And that saying (Cic.

Phil. 4,8): 'if Antonius is consul, Brutus is an enemy: if Brutus is the preserver of the commonwealth, Antonius is the enemy.' [12] Exoche (Cic. Mil. 59): 'Who summoned them? Appius. Who brought them forward? Appius.' [13] Now let us pursue the figures of sentences, which it is worth the effort to know. [14] A sententia (maxim) is an impersonal saying, as (Ter. Andr. 68): 'Compliance begets friends, truth

begets hatred.' If a person is added to this, it will be a Chria (anecdote), thus: 'Achilles offended Agamemnon by speaking the truth.' 'Metrophanes earned the favor of Mithridates by his compliance.' For between a chria and a sententia there is this difference, that a sententia is uttered without a person, a chria is never spoken without a person. Hence if a person is added to a sententia, it becomes a chria; if it is taken away, it becomes

a sententia. [15] The kinds of sentences are many. For some are indicative, others are declarative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,373): 'Nowhere is good faith safe'; others imperative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,223): 'Go, come, my son, call the Zephyrs, and glide down on your wings.' Others admirative (expressing wonder) (Virg. Aen. 1,11): 'Is there such great wrath in heavenly minds?' [16] Others comparative (Lucil.

iv. frag.?): 'If I conquer and yet perish, what does it profit me there to conquer?' Others superlative, which are uttered with some emotion of the mind and indignation (Virg. Aen. 3,57): 'To what do you not drive mortal hearts, O accursed hunger for gold!' [17] Others interrogative [as] (Virg. Aen. 8,113): 'Young men, what cause has driven you to try unknown ways? Where is your race, whence your home? Do you bring hither peace,

or arms?' [18] Others responsive, as 'from there,' 'from here.' Others deprecatory, as (Virg. Aen. 6,365): 'Snatch me, unconquered one, from these evils!' Others promissory, as (Virg. Aen. 1,257): 'Spare your fear, the destinies of your people remain unmoved.' Others concessive, which by their impulse forbid, as (Virg. Aen. 4,381): 'Go, seek Italy with the winds, make for the realms across the waves.' Yet lest the persuasion be not

understood, some words are mingled in which secretly forbid, as 'with the winds,' 'across the waves.' Others demonstrative, as 'lo,' 'behold.' Others optative (expressing a wish), as (Virg. Aen. 8,560): 'O if only Jupiter would bring me back the years gone by.' [19] Others derogative (denying), as 'by no means.' Others which are uttered with an exclamation, as (Petron. 68): 'What madness, O citizens, has turned peace into arms?'

And Cicero (Cat. 1,9): 'O immortal gods, where in the world are we?' [20] Others exhortative, when we call someone to a resolution, as (Virg. Aen. 8,364): 'Dare, my guest, to despise wealth.' [21] Others dehortative, when we lead someone back from a contrary fault and sin. There are also affirmative ones, as 'why not,' 'assuredly.' [22] Preceptive, as (cf. Virg. Georg. 1,299): 'Plow naked, sow

naked, and you will have your harvests in cold weather.' [23] Prohibitive, as (Virg. Georg. 2,299): 'Nor plant the hazel among the vines, nor reach for the topmost shoots.' [24] Negative, as 'no,' 'by no means.' There are also wondering ones, as (Hieronym. epist. ad Rust. 4,6): 'Amazing! Is it not permitted to live, and yet fornication pleases?' [25] Of one grieving, [as] (cf. Ovid, Heroid. 5,149): 'Woe is me, that no love is

curable by herbs.' Of one weeping [as]. Of likeness, thus (Virg. Aen. 5,588): 'As once in high Crete the Labyrinth is said to have been.' Of one admonishing [as]. Of one mocking [as]. Of one groaning [as]. Exhortative [as]. Consolatory [as]. Of one commiserating [as]. Of these, as many as are the figures, so many also are the voices in delivery. [26] There are also Amphidoxae, of which part is honorable, part dishonorable, as

(Ovid, Met. 2,53): 'Your wish is not safe: you seek great things, Phaethon.' [27] There are also others, procatalempsis (anticipation), when we forestall beforehand, for its dispelling, that which could be objected against us, as (Cic. Div. in Caec. 1): 'If any of you, judges, or of those who are present, should perchance wonder.' There are also aporiae, the doubting of one who feigns not to know what he knows, or how it may be said. [28]

