「By this, life becomes safe; by this, honourable; by this, illustrious; and by this same, pleasant. For from this many advantages come to the commonwealth, if wisdom, the governess of all things, is at hand. From this, to those who have attained it, praise, honour, and dignity flow together. From this also there is for their friends the most certain and safest protection.」 These are called 「mechanical,」 that is, 「adulterine,」 because they deal with the work of the craftsman, which borrows its form from nature.
Just as the other seven are called 「liberal,」 either because they require free, that is, unencumbered and well-exercised minds, since they dispute subtly about the causes of things; or because in antiquity only free men, that is, the noble, were accustomed to study them, while the common people and the sons of the ignoble engaged in the mechanical arts on account of skill in working. In this appears the great diligence of the ancients, who wished to leave nothing untried, but to bind all things under fixed rules and precepts. The mechanical is the science to which, they say, the fabrication of all things has recourse. The first: the working of wool.
The working of wool contains all kinds of weaving, sewing, and twisting that are done by hand, by needle, spindle, awl, reel, comb, loom, curling-iron, cylinder, or by any other instruments whatever, from any material of flax or wool and from every kind of skins scraped or bearing hair, also of hemp, or cork, rushes, hairs, tufts, or any other such thing that can be reduced to the use of garments, coverings, linens, cloaks, pack-saddles, beddings, curtains, mats, felts, cords, nets, ropes. Likewise the straws from which men are wont to weave hats and little baskets. All these pursuits pertain to the working of wool. The second: armament. The second is armament.
「Arms」 are sometimes called any instruments whatsoever, as when we say 「the arms of war」 or 「the arms of a ship,」 that is, the instruments of war and of a ship. But properly, arms are those things by which we are covered, such as shield, breastplate, helmet; or those by which we strike, such as sword, battle-axe, pike. Missiles (tela), however, are those by which we can hurl, such as spear and arrow. Arms are so called from 「armus,」 that is, the shoulder or arm, because they protect the arm, which we are wont to set against blows. But missiles are named from the Greek 「telon,」 that is, 「long,」 because things of this kind are long; whence also 「to protract」 (protelare) is said, that is, 「to prolong.」
Armament, then, is called as it were an 「instrumental」 science, not so much because it works using instruments, as because it fashions some instrument, so to speak, out of the previously existing material of some mass. To this belongs all material of stones, woods, metals, sands, and clays. It has two species: the architectural and the smith's craft.
The architectural is divided into masonry, which pertains to stonecutters and masons, and into carpentry, which pertains to carpenters and joiners, and to other craftsmen of both kinds, working with adzes and axes, file and chisel, saw and auger, planes, knives, trowel, level, polishing, hewing, sculpting, filing, carving, joining, plastering, in any material — mud, brick, stone, wood, bone, gravel, lime, gypsum — and any like things of those who work. The smith's craft is divided into the malleatory, which by striking extends the mass into a form, and into the casting craft, which by pouring reduces the mass into a form; whence those are called 「casters」 who from the formless mass know how to express the form of a vessel.
The third: navigation. Navigation contains all trafficking in the buying, selling, and exchanging of goods, whether domestic or foreign. This is most rightly, as it were, a kind of rhetoric of its own genus, because eloquence is most necessary to this profession; whence he too who is said to preside over eloquence, Mercury, is named as it were 「merchants' kyrios,」 that is, 「Lord.」 This penetrates the secret places of the world, approaches unseen shores, traverses dreadful deserts, and carries on the commerce of humanity with barbarous nations and unknown tongues. The pursuit of it reconciles peoples, quells wars, confirms peace, and converts private goods to the common use of all. The fourth: agriculture. Agriculture has four species:
the ploughed field (arvum), the field assigned to sowing; the planted ground (consitum), which is given over to trees, such as vineyards, orchards, groves; the pasture (pascuum), such as meadows, valleys, wastelands; the flowering ground (floridum), such as gardens and rose-beds. The fifth: hunting. Hunting is divided into the chase of wild beasts, fowling, and fishing. The chase of beasts is carried on in many ways: with nets, snares, traps, pitfalls, bow, javelins, spear, encircling toils, the scent of feathers, dogs, hawks. Fowling is done with snares, traps, nets, bow, birdlime, hook. Fishing is done with seines, nets, weirs, hooks, javelins. To this discipline pertains the preparation of all foods, flavours, and drinks.
