Etymologies & Works 2 part 2/6

'Him, therefore, whom he was unwilling to slay with anyone's thanks, this man he was willing to slay with some men's complaint. Him whom he did not dare to slay by right, in a fit place, at a fit time, this man he did not hesitate to slay by wrong, at another's time, at the peril of his own life.' [14] Moreover, according to Victorinus, there is another definition of the enthymeme, from the proposition alone, as has already been said, which runs thus: If the storm is to be avoided,

then a voyage is not to be sought. [15] From the assumption alone, as in this instance: If he is an enemy, he slays; but he is an enemy. And because it lacks a conclusion, it is called an enthymeme. [16] There follows the epicheireme, descending from ratiocination, broader and more elaborated than the rhetorical syllogisms, differing by its breadth and the extension of its discourse from the dialectical syllogisms, on account of which

it is assigned to the rhetoricians. This consists of three modes. The first mode is threefold, the second fourfold, the third fivefold. [17] The threefold epicheirematic syllogism is that which consists of three members, that is, proposition, assumption, and conclusion. The fourfold is that which consists of four members: the first the proposition, the second the assumption

together with a supporting statement joined to the proposition or the assumption, the third the proof and the conclusion. [18] The fivefold, then, is that which consists of five members, that is, the first the proposition, the second its proof, the third the assumption, the fourth its proof, the fifth the conclusion. Cicero constructs it thus in the art of Rhetoric (On Invention 1,12): 'If deliberation and

demonstration are kinds of cases, they cannot rightly be thought to be parts of any kind of case. For the same thing can be a genus to one and a part to another; but to the same thing it cannot be both genus and part,' and so on, until the members of this syllogism are brought to a close. X. ON LAW. [1] Law is an ordinance of the people, which the elders together with the commons have sanctioned. For what a King or Emperor

decrees is called an ordinance or an edict. The establishment of equity is twofold: sometimes in laws, sometimes in customs. Between law and custom there is this difference, that law is written, whereas custom is a usage approved by antiquity, that is, an unwritten law. For law (lex) is so called from reading (legere), because it is written. [2] Custom (mos), on the other hand, is a long-standing usage, drawn likewise from manners (mores).

Custom, moreover, is a certain right established by manners, which is received in place of a law when a law is lacking; nor does it matter whether it rests on writing or on reason, since reason too commends the law. [3] Furthermore, if a law rests on reason, then everything that shall have rested on reason will already be law, provided only that it accords with religion, agrees with discipline, and profits salvation. It is called

custom because it is in common use. [4] Now every law either permits something, as 'let the brave man seek a reward'; or forbids, as 'let it be lawful for no one to seek the marriage of consecrated virgins'; or punishes, as 'whoever commits murder, let him be struck at the head.' [5] Laws were made in order that by fear of them human boldness might be curbed, and innocence be safe among the wicked, and among

the wicked themselves the power of doing harm be restrained by dread of punishment. For by the reward or the penalty of law human life is governed. [6] A law will be honourable, just, possible, in accordance with nature, in accordance with the custom of the fatherland, suited to place and time, necessary, useful, and also manifest, lest it contain anything by its obscurity to entrap us, framed with no private

advantage, but written for the common benefit of the citizens. XI. ON THE MAXIM. [1] A maxim (sententia) is an impersonal saying, as (Terence, Andria 68): 'Compliance wins friends, truth wins hatred.' If a person is added to it, it will be a chreia, thus: 'Achilles offended Agamemnon by telling the truth,' 'Metrophanes earned the favour of Mithridates by compliance.' [2] For between the chreia and

the maxim there is this difference, that the maxim is uttered without a person; the chreia is never spoken without a person. Hence, if a person is added to a maxim, it becomes a chreia; if it is taken away, it becomes a maxim. XII. ON CONFIRMATION AND REFUTATION. [1] Confirmation (catasceua) is the establishing of a matter that has been propounded. Refutation (anasceua), on the other hand, is the contrary of the former. For it disproves that something was, or is, which is proposed to have been born,

or done, or said; as if one should deny that the Chimaera existed, or should affirm that it existed. [2] Between these and the thesis there is this difference, that the thesis, although it too involves debate on either side, is nevertheless as it were a certain deliberation or exhortation concerning an uncertain matter. Confirmation and refutation, however, are for the most part occupied with those matters which are not probable but are

