Etymologies & Works 2

Isidore: Etymologies, Book II. I. ON RHETORIC AND ITS NAME. [1] Rhetoric is the science of speaking well in civil questions, an abundance of eloquence for persuading toward what is just and good. It is called 'Rhetoric' by a Greek appellation, apo tou rhetorizein, that is, from abundance of speech; for among the Greeks 'rhesis' means speech, and 'rhetor' an orator. 2

Rhetoric, moreover, is joined to the art of Grammar. For in Grammar we learn the science of speaking correctly, but in Rhetoric we perceive how we may set forth the things we have learned. II. ON THE INVENTORS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC. [1] This discipline was invented by the Greeks - by Gorgias, Aristotle, and Hermagoras - and was carried over into Latin, namely by Cicero and Quintilian

[and Titianus], but so copiously and so variously that for the reader it is easy to admire it, yet impossible to master it wholly. [2] For while the parchments are held before one, the sequence of the discourse clings, as it were, to the memory, but as soon as they are laid aside all recollection slips away. Perfect knowledge of this discipline makes an orator. III. ON THE NAME OF THE ORATOR AND THE PARTS OF RHETORIC. [1] An orator, then, is

a good man, skilled in speaking. A good man is constituted by nature, character, and accomplishments. Skill in speaking consists of artful eloquence, which is made up of five parts - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery - and of the end of its function, which is to persuade of something. [2] But the skill of speaking itself consists in three things: nature, learning, and practice.

Nature [lies] in native talent, learning in knowledge, practice in assiduity. For these are what are looked for not only in an orator but in every skilled craftsman, that he may accomplish something. IV. ON THE THREE KINDS OF CASES. [1] There are three kinds of cases: deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which it is treated, concerning any of the useful things of life, what

ought or ought not to be done. The demonstrative kind is that in which a person is shown to be praiseworthy or blameworthy. [2] The judicial kind is that in which, concerning the deed of the person himself, a sentence of either punishment or reward is given. It is called 'judicial' for this reason, that it judges a man and by its verdict shows whether he is praiseworthy and worthy of reward, or else guilty, to be condemned

and freed from punishment. [3] The deliberative kind is so called because in it deliberation is made about each matter. This kind is twofold: persuasion and dissuasion - that is, concerning what is to be sought and what is to be avoided, that is, concerning what is to be done and not to be done. [4] Persuasion is divided into three topics: the honourable, the useful, and the possible. It differs somewhat from the deliberative, because persuasion requires

another person, whereas the deliberative sometimes deals even with oneself. In persuasion there are two things that prevail most: hope and fear. [5] The 'demonstrative' is so called because it demonstrates each matter either by praising or by blaming. This kind has two species: praise and blame. The order of praise is distinguished by three periods: before the man himself, during him, and after him. [6]

Before the man himself, as (Virgil, Aeneid 1,605): 'What ages so glad brought you forth?' During him, as (Aeneid 1,597): 'O you who alone have pitied the unspeakable toils of Troy.' After him, as (Aeneid 1,607): 'While rivers run down into the sea, while shadows sweep across the mountain slopes, ever shall your honour and your name and your praises abide.' [7] In like order, but conversely, in the blame of a man as well

this same form is to be observed: before the man, during the man, after the man. The 'common topic' (locus communis) belongs to the demonstrative kind of blame, yet it differs from it in something. For blame, which is the contrary of praise, is applied specifically to a particular person who does [some deed]. [8] But the common topic is set forth generally against the crime of a deed. Whence indeed it is called a 'common topic,'

because, the person being absent, it is set forth not so much against the man as against the crime itself. For every vice is found not in one man alone, but also in common in many. V. ON THE TWOFOLD ISSUE OF CASES. [1] Among the rhetoricians, the 'status' (issue) is said to be that thing in which the case consists, that is, its constitution. The Greeks call the 'status' from contention, 'stasis.' But the Latins [name it] not only from

the fight by which they overthrow the adversary's proposition, but [name it thus] because in it each party takes its stand. It arises from accusation (intentio) and repulsion (depulsio). [2] The issues of cases are two: rational and legal. From the rational arise conjecture, definition, quality, and transference. From definition arise the judicial and the negotial. From the judicial arise the absolute and the assumptive. From the assumptive arise concession,

the removal of the charge, the transfer of the charge, and counterbalancing. From concession arise exculpation and entreaty. [3] The conjectural issue is when a deed, charged against one man, is utterly denied by that man. The definitive issue is when what is charged is contended not to be this [thing], but what it is is proved by applying definitions. Quality is when it is asked of what character a thing is; and because

the controversy is carried on concerning the force and kind of the matter, it is called the general constitution. [4] Transference is when the case depends on this, that either the one who ought does not seem to be acting, or [the suit is brought] not before those [before whom], nor at the time, under the law, on the charge, or with the penalty that it ought to be. It is a transferential constitution, because the action seems to require transference and change. [5] The judicial issue is that in

which the nature of the equitable and the right, and the reckoning of rewards or punishments, is inquired into. The negotial issue is that in which what is lawful according to civil custom and equity is considered. The assumptive is that which of itself yields nothing firm for refutation [but takes up some defence from without]. [6] Concession is when the defendant does not defend the thing that was done, but asks that it be pardoned.

This we have shown to pertain to penitents. The removal of the charge is when the defendant attempts, by force and power, to shift onto another the charge that is brought against him and against his own fault. [7] The transfer of the charge is when the deed is said to have been done rightfully, because someone had previously been provoked by an injury. Comparison is when it is contended that some other deed of another person was honourable or useful,

and that, in order that it might be done, the thing which is charged is said to have been committed. [8] Exculpation is when the deed is indeed admitted, but the fault is removed. This has three parts: imprudence, chance, and necessity. Entreaty is when the defendant confesses both that he has sinned and that he has sinned deliberately, and yet asks to be pardoned. This kind can very rarely occur. [9] Likewise, from the legal

issue these arise, that is: the letter and the intent (scriptum et voluntas), contrary laws, ambiguity, inference or reasoning, and legal definition. 'The letter and the intent' is when the words themselves seem to be at variance with the writer's meaning. The issue of contrary laws is when two or more laws are recognized to disagree with one another. Ambiguity is when what is written

seems to signify two or more things. Inference or reasoning is when, from what is written, something else also, which is not written, is discovered. Legal definition is when the force [of a term], as in a definitive constitution, in what it is placed, is inquired into. [10] Therefore the issues, both rational and legal, are by some more precisely counted as eighteen

in all. But according to Cicero's Rhetorica nineteen are found, because he principally fixed transference among the rational issues; then Cicero, correcting even himself, applied transference to the legal issues. VI. ON THE THREEFOLD CONTROVERSY. [1] According to Cicero, the threefold controversy is either simple or conjoined. And if it is conjoined,

it must be considered whether it is conjoined out of several questions, or out of some comparison. A simple controversy is one that contains a single, self-contained question, in this manner: 'Do we declare war on the Corinthians, or not?' [2] It is conjoined out of several questions when several things are asked in this way: 'Whether Carthage should be destroyed, or restored to the Carthaginians, or whether a

colony be established there?' From comparison, it is asked which is preferable, or what is most preferable, in this manner: 'Whether an army should be sent into Macedonia against Philip, to be a help to our allies, or whether it should be kept in Italy, so that there may be the greatest possible forces against Hannibal?' VII. ON THE FOUR PARTS OF A SPEECH. [1] The parts of a speech in the art of Rhetoric are four: the exordium,