Yet it takes its name from one part of itself, because in antiquity people were more accustomed to feed on hunting — as still in certain regions, where the use of bread is very rare, they have flesh for food and mead or water for drink. Food is divided into two: into bread and the side-dish (obsonium). Bread (panis) is so called, either as if 「ponis,」 because it is set out (apponitur) at all tables, or from the Greek 「pan,」 which is 「all,」 because no good banquet is held without bread. There are many kinds of bread: unleavened, leavened, baked under ashes, coarse bread, sponge-bread, flatcake, oven-bread, sweets, fine wheaten bread, starch-bread, fine flour, and many others. The 「obsonium」 is so called as if 「adjoined to bread」 (adjunctum pani), which we may call 「fare.」 Of this there are many kinds: meats, broths, milk-dishes, vegetables, fruits.
Of meats, some are roasted, some fried, some boiled, some raw, some salted. Some are called 「succidia」 (salted flesh), also lard or 「taxea,」 ham or little shoulder-cut, fat, suet, grease. Of broths likewise there are many kinds: the Lucanian sausage, hash, 「afrotum,」 the 「mortisia」 of Galatia, and whatever else the chief of cooks could devise. Of milk-foods there are milk, beestings, 「babduta,」 butter, cheese, whey. Who could enumerate the names of vegetables and fruits? Of flavours, some are hot, some cold, some bitter, some sweet, some dry, some moist. Of drinks, some are only drink, that is, which only moisten and do not nourish, like water; others are both drink and food, that is, which both moisten and nourish, like wine.
Again, of those which are food, some are food naturally, like wine and any strong drink (sicera); others accidentally, like beer and 「medones」 (mead-drinks). Hunting, then, contains all the offices of bakers, butchers, cooks, and innkeepers. The sixth: medicine. Medicine is divided into two parts: occasions and operations. The occasions are six: air; motion and rest; emptiness and repletion; food and drink; sleep and waking; and the accidents of the soul. These are called 「occasions」 because they produce and preserve health if they are temperate; if they are intemperate, sickness.
The accidents of the soul are called an occasion of health or sickness because they sometimes stir up heat impetuously, as anger, or gently, as pleasures; or they draw in and conceal it, either impetuously, as terror and fear, or gently, as anguish. And there are those which stir the natural power within and without, as is sadness. Every operation of medicine is done either within or without: within, as those things which are introduced by the mouth, nostrils, ears, or anus, such as potions, emetics, powders, etc., which are taken by drinking, chewing, or inhaling; without, as poultices, plasters, salves, and surgery, which is twofold: in the flesh, as to incise, to suture, to cauterize; in the bone, as to set and to restore to the joint.
Let no one be troubled that I number food and drink among the things attributed to medicine, which above I attributed to hunting; for this was done according to different respects. For wine, in the grape-cluster, belongs to agriculture; in the storehouse, to the cellarer; in the tasting, to the physician. Likewise the preparation of foods pertains to the bakery, the meat-market, and the kitchen; the virtue of the flavour, to medicine. The seventh: the theatrical. The theatrical is called the science of games, from the theatre where the people were wont to gather for play — not because games were held only in the theatre, but because it was a more celebrated place than the others. Games were held, some in theatres, some on platforms, some in gymnasia, some in amphitheatres, some in the arenas, some at banquets, some in shrines.
In the theatre, deeds were recited either by songs, or by characters, or by masks, or by puppets. On platforms they led choral dances and leaped. In the gymnasia they wrestled. In the amphitheatres they competed in racing, whether of feet, or horses, or chariots; in the arenas boxers exercised. At banquets they sang to rhythms and musical instruments and odes, and played at dice. In the shrines, at the solemn time, they sang the praises of the gods. Now they numbered games among the lawful activities for this reason: because by temperate motion the natural heat is nourished in the body, and the spirit is restored by gladness;
or — what seems more likely — because, since it was necessary that the people should sometimes gather for play, they wished the places of play to be determined, lest, holding gatherings in inns, they should perpetrate something shameful or criminal. Concerning logic, which is the fourth part of philosophy. Logic is divided into grammar and the method of disputation. 「Gramma」 in Greek is interpreted 「letter」 in Latin; hence it is called grammar, that is, the science of letters. A letter (littera), properly, is the figure that is written; an element (elementum) is the sound that is pronounced. But here 「letter」 is to be taken broadly, so that we may understand both the voice and the writing, for both pertain to grammar.
