Etymologies & Works 2 part 4/6

...it is grasped by firm reasoning, as for instance whether the sun is truly as great as it appears, or greater than the whole earth; likewise whether the moon is spherical or concave, and whether the stars cling to the heaven or are borne through the air in a free course; of what magnitude the heaven itself is, and of what material it is composed; whether it is at rest and unmoving, or is whirled about with incredible speed; how great is the earth's...

...thickness, or by what foundations it remains balanced and suspended. [3] The name itself, interpreted into Latin, professes 'the love of wisdom.' For the Greeks say philo- for 'love,' and sophia for 'wisdom.' The kinds of philosophy are threefold: one natural, which in Greek is called Physics, in which the investigation of nature is discussed; the second moral, which in Greek...

...is called Ethics, in which morals are treated; the third rational, which by the Greek word is called Logic, in which it is disputed how, in the causes of things or in the morals of life, truth itself is to be sought. [4] In Physics, therefore, is engaged the cause of inquiring; in Ethics, the order of living; in Logic, the method of understanding. Among the Greeks the first to examine Physics was Thales...

...of Miletus, one of those seven sages. For he before others gazed upon the causes of the heaven and the force of natural things by contemplative reason, which Plato afterwards distributed into four definitions, that is, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy. [5] Ethics Socrates first established for correcting and ordering morals, and directed all his study to...

...brought it to bear upon the discussion of living well, dividing it into the four virtues of the soul, that is, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. [6] Prudence is exercised in things, whereby evils are discerned from goods. Fortitude, whereby adversities are endured with equanimity. Temperance, whereby lust and the craving for things is bridled. Justice, whereby by right judgment to each is rendered his own...

...they distribute. [7] Logic, which is called rational, Plato appended, through which, the causes of things and morals having been examined, he rationally investigated their force, dividing it into Dialectic and Rhetoric. And it is called Logic, that is, rational; for logos among the Greeks signifies both speech and reason. [8] For in these three kinds of philosophy the divine...

...the divine utterances also consist. For they are wont either to discourse of nature, as in Genesis and in Ecclesiastes; or of morals, as in Proverbs and scattered throughout all the books; or of Logic, in place of which our own writers claim the Theoretic for themselves, as in the Song of Songs and the Gospels. [9] Likewise, some of the learned have thus defined Philosophy in its name and its parts:

Philosophy is the probable knowledge of things divine and human, in so far as it is possible for man. Otherwise: Philosophy is the art of arts and the discipline of disciplines. Again: Philosophy is the meditation on death, which better befits Christians who, having trampled the ambition of the world, live by a disciplined manner of life in the likeness of the fatherland to come. Philosophy...

...is divided into two parts: the first speculative, the second practical. [10] Others have defined that the method of philosophy consists in two parts, of which the first is speculative, the second practical. The speculative is divided in three modes, that is, the first into natural, the second into doctrinal, the third into divine. The doctrinal is divided into four, that is, the first into...

...Arithmetic, the second into Music, the third into Geometry, the fourth into Astronomy. [11] The practical is divided in three, that is, the first into moral, the second dispensative (economic), the third civil. The speculative is so called, whereby, having passed beyond visible things, we contemplate something of the divine and heavenly, and behold them by the mind alone, since they surpass bodily sight. [12]

The natural is so called where the nature of each single thing is examined, since nothing is generated aimlessly in life, but each thing is assigned to those uses for which it was appointed by the Creator, unless perhaps, by the will of God, some miracle is shown to come to pass. [13] The divine is so called when we discuss either the ineffable nature of God, or spiritual creatures in some part, with the most profound...

...quality we discourse. [14] The doctrinal is called that science which considers abstract quantity. For that quantity is called abstract which, separating it by the intellect from matter, or from other accidents, such as even, odd, or things of this kind, we treat in reasoning alone. Its species are four: Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy. [15]

Arithmetic is the discipline of numerable quantity in itself. Geometry is the discipline of immovable magnitude and of forms. Music is the discipline which speaks of numbers that stand in relation to something, namely those which are found in sounds. Astronomy is the discipline which contemplates all the courses of the heavenly bodies and the figures of the stars, and traces by searching reason the relations of the stars around themselves and...

...around the earth. [16] Further, that is called practical which unfolds by its own operations the matters proposed. Its parts are three: moral, dispensative, and civil. It is called moral, through which an honorable manner of living is sought after, and institutions tending toward virtue are prepared. It is called dispensative, when the order of household affairs is wisely...

...arranged. It is called civil, through which the utility of the whole city is administered. XXV. ON THE ISAGOGE OF PORPHYRY. [1] After the definitions of philosophy, in which all things are generally contained, let us now set forth the Isagoge of Porphyry. For 'Isagoge' in Greek is called in Latin 'introduction,' namely of those who are beginning philosophy; containing in itself the demonstration...

...of the first principles concerning any given thing—what it is—and that it be declared by its own sure and substantial definition. [2] For, the highest genus having been set down, we then subjoin the species and other things that may be near it, and separate them by distinguishing their common features, so long interposing differences, until we arrive at the property of that which we are inquiring about, its expression being marked out, as for example:

Man is a rational, mortal, earthly, two-footed animal, capable of laughter. [3] When the genus 'animal' has been stated, the substance of man is declared. For 'animal' is a genus in relation to man; but because it extended widely, the species 'earthly' was added: now that is excluded which was supposed to be either ethereal or watery. But the difference, such as 'two-footed,' is set down on account of the animals...