...narration, argumentation, and conclusion. Of these the first rouses the hearer's mind, the second sets forth the events, the third lends credit to the assertions, and the fourth embraces the end of the whole speech. [2] We must therefore make our beginning in such a way as to render the hearer well-disposed, teachable, and attentive: well-disposed by entreaty, teachable by instruction, attentive by stirring him up. The narration must be delivered

in such a way that we speak briefly and clearly; the argumentation must be conducted so that first we establish our own case, and then we shatter the opposing one; the conclusion must be so framed that we stir the minds of our hearers to fulfil what we say. VIII. ON THE FIVE KINDS OF CASES. [1] The kinds of cases are five: [that is,] the honourable, the astonishing, the lowly, the doubtful, and the obscure. The honourable is that kind of case to which

the hearer's mind at once shows favour without any speech of ours. The astonishing is that from which the minds of those who are to hear are estranged. The lowly is that which is disregarded by the hearer. [2] The doubtful is that in which either the judgement is uncertain, or the case partakes of both honour and baseness, so that it produces both goodwill and offence. The obscure is that in which either the hearers are slow, or

the case is seen to be entangled in matters too difficult to be understood. IX. ON SYLLOGISMS. [1] What in Greek is called a syllogism is in Latin termed argumentation. And it is called argumentation as it were the discourse of a keen (arguta) mind, by which we work out a probable finding. A syllogism, then, is the final conclusion of a proposition, an assumption, and a confirmation, drawn either from the uncertainty of one who is in doubt,

or from the confidence of one who gives approval. [2] For it consists of three parts: the proposition, the assumption, and the conclusion. By the proposition, for example: 'that which is good cannot have a base use.' The hearer agreed; he assumed: 'money has a base use.' It is concluded: 'therefore money is not a good.' [3] Syllogisms, moreover, are used not only by rhetoricians but especially by

dialecticians, although the Apostle often propounds, assumes, confirms, and concludes: which things, as we have said, belong properly to the arts of Dialectic and Rhetoric. [4] Among the rhetoricians there are two principal kinds of syllogism: induction and ratiocination. Induction has three members: the first is the proposition, the second the inference, which is also called the assumption, and the third the conclusion.

[5] Induction is that which by matters not in doubt secures the assent of the person to whom it is directed, whether it is set up among philosophers, or among rhetoricians, or among those engaged in conversation. The proposition of an induction is that which necessarily brings in likenesses of one or more things whose point is to be granted. [6] The inference of an induction, which is also called the assumption, is that which

introduces the matter in dispute, and for whose sake the likenesses were adduced. The conclusion of an induction is that which either confirms the granting of the inference, or declares what is accomplished from it. Ratiocination is a discourse by which the point in question is proved. [7] There are two modes of ratiocination. The first is the enthymeme, which is an imperfect and rhetorical syllogism. The second is

the epicheireme, which is a rhetorical and broader syllogism. [8] The enthymeme, then, is rendered in Latin as 'a conception of the mind,' which the writers of handbooks are wont to call an imperfect syllogism. For its argumentative form consists in two parts, when, passing over the law of syllogisms, it employs that which pertains to producing belief, as in this instance: 'If the storm is to be avoided,

then one must not set sail.' For it is agreed to be complete from the proposition and conclusion alone, whence it has been judged to suit rhetoricians rather than dialecticians. [9] The members of the enthymeme are five: the first the convincing, the second the demonstrative, the third the sententious, the fourth the exemplary, the fifth the collective. [10] The convincing is that which by evident reasoning

is proven, as Cicero did in the speech For Milo (79): 'You sit, then, as avengers of his death, whose life, if you should think it could be restored by you, you would be unwilling to restore.' The demonstrative is that which binds fast by a sure demonstration of the matter, as Cicero in Against Catiline (1,2): 'Yet this man lives, nay, he even comes into the Senate.' The sententious is that which a general maxim brings forward, as in Terence

(Andria 68): 'Compliance wins friends, truth wins hatred.' [12] The exemplary is that which by the comparison of some example threatens a like outcome, as Cicero in the Philippics (2,1): 'I marvel at you, Antony, that you do not dread the ends of those whose examples you imitate.' [13] The collective is when the things that have been argued are gathered into one, as Cicero says For Milo (41):

'Him, therefore, whom he was unwilling to slay with anyone's thanks, this man he was willing to slay with some men's complaint. Him whom he did not dare to slay by right, in a fit place, at a fit time, this man he did not hesitate to slay by wrong, at another's time, at the peril of his own life.' [14] Moreover, according to Victorinus, there is another definition of the enthymeme, from the proposition alone, as has already been said, which runs thus: If the storm is to be avoided,

then a voyage is not to be sought. [15] From the assumption alone, as in this instance: If he is an enemy, he slays; but he is an enemy. And because it lacks a conclusion, it is called an enthymeme. [16] There follows the epicheireme, descending from ratiocination, broader and more elaborated than the rhetorical syllogisms, differing by its breadth and the extension of its discourse from the dialectical syllogisms, on account of which

it is assigned to the rhetoricians. This consists of three modes. The first mode is threefold, the second fourfold, the third fivefold. [17] The threefold epicheirematic syllogism is that which consists of three members, that is, proposition, assumption, and conclusion. The fourfold is that which consists of four members: the first the proposition, the second the assumption

together with a supporting statement joined to the proposition or the assumption, the third the proof and the conclusion. [18] The fivefold, then, is that which consists of five members, that is, the first the proposition, the second its proof, the third the assumption, the fourth its proof, the fifth the conclusion. Cicero constructs it thus in the art of Rhetoric (On Invention 1,12): 'If deliberation and

demonstration are kinds of cases, they cannot rightly be thought to be parts of any kind of case. For the same thing can be a genus to one and a part to another; but to the same thing it cannot be both genus and part,' and so on, until the members of this syllogism are brought to a close. X. ON LAW. [1] Law is an ordinance of the people, which the elders together with the commons have sanctioned. For what a King or Emperor

decrees is called an ordinance or an edict. The establishment of equity is twofold: sometimes in laws, sometimes in customs. Between law and custom there is this difference, that law is written, whereas custom is a usage approved by antiquity, that is, an unwritten law. For law (lex) is so called from reading (legere), because it is written. [2] Custom (mos), on the other hand, is a long-standing usage, drawn likewise from manners (mores).