Some say that grammar is not a part of philosophy, but as it were a certain appendage and instrument to philosophy. But concerning the method of disputation, Boethius says that it can be both a part and an instrument to philosophy — just as the foot, hand, tongue, eyes, etc., are parts of the body and instruments. Grammar deals simply with words, that is, treating of their derivation and formation, composition, inflection, and pronunciation according to themselves, and other things pertaining only to pronunciation. The method of disputation deals with words according to their meanings. Concerning grammar. Grammar is divided into the letter, the syllable, the word, and the sentence.
Or otherwise, grammar is divided into letters, that is, that which is written, and voices, that is, that which is pronounced. Or otherwise, grammar is divided into the noun, verb, participle, pronoun, adverb, preposition, conjunction, interjection; the articulate voice; the letter; the syllable; feet; accents; points of pause; marks; orthography; analogy; etymology; glosses; differences; barbarism; solecism; faults; metaplasm; figures; tropes; prose; metres; fables; histories.
I pass over the exposition of these, both because it would be more lengthy than the brevity of this little page requires, and also because in this little work I have proposed to investigate only the divisions and names of things, so that there might be laid for the reader merely a certain beginning of learning. But whoever desires to know these things, let him read Donatus, Servius, Priscian 「On Accents」 and Priscian 「On the Twelve Verses of Virgil,」 and the 「Barbarism,」 and Isidore's 「Etymologies.」 Concerning the method of disputation. The method of disputation has as its integral parts invention and judgement, but as its dividing parts demonstration, the probable, and the sophistical. Demonstration is in necessary arguments and pertains to philosophers. The probable pertains to dialecticians and rhetoricians;
the sophistical, to sophists and quibblers. The probable is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, each of which has as integral parts invention and judgement. For since they integrally constitute the genus itself, namely the disputative, it is necessary that in the composition of all its species they be found together. Invention is that which teaches one to find arguments and to construct argumentations. The science of judging is that which teaches one to judge concerning both. It may be asked whether invention and judgement are contained under philosophy; for they seem to be neither under theory, nor under practice, nor under the mechanical, nor under logic, under which they would rather seem to be contained.
They are not contained under logic, because neither through grammar nor through the disputative. They are not contained through the disputative, since they integrally constitute it; and no thing can be at once an integral and a dividing part of the same genus. And so philosophy would seem not to contain every science. But it should be known that 「science」 is wont to be taken in two ways: namely, for any of the disciplines, as when I say that dialectic is a science, that is, an art or discipline; and for any cognition whatsoever, as when I say that he has knowledge who knows something. For example, if I know dialectic, I have knowledge; and if I know how to swim, I have knowledge; and if I know that Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus, I have knowledge.
And universally everyone who knows anything can be said to have knowledge. But yet it is one thing when I say 「dialectic is a science,」 that is, an art or discipline, and another when I say 「to know that Socrates is the son of Sophroniscus is a science,」 that is, a cognition. Of every science which is an art or discipline, it is true to say that it is a dividing part of philosophy; but it cannot be said universally that every science which is a cognition is a dividing part of philosophy. Yet absolutely every science, whether a discipline or any cognition whatever, is a part of philosophy, either dividing or integral.
But a discipline is a science that has an absolute end, in which the purpose of the art is perfectly worked out; which does not befit the science of inventing or of judging, since neither is by itself absolute, and therefore they cannot be called disciplines, but parts of a discipline, that is, of the disputative. Again it is asked whether invention and judgement are the same parts of dialectic and of rhetoric — which seems unfitting, that two opposite genera should be constituted of exactly the same parts.
It can therefore be said that these two terms are equivocal with respect to the parts of dialectic and of rhetoric; or — what is perhaps better — let us say that invention and judgement are properly parts of the disputative, and under these terms are spoken univocally, yet in certain things lower than this genus they differ from one another by certain proprieties. These differences, however, are not distinguished by these terms, because by them things are signified not according to that whereby they compose the species, but according to that whereby they are parts of the genus. Grammar is the science of speaking without fault; dialectic, acute disputation distinguishing the true from the false; rhetoric is the discipline suited for persuading in whatever matters.