put forward as true. [3] The first division of refutation is the incongruous and the false. The species of the incongruous are that which is dishonourable and that which is useless. Likewise the dishonourable is treated either in words or in deeds. In words, as if someone were said to have spoken things unseemly and unbefitting his authority; for instance, if someone should defame that famous Cato the Censor,

as having exhorted the youth to wickedness and luxury. [4] In deeds, as if someone were said to have done something abhorrent to his own holiness and reputation; such as the tale of the adultery of Mars and Venus. Falsehood has three species: the incredible, which is believed not to have happened, as of a young man who claimed to have seen fleets entering Africa from the Sicilian shore. [5]

It is impossible that Clodius should have laid an ambush for Milo and yet himself have been slain by Milo. It is contradictory; for if he laid the ambush, he slew. He was slain; he did not lay the ambush. This distribution, recast into its contrary, will amount to a confirmation. [So that we may establish all the degrees: the honourable, the useful, the probable, the possible, the consistent; or on the opposite side, the dishonourable, the useless,

the scarcely probable, the impossible, the contradictory.] We shall, however, have to order our beginnings in such a way that we say either that credence is to be given to the authority of the ancients, or that no faith is to be placed in fables. [6] And to this final point in refutation let us inquire whether those who invented these things may not have meant to signify something else: as that Scylla was not a sea-creature but a maritime woman, and was not girt with dogs,

but was some rapacious and inhospitable woman toward those who came to her. XIII. ON PERSONIFICATION. [1] Personification (prosopoeia) is when both a person and speech are feigned for inanimate things. Cicero in Against Catiline (1,27): 'For indeed, if my fatherland, which is far dearer to me than my very life, were to speak with me, saying,' and so forth. [2] Thus we also introduce mountains and rivers or trees as speaking, imposing a person

upon a thing that has no capacity for speaking; which is both customary among the tragedians and very frequently found in orations. XIV. ON CHARACTERIZATION. [1] Characterization (ethopoeia) we call that in which we feign the person of a human being for the sake of expressing the feelings of age, pursuit, fortune, joy, sex, grief, and boldness. For when the person of a pirate is taken up, the speech will be bold, abrupt,

and reckless; when the speech of a woman is imitated, the speech ought to befit her sex; and again, the speech to be given for a youth and an old man, a soldier and a general, a parasite and a rustic and a philosopher, must be different. [2] For one affected by joy speaks in one way, one who is wounded in another. In this kind of expression these things above all must be considered: who is speaking and to whom, about

what, and where, and at what time; what he has done, what he is about to do, or what he may have to suffer if he shall have neglected these considerations. XV. ON THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS. [1] There are two kinds of questions, of which one is definite, the other indefinite. The definite is in Greek hypothesis, in Latin called a 'case' (causa), where the controversy is with a definite person. [2] The indefinite, which in Greek is thesis, in Latin

is called a 'proposition' (propositum). This has no definite person, nor is it contained within any definite circumstance, that is, neither place nor time. In a 'case,' on the other hand, all things are definite, whence the 'proposition' is, as it were, a part of the 'case.' XVI. ON DICTION. [1] Now in matters of diction it will be proper to observe this: that as the subject, the place, the time, and the person of the hearer demand, sacred things be not mingled with profane, nor

immodest things with chaste, nor trivial with weighty, nor wanton with serious, nor ridiculous with sorrowful. Moreover, one must speak in correct Latin and with clarity. [2] He speaks correct Latin who follows the true and natural words of things, and does not diverge from the speech and refinement of the present age. For such a one it is not enough to see what he says, unless he also says it plainly and pleasantly; nor even

that much, unless what he says he also carries out. XVII. ON THE THREEFOLD STYLE OF SPEAKING. [1] Things also must be spoken: humble matters gently, urgent matters weightily, matters of a middle sort with moderation. For this is that threefold style of speaking: the low, the middle, and the grand. For when we speak of great things, they must be uttered grandly; when we speak of small things, subtly; when of middling things, in a tempered manner. [2] For in