Custom, moreover, is a certain right established by manners, which is received in place of a law when a law is lacking; nor does it matter whether it rests on writing or on reason, since reason too commends the law. [3] Furthermore, if a law rests on reason, then everything that shall have rested on reason will already be law, provided only that it accords with religion, agrees with discipline, and profits salvation. It is called

custom because it is in common use. [4] Now every law either permits something, as 'let the brave man seek a reward'; or forbids, as 'let it be lawful for no one to seek the marriage of consecrated virgins'; or punishes, as 'whoever commits murder, let him be struck at the head.' [5] Laws were made in order that by fear of them human boldness might be curbed, and innocence be safe among the wicked, and among

the wicked themselves the power of doing harm be restrained by dread of punishment. For by the reward or the penalty of law human life is governed. [6] A law will be honourable, just, possible, in accordance with nature, in accordance with the custom of the fatherland, suited to place and time, necessary, useful, and also manifest, lest it contain anything by its obscurity to entrap us, framed with no private

advantage, but written for the common benefit of the citizens. XI. ON THE MAXIM. [1] A maxim (sententia) is an impersonal saying, as (Terence, Andria 68): 'Compliance wins friends, truth wins hatred.' If a person is added to it, it will be a chreia, thus: 'Achilles offended Agamemnon by telling the truth,' 'Metrophanes earned the favour of Mithridates by compliance.' [2] For between the chreia and

the maxim there is this difference, that the maxim is uttered without a person; the chreia is never spoken without a person. Hence, if a person is added to a maxim, it becomes a chreia; if it is taken away, it becomes a maxim. XII. ON CONFIRMATION AND REFUTATION. [1] Confirmation (catasceua) is the establishing of a matter that has been propounded. Refutation (anasceua), on the other hand, is the contrary of the former. For it disproves that something was, or is, which is proposed to have been born,

or done, or said; as if one should deny that the Chimaera existed, or should affirm that it existed. [2] Between these and the thesis there is this difference, that the thesis, although it too involves debate on either side, is nevertheless as it were a certain deliberation or exhortation concerning an uncertain matter. Confirmation and refutation, however, are for the most part occupied with those matters which are not probable but are

put forward as true. [3] The first division of refutation is the incongruous and the false. The species of the incongruous are that which is dishonourable and that which is useless. Likewise the dishonourable is treated either in words or in deeds. In words, as if someone were said to have spoken things unseemly and unbefitting his authority; for instance, if someone should defame that famous Cato the Censor,

as having exhorted the youth to wickedness and luxury. [4] In deeds, as if someone were said to have done something abhorrent to his own holiness and reputation; such as the tale of the adultery of Mars and Venus. Falsehood has three species: the incredible, which is believed not to have happened, as of a young man who claimed to have seen fleets entering Africa from the Sicilian shore. [5]

It is impossible that Clodius should have laid an ambush for Milo and yet himself have been slain by Milo. It is contradictory; for if he laid the ambush, he slew. He was slain; he did not lay the ambush. This distribution, recast into its contrary, will amount to a confirmation. [So that we may establish all the degrees: the honourable, the useful, the probable, the possible, the consistent; or on the opposite side, the dishonourable, the useless,

the scarcely probable, the impossible, the contradictory.] We shall, however, have to order our beginnings in such a way that we say either that credence is to be given to the authority of the ancients, or that no faith is to be placed in fables. [6] And to this final point in refutation let us inquire whether those who invented these things may not have meant to signify something else: as that Scylla was not a sea-creature but a maritime woman, and was not girt with dogs,

but was some rapacious and inhospitable woman toward those who came to her. XIII. ON PERSONIFICATION. [1] Personification (prosopoeia) is when both a person and speech are feigned for inanimate things. Cicero in Against Catiline (1,27): 'For indeed, if my fatherland, which is far dearer to me than my very life, were to speak with me, saying,' and so forth. [2] Thus we also introduce mountains and rivers or trees as speaking, imposing a person

upon a thing that has no capacity for speaking; which is both customary among the tragedians and very frequently found in orations. XIV. ON CHARACTERIZATION. [1] Characterization (ethopoeia) we call that in which we feign the person of a human being for the sake of expressing the feelings of age, pursuit, fortune, joy, sex, grief, and boldness. For when the person of a pirate is taken up, the speech will be bold, abrupt,

and reckless; when the speech of a woman is imitated, the speech ought to befit her sex; and again, the speech to be given for a youth and an old man, a soldier and a general, a parasite and a rustic and a philosopher, must be different. [2] For one affected by joy speaks in one way, one who is wounded in another. In this kind of expression these things above all must be considered: who is speaking and to whom, about

what, and where, and at what time; what he has done, what he is about to do, or what he may have to suffer if he shall have neglected these considerations. XV. ON THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS. [1] There are two kinds of questions, of which one is definite, the other indefinite. The definite is in Greek hypothesis, in Latin called a 'case' (causa), where the controversy is with a definite person. [2] The indefinite, which in Greek is thesis, in Latin

is called a 'proposition' (propositum). This has no definite person, nor is it contained within any definite circumstance, that is, neither place nor time. In a 'case,' on the other hand, all things are definite, whence the 'proposition' is, as it were, a part of the 'case.' XVI. ON DICTION. [1] Now in matters of diction it will be proper to observe this: that as the subject, the place, the time, and the person of the hearer demand, sacred things be not mingled with profane, nor

immodest things with chaste, nor trivial with weighty, nor wanton with serious, nor ridiculous with sorrowful. Moreover, one must speak in correct Latin and with clarity. [2] He speaks correct Latin who follows the true and natural words of things, and does not diverge from the speech and refinement of the present age. For such a one it is not enough to see what he says, unless he also says it plainly and pleasantly; nor even

that much, unless what he says he also carries out. XVII. ON THE THREEFOLD STYLE OF SPEAKING. [1] Things also must be spoken: humble matters gently, urgent matters weightily, matters of a middle sort with moderation. For this is that threefold style of speaking: the low, the middle, and the grand. For when we speak of great things, they must be uttered grandly; when we speak of small things, subtly; when of middling things, in a tempered manner. [2] For in

small causes nothing grand, nothing sublime should be said, but one should speak in a gentle and plain manner. In greater causes, however, where we treat of God or the salvation of men, more magnificence and splendour must be displayed. [3] In tempered causes, on the other hand, where nothing is done to move the hearer to action, but only that he may be delighted, one must speak with moderation between the two: but also,

although anyone may speak of great matters, he nevertheless ought not always to teach grandly, but modestly when he teaches; with moderation when he praises or blames something; grandly when he rouses averted minds to conversion. Yet the words to be employed are sufficient ones in the low style, splendid ones in the tempered style, and vehement ones in the grand. XVIII. ON THE COLON, COMMA, AND PERIOD. [1]