...which rest upon many feet. Likewise 'rational,' on account of those things that lack reason; but 'mortal,' on account of that which an angel is not. [4] Afterwards, things having been distinguished and set apart, the property was added in the last part [capable of laughter]; for it belongs to man alone that he laughs. Thus the definition is perfected in every part for declaring man. Of which discipline...

...Aristotle and Tullius (Cicero) held the full definition to consist of genus and differences. [5] Certain others afterwards, being more thorough in teaching, divided its perfect substantial definition into five parts, as it were into its own members. Of these the first is on genus, the second on species, the third on difference, the fourth on property, the fifth on accident. [6]

Genus, as 'animal.' For it is a general term common to all that possess a soul. Species, as 'man.' For it is a specialty by which he is separated from the other living beings. Difference, as 'rational,' 'mortal.' For by these two man differs from the rest. [7] For when 'rational' is said, he is distinguished from the irrational dumb beasts, which have no reason. When it is said...

'mortal,' he is distinguished from the angels, who know not death. Property, as 'capable of laughter.' For man is that which laughs, and this belongs to no animal besides man. Accident, as color in the body, learning in the mind. [8] For these both befall and change with the variety of times; and out of all these five parts is composed a statement of full meaning, thus: Man is a...

...rational, mortal, capable of laughter, capable of good and evil. So too in every substantial statement we ought to interpose species and differences so long, until—all things being set aside which can be this same thing—we arrive at this, that the property may now be held as certain. [9] The Isagoge, moreover, Victorinus the orator translated from Greek into Latin, and Boethius issued a commentary on it in five...

...five books. XXVI. ON THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. [1] There follow the Categories of Aristotle, which in Latin are called 'predicaments'; by which, through their various significations, all speech is comprised. [2] The instruments of the categories are three, that is, the first equivocal, the second univocal, the third denominative. Equivocal are those, when the name of many things is one,

...but not the same definition, as 'lion.' For as far as the name is concerned, a real lion, a painted lion, and a celestial lion are all called 'lion'; but as far as the definition is concerned, the real is defined one way, the painted another, the celestial another. [3] Univocal are those, when of two or of many things there is one name and one definition, as 'garment.' For both the cloak and the tunic can receive both the name of 'garment'...

...and its definition. Therefore this univocal is understood to reside in the genera, because it gives both name and definition to its own forms. [4] Denominative, that is derivative, are all those called which, from something by a mere difference of case, take their appellation according to the name, as from 'goodness' (bonitas) comes 'good' (bonus), and from 'malice' (malitia) comes 'bad' (malus). [5] The species of the categories are ten, that is, substance,

quantity, quality, relation, position, place, time, condition, acting and being acted upon. [6] Substance is that which is properly and principally so called, which is neither predicated of a subject nor is in a subject, as some particular man or some particular horse. But second substances are called those species in which those which were principally and primarily called substances are contained...

...and enclosed, as Cicero within 'man.' [7] Quantity is a measure by which something is shown to be either great or small, as 'long,' 'short.' Quality is that whereby one is of a certain sort, an orator or a rustic, black or white. Relation is that which is referred to something. For when 'son' is said, 'father' too is indicated. These relatives begin together. For servant and master...

...take the beginning of their name at one and the same time, nor is the master ever found prior to the servant, nor the servant to the master. For the one cannot exist before the other. [8] Place is 'where one is,' in the forum, in the street. And the motion of place has six parts: right and left, before and behind, up and down. These six parts too have two things [that is, position and time. Position,

as] far and near. Time, as: yesterday, today. Furthermore, 'position' (situs) is named from placing, as whether one stands, or sits, or lies down. [9] 'Condition' (habitus) is named from 'having' something, as to have knowledge in the mind, virtue in the body, clothing about the body, and the rest, which is comprehended under the mode of having, the number being fixed by the learned. [10] Now indeed 'acting' and 'being acted upon'...

...consist in the signification of the agent and the patient. For 'I write' (scribo) has the act of the voice, since it indicates one doing the thing. 'I am written' (scribor) belongs to the patient, since it shows itself as being acted upon. For in these nine categories, of which certain examples have been set down, or even in the very category of substance, which is ousia, innumerable things are found. For even those things which we grasp by the intellect, we...

...make known in speech under one or the other of these ten predicaments. [11] For a full sentence concerning them is thus: 'Augustine, a great orator, the son of that man, standing in the temple, today, wearing the fillet, is wearied by disputing.' Ousia, moreover, is substance, that is, the proper thing, which underlies the rest; the remaining nine are accidents. And substance is named from this, that every thing, in relation to itself,

...subsists. For a body subsists, and therefore is a substance. [12] But those accidents which are in that which subsists and in the subject are not substances, because they do not subsist but change, such as color or form. [13] 'Of a subject' and 'in a subject' are as it were 'of the thing itself' and 'in the thing itself.' For where it is said 'of a subject,' it is substance, as though it were said 'of...

...substance.' But where it is said 'in a subject,' they are accidents, that is, those which happen in a substance, as quantity, quality, or figure. Therefore genera and species are 'of a subject,' while accidents are 'in a subject.' Of these nine accidents, three are within the ousia: quantity, quality, and position. For these cannot exist without the ousia. But outside the ousia are...

...place, time, and condition; both within and outside the ousia are relation, acting, and being acted upon. [14] And it is established that they are called categories because they cannot be recognized except from their subjects. For who could recognize what man is, unless he set some man before his eyes, as it were a subject for the name? [15] This work of Aristotle is to be understood in this way, since, as has been said,