small causes nothing grand, nothing sublime should be said, but one should speak in a gentle and plain manner. In greater causes, however, where we treat of God or the salvation of men, more magnificence and splendour must be displayed. [3] In tempered causes, on the other hand, where nothing is done to move the hearer to action, but only that he may be delighted, one must speak with moderation between the two: but also,

although anyone may speak of great matters, he nevertheless ought not always to teach grandly, but modestly when he teaches; with moderation when he praises or blames something; grandly when he rouses averted minds to conversion. Yet the words to be employed are sufficient ones in the low style, splendid ones in the tempered style, and vehement ones in the grand. XVIII. ON THE COLON, COMMA, AND PERIOD. [1]

Now every discourse is composed and constructed of words, comma, colon, and period. The comma is a small portion of a sentence. The colon is a member. The period is a compass or circuit. Now the comma is formed from the joining of words, the colon from the comma, and the period from the colon. [2] The comma is a limiting off of a juncture, as for instance (Cicero, For Milo 1): 'Although I fear, O judges,'—behold one comma; there follows another

comma: 'that it may be a disgrace to plead for the bravest of men,'—and a colon has been made, that is, a member, which yields sense to the understanding; but the discourse still hangs in suspense, and so thereafter from several members a period is made, that is, the final close of the sentence: 'so much do they demand the ancient manner of the courts.' A period, moreover, ought not to be longer than can be uttered in a single breath. XIX. ON

THE FAULTS OF LETTERS, WORDS, AND SENTENCES TO BE AVOIDED. [1] Furthermore, the pure and honourable eloquence of an orator ought to be free from all faults, as much in its letters as in its words, and even in its sentences. [2] In its letters, that the juncture be apt and fitting; and thus it must be observed that the final vowel of a preceding word does not fall upon the same vowel as the first of the following word.

...of the following, as in 'feminae Aegyptiae' ('Egyptian women'). This structure becomes better if consonants are joined to vowels. The junction of three consonants which, when they collide, seem to grate and as it were quarrel with one another, must likewise be avoided, that is, R, S, X, as in 'ars studiorum' ('the art of studies'), 'rex Xerxes' ('King Xerxes'), 'error Romuli' ('the error of Romulus'). One must also avoid the consonant M crushed against vowels, as in 'verum enim' ('but indeed'). XX. ON THE JOININGS

OF WORDS. [1] In words too the faults must be guarded against, so that improper words are not employed, which the Greeks call Acyrologia (impropriety). Propriety of expression is therefore to be cherished, yet in such a way that at times, on account of the lowliness of a base or foul term, one may use borrowed names by transferred meaning; not, however, ones fetched from far off, but such as seem near akin and cognate to the true words. [2] One must also flee overlong Hyperbata (transpositions of word order),

which cannot occur without confusion of the other meanings. Ambiguity too, and that fault, must be guarded against, when certain men, led by a display of eloquence, enclose within a long and roundabout circuit—by interposing empty words—what they could have signified in one or two words: which fault is called Perissologia (redundancy). [3] Contrary to this is the fault, itself blameworthy, of

in the zeal for brevity to filch away even necessary words. Just as in letters and words, so too in sentences the faults are to be shunned, which are learned among the first studies of the grammarians. [4] These are Cacemphaton (ill-sounding), Tautologia, Ellipsis, Acyrologia, Macrologia, Perissologia, Pleonasmos, and the like. On the contrary, energia (vividness) exalts and adorns discourse, and then

Emphasis, which makes something more to be understood than has been said; as if you were to say: 'He ascended to the glory of Scipio,' and Virgil (Aen. 2,262): 'Having slid down let down by a rope.' For when he says 'slid down,' he suggests the image of a height. Contrary to this is the virtue of diminishing by words things that are by their nature great. XXI. ON THE FIGURES OF WORDS AND OF SENTENCES. [1] Discourse is increased and adorned

also comes through the figures of words and of sentences. For since direct and unbroken discourse creates weariness and distaste both in the speaker and in the hearer, it must be bent and turned into other shapes, so that it may both refresh the speaker, and become more adorned, and turn aside the judge by a varied countenance and hearing. Of these, very many have been noted above by Donatus in the schemata of the art of Grammar