Now every discourse is composed and constructed of words, comma, colon, and period. The comma is a small portion of a sentence. The colon is a member. The period is a compass or circuit. Now the comma is formed from the joining of words, the colon from the comma, and the period from the colon. [2] The comma is a limiting off of a juncture, as for instance (Cicero, For Milo 1): 'Although I fear, O judges,'—behold one comma; there follows another

comma: 'that it may be a disgrace to plead for the bravest of men,'—and a colon has been made, that is, a member, which yields sense to the understanding; but the discourse still hangs in suspense, and so thereafter from several members a period is made, that is, the final close of the sentence: 'so much do they demand the ancient manner of the courts.' A period, moreover, ought not to be longer than can be uttered in a single breath. XIX. ON

THE FAULTS OF LETTERS, WORDS, AND SENTENCES TO BE AVOIDED. [1] Furthermore, the pure and honourable eloquence of an orator ought to be free from all faults, as much in its letters as in its words, and even in its sentences. [2] In its letters, that the juncture be apt and fitting; and thus it must be observed that the final vowel of a preceding word does not fall upon the same vowel as the first of the following word.

...of the following, as in 'feminae Aegyptiae' ('Egyptian women'). This structure becomes better if consonants are joined to vowels. The junction of three consonants which, when they collide, seem to grate and as it were quarrel with one another, must likewise be avoided, that is, R, S, X, as in 'ars studiorum' ('the art of studies'), 'rex Xerxes' ('King Xerxes'), 'error Romuli' ('the error of Romulus'). One must also avoid the consonant M crushed against vowels, as in 'verum enim' ('but indeed'). XX. ON THE JOININGS

OF WORDS. [1] In words too the faults must be guarded against, so that improper words are not employed, which the Greeks call Acyrologia (impropriety). Propriety of expression is therefore to be cherished, yet in such a way that at times, on account of the lowliness of a base or foul term, one may use borrowed names by transferred meaning; not, however, ones fetched from far off, but such as seem near akin and cognate to the true words. [2] One must also flee overlong Hyperbata (transpositions of word order),

which cannot occur without confusion of the other meanings. Ambiguity too, and that fault, must be guarded against, when certain men, led by a display of eloquence, enclose within a long and roundabout circuit—by interposing empty words—what they could have signified in one or two words: which fault is called Perissologia (redundancy). [3] Contrary to this is the fault, itself blameworthy, of

in the zeal for brevity to filch away even necessary words. Just as in letters and words, so too in sentences the faults are to be shunned, which are learned among the first studies of the grammarians. [4] These are Cacemphaton (ill-sounding), Tautologia, Ellipsis, Acyrologia, Macrologia, Perissologia, Pleonasmos, and the like. On the contrary, energia (vividness) exalts and adorns discourse, and then

Emphasis, which makes something more to be understood than has been said; as if you were to say: 'He ascended to the glory of Scipio,' and Virgil (Aen. 2,262): 'Having slid down let down by a rope.' For when he says 'slid down,' he suggests the image of a height. Contrary to this is the virtue of diminishing by words things that are by their nature great. XXI. ON THE FIGURES OF WORDS AND OF SENTENCES. [1] Discourse is increased and adorned

also comes through the figures of words and of sentences. For since direct and unbroken discourse creates weariness and distaste both in the speaker and in the hearer, it must be bent and turned into other shapes, so that it may both refresh the speaker, and become more adorned, and turn aside the judge by a varied countenance and hearing. Of these, very many have been noted above by Donatus in the schemata of the art of Grammar

have been noted. [2] Hence it was fitting to insert here only those which in poetry either never occur or occur with difficulty, but in prose freely. [3] [Anadiplosis is the doubling of words, as (Cic. Catil. 1,2): 'yet this man lives, he lives, nay he even comes into the senate.' [4] Climax is a gradation, when from that at which the higher meaning ends, the lower begins, and thereafter, as it were through

steps, the order of speaking is preserved, as is that saying of Africanus: 'from innocence is born worth, from worth honor, from honor authority, from authority liberty.' Some call this figure a 'chain,' because one thing is bound to another as it were by a name, and thus several matters are drawn along in the doubling of words. This figure occurs not only in single words, but

also in the connection of words, as in Gracchus: 'your boyhood was a dishonoring of your youth, your youth a disgracing of your old age, your old age a scandal to the commonwealth.' So too in Scipio: 'compelled by force and against my will I made that formal agreement with him; the agreement made, I brought him before the judge; brought forward, at the first assembly I condemned him; condemned, of my own will I let him go.' [5]

Antitheta, which in Latin are called 'contraposita' (things set opposite): which, when they are set over against one another, produce a beauty of thought, and stand out as most fitting in the adornment of expression, as Cicero (Catil. 2,25): 'on this side modesty fights, on that wantonness; here chastity, there defilement; here good faith, there fraud; here piety, there crime; here steadfastness,'

there frenzy; here honor, there baseness; here self-control, there lust; here in short equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence—all the virtues contend with iniquity, luxury, cowardice, rashness, with all the vices; finally abundance with want; sound reason with lost reason; a sound mind with madness; good hope in short with the

despair of all things does battle.' In this kind of contest and battle, of this kind of ornament of expression the book of Ecclesiasticus made use, saying (33,15): 'against evil good, and against death life: so against the godly the sinner; and so behold all the works of the Most High, two and two, one against one.' [6] Synonymia is whenever in connected discourse we signify one

thing by several words, as Cicero says (Catil. 1,8): 'you do nothing, you attempt nothing, you plan nothing.' And likewise (Catil. 1,10): 'I will not bear it, I will not endure it, I will not allow it.' [7] Epanodos, which our writers call regressio (return) (Cic. Ligar. 19): 'in origin their rank was almost equal; not equal perhaps in the things that followed.' [8] Antapodosis, whenever the middle terms agree with the first and the last

[as it is] (Cic. c. cont. Metell. frag. 5): 'this deed of yours I now blame, conscript fathers, not my own—and indeed a most noble deed: yet, as I said, not mine, but yours.' [9] Paradiastole is whenever we distinguish by interpretation that which we say (cf. Rutil. Lup. 1,4): 'when you call yourself wise instead of cunning, brave instead of reckless,

diligent instead of stingy.' [10] Antanaclasis is that which expresses a contrary sense by the same word. A certain man was complaining of his son, when the latter, while awaiting his death, answered: 'I am not awaiting it,' said he, 'nay I beg that you may await.' [11] Antimetabole is a reversal of words which, with the order changed, produces a contrary sense: 'I do not live in order to eat, but I eat in order to live.' And that saying (Cic.