Koinonosis, moreover, is called the sharing of counsel with the judges or the adversaries, as if you were to say: 'I consult you, judges, or you adversaries, what it would have been fitting for me to do, or what you would have done.' [29] Paradoxon is when we say that something unexpected has happened, as Cicero says of Flaccus (cf. Flacc. 1): 'the man who ought to have been the herald of his praise, has been made the

pleader against his peril.' [30] Epitrope, that is, permission, when we leave certain things to be judged by the judges or the adversaries themselves, as Calvus in his speech against Vatinius: 'Rub your brow, and say that you are worthier to become praetor than Cato.' [31] Parrhesia is a discourse full of freedom and confidence (Cic. Mil. 72): 'I slew not Spurius Maelius,' and so on. With this figure

must be used cautiously, as Cicero does: for he sent an excuse ahead of it. [32] Ethopoeia is when we introduce speech from another person's character, as Tullius in his defense of Caelius makes Appius Caecus speak with Clodia. [33] Energia is the setting before the eyes of things done or as if done, of which we have already spoken. [34] Metathesis is that which sends the minds of the judges into things past or

future things, in this manner: 'Recall your minds to the spectacle of a wretched city taken by storm, and believe that you see the burnings, the slaughters, the plunderings, the pillagings, the outrages upon free persons, the captivities of matrons, the butcherings of old men.' Into the future, however, it is an anticipation of the things which the adversary is about to say, as by Tullius in his defense of Milo, when he sends the minds of the judges into that

condition of the commonwealth which was going to be, even if, Milo being slain, Clodius were alive. [35] Aposiopesis is when we cut off in silence that which we seemed about to say (Virg. Aen. 1,135): 'Whom I—; but it is better to calm the stirred-up waves.' [36] Epanalempsis is a digression: 'The heat of speaking and the dignity of the matters carried me a little farther than I wished, but I return to the case.'

[37] Anamnesis is the recollection of that matter which we feign to have forgotten. [38] Aparisis is when we opportunely demand back that which we had, as it were, deposited in the minds of the judges. [39] Aetiologia is when we propose something and render its cause and reason. [40] Characterismus is an expressed description of someone's appearance, as (Virg. Aen. 4,558): 'In all things like to Mercury,

both in voice and complexion, and in the golden hair and the limbs graceful with youth.' ATHROISMOS is when they heap several briefly dispatched thoughts into one place, and it runs on with a certain haste, as Cicero (Cic. Catil. 3,1): 'The commonwealth, O Quirites, and the lives of all of you, your goods, your fortunes, your wives, and your children,' and so on. [41] Irony is when through

pretense one wishes a different thing to be understood than what one says. And this happens either when we praise the one whom we wish to blame, or blame the one whom we wish to praise. An example of both will be, if you were to call Catiline a lover of the commonwealth, and Scipio an enemy of the commonwealth. [42] Diasyrmos diminishes by words those things that are great, or exalts the smallest. [43] Efon (Ephodos?) is whenever in the same

sense we dwell rather long: 'Whom, pray, did he spare? Whose friendship did he keep faith with? To what good man was he not an enemy? When did he not either accuse someone, or beat him, or betray him?' [44] Epangelia is a promise, by which we make the judge attentive, pledging that we shall say something great or something small. [45] Prosopopoeia is when both the person and the speech of inanimate things

are feigned. Cicero in the Catiline (1,27): 'for indeed if my fatherland, which is far dearer to me than my life, were to speak with me, saying,' and so on. [46] Parathesis is when we as it were deposit something unfinished with the memory of the judges, saying that we shall take it up again when it shall be opportune. [47] Peusis, that is, soliloquy, when we ourselves answer to the questions we ourselves have asked. [48]

Synaeresis is when we defer something, asking that they permit us meanwhile to say something else.] XXII. ON DIALECTIC. [1] Dialectic is the discipline invented for discussing the causes of things. It is itself a branch of philosophy, which is called Logic, that is, capable of rationally defining, inquiring, and discussing. For it teaches, in many kinds of questions, in what manner

true and false things may be judged apart by disputing. [2] Certain first philosophers possessed this in their utterances; yet they did not reduce it to the skill of an art. After these, Aristotle brought the arguments of this doctrine into certain rules, and named it Dialectic, for the reason that in it there is disputation about things said. For LEKTON means 'a thing said.' And for this reason Dialectic follows after the discipline of Rhetoric,

because in many respects the two are common. XXIII. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARTS OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC. [1] Varro, in his books of the Nine Disciplines, defined Dialectic and Rhetoric by such a comparison: 'Dialectic and Rhetoric are like the closed fist and the open palm in a man's hand: the former contracting words, the latter expanding them.' [2]

Dialectic indeed is the sharper for discussing matters: Rhetoric is the more eloquent for teaching those things at which it aims. The former sometimes comes to the schools: the latter goes forth continually into the forum. The former requires the rarest of students: the latter frequently requires even whole peoples. [3] But the philosophers are wont, before they come to expound the isagoge (introduction), to set forth the definition of Philosophy, so that the more easily

those things which pertain to it may be demonstrated. XXIV. ON THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. [1] Philosophy is the knowledge of human and divine things joined with the pursuit of living well. It seems to consist of two things, knowledge and opinion. [2] Knowledge is when some thing is perceived by a sure reason; opinion, however, is when a thing still uncertain lies hidden and by no