Phil. 4,8): 'if Antonius is consul, Brutus is an enemy: if Brutus is the preserver of the commonwealth, Antonius is the enemy.' [12] Exoche (Cic. Mil. 59): 'Who summoned them? Appius. Who brought them forward? Appius.' [13] Now let us pursue the figures of sentences, which it is worth the effort to know. [14] A sententia (maxim) is an impersonal saying, as (Ter. Andr. 68): 'Compliance begets friends, truth

begets hatred.' If a person is added to this, it will be a Chria (anecdote), thus: 'Achilles offended Agamemnon by speaking the truth.' 'Metrophanes earned the favor of Mithridates by his compliance.' For between a chria and a sententia there is this difference, that a sententia is uttered without a person, a chria is never spoken without a person. Hence if a person is added to a sententia, it becomes a chria; if it is taken away, it becomes

a sententia. [15] The kinds of sentences are many. For some are indicative, others are declarative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,373): 'Nowhere is good faith safe'; others imperative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,223): 'Go, come, my son, call the Zephyrs, and glide down on your wings.' Others admirative (expressing wonder) (Virg. Aen. 1,11): 'Is there such great wrath in heavenly minds?' [16] Others comparative (Lucil.

iv. frag.?): 'If I conquer and yet perish, what does it profit me there to conquer?' Others superlative, which are uttered with some emotion of the mind and indignation (Virg. Aen. 3,57): 'To what do you not drive mortal hearts, O accursed hunger for gold!' [17] Others interrogative [as] (Virg. Aen. 8,113): 'Young men, what cause has driven you to try unknown ways? Where is your race, whence your home? Do you bring hither peace,

or arms?' [18] Others responsive, as 'from there,' 'from here.' Others deprecatory, as (Virg. Aen. 6,365): 'Snatch me, unconquered one, from these evils!' Others promissory, as (Virg. Aen. 1,257): 'Spare your fear, the destinies of your people remain unmoved.' Others concessive, which by their impulse forbid, as (Virg. Aen. 4,381): 'Go, seek Italy with the winds, make for the realms across the waves.' Yet lest the persuasion be not

understood, some words are mingled in which secretly forbid, as 'with the winds,' 'across the waves.' Others demonstrative, as 'lo,' 'behold.' Others optative (expressing a wish), as (Virg. Aen. 8,560): 'O if only Jupiter would bring me back the years gone by.' [19] Others derogative (denying), as 'by no means.' Others which are uttered with an exclamation, as (Petron. 68): 'What madness, O citizens, has turned peace into arms?'

And Cicero (Cat. 1,9): 'O immortal gods, where in the world are we?' [20] Others exhortative, when we call someone to a resolution, as (Virg. Aen. 8,364): 'Dare, my guest, to despise wealth.' [21] Others dehortative, when we lead someone back from a contrary fault and sin. There are also affirmative ones, as 'why not,' 'assuredly.' [22] Preceptive, as (cf. Virg. Georg. 1,299): 'Plow naked, sow

naked, and you will have your harvests in cold weather.' [23] Prohibitive, as (Virg. Georg. 2,299): 'Nor plant the hazel among the vines, nor reach for the topmost shoots.' [24] Negative, as 'no,' 'by no means.' There are also wondering ones, as (Hieronym. epist. ad Rust. 4,6): 'Amazing! Is it not permitted to live, and yet fornication pleases?' [25] Of one grieving, [as] (cf. Ovid, Heroid. 5,149): 'Woe is me, that no love is

curable by herbs.' Of one weeping [as]. Of likeness, thus (Virg. Aen. 5,588): 'As once in high Crete the Labyrinth is said to have been.' Of one admonishing [as]. Of one mocking [as]. Of one groaning [as]. Exhortative [as]. Consolatory [as]. Of one commiserating [as]. Of these, as many as are the figures, so many also are the voices in delivery. [26] There are also Amphidoxae, of which part is honorable, part dishonorable, as

(Ovid, Met. 2,53): 'Your wish is not safe: you seek great things, Phaethon.' [27] There are also others, procatalempsis (anticipation), when we forestall beforehand, for its dispelling, that which could be objected against us, as (Cic. Div. in Caec. 1): 'If any of you, judges, or of those who are present, should perchance wonder.' There are also aporiae, the doubting of one who feigns not to know what he knows, or how it may be said. [28]

Koinonosis, moreover, is called the sharing of counsel with the judges or the adversaries, as if you were to say: 'I consult you, judges, or you adversaries, what it would have been fitting for me to do, or what you would have done.' [29] Paradoxon is when we say that something unexpected has happened, as Cicero says of Flaccus (cf. Flacc. 1): 'the man who ought to have been the herald of his praise, has been made the

pleader against his peril.' [30] Epitrope, that is, permission, when we leave certain things to be judged by the judges or the adversaries themselves, as Calvus in his speech against Vatinius: 'Rub your brow, and say that you are worthier to become praetor than Cato.' [31] Parrhesia is a discourse full of freedom and confidence (Cic. Mil. 72): 'I slew not Spurius Maelius,' and so on. With this figure

must be used cautiously, as Cicero does: for he sent an excuse ahead of it. [32] Ethopoeia is when we introduce speech from another person's character, as Tullius in his defense of Caelius makes Appius Caecus speak with Clodia. [33] Energia is the setting before the eyes of things done or as if done, of which we have already spoken. [34] Metathesis is that which sends the minds of the judges into things past or

future things, in this manner: 'Recall your minds to the spectacle of a wretched city taken by storm, and believe that you see the burnings, the slaughters, the plunderings, the pillagings, the outrages upon free persons, the captivities of matrons, the butcherings of old men.' Into the future, however, it is an anticipation of the things which the adversary is about to say, as by Tullius in his defense of Milo, when he sends the minds of the judges into that

condition of the commonwealth which was going to be, even if, Milo being slain, Clodius were alive. [35] Aposiopesis is when we cut off in silence that which we seemed about to say (Virg. Aen. 1,135): 'Whom I—; but it is better to calm the stirred-up waves.' [36] Epanalempsis is a digression: 'The heat of speaking and the dignity of the matters carried me a little farther than I wished, but I return to the case.'

[37] Anamnesis is the recollection of that matter which we feign to have forgotten. [38] Aparisis is when we opportunely demand back that which we had, as it were, deposited in the minds of the judges. [39] Aetiologia is when we propose something and render its cause and reason. [40] Characterismus is an expressed description of someone's appearance, as (Virg. Aen. 4,558): 'In all things like to Mercury,

both in voice and complexion, and in the golden hair and the limbs graceful with youth.' ATHROISMOS is when they heap several briefly dispatched thoughts into one place, and it runs on with a certain haste, as Cicero (Cic. Catil. 3,1): 'The commonwealth, O Quirites, and the lives of all of you, your goods, your fortunes, your wives, and your children,' and so on. [41] Irony is when through

pretense one wishes a different thing to be understood than what one says. And this happens either when we praise the one whom we wish to blame, or blame the one whom we wish to praise. An example of both will be, if you were to call Catiline a lover of the commonwealth, and Scipio an enemy of the commonwealth. [42] Diasyrmos diminishes by words those things that are great, or exalts the smallest. [43] Efon (Ephodos?) is whenever in the same

sense we dwell rather long: 'Whom, pray, did he spare? Whose friendship did he keep faith with? To what good man was he not an enemy? When did he not either accuse someone, or beat him, or betray him?' [44] Epangelia is a promise, by which we make the judge attentive, pledging that we shall say something great or something small. [45] Prosopopoeia is when both the person and the speech of inanimate things

are feigned. Cicero in the Catiline (1,27): 'for indeed if my fatherland, which is far dearer to me than my life, were to speak with me, saying,' and so on. [46] Parathesis is when we as it were deposit something unfinished with the memory of the judges, saying that we shall take it up again when it shall be opportune. [47] Peusis, that is, soliloquy, when we ourselves answer to the questions we ourselves have asked. [48]

Synaeresis is when we defer something, asking that they permit us meanwhile to say something else.] XXII. ON DIALECTIC. [1] Dialectic is the discipline invented for discussing the causes of things. It is itself a branch of philosophy, which is called Logic, that is, capable of rationally defining, inquiring, and discussing. For it teaches, in many kinds of questions, in what manner

true and false things may be judged apart by disputing. [2] Certain first philosophers possessed this in their utterances; yet they did not reduce it to the skill of an art. After these, Aristotle brought the arguments of this doctrine into certain rules, and named it Dialectic, for the reason that in it there is disputation about things said. For LEKTON means 'a thing said.' And for this reason Dialectic follows after the discipline of Rhetoric,

because in many respects the two are common. XXIII. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARTS OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC. [1] Varro, in his books of the Nine Disciplines, defined Dialectic and Rhetoric by such a comparison: 'Dialectic and Rhetoric are like the closed fist and the open palm in a man's hand: the former contracting words, the latter expanding them.' [2]

Dialectic indeed is the sharper for discussing matters: Rhetoric is the more eloquent for teaching those things at which it aims. The former sometimes comes to the schools: the latter goes forth continually into the forum. The former requires the rarest of students: the latter frequently requires even whole peoples. [3] But the philosophers are wont, before they come to expound the isagoge (introduction), to set forth the definition of Philosophy, so that the more easily

those things which pertain to it may be demonstrated. XXIV. ON THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. [1] Philosophy is the knowledge of human and divine things joined with the pursuit of living well. It seems to consist of two things, knowledge and opinion. [2] Knowledge is when some thing is perceived by a sure reason; opinion, however, is when a thing still uncertain lies hidden and by no

...it is grasped by firm reasoning, as for instance whether the sun is truly as great as it appears, or greater than the whole earth; likewise whether the moon is spherical or concave, and whether the stars cling to the heaven or are borne through the air in a free course; of what magnitude the heaven itself is, and of what material it is composed; whether it is at rest and unmoving, or is whirled about with incredible speed; how great is the earth's...

...thickness, or by what foundations it remains balanced and suspended. [3] The name itself, interpreted into Latin, professes 'the love of wisdom.' For the Greeks say philo- for 'love,' and sophia for 'wisdom.' The kinds of philosophy are threefold: one natural, which in Greek is called Physics, in which the investigation of nature is discussed; the second moral, which in Greek...

...is called Ethics, in which morals are treated; the third rational, which by the Greek word is called Logic, in which it is disputed how, in the causes of things or in the morals of life, truth itself is to be sought. [4] In Physics, therefore, is engaged the cause of inquiring; in Ethics, the order of living; in Logic, the method of understanding. Among the Greeks the first to examine Physics was Thales...

...of Miletus, one of those seven sages. For he before others gazed upon the causes of the heaven and the force of natural things by contemplative reason, which Plato afterwards distributed into four definitions, that is, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy. [5] Ethics Socrates first established for correcting and ordering morals, and directed all his study to...

...brought it to bear upon the discussion of living well, dividing it into the four virtues of the soul, that is, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. [6] Prudence is exercised in things, whereby evils are discerned from goods. Fortitude, whereby adversities are endured with equanimity. Temperance, whereby lust and the craving for things is bridled. Justice, whereby by right judgment to each is rendered his own...

...they distribute. [7] Logic, which is called rational, Plato appended, through which, the causes of things and morals having been examined, he rationally investigated their force, dividing it into Dialectic and Rhetoric. And it is called Logic, that is, rational; for logos among the Greeks signifies both speech and reason. [8] For in these three kinds of philosophy the divine...

...the divine utterances also consist. For they are wont either to discourse of nature, as in Genesis and in Ecclesiastes; or of morals, as in Proverbs and scattered throughout all the books; or of Logic, in place of which our own writers claim the Theoretic for themselves, as in the Song of Songs and the Gospels. [9] Likewise, some of the learned have thus defined Philosophy in its name and its parts:

Philosophy is the probable knowledge of things divine and human, in so far as it is possible for man. Otherwise: Philosophy is the art of arts and the discipline of disciplines. Again: Philosophy is the meditation on death, which better befits Christians who, having trampled the ambition of the world, live by a disciplined manner of life in the likeness of the fatherland to come. Philosophy...

...is divided into two parts: the first speculative, the second practical. [10] Others have defined that the method of philosophy consists in two parts, of which the first is speculative, the second practical. The speculative is divided in three modes, that is, the first into natural, the second into doctrinal, the third into divine. The doctrinal is divided into four, that is, the first into...

...Arithmetic, the second into Music, the third into Geometry, the fourth into Astronomy. [11] The practical is divided in three, that is, the first into moral, the second dispensative (economic), the third civil. The speculative is so called, whereby, having passed beyond visible things, we contemplate something of the divine and heavenly, and behold them by the mind alone, since they surpass bodily sight. [12]

The natural is so called where the nature of each single thing is examined, since nothing is generated aimlessly in life, but each thing is assigned to those uses for which it was appointed by the Creator, unless perhaps, by the will of God, some miracle is shown to come to pass. [13] The divine is so called when we discuss either the ineffable nature of God, or spiritual creatures in some part, with the most profound...

...quality we discourse. [14] The doctrinal is called that science which considers abstract quantity. For that quantity is called abstract which, separating it by the intellect from matter, or from other accidents, such as even, odd, or things of this kind, we treat in reasoning alone. Its species are four: Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy. [15]

Arithmetic is the discipline of numerable quantity in itself. Geometry is the discipline of immovable magnitude and of forms. Music is the discipline which speaks of numbers that stand in relation to something, namely those which are found in sounds. Astronomy is the discipline which contemplates all the courses of the heavenly bodies and the figures of the stars, and traces by searching reason the relations of the stars around themselves and...

...around the earth. [16] Further, that is called practical which unfolds by its own operations the matters proposed. Its parts are three: moral, dispensative, and civil. It is called moral, through which an honorable manner of living is sought after, and institutions tending toward virtue are prepared. It is called dispensative, when the order of household affairs is wisely...

...arranged. It is called civil, through which the utility of the whole city is administered. XXV. ON THE ISAGOGE OF PORPHYRY. [1] After the definitions of philosophy, in which all things are generally contained, let us now set forth the Isagoge of Porphyry. For 'Isagoge' in Greek is called in Latin 'introduction,' namely of those who are beginning philosophy; containing in itself the demonstration...

...of the first principles concerning any given thing—what it is—and that it be declared by its own sure and substantial definition. [2] For, the highest genus having been set down, we then subjoin the species and other things that may be near it, and separate them by distinguishing their common features, so long interposing differences, until we arrive at the property of that which we are inquiring about, its expression being marked out, as for example:

Man is a rational, mortal, earthly, two-footed animal, capable of laughter. [3] When the genus 'animal' has been stated, the substance of man is declared. For 'animal' is a genus in relation to man; but because it extended widely, the species 'earthly' was added: now that is excluded which was supposed to be either ethereal or watery. But the difference, such as 'two-footed,' is set down on account of the animals...

...which rest upon many feet. Likewise 'rational,' on account of those things that lack reason; but 'mortal,' on account of that which an angel is not. [4] Afterwards, things having been distinguished and set apart, the property was added in the last part [capable of laughter]; for it belongs to man alone that he laughs. Thus the definition is perfected in every part for declaring man. Of which discipline...

...Aristotle and Tullius (Cicero) held the full definition to consist of genus and differences. [5] Certain others afterwards, being more thorough in teaching, divided its perfect substantial definition into five parts, as it were into its own members. Of these the first is on genus, the second on species, the third on difference, the fourth on property, the fifth on accident. [6]

Genus, as 'animal.' For it is a general term common to all that possess a soul. Species, as 'man.' For it is a specialty by which he is separated from the other living beings. Difference, as 'rational,' 'mortal.' For by these two man differs from the rest. [7] For when 'rational' is said, he is distinguished from the irrational dumb beasts, which have no reason. When it is said...

'mortal,' he is distinguished from the angels, who know not death. Property, as 'capable of laughter.' For man is that which laughs, and this belongs to no animal besides man. Accident, as color in the body, learning in the mind. [8] For these both befall and change with the variety of times; and out of all these five parts is composed a statement of full meaning, thus: Man is a...

...rational, mortal, capable of laughter, capable of good and evil. So too in every substantial statement we ought to interpose species and differences so long, until—all things being set aside which can be this same thing—we arrive at this, that the property may now be held as certain. [9] The Isagoge, moreover, Victorinus the orator translated from Greek into Latin, and Boethius issued a commentary on it in five...

...five books. XXVI. ON THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. [1] There follow the Categories of Aristotle, which in Latin are called 'predicaments'; by which, through their various significations, all speech is comprised. [2] The instruments of the categories are three, that is, the first equivocal, the second univocal, the third denominative. Equivocal are those, when the name of many things is one,

...but not the same definition, as 'lion.' For as far as the name is concerned, a real lion, a painted lion, and a celestial lion are all called 'lion'; but as far as the definition is concerned, the real is defined one way, the painted another, the celestial another. [3] Univocal are those, when of two or of many things there is one name and one definition, as 'garment.' For both the cloak and the tunic can receive both the name of 'garment'...

...and its definition. Therefore this univocal is understood to reside in the genera, because it gives both name and definition to its own forms. [4] Denominative, that is derivative, are all those called which, from something by a mere difference of case, take their appellation according to the name, as from 'goodness' (bonitas) comes 'good' (bonus), and from 'malice' (malitia) comes 'bad' (malus). [5] The species of the categories are ten, that is, substance,

quantity, quality, relation, position, place, time, condition, acting and being acted upon. [6] Substance is that which is properly and principally so called, which is neither predicated of a subject nor is in a subject, as some particular man or some particular horse. But second substances are called those species in which those which were principally and primarily called substances are contained...

...and enclosed, as Cicero within 'man.' [7] Quantity is a measure by which something is shown to be either great or small, as 'long,' 'short.' Quality is that whereby one is of a certain sort, an orator or a rustic, black or white. Relation is that which is referred to something. For when 'son' is said, 'father' too is indicated. These relatives begin together. For servant and master...

...take the beginning of their name at one and the same time, nor is the master ever found prior to the servant, nor the servant to the master. For the one cannot exist before the other. [8] Place is 'where one is,' in the forum, in the street. And the motion of place has six parts: right and left, before and behind, up and down. These six parts too have two things [that is, position and time. Position,

as] far and near. Time, as: yesterday, today. Furthermore, 'position' (situs) is named from placing, as whether one stands, or sits, or lies down. [9] 'Condition' (habitus) is named from 'having' something, as to have knowledge in the mind, virtue in the body, clothing about the body, and the rest, which is comprehended under the mode of having, the number being fixed by the learned. [10] Now indeed 'acting' and 'being acted upon'...

...consist in the signification of the agent and the patient. For 'I write' (scribo) has the act of the voice, since it indicates one doing the thing. 'I am written' (scribor) belongs to the patient, since it shows itself as being acted upon. For in these nine categories, of which certain examples have been set down, or even in the very category of substance, which is ousia, innumerable things are found. For even those things which we grasp by the intellect, we...

...make known in speech under one or the other of these ten predicaments. [11] For a full sentence concerning them is thus: 'Augustine, a great orator, the son of that man, standing in the temple, today, wearing the fillet, is wearied by disputing.' Ousia, moreover, is substance, that is, the proper thing, which underlies the rest; the remaining nine are accidents. And substance is named from this, that every thing, in relation to itself,

...subsists. For a body subsists, and therefore is a substance. [12] But those accidents which are in that which subsists and in the subject are not substances, because they do not subsist but change, such as color or form. [13] 'Of a subject' and 'in a subject' are as it were 'of the thing itself' and 'in the thing itself.' For where it is said 'of a subject,' it is substance, as though it were said 'of...

...substance.' But where it is said 'in a subject,' they are accidents, that is, those which happen in a substance, as quantity, quality, or figure. Therefore genera and species are 'of a subject,' while accidents are 'in a subject.' Of these nine accidents, three are within the ousia: quantity, quality, and position. For these cannot exist without the ousia. But outside the ousia are...

...place, time, and condition; both within and outside the ousia are relation, acting, and being acted upon. [14] And it is established that they are called categories because they cannot be recognized except from their subjects. For who could recognize what man is, unless he set some man before his eyes, as it were a subject for the name? [15] This work of Aristotle is to be understood in this way, since, as has been said,

...whatever a man speaks is held within these ten predicaments. It will also profit toward understanding the books that are applied either to the Rhetoricians or to the Dialecticians. XXVII. ON THE PERIHERMENIAS (ON INTERPRETATION). [1] There follows next the book Perihermenias, exceedingly subtle, and most careful through its various forms and repetitions; of which it is said: Aristotle, when he was writing the Perihermenias,

...used to dip his pen in his mind. [2] Preface to the Perihermenias. For every thing which is one and is signified by one word is signified either by a noun or by a verb; which two parts of speech interpret the whole, whatever the mind has conceived for speaking. For every utterance is the interpreter of the thing conceived in the mind. [3] This Aristotle, a man most skilled in...

...the expression of things and in the making of discourses, calls it Perihermenia, which we call 'interpretation'; namely because it interprets things conceived in the mind by discourses brought forth, through cataphasis and apophasis, that is, affirmation and negation. Through affirmation, as 'a man runs'; through negation, as 'a man does not run.' [4] And so, in these...

...Perihermenias the aforesaid philosopher treats of seven species, that is, of the noun, of the verb, of the discourse, of the enunciation, of affirmation, of negation, of contradiction. [5] A noun is a significant vocal sound by convention, without time, of which no part is significant when separated, as 'Socrates.' A verb is that which signifies time, of which a part...

...signifies nothing separately, but is always a mark of those things which are said of another, as 'he thinks,' 'he disputes.' A discourse (oratio) is a significant vocal sound, some part of which, taken separately, is significant, as 'Socrates disputes.' An enunciative discourse is a significant vocal sound concerning that which either is something or is not, as 'Socrates is,' 'Socrates is not.' [6] Affirmation is the enunciation...

...of something concerning something, as 'Socrates is.' Negation is of something denied from something, as 'Socrates is not.' Contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, as 'Socrates disputes,' 'Socrates does not dispute.' [7] [All these things are treated most minutely, divided and subdivided, in the book of the Perihermenias; concerning which matters let it here suffice to have briefly intimated the definitions, since in...

...in it a fitting explanation is found. [Usefulness.] The usefulness of the Perihermeniae (On Interpretation) is this: that from these expositions syllogisms are formed. Hence too the Analytics are treated. XXVIII. On Dialectical Syllogisms. [1] Next follow the dialectical syllogisms, in which the usefulness and power of the whole art is displayed; and their conclusion greatly assists the reader toward

...pursuing the truth—provided only that there be absent that error of deceiving one's adversary through the sophisms of false conclusions. [2] The figures of categorical, that is, predicative, syllogisms are three. [3] Of the first figure there are nine modes. The first mode is the one that concludes—that is, that gathers—from two universal affirmatives a universal affirmative directly, as: 'Everything just is

honourable; everything honourable is good; therefore everything just is good.' [4] The second mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a universal negative a universal negative directly, as: 'Everything just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore nothing just is base.' [5] The third mode concludes from affirmatives, a particular and a universal, a particular affirmative

directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; all honourable is useful; therefore some just is useful.' [6] The fourth mode concludes from a particular affirmative and a universal negative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore some just is not base.' [7] The fifth mode concludes from

universal affirmatives a particular affirmative by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; all honourable is good; therefore some good is just.' [8] The sixth mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a universal negative a universal negative by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore nothing base is just.'

[9] The seventh mode concludes from a particular and a universal affirmative a particular affirmative by conversion, as: 'Some just is honourable; all honourable is useful; therefore some useful is just.' [10] The eighth mode concludes from universals, a negative and an affirmative, a particular negative by conversion, as: 'Nothing base is honourable;

all honourable is just; therefore some base is not just.' [11] The ninth mode concludes from a universal negative and a particular affirmative a particular negative by conversion, as: 'Nothing base is honourable; some honourable is just; therefore some just is not base.' [12] Of the second figure there are four modes. The first mode concludes

from universals, an affirmative and a negative, a universal negative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; nothing base is honourable; therefore nothing base is just.' [13] The second mode concludes from universals, a negative and an affirmative, a universal negative directly, as: 'Nothing base is honourable; all just is honourable; therefore nothing base is just.' [14]

The third mode concludes from a particular affirmative and a universal negative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; nothing base is honourable; therefore some just is not base.' [15] The fourth mode concludes from a particular negative and a universal affirmative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just

is not base; all evil is base; therefore some just is not evil.' [16] Of the third figure there are six modes. The first mode concludes from universal affirmatives a particular affirmative, both directly and by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; all honourable is just; all just is good; therefore some honourable is good, and some good is honourable.' [17]

The second mode concludes from affirmatives, a particular and a universal, an affirmative from the particular directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; all just is good; therefore some honourable is good.' [18] The third mode concludes from affirmatives, a universal and a particular, a particular affirmative